Tradition and Authority

As successor to the Crown of Aragon Fernando II inherited a longstanding tradition of Mudejarism, the royal sanctioning and protection of subject Muslim populations within Christian realms. The Mudejar pattern had been established in a series of surrender treaties reached between the Aragonese kings and the conquered Muslims of Aragon-Catalonia in the twelfth century (Zaragoza in 1118, Tudela in 1119, Tortosa and Lérida in 1148, Teruel in 1170, and so on), and, in the 1230s, was applied on a considerably larger scale in the new kingdom of Valencia by Jaime I. The treaties guaranteed to the Muslims their religious, judicial, and communal autonomy. In other words, the Mudejars could practice Islam, maintain their mosques with their adjoining properties (waqf endowments), rule on litigations between Muslims in Islamic courts according to Islamic law, and select their own officials for the governance and administration of their communities, or aljamas. The Muslims' sustenance was ensured by the terms allowing them to retain their homes, lands, and movable goods. By and large, the Crown con-

sistently adhered to the capitulations, each king shrewdly balancing religious scruples with fiscal necessity. Mudejarism survived, not out of deference to an ideal of tolerance, but because the Muslims were valuable to the Crown as a source of taxation and as the agricultural and industrial substrata of local economies. This was especially the case in the kingdom of Valencia, where the Muslims always represented a substantial portion of the population, the majority, in fact, until the late fourteenth century.6

By the late fifteenth century the lands of the Crown of Aragon had experienced significant demographic change, so that in Aragon, Catalonia, and even Valencia the Christians formed a clear majority. Owing to recurrent plague, the wars between Aragon and Castile, Christian settlement, and Mudejar emigration, the Muslim proportion of the population had steadily diminished. During Fernando's reign the Muslims of Valencia constituted roughly 30 percent of the population, while in Aragon proper and Catalonia they formed only 20 percent and 1.5 percent, respectively.7 Nevertheless, in Valencia, and to a lesser extent in Aragon, the Mudejars continued to play a vital economic role, and were viewed by both the king and the nobility as an important source of revenue. The royal-seigneurial competition to attract Muslim vassals to their respective lands, to be discussed at length in this chapter, bears out this assertion.

The large majority of Mudejars resided on seigneurial lands. There, local lords collected taxes and feudal dues from their Muslim vassals and exercised varying degrees of judicial authority over them. The Crown retained direct lordship over only a small number of urban aljamas. In Catalonia the royal aljamas were Tortosa and Lérida, and in Aragon they were Zaragoza, Huesca, Teruel, Daroca, Calatayud, Borja, Belchite, Albarracín, and Tarazona. In the kingdom of Valencia royal aljamas were located in Valencia, Játiva, Alcira, Murviedro, Castellón de la Plana, Villarreal, Alcoy, Jérica, Monforte, Onda, Liria, and Castellón de Játiva. Despite this distinction between royal and seigneurial Muslims—an important one, since it determined to whom the Mudejars paid their taxes—the Crown still possessed ultimate jurisdiction over all the Muslims in its realms. It was the Crown, in both Aragon and Castile, that decided the fate of its Muslims and Jews, variously converting them, expelling them, or defending their dissident status. As his predecessors had done, Fernando referred to the Mudejars as "our coffers," "our patrimony," or "servants of our chamber."8 Under Fernando, royal supremacy in Mudejar affairs was more than a theoretical claim; it was a royal prerogative invoked and exercised.

With respect to his own Crown of Aragon, Fernando was an absentee ruler, spending less than three years in Aragon proper, just over three

years in Catalonia, and only six months in the kingdom of Valencia. However, this did not prevent him from attending to the business of his kingdoms through a team of Catalan and Aragonese secretaries; in fact, he successfully strengthened royal authority at the expense of local powers. Fernando overcame strong local opposition in all of his kingdoms to institute a Crown-controlled Inquisition. He effectively imposed royal control over the principal cities of his realms, Zaragoza in Aragon, and Barcelona in Catalonia. In the city of Valencia the king exerted influence over the municipal government by appointing local magistrates, and he was able to exact substantial loans for royal enterprises, although with ruinous effect on the city's economy, as Ernest Belenguer Cebrià has shown. Still, ruling from a distance posed difficulties, causing delays in the royal response to local problems and necessitating a perhaps excessive reliance on the alacrity and diligence of local officials.9

In the kingdom of Valencia royal authority over the Mudejars was delegated to a handful of officials. The lieutenant general (llochtinent general ), or viceroy, acted as the king's alter-ego and was invested with full royal power. While it may be assumed that the viceroys usually acted in the best interests of the Crown, at times their measures displayed an imprudence stemming from unfamiliarity with the local situation.10

Most important in Mudejar affairs was the bailiff general. Because he was the superintendent of the royal patrimony, of which the Mudejars formed a part, he exercised supreme authority over the kingdom's Muslims. All Muslims wishing to bear arms, beg for alms, travel within the kingdom or to Islamic lands, emigrate, borrow money, or practice prostitution were required to possess a license from the bailiff general. Any Muslims caught without such a license were summarily prosecuted. The bailiff general saw to it that Muslims paid their taxes and debts, or, conversely, pardoned them for debts and crimes. He supervised the sale of all Muslim slaves and captives, as well as their manumission. His court had criminal and often civil jurisdiction over all Muslims residing in royal morerías (Muslim quarters) and on the lands of the Church. In sum, the bailiff general was the executor of royal Mudejar policy, and, for the most part, his actions may be considered an accurate reflection of royal wishes. The holders of the bailiwick during Fernando's reign, Honorat Mercader (until 1485) and Diego de Torres (from 1485), seem to have fulfilled their duties conscientiously. Fernando sometimes relied on their expertise in Mudejar affairs when he formulated policy.11

Each royal city and town had a local bailiff to whom the bailiff general's powers were delegated. At the level of daily life, royal Mudejars dealt most frequently with this official. The bailiff functioned as the Muslims' judge and protector against the abuses of municipal govern-

ments, although at times Muslims suffered from the bailiff's own unscrupulous behavior. Thus, it was of utmost importance that the Mudejars were able to turn to the bailiff general as a court of final appeal.12

The governor played a more limited role in Mudejar affairs. He was competent to hear cases involving seigneurial Muslims, although the lords themselves often administered justice to their vassals. A frequent problem during Fernando's reign was the governor's attempts to overstep the boundaries of his jurisdiction over Mudejars, which brought him into conflict with the bailiff general. Although the governor at times acted as the royal deputy regarding Mudejars, and his court had jurisdiction in specific Mudejar litigations, the general supervision of all the kingdom's Muslims was always the bailiff general's special prerogative.13

While Fernando's absenteeism compelled him to entrust considerable power to these officials, it does not follow that he restricted his concerns to only the broad contours of Mudejar policy. The king managed to find time to attend to the particular grievances of his Muslim subjects as they arose, and this was the case regarding seigneurial as well as royal vassals. Fernando's ability to intervene in seigneurial affairs is indicative of the strength of royal authority and of its ultimate jurisdiction in matters involving the religious minorities.

Individual seigneurial Muslims and entire aljamas, when wronged by the nobility, would turn to the king for succor. Muslims who moved from Chova to Eslida complained that the lord of Chova had violated the governor's orders by seizing the fruits from their lands and other possessions they still had in Chova. Fernando commanded the governor to see to it that the Muslims' property was restored.14 The lord of Malejám, in Aragon, received a royal order that he release the goods of his Muslim vassals, who claimed that their lord had occupied their properties under the pretense of Malejám's entry into the Hermandad (Brotherhood) of Borja.15 The Christian councils and the aljamas of Alcocer, Alberique, and Alasquer brought to the king's attention the fact that their lord had altered the customary apportionment of irrigation water to their lands.16

Fernando's efforts to control the feuding of rival nobles tended to benefit their Muslim vassals, who were often the victims of the nobles' reciprocal depredations. When the Rocamoras murdered two Muslim vassals of the Rocasfulls, Fernando tried to prevent further escalation of the conflict by prohibiting the Rocasfulls from taking revenge on the assailants. Instead, the governor of Orihuela was to apprehend and punish them.17 In the dispute between the lords of Carlet and Alcudia and their respective Muslim and Christian vassals, from which "wounds, deaths, scandals, and evils" had already resulted, two royal officials

were sent to Carlet to punish the malefactors.18 It is difficult to determine whether royal vigilance successfully curbed seigneurial feuding, or if it was always the case of the king demanding reparations for the broken bodies and destroyed property of the victims. Even if the latter were true, royal action still might work in favor of victimized Mudejars, as when Fernando commanded the governor of Aragon to see to the release of two Muslim prisoners whom the men of Argavieso had captured when they looted Novales.19

In general, Fernando's Mudejar policy can be described as a continuation of that of his predecessors. He envisaged no significant departures from the established precedent, and he readily confirmed the privileges granted to the various aljamas by previous kings. At the request of the aljama of Játiva, Fernando required his officials to observe the provisions of Alfonso V and Juan II, placing the morería under royal protection.20 He confirmed the privileges and immunities his father had conceded to the aljama of Valencia as an aid to its recovery after the debacle of 1455,21 and likewise ratified Juan II's creation of a morería in Alcoy,22 and Juan's upholding of the rights of Daroca's Muslims to rent their butcher shop to a Christian and to graze their animals in surrounding pastures.23

In his governance of individual communities Fernando was guided by established usage, and he discouraged any innovations that local governments might wish to make. When the Christian council of Terrer planned to modify their arrangement with the local Muslims on the use and guarding of village common land without consulting the aljama, the king enjoined, "you should neither do nor innovate anything with respect to the abovesaid in derogation of their [the Muslims'] privileges, uses, and ancient customs observed between you and them; rather, you should maintain them."24

Fernando even found himself having to revoke his own enactments when he realized that they contravened those of his predecessors. He usually left the final ruling on such matters to the expertise of royal officials and lawyers versed in the local law. In the first year of his reign Fernando had provided that the mustaçaff of Játiva could inspect the weights and measures in the market of the local morería , a duty that normally pertained to its own mustaçaff (or çalmedina ). When the aljama pointed out that this violated earlier privileges, and that a final decision on the question had been pending since 1428, the king ordered a return to the status quo prevailing before his provision.25 He unwittingly raised other difficulties when he permitted the lord and Christians of Mislata to build their own oven, for Alfonso V had conceded to the Muslims of Mislata and their lord (the Muslims and the Christians had different lords) the exclusive privilege of possessing the town's oven.

Two years later, a compromise was reached through the offices of the governor and Valencian lawyers, allowing the Christians their oven, but forbidding Muslim access to it.26

A young king, particularly an absentee one, would have found the mastery of such intricacies of local custom one of the more difficult, and tiresome, aspects of royal administration. Although Fernando sometimes stumbled through a process of trial and error, his intention to tread on the path laid out by his forbears emerges clearly enough.

Augmenting the "Royal Treasure"

Fernando's exertion of monarchical power, his attention to detail, his accessibility to his aggrieved subjects of all faiths, and his deference to tradition all tell us more about Fernando as a leader and his style of rulership than about the specifics of his Mudejar policy. Given the importance of the issue of the religious minorities, for both Fernando's contemporaries and modern historians, it would be of significance to state simply that with respect to the Mudejars Fernando fully intended to maintain the status quo. This, however, was not quite the case, for from the outset the Catholic Monarch embarked on a program to augment substantially the populations of the royal morerías in the kingdom of Valencia. Implicit in the pursuit of such a program was Fernando's assumption that his Muslim subjects were a more or less permanent fixture on the Valencian and, by extension, Arago-Catalan scene.

Yet one must not attribute to Fernando any special enlightenment, nor should one presume that he had a moral stake in religious pluralism per se. Concretely, it boiled down to a matter of hard-nosed fiscal politics. By increasing the number of royal Muslim vassals Fernando was widening his own tax base. The Crown's financial needs were considerable, owing to Aragon's Italian entanglements and Castile's wars in Granada and Africa. Fernando's endeavor to augment his Mudejar treasure corresponds well with his exaction of numerous loans from the city of Valencia.

The royal program had three facets: (1) drawing Muslims away from seigneurial lands to royal morerías ; (2) creating new morerías or instilling life into declining ones; and (3) settling Muslims from the conquered sultanate of Granada on Crown lands. All of these had precedents in the Mudejar policies of previous kings.27 Because of the lack of detailed studies of this question for other reigns, it is difficult to say whether Fernando was any more avid or successful in his quest for taxable Mudejars.

Fernando was able to pursue the first course of action, inducing

seigneurial Muslims to occupy royal morerías , because Mudejars could legally change their vassalage, moving from baron to king, from king to baron, or from one baron to another. However, on some seigneuries five or ten years of personal residence were required before the bonds of vassalage could be dissolved. In any case, the Mudejar was always someone's vassal. Unlike the Christian citizen and the urban corporation of the universitas , the Mudejar and his corporate aljama had no independent political status. The precondition to the Mudejar's dissolving the bonds of fealty to his lord was the settling of all accounts with the lord; that is, the Mudejar had to pay all feudal dues and whatever other debts he owed. Once this was done, the Mudejar could swear homage to his new lord, or king, promising to abide by the terms of the feudal relationship as stipulated by the lord. These terms were primarily of a fiscal nature. By the late fifteenth century Mudejar vassalage in Valencia was largely devoid of obligations of military service.28

Normally, the Muslim informed the bailiff general or the local bailiff of his desire to become a royal vassal. The bailiff would then see to it that the process of changing vassalage was expedited as smoothly as possible, mainly by instructing seigneurial officials to settle accounts justly with the departing vassal. For example, when Abdolaziz Abedua, a vassal in Tabernes de Valldigna, decided to move to the royal morería of Valencia, he informed the aljama officials there of his wish, and they then "presented" Abdolaziz to the bailiff general. The bailiff, treating the Muslim's change of vassalage almost as a fait accompli, wrote to the seigneurial officials of Valldigna "that [Abdolaziz] has been registered as vassal in the said morería [of Valencia] and is ready and prepared to settle accounts with you ... And after he has settled accounts and has paid what he owes ... he wishes to come and stay and live in this morería just as the other vassals of the said lord king." The bailiff was careful to remind these officials that Abdolaziz was now under royal safeguard and that he should be permitted not just to sell his property in Tabernes and liquidate his debts from the proceeds but also to collect any debts owed to him. For the bailiff the crucial point was that Abdolaziz, as a royal vassal, would be paying taxes to the Crown; hence, any failure to cooperate by Valldigna's officials would be tantamount to an assault on the royal patrimony. The bailiff concluded his letter with a warning: "if you should thus refuse to act, taking into account that the said Moor is being made a vassal of the said lord king, it will be necessary for us, for the preservation of the taxes of the said lord king ... to provide on the matter as we determine ought to be done."29

Historians have assumed that the conditions of life in royal morerías were intrinsically better than those obtaining on seigneurial lands.30 Yet it is not at all clear that this was the case, for, were it so, one would have

expected the streets of royal morerías to have been inundated with new vassals. While a tendency for Mudejar movement from seigneurial to royal lands is discernible, it nowhere approached the proportions of a deluge. In terms of the Muslims' ability to make public manifestations of Islamic worship and to buttress their Islamic cultural integrity effectively, many probably preferred seigneurial morerías to royal towns. In the royal towns, even if the tax burden were lighter, Christian officialdom and clergymen tended to be touchier about ritual displays of Islam, and the Muslims' communal life suffered more from Christian interference or mere presence. The quality of Mudejar life on seigneurial lands varied from lordship to lordship, so that general comparisons between royal and seigneurial morerías are tenuous.

Because there were not large numbers of Mudejars clamoring for entry into royal towns, the Crown had to offer inducements to make vassalage to the king more appealing. In order to repopulate Alcira, Juan II had offered a royal safeguard against prosecution for crimes and debts to all Muslims, Christians, and Jews who would come to reside there.31 Fernando followed his father's example, and, in order to fill the vacant Jewish quarter of Borja after the expulsion, freed new Muslim occupants from the tax of the morabatí for one year.32 He granted to any Muslim who became a royal vassal in Játiva a ten-year exemption from the payment of the besant , or annual hearth tax paid by all Muslims. However, if the Muslim moved from Játiva before the expiration of the ten years, he then had to pay the besants for the years he had dwelled there.33 Whereas in Aragon Fernando could legally threaten with penalty of death his Muslim vassals who were swearing homage to barons,34 in Valencia his means of coercing Muslims to remain in royal morerías were limited to pecuniary penalties applicable during only the initial few years of their residence. Therefore, the king had to ensure that the circumstances of life in his morerías continued to be favorable. Herein lay the importance of the royal confirmation and protection of the privileges the Crown had previously conceded to royal aljamas. At the very least, Fernando had to prevent any encroachment on these privileges, for any marked deterioration in the Mudejars' situation could have as a consequence their abandonment of the royal morerías . Indeed, flight en masse was the Muslims' usual response to impossible tax burdens or to consistent harassment by local officials, and, of course, barons were more than willing to receive them on their lands.

A letter from the bailiff general to Fernando (1 March 1483) advising the king what measures he ought to take in the administration of his aljamas gives some sense of how delicately the king had to handle his Mudejar vassals. The aliama of Játiva had shown to the bailiff an order of Fernando (3 December 1482) establishing one royal mill that all local

Muslims would have to use. The king was hoping to earn 100 pounds annually from the rent of this utility. The bailiff delicately suggested that the king perhaps ought to reconsider, for when the construction of the royal mill recently commenced, so did the depopulation of the morería . The problem was that Fernando's measure contravened a privilege granted by Pedro III in 1283, which allowed the Muslims of Játiva to use whichever mill they pleased. Fernando's new mill would only serve to destroy and not to augment the royal patrimony. Besides, it would also be detrimental to the Minorite monastery that exercised lordship over the majority of Játiva's mills. In this same letter the bailiff reminded the king that the population of the morería of Alcira had increased from 25 to more than 100 households. Unfortunately, the municipal officials of Alcira were detracting from this achievement by forcing the Muslims to contribute to the peyta , in violation of the aljama's privileges. The bailiff recommended that Fernando put a stop to this activity, again in the interest of the royal patrimony. The bailiff added one final word of advice: "Because the counts, barons, and others who have vassals favor their vassals ... much more ought to be favored the Moorish vassals of your Royal lordship."35 In this competition between Crown and nobility for Muslim vassals the bailiff general recognized the necessity for prompt attention to Muslim grievances.

However eager the Crown might have been to acquire new Mudejar vassals, it still would not, and indeed, owing to seigneurial opposition, could not countenance the vassalage of Muslims still indebted to their former lords. Thus, when it was discovered that Azmet Ballester, a royal vassal in Alcira, owed his former lord, Pere Bosch, 30 pounds, the bailiff general ruled that Azmet and his wife Johar should be relinquished to Bosch if they could not pay. Muslims in the position of Azmet were considered to have committed the crime of "flight," for which the Furs demanded punishment.36

Because the system allowed Muslims to state their intention of becoming royal vassals before actually settling accounts, some, burdened by heavy debts to their lords, took advantage of that system and simply abandoned seigneurial lands, with the hope that by enlisting the support of royal officials unaware of their financial status they could evade their noble creditors. Ali Gombau, a vassal of and tax farmer for Don Joan de Vallterra in Areñol, escaped from Areñol without having squared accounts with Vallterra and became a royal vassal in Castellón de la Plana, successfully evading prosecution for almost one year.37 Such abuses elicited loud complaints from the nobility in the Valencian Corts of 1488, resulting in legislation prohibiting the abandonment of seigneurial lands by Muslim debtors.38 Nevertheless, the problem recurred. In 1492 the lords of Sellent, Cuart, and Turís protested that their Muslim

vassals had departed insolvent, and that the local bailiffs had the temerity to demand that they come to town to settle accounts with their own fugitive vassals.39

At times Mudejars proved to be quite cunning, and criminally so, in their exploitation of the right to change vassalage. Juçef Çabot hoped literally to get away with murder by leaving Valldigna and becoming a royal vassal in Játiva. He returned to the valley, stabbed to death a Muslim enemy there, and then, as a royal vassal, sought the protection of the bailiff general.40 With less sanguinary thoughts, Muslims of the barony of Torres Torres became royal vassals in Murviedro but continued to reside on the barony. Not only was the baron unable to collect feudal dues from them, but also, when the Muslims committed crimes or created disturbances on the barony, they were protected by the jurates (councillors) of Murviedro and took refuge in the court of the governor. Worse still, other vassals of the baron, realizing that while in this state of legal limbo they could disobey the baron with impunity, were swearing fealty to the king in Murviedro.41

It may be that local Crown officials and townsmen, motivated by economic interest and hostility toward the nobility, connived at bringing seigneurial Muslims to their lands and towns. Fernando had to rail at and threaten with deprivation of office unscrupulous royal officials who "with the favor and authority of [their] offices" were transferring Muslims from royal morerías to their own lands. He declared that royal Mudejars could not be received into other lordships until they had spent at least four years on royal lands.42 This final stipulation suggests that the officials were directing their persuasive efforts at new royal vassals. Ultimately, seigneurial lands, the source of the new vassals, received the most damage.

Still, a much greater problem was seigneurial resistance to the Mudejars' legal change of vassalage. The departure of vassals was, of course, detrimental to the lord's finances, and this was especially the case in fifteenth-century Valencia, where a scarcity of labor, due to the toll taken by recurrent plagues, rendered each vassal a still more valuable asset. Two additional considerations explain why the lords felt these losses so keenly. First, those Muslims who could afford to take up residence in royal morerías , that is, those who possessed the wherewithal to pay all their dues and debts, were men of means, at least in comparison to those Muslims rendered immobile by insolvency. The lords, therefore, were being deprived of some of their most reliable and, one might presume, enterprising rent-payers. Second, when a Muslim transferred his fealty and residence from a barony to a royal town he did not thereby relinquish rights to the lands he rented in the barony. In Valencia there

was a crucial distinction between the status of tenant and that of vassal. This meant that the new royal vassal, living and working in town, could continue to cultivate and reap the fruits from the lands he still rented on the estate of his former lord. He was obliged to pay to his former lord only the rent required of a tenant. He was now freed from the feudal dues incumbent on a vassal; these he now paid to the Crown. Consequently, the erstwhile lord was faced with the long-term occupation of his lands by absentee tenants who paid rent but not the more lucrative seigneurial dues. He was thus unable to exploit his lands to their maximum potential.

Taking into account these factors, it is not difficult to comprehend why the lords were so intent on preventing their vassals from altering their status. Seigneurial opposition on this score was not a problem peculiar to Fernando's reign; lords had been placing obstacles in the way of Mudejar transference to royal morerías throughout the fifteenth century. Fernando's efforts to remove such obstacles scarcely differed from those of Alfonso V and Juan II. Regarding the protection of new Muslim vassals in Castellón de la Plana and Alcoy, he simply reissued their commands.43 Although it seems that the Crown was usually able to overcome seigneurial resistance, the lords, through a variety of tactics, often made the Mudejars' change of vassalage a long and litigious process. The officials of the lord of Valldigna, the Cardinal of Valencia, tried to nip the entire matter in the bud by proclaiming that any Muslim who was a vassal in the valley and then became a vassal of another lord, including the king, had to revert to his original status within eight days or lose all of his property in the valley. The bailiff promptly disabused these officials of the idea that they could enforce such a decree.44

Because the settling of accounts was the precondition to the Muslim's final release from vassalage to his lord, the first tack taken by the latter was to avoid the vassal trying to discharge his debts. Don Franger Ladro, seigneur of Turís, gave to Yuçeff Jacob b. Çahat the lame excuse that he did not have his account book with him. The Crown countered by notifying Don Franger that the 40s Yuçeff owed were being deposited with the bailiff general's office and that he could collect it only after he released Yuçeff's goats, wheat, and beehives to a Crown official.45 At times evasion hardened and took crueler forms. When Abdalla Lopo went to Cuart to settle accounts with the Countess d'Aversa, he was imprisoned and physically abused.46

The lords' second line of resistance, once all accounts had been squared, was to hinder the new royal vassals from tilling and harvesting the lands they were still renting in the lordships. Some argued, perhaps justifiably so, that, according to the privileges attached to their lordship,

tenants had to reside there personally.47 It would follow that the Muslim resident in a royal morería thereby forfeited all rights to his lands. Other lords dispensed with the legal niceties. The officials of Mislata tried to force a Muslim widow to pay feudal dues on the house and property she possessed there, knowing full well that she was a royal vassal in Valencia.48 Çahat Atzuar returned to Mascarell to cultivate his lands, only to discover that other vassals had since occupied them.49 Açen b. Maymo Jaffiol had worse luck. Instead of being allowed to attend to his properties, he was imprisoned and had 60 pounds extorted from him by the lord of the Vall d'Artana.50 In all three cases the bailiff general invoked the rights of the Muslims as royal vassals and demanded that the lords in question permit them to dispose of their properties as they wished.

The effects of such seigneurial aggression ramified beyond the lives of individual lords and Muslims and aggravated the tensions between the citizenry of royal towns and the neighboring nobility. Some towns welcomed the arrival of new Mudejar inhabitants, hoping that their enterprise would benefit the local economy. The citizens resented and resisted the unscrupulous measures taken by the lords against their former vassals. In effect, the general royal-seigneurial competition for Muslim vassals manifested itself at the local level in a tug-of-war between the nobility and the urban folk. The issue of Mudejar vassalage, only one of several that would lead to the antiseigneurial violence of the Germanías (1519–1522), by itself had the potential to cause considerable disorder. When the lord of Bechí imprisoned the wives and confiscated the goods of Muslims residing in Castellón de la Plana in an attempt to convince the anxious husbands to return to Bechí, the jurates of Castellón beseeched the bailiff general to intervene, and added that if he did not, the people of Castellón would themselves march on Bechí. They further pointed out that Murviedro and other royal towns, as well as Castellón, were already accustomed to taking into their own hands the correction of barons and knights.51

Fernando was fully aware of the blackmail of his Muslim vassals by lords struggling to maintain the financial equilibrium of their estates, and he seems to have understood its wider implications in the trajectory of the conflict between town and landed nobility. It probably was not a mere coincidence that during precisely the same month when the above tensions arose between Castellón and the lord of Bechí, Fernando commanded all officials, royal and seigneurial as well, to observe the provisions of Alfonso V and Juan II meant to curb the barons' misdeeds in the area.52 He also issued a directive to all royal bailiffs in the kingdom regarding the appropriate response to the problem of seigneurial resistance:

we understand that by some barons and others in the kingdom of Valencia who have Sarracen vassals there is attempted this oppression and iniquity, namely, that after someone who was previously their vassal departs from the said barons and knights and comes to live and, at the same time, becomes a vassal in the said morería of Játiva or another royal [morería ], they [the barons] seizing them or their lands, do not allow such vassals, presently ours, to return to their lands and possessions nor to cultivate their lands and to procure and receive the fruit.

Fernando continued, emphasizing that such actions could "result in the prejudice and damage of our morerías and of the royal curia," and he concluded by ordering the bailiffs to see to it that the seigneurs, on pain (penalty) of 1,000 gold florins, allow their erstwhile vassals to attend to the lands that they were still renting from them.53 Later, the king made a point of expressing to the representatives of the military estate his displeasure at their treatment of Muslims wishing to become royal vassals.54

The pattern of landholding prevalent in Valencia, where the farmer rented small parcels in a number of localities, both royal and seigneurial, was a source of uncertainty as to whom any particular tenant was bound as a vassal.55 Also, because vassals, by virtue of their dispersed landholdings, might have economic interests in other communities, their respective lords frequently conflicted while pursuing their vassals', and therefore their own, interests. Fernando asserted monarchical power on behalf of Muslims of Játiva when he learned that seigneurial vassals, both Muslim and Christian, were indebted to them. The bailiff was instructed to demand payment from the lords of the debtors in question, and, that failing, to confiscate enough of the debtors' property to satisfy the creditors.56 Another document demonstrates that Fernando was less concerned with the welfare of his Muslim vassals per se than with filling his own purse. In response to the lords who were collecting feudal dues from royal Mudejars renting lands on their estates, the king, rather than simply putting a stop to this activity, decided to exact royal taxes from seigneurial Muslims farming Crown lands. The seemingly twisted logic Fernando employed in explanation of his decision—"so that our Sarracen vassals do not enjoy less prerogatives or rights than vassals of whatever persons, nay rather let them be treated equally"—is actually quite transparent.57 The king and the seigneurs remained on an equal footing, while the vassals of both were fleeced.

Throughout the fifteenth century the kingdom of Valencia as a whole, the city of Valencia being a notable exception, suffered from chronic underpopulation. In the latter half of the century the population steadily diminished, a consequence of recurring epidemics of plague.58

As suggested above, this factor enhanced the rivalry between Crown and nobility for the labor of Mudejar vassals. One Crown response to underpopulation, which added to this royal-seigneurial rivalry, was the attempt to reconstruct and repopulate towns particularly devastated by pestilence. The Mudejars, renowned for their skill and energy as farmers and artisans, were integral to some of these reconstruction plans. In 1468 Juan II endeavored to resuscitate the town of Alcoy, the population of which had been halved from 600 to less than 300 households. At the request of its Christian council, Juan provided for the construction of a morería with 100 houses and a mosque. The council hoped that Mudejars would occupy and rebuild the homes in disrepair, and buy land in the area, thereby increasing property values. The king was, as always, attracted by the prospect of an increment in his revenue.59

Fernando's establishment of a Muslim aljama in Castellón de Játiva was motivated by much the same interests, although this time it was not done at the request of the town's Christian populace, who, nevertheless, in no way objected to the royal project. In the document detailing the creation of the aljama the king's fiscal concerns emerge quite clearly: "Just as other men strive to promote whatever is useful for them and to drive away misfortunes, so it is fitting that kings and princes occasionally seek ways of preserving and augmenting their patrimony and employ a method by which the increase of benefits is directed more easily to it." He pointed out that since "mortalities and other adversities" had reduced Castellón's population from four hundred to only ninety households, a new aljama would be just the thing to revitalize the town while replenishing the "revenues and profits for our patrimony."60 Fernando was careful to attend to the necessities of the nascent Muslim community: the setting aside for it of a special part of town called "Lo Pedro," the constitution of its corporate aljama, the annual election of an amin * and adelantats , the establishment of a special Muslim butcher shop, and, of course, the taxes the inhabitants would have to pay to the Crown. In sum, the new aljama was to enjoy the same privileges and immunities as the aljama of Játiva.61 The king also appointed a bailiff for the morería , Pere Caldes, who, like other bailiffs, would administer civil and criminal justice in cases involving the morería 's residents (although not in civil suits between Muslims) and see to the collection of taxes.62

Fernando shrewdly stipulated that all new Muslim residents must pay a fee of 50s for right of entry or vassalage, and that they could not transfer to Castellón from other royal morerías without royal license.63 The newcomers, then, would not be destitute, and the populations of the other royal morerías would be maintained. The losers in this scheme would be the nobles of the region of Játiva.

As we might expect by now, the new aljama had its growing pains.

First, it was revealed that Christians owning homes in the part of town designated for the morería were taking advantage of the royal project and asking exorbitant prices for them. Concerned that potential Muslim buyers might be scared off, Fernando instructed royal and local officials to determine suitable sale prices.64 The seigneurs in the area proved to be as troublesome as ever. Muslim residents of Castellón were prevented from picking the leaves from their mulberry trees in Alcocer; instead, the leaves, essential for the raising of silkworms, were taken by Muslim vassals of the lordship.65 The knight Perot de Castellvi accused Ali Mançor of having abandoned his lordship, Benimuslem, for Castellón without settling accounts. After the bailiff general ruled on the suit in Ali's favor, Castellvi turned Ali's family problems to his own advantage. Apparently Ali's wife had been reluctant to move from Benimuslem and had demanded that her husband hand over her bridewealth. Ignoring the bailiff, who had jurisdiction in a case involving a royal vassal, Castellvi turned to the governor, who then had 100 head of Ali's sheep confiscated on behalf of Castellvi and Ali's wife.66

Establishing a new aljama was a risky business. There was the distinct possibility that it would sink into the existing welter of competing interests and jurisdictions. The following case, in which Castellón's bailiff, Pere Caldes, found himself in jail, is suggestive of this danger. Problems began when Mahomat Bonafort appeared before Caldes requesting to be made a vassal in Castellón. Caldes could permit this only after he, acting on Mahomat's behalf, and the lieutenant governor "beyond the Júcar River" had agreed on a settlement regarding Mahomat's wounding of another seigneurial Muslim. Despite the settlement, the lieutenant governor still attempted to have Mahomat seized, but Caldes, who was protecting Mahomat in his own house, would not allow it, pointing out that Mahomat, now a royal vassal, fell under only the bailif's jurisdiction. Unfortunately, Luis Ferrer, the lieutenant governor of the entire kingdom, got wind of the affair. It so happened that the Muslim whom Mahomat had wounded was the vassal of one of Ferrer's relations. Ferrer complained to the bailiff general about Caldes, but to no avail. Later, when Caldes went to Játiva to pay the remainder of the settlement, the lieutenant governor threw him in jail and then proceeded to Castellón. There he and his men broke into Mahomat's house and made an inventory of the property they intended to confiscate on behalf of one of Mahomat's creditors. Worse still, when the other Muslim residents of Castellón witnessed these events they became very uneasy and began wondering about their own security, while other Muslims intending to move there changed their minds.67 Eventually the matter was set right, and the new aljama managed, if not to prosper, at least to survive.

Whatever success Juan II and his son might have had in forming the new aljamas of Alcoy and Castellón de Játiva, it is doubtful if the income derived from these aljamas offset the losses sustained by the Crown in 1455 when the morería of the capital was sacked and largely depopulated. Valencia's Muslims had been notable for their prosperity and commercial activity. In the first half of the fifteenth century of the 170 Mudejar merchants conducting business with the sultanate of Granada, 118 were from the capital.68 In contrast, during the years 1479–1491, of the 32 Mudejars engaged in commerce with Granada and North Africa, only seven were residents of Valencia's struggling morería , and three of these were agents of the powerful Bellvis family.69 Juan II had attempted to rebuild and repopulate the morería by enjoining the aljama's creditors to reduce the amounts the aljama owed, and by permitting the aljama to pay to the Crown a simple annual lump sum of 25 pounds instead of the usual royal taxes. Fernando followed suit and confirmed the privileges conceded by his father.70 Their efforts were not futile, for there is evidence that the morería attracted new vassals during Juan's reign,71 and under Fernando between thirty and forty Mudejars took up residence there. However, the aljama never regained its former prosperity, since artisans had replaced the long-distance merchants.72

Because there simply were not enough bodies to populate both baronies and royal towns sufficiently, the Crown's policy of promoting the growth of its own aljamas could, after all, have only limited success, and since the new royal vassals were acquired from seigneurial lands, that policy could not be pursued too aggressively lest the nobility be dangerously alienated. Of course, the fluctuations of population were out of the king's control and depended on biological and epidemiological factors. However, the conquest of the sultanate of Granada presented Fernando with a situation in which he could direct the fate and, more importantly, the settlement of a large conquered Muslim population. As a means of preventing the complete ruination of Granada's economy, Fernando and Isabel reproduced the Mudejar pattern throughout the conquered sultanate. The large majority of Granada's Muslims remained in their homes as the vassals of the Crown of Castile and Castilian lords. Yet Fernando managed to secure some Granadans as vassals of his own Crown of Aragon.

More than three years before the conquest of the sultanate was completed Fernando began permitting the entry of Granadan Muslims into the Christian kingdoms as royal vassals. Some of these early immigrants, from Almería and Baza, seem to have been Fernando's agents. The Almerians, at least, expressed their fear of the sultan and of the city's other Muslims, probably on account of their own treachery.73 At the request of the faqih * of Valencia's aljama, who hoped to expedite the

escape of his relations from Almería before its fall, Fernando conceded a safe-conduct to the faqih 's* sister-in-law and niece, "and all their family and company ... to come to live in our city of Valencia and become our vassals."74

The majority of the immigrants came from Vera and Almería, the part of the sultanate closest to Valencia. It was with these cities, especially Almería, that the Mudejars had maintained the most extensive commercial and family ties.75 Fernando even went so far as to allow Muslims from Vera, who had first emigrated to Oran, to return and become royal vassals in Valencia.76 Other immigrants originated from Málaga, Baza, and Granada itself.77

The Granadans settled in a variety of localities. Some made their new homes in royal morerías , such as Játiva, Alcira, Valencia, and Calatayud in Aragon.78 Others became seigneurial vassals and joined the aljamas of Manises, Novelda, Elche, Bétera, Valldigna, Cocentaina, and others. The majority of the latter were captives from Málaga who had first been sold in the kingdom as slaves and subsequently were ransomed by the seigneurial aljamas.79

On occasion Fernando settled the Granadan Muslims in specific locations. He rewarded his bailiff "beyond the Jijona River" with a number of Muslim households to populate lands the latter possessed near Orihuela. These Muslims were not slaves, for they made a feudal contract with their new lord, promising to remain on his lands as vassals for a period of five years.80 Still, in general, the king was content with the fact that the Muslims had come voluntarily to live in his kingdoms and was not too particular as to where they settled. In one instance, Queen Isabel bade the bailiff general to place Muslims from Vera on the lands of the Cardinal of Valencia: "work with them [the Muslims] in a manner that they accept their residence in the said baronies and in no other area."81 One month later Fernando countermanded his wife's order, instructing the bailiff not to force the Muslims to live on the Cardinal's lands, but to allow them to settle where they wished, preferably "in our royal cities and lands rather than in any [other] lands."82 In another case, the councillors of Montalbán had requested that the king send Muslims to settle in their town, but Fernando wrote them that his hands were, in effect, tied, "inasmuch as in their submission to our obedience we promised them and gave them freedom to go where they wish and, thus, for the sake of justice, they cannot be forced to live in some place against their will."83

Of course, there were strings attached, namely, that wherever a Granadan Muslim chose to settle he would have to pay the accustomed taxes, just like the other Mudejars of Valencia. When some Almerians maintained that the king had granted them exemptions from these

taxes, Fernando replied, "we are surprised that they would claim such a thing, because we never would grant them anything that was contrary to the taxes of that kingdom."84 The royal "milch cows" might graze where they liked, but they still had to produce milk.

It is extremely difficult to assess how many Granadan Muslims were incorporated into Valencia's Mudejar population. It is unlikely that their numbers were very great. Those Granadans unable to endure Christian rule would have emigrated to the Maghrib, and those who remained in Granada did so because of their attachment to their still recognizably Islamic homeland. Valencia, long transmogrified by a Christian impress, offered them little attraction. Only after Cisneros set in motion a sequence of rebellions and more or less forced conversions (1499–1502) would Valencia have appeared a haven, but by then it was too late, for the kingdom of Granada had been effectively cordoned off from the territories of the Crown of Aragon. The Granadan Muslims who made their way to Valencia did so either because they had kinfolk there, as was the case with a number of Almerians, or because they came in through the back door as slaves who, once ransomed, stayed on, or as refugees who were disenchanted with life in the Maghrib and could not return home.85 Whatever their numbers, the salient point is that Fernando was willing to accept them as vassals. With one eye on his purse and the other on the example of his forbears, the king concluded that the perpetuation of Mudejarism had its benefits.

With both Crown and nobility, including ecclesiastical prelates, striving to maintain the population and productivity of their lands, Mudejar emigration to North Africa was correspondingly restricted and usually completely prohibited. When Mudejars were permitted to emigrate, they had to pay a passage duty of 13s 4d. Jewish emigrants paid far less, only 3s 4d, which reflects the greater economic importance of the Muslims in Valencia.86

Emilia Salvador has traced the increasing stringency of the emigration policy from the time of the thirteenth-century conquest until the midsixteenth century. The ten-year suspension on the issuance of emigration licenses enacted by Pedro IV at the request of the Corts (1370) became a perpetual prohibition under Martin I (1403). No doubt demographic change and a diminishing labor supply were considerations guiding the imposition of these restrictions. In the Corts of 1488 Martin's prohibition was reiterated.87

Despite such prohibitions, monarchs sometimes, in individual cases, conceded licenses for emigration or permitted the bailiff general to do so. This was a means of getting ready cash from the passage duties the Muslims had to pay. Juan II (1477) allowed the bailiff general to issue licenses, as did Fernando at the outset of his reign.88 In 1486 this was

still described as one of the bailiff general's duties.89 Other officials who licensed Mudejars to emigrate were reprimanded for having encroached on the bailiff's special prerogative.90 It seems that even after the Corts of 1488 the bailiff continued to grant emigration licenses, for which reason the military estate expressed considerable dismay.91 Valencian Muslims who could not cross to the Maghrib from the port of Valencia might have been able to do so through Tortosa in Catalonia.92 Before 1498 there is no record of how many Mudejars emigrated to the Maghrib, and after 1498 none of the emigrés were Valencians.93 In any case, by 1492 Fernando had definitely deprived the bailiff general of the prerogative of licensing Mudejar emigration. Consequently, the bailiff's lieutenant had to be compensated for the revenues he had been receiving for his labors in the emigration procedures.94 In 1493 the king expressly forbade the emigration of a rich Muslim of Játiva.95 There is little other indication in the documentation that Valencia's Mudejars desired to emigrate. This became the case only during the troubled years after 1500.96 Even if emigration had been desired, it was only infrequently permitted. It would have made little sense for the king to have exerted such effort to attract Mudejar vassals only to allow them to slip through his fingers.

The criterion by which the success of Fernando's program to augment the population of royal aljamas may be evaluated is the degree to which the aljamas grew. The besant lists of certain royal aljamas (the besant was the hearth tax paid annually by each Muslim household) allow for an assessment of the aljamas' population size on a yearly basis. It should be pointed out, however, that the besant lists have only a relative value. Not all Mudejars paid the besant ; some were excused for reason of poverty, and others, as in Játiva, were exempted for a number of years as an inducement to their becoming royal vassals. Of course, the Crown was mainly interested in those Muslims who could pay their taxes. Population increase need not have been due to immigration; it might have been merely the result of other demographic factors, in the case of the besant , the departure of adult children from their parents' home to their own dwelling in the same morería . Likewise, population decrease was not necessarily caused by the flight of Mudejars to seigneurial lands, but by the normal rate of mortality or by an abnormally high rate due to plague.97

Taking these factors into consideration, the besant lists suggest that Fernando's program had moderate success (see table 1). The morerías of Alcira, Castellón de la Plana, Murviedro, and Monforte all show an increase in population, but without any extraordinary surges forward. From other sources, we know that at least six seigneurial Muslims joined the aljama of Liria, with the same number taking up residence in

Villarreal, and at least thirty Muslims doing so in Valencia's morería .98 Valencia, as a commercial center with a growing and dynamic population, held obvious attraction for the ambitious Mudejar. Although some Mudejars moved to Valencia from considerable distances, the usual pattern was for the Mudejar to move to a royal morería near his former place of residence. This allowed him to attend more easily to landholdings and other business interests concentrated within a specific region. The one important exception to the success of Fernando's program was

the aljama of Játiva, the largest in the kingdom. It seems to have experienced a steady decline in population, to which the oppressive administration of the local bailiff likely contributed (see below). Plague also seems to have played a role. Given the kingdom's overall decline in population, the resistance of lords to their vassals' change of status, and the varied circumstances militating against a Mudejar's mobility (insolvency, preference of seigneurial. lands for the comparative isolation they afforded Muslim communities, and so on), it was no small achievement that Fernando had any success at all in augmenting the population of his aljamas.

Protecting the "Royal Treasure"

Historians have emphasized the solicitude of Aragon's kings, and of their bailiff generals, for protecting their Muslim subjects. While the efficacy of royal protection is itself debatable, still more troubling is the avoidance of the question of why Mudejars so often felt compelled to turn to the king for aid against their oppressors.99 Many of the difficulties Mudejars experienced derived from their membership in a turbulent and conflictive Valencian society, and, lacking comparative data for other social groups, it would be risky to posit that Muslims necessarily suffered more than Christians or Jews. Nevertheless, it is equally true that much of the hardship Mudejars endured inhered in their peculiar status as Muslims in a Christian society.

Modern observers would deplore the fact that the Mudejar was not, in either juridical, political, or social terms, on an equal footing with his Christian counterpart. The Mudejar, however, did not expect parity in treatment any more than did the Christian and Jewish dhimmi s* in Islamic societies; nor did he strive to effect social change or to achieve social advancement, for not even substantial wealth could alter his inferior status vis-à-vis Christian society. The price the Mudejar paid, and was willing to pay, for his adherence to Islam was social inferiority and a lack of political status or power. Although Mudejar inequality was not an issue in fifteenth-century Valencia, the terms on which that inequality was based were, for the Mudejar, the source of numerous problems.100

Muslim survival in Valencia had been founded on a series of surrender treaties reached between the conquered Muslims and King Jaime I of Aragon. Every right the Mudejar enjoyed—the ability to practice Islam, own property, and so on—was set forth in a specific royal privilege or concession. There was no higher law guaranteeing the permanence of Mudejar existence or their enjoyment of particular rights; all depended on the royal will, at times quite capricious, and privileges

could be as easily withdrawn as confirmed. The only source of protection for the Mudejars against the aggressions of nobles, clergy, local officialdom, or the Christian mob was the king. The king confirmed privileges and provided protection not because he was morally bound to do so—indeed, purely religious considerations advised against this course of action—but because the Mudejars' assiduous toil was beneficial for the kingdom's economy. Crown, nobility, clergy, and urban oligarchies all suffered the Muslims' presence out of economic interest, and all expected to profit from it. Although Mudejar vassals were sought after and the competition for them sometimes ameliorated the conditions of their vassalage, they were nevertheless perceived by their lords primarily as exploitable labor. If the Mudejars did not produce, there was nothing else, and least of all their religious affiliation, to justify their presence. If revenue could not be squeezed out of the Mudejar legally, then the interested parties were quick to resort to methods of extortion. Because the Mudejar professed an inferior religion, the Christian offender experienced little compunction for his crimes. Royal protection of the Mudejar rarely entailed the punishment of the culprit. Usually only restitution of the victim's property was demanded, which underlines the economic aspect of the problem, for restoring to the Mudejar what he had lost ultimately redounded to the benefit of the Mudejar's lord, either king or nobleman. The Mudejar, as individual or corporate aljama, was not really the main concern.

Valued as a dependable source of labor and conspicuous by virtue of their faith, the Mudejars tended to suffer acutely from the kingdom's socioeconomic dislocations. Thus, when labor was scarce, the Mudejars were more sought after by nobles and royal towns, but being the object of their rivalry also meant that they were frequently the victims of injury by the antagonistic parties. Either guarded as a precious resource despite the fact they were Muslims, or subject to the brutalities and extortions of a Christian majority because they were infidels, the Mudejars' position was a precarious one.

We have seen, regarding the issue of Mudejar vassalage, that the disputes between towns and neighboring lordships could become quite heated. Municipal governments and noblemen might clash for any number of reasons,101 and in each case the interests of the local inhabitants, both Christian and Muslim, were implicated. Rights to land and water usage were vital questions. Alcira's modifications of the irrigation system that served it and the adjacent baronies in favor of the landowners of its own huerta prompted complaints from the councils and aljamas of Alberique, Alcocer, and Alasquer.102 The effort of Don Manuel Lançol, lord of Gilet, to appropriate lands located within the boundaries of Murviedro was the cause of considerable hostility between the Chris-

tians of Murviedro and Don Manuel's Muslim vassals, taking the form of a breakdown in trade between Gilet and Murviedro and much "murmuring" on both sides.103 The competence of municipal officials to collect taxes from seigneurial vassals in the surrounding countryside was also a point for debate. Orihuela's collection of the sisa del carn (sales tax on meat) from the vassals of Albatera raised objections from their lord.104

Hypothetically, Muslims should not have been affected any more than Christians by these disputes between town and nobility, for the matters of controversy—rights to land and water and to taxation—had little to do with the Mudejars' status as Muslims or as vassals of a particular lord. However, because Mudejars were so highly valued as vassals, the disputants seem to have reasoned that the most effective way of inflicting damage on one's opponent, and thereby lending weight to one's own argument, was to proceed immediately against the persons or property of the opponent's Muslims (a royal town's Muslims would have been royal vassals). This reasoning was given greater force by the Christians' disdain for the Mudejar as an infidel, by the inability of a minority to resist the majority's perpetration of outrage,105 and by the Christians' confidence that for a crime against a Muslim punishment, if ever doled out, was unlikely to be severe. Thus, when the officials of Gandía arbitrarily raised the amount of the sisa they collected from the lordships located within the town's general limits, their first act was the confiscation of Azmet Vaquel's two mules as security for the payment of the sisa .106 During their ongoing controversy with the lord of Gilet, the jurates of Murviedro violently threatened to exact the peyta from his Muslim vassals.107 The officials of the barony of Corbera attempted to settle whatever scores they had with Alcira by making off with goats from the aljama's flock,108 and by waylaying and robbing a Muslim transporting his olives from Alcira to a nearby mill.109 The lex talionis as practiced by municipal and baronial officialdom was not "an eye for an eye," but a Muslim for a Muslim. When the bailiff of Alcira was questioned as to why he had seized two Muslim vassals of Valldigna, he responded with the justification that the officials of Valldigna had previously detained Açech Quilis of Alcira.110 Indeed, the Cardinal of Valencia, Valldigna's lord, made his presence felt in Alcira and Játiva by his maltreatment of the king's Muslim vassals, clamping Offri Negral in irons for not paying a tax on wheat,111 holding others in his custody for alleged crimes,112 and summarily hanging two Muslims who had committed theft in Játiva.113

Barons and burghers both, jockeying for power and asserting their claims to land and resources, viewed their rivals' Muslims as the ideal target for their initiatives and reprisals. Essential to both as a source of

labor and revenue, dispensable to both as Muslims, the Mudejars found themselves fought over, robbed, and physically abused, a state of affairs that the king, by displaying similar attitudes and by demanding the mere restitution of Muslim persons and property,114 could not prevent but only referee.

The Muslims of urban morerías , even when safe from the depredations of local barons, still had to contend with the misdeeds of municipal governments. It may seem strange that the same town councils that had frequently struggled with the nobility in an effort to attract and protect new Muslim vassals should have violated the rights of those vassals. One must consider the fact that the towns desired Muslim inhabitants as a means of accelerating the growth of their local economies. Yet, because it was the Crown that collected most taxes, rents, and judicial fines from the royal aljamas, the towns profited only indirectly from the Mudejars' presence, that is, only to the extent that Mudejar enterprise increased local productivity. The towns had a political status independent of the Crown and were not always content to see the king reap all the immediate benefits of Mudejar settlement. Consequently, municipal authorities sometimes resorted to their own dubious means of squeezing revenue out of the Mudejars, revenue that would be deposited in their own treasuries. Furthermore, because the towns were themselves subject to royal taxation, the jurates might have concluded that extorting money from the Mudejars, the king's special wards, was one way of retrieving from him a portion of the taxes Christian citizens had paid.

Alcira was the locus of the most controversy between municipal government and royal aljama. The central problem was the jurates' illegal collection of taxes from the aljama. In blatant disregard of the bailiff general's command they proceeded "rigorously" to tax the aljama (1482),115 and later (1492), their arbitrary exaction of new sises and peytes was impelling Alcira's Muslims to abandon the morería for seigneurial lands.116 When taxation bore little fruit, the jurates tried to force the Muslims to labor in the town's public works (1493),117 and in 1499 they were still making mischief, entering the morería and confiscating the property of Muslims for unspecified reasons.118 The occurrence of these incidents over a seventeen-year period suggests that the aljama of Alcira was subject to consistent harassment by an apparently undeterred town council.

The experiences of other urban aljamas were variations on the same theme.119 The aljama of Játiva took the wise precaution of seeing to it that Fernando confirm the provision of Juan II (1479) forbidding the justice and jurates to enter the morería and make executions on Muslim property for whatever reason.120 This seems to have kept Játiva's ju-

rates at a distance, although, as we shall see, the aljama had far greater difficulties with the local bailiff.

Apart from the question of taxation, two other points of controversy soured relations between the aljamas and the municipal authorities. One was the administration of justice, the problem here being the attempts of municipal justices to rule on cases involving Muslims so that any monetary fines would be paid into their courts. For this reason impediments were placed in the way of the trying of cases between Muslims in the qadi 's* court in Valencia.121 Játiva's public prosecutor had the same idea when he wrongly brought Muslims and Jews before the governor's court, instead of the bailiff's court.122 Controversy also revolved around the Muslim butcher shops, which were royal monopolies. Valencia's aljama complained that the Christian guild of butchers was imposing restrictions on how much meat the Muslim butcher could slaughter, perhaps hoping to force the Muslims to buy meat from them.123 The jurates of Castellón de la Plana feigned religious scruples when they forbade Christians to buy meat from the Muslim butcher shop, where they could not collect the sales tax (sisa ). The jurates then went so far as to exact the sales tax illicitly from the Muslims as well.124

Albarracín (Aragon) was the scene of some interesting financial maneuverings involving the king, town council, and aljama. Fernando had conceded to the aljama the privilege of having its own store for the sale of bread, salted fish, oil, and other staples to all Muslims residing in or visiting the morería . The proceeds from the sales were to go to the aljama, which was in financial straits and had scarcely enough funds to pay taxes. The council, more concerned about the town's economy than with the royal patrimony, refused to allow the Muslims to open their store, obviously preferring that they do business with local Christian merchants.125

It is difficult to say how far the town councils would have gone in their fleecing of local aljamas if they had not been held in check by the king and his bailiffs. Probably they would have realized, as the Crown had long ago, that the depletion of an aljamas' financial resources was, in the end, detrimental to their own interests. Certainly the depopulation of the morería would have meant an economic setback for the town. However, since the Muslims were not under their supervision and they did not necessarily identify the aljama's interests with their own, the councils were content to welcome the Muslims to their towns and then to exact from them what little else they could.

At the local level, the bailiff was the overseer of royal interests and, therefore, of Mudejar affairs. As the Muslims' judge and protector his office was of crucial importance, particularly in light of the transgres-

sions of town councils. Although most local bailiffs seem to have fulfilled the duties of their office with the king's and the aljama's interests in mind, Joan Dezpuig, the bailiff of Játiva, which housed the kingdom's largest aljama, was a glaringly important exception. On one hand, Dezpuig and his surrogates seem to have guarded the aljama from the trespasses of others. The necessity of the bailiff's protection was demonstrated when the governor's officials, who had come to the morería to inventory and take pledges from the goods of Mudejar debtors, molested Muslim women and stole their belongings. Fernando responded with the command that no one could enter the morería without the bailiff in attendance.126 This problem or similar ones involving Játiva's jurates did not arise again, so that it may be presumed that someone was doing his job. On the other hand, it seems that Dezpuig protected the aljama from others only so that he himself might interfere in its affairs and treat it as part of his own personal patrimony. Thus it follows that while the aljama of Játiva had the fewest problems with the municipal authorities, it suffered far more than other aljamas from the unscrupulousness of its own bailiff.

We first encounter Dezpuig just after his return to Játiva from an extended absence (1483). During his absence Luis de Fevollet, the lieutenant bailiff, had seen to the aljama's business and had ruled on a variety of matters. Dezpuig's first act was to annul Fevollet's provisions arbitrarily, perhaps because he perceived them to be inimical to his own interests. This act not only violated Fevollet's prerogatives but also seemed sure to burden the aljama with more costly litigation.127 Although Dezpuig was reprimanded by the king for this, he still was not finished with Fevollet. Because the aljama was paying Fevollet a salary for his services, Dezpuig's next move was to confiscate securities (penyores ) from the treasurer of the aljama so that the payment could not be made. He also incarcerated the aljama's çalmedina for an unknown reason, perhaps because the çalmedina had attempted to stop him.128

Two other cases, in which the aljama of Játiva was not involved, provide a bit more information on Dezpuig and how he operated. As bailiff of Játiva, a knight, and lord of Alcantera, Dezpuig was a powerful man in the region, and a well-connected one. In the first case, Çaat Melich, accused of the murder of Ali Dabbau of Ayelo, was incarcerated in the bailiff's jail. When the victim's family dropped the charges against Çaat, Dezpuig refused to release him because of his own kinship tie with the victim's lord. Çaat continued to languish in jail dying of hunger, which indicates the kind of justice Dezpuig was intending to administer.129 Dezpuig was also involved in several litigations with the lord of Cárcer. The latter maintained that he was unable to receive a fair

hearing in the governor's court, because the governor's surrogate was Dezpuig's nephew and the governor himself was only concerned that his son, married to Dezpuig's daughter, become Dezpuig's heir.130 The bailiff of Játiva, then, appears an ambitious man willing to rise above the law and to utilize his considerable power and family connections to attain his ends.

Dezpuig employed like tactics in his dealings with the aljama. The antagonism between the bailiff and the aljama came to the fore in a litigation that lasted for at least fourteen years (1486–1500). The point of dispute was 13 pounds 11s, which, Dezpuig argued, the aljama had to pay to him annually, beyond his regular salary, for services rendered. The 13 pounds 11s was a translation into cash of a gift of linen to Dezpuig's wife, one sheep given to the bailiff himself, 110s for the lieutenant bailiff, and another 100s for Dezpuig's labors in farming out the sisa collected from the aljama. The aljama had made these gifts to the bailiffs in the past, but in 1486 refused to do so, apparently on the good advice of the lieutenant bailiff, Fevollet. Dezpuig responded by abrogating the privilege of the aljama to elect its four adelantats (jurates) and appointed adelantats favorable to his own interests, "less suitable and sufficient, and little zealous for the benefit and increase of the said aljama ... so that you [Dezpuig] can extort from the said aljama the money not owed to you, as is said."131 Fernando foiled the bailiff's plan, but the suit continued. Dezpuig argued that the bailiff of Játiva's right to the 13 pounds 11s had been established by the provisions of Alfonso V and Juan II, and that, after all, he ought to be recompensed for the labors he exerted on the aljama's behalf. The aljama countered that there existed no such royal provisions and that their gift of the 13 pounds 11s to Dezpuig had not been obligatory; rather, it had been given voluntarily and gratuitously. As for Dezpuig's services, the aljama pointed out that Dezpuig was living in Valencia, was never in Játiva, and had done absolutely nothing for the aljama. Therefore, the aljama had decided that the bailiff no longer deserved the gifts. By 1500, after one of the bailiff general's assessors had decided in the aljama's favor, and then another assessor in Dezpuig's favor, the outcome of the case was still uncertain. What is more certain is that Dezpuig treated the aljama as if it were bound to him personally, obliged to pay him regardless of whether he fulfilled his duties. Throughout the fourteen years of litigation the aljama complained of being subjected to the bailiff's harassment and molestations. That the population of Játiva's aljama experienced a marked decline may well have been in part due to the oppressive administration of Joan Dezpuig.132

Dezpuig was not the only one in a position of power over Mudejars to have abused his authority. For example, the archbishop of Zaragoza

interfered in the elections of that city's aljama,133 and attempted to have the ecclesiastical tithes collected from the seigneurial Muslims of Aragon, an unprecedented act.134 There were certainly others crueler than Dezpuig. In one instance, after charges had been dropped and a settlement reached between feuding Mudejar families, Luis Bou, the lieutenant governor, nevertheless proceeded to the home of two previously accused brothers, and there seized not the brothers, but their eighty-year-old crippled father, who clearly was incapable of any crime. Bou hung up the old man by his feet and threatened to stone him. The victim's anxious friends and family agreed to pay 3000s to Bou for the old man's release. Bou was not punished; he only had to return the money thus exacted, that is, if the settlement he had reached with the elder's family was not "well made."135

Given the fact that men such as Dezpuig were permitted to retain their offices, and given the patent unwillingness of the king to castigate crimes against Muslims seriously, one must question those historians who have applauded the protection afforded the Mudejars by the Crown, although protection is clearly what they needed. The restoration of a Muslim's stolen property, if robbery were the only outrage to which he had been subjected, was an insufficient means of either deterring potential malefactors or repairing the damage done to the victim's human dignity. Still, the king at least recognized that leniency toward the Christian offenders had to be balanced by an attendance to Mudejar needs and grievances if he did not wish to be left with vacant morerías . Also, there were conscientious officials, such as Luis de Fevollet, Pere Caldes, and the bailiff generals, whose efforts on the Muslims' behalf perhaps offset the excesses and brutalities of others.

Islam: The Royal Outlook

We have seen that, contrary to the expectations evoked by the establishment of the Inquisition, the expulsion of the Jews, and the fate of the Muslims of Granada and Castile, Fernando was determined not only to maintain the Mudejar communities of his kingdoms but also to increase the Crown's share in the financial benefits accruing from Mudejar vassalage. Hence, one might conclude that in Fernando's mind fiscal considerations carried greater weight than religious ones, and that in the chemistry of the Catholic Monarchs' union the cool cynicism of Fernando managed to control but not extinguish the flames of Isabel's religious zeal. These conclusions are, to a certain extent, tenable. Certainly Isabel's religiosity was more extreme, and she was more willing to use

the Catholic faith, in its mutations of Inquisition and crusade, as a blunt tool with which to hammer the Iberian peninsula, if not the entire Mediterranean, into a crude shape of religious uniformity. It is also safe to say that Fernando was the subtler one of the couple, adroitly balancing the seemingly disjunctive demands of Church, royal treasury, and Mediterranean empire. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to assert that the king did not find the concerns of the Church and Christian society equally compelling. The main difference between Fernando and Isabel was not that the king was less interested in the promotion of the faith and the proselytizing of non-Christians, but that he was not willing to employ quite the same means as the queen in achieving those ends. Fernando had the perspicacity to realize that the majority of Mudejars were not about to abandon Islam voluntarily and embrace Christianity, and, as we shall see below, he had no desire to force the issue. At the same time, it was clear to him that an expulsion of the Mudejars would seriously debilitate the kingdoms of Valencia and Aragon. Fernando, then, accepted these two basic premises, that the Mudejars must continue laboring in their fields and shops, and that they would also continue praying in their mosques. Royal Mudejar policy consisted of pursuing the optimal fiscal benefits under these conditions.

Given that Fernando seems to have felt compelled to accept the Mudejar's adherence to Islam, which is evinced by the simple fact that the Mudejars' religious status remained unchanged until the subsequent reign, it is still essential to understand more precisely Fernando's outlook on the Islamic presence in his kingdoms, on the relations between Muslims and Christians, and on the possibilities of assimilating that Muslim body into Christian society through baptism. Such an understanding is necessary not simply because the history of the Jews and Castilian Mudejars raises the question but also for the reason that whatever economic importance the Mudejars had, it would have made little difference had Fernando indeed been intent on the eradication of Spanish Islam. The early history of the Inquisition speaks eloquently enough on this point. Very much aware of the economic havoc the Inquisition would and did wreak by decimating the Converso community, the Catholic Monarch still unhesitatingly forced the Holy Office on all of his kingdoms to stamp out the judaizing heresy.136 Although material concerns significantly influenced Fernando's handling of the minorities, the factor of religion was ultimately decisive.

The most fundamental of all the privileges accorded to the Mudejars was the freedom to practice Islam, and this freedom Fernando never disputed. However, religious sentiments were such that the Mudejars' practice of Islam raised other delicate issues, namely, whether Islamic

worship should be allowed to manifest itself publicly, and, if so, what kind of limitations were to be imposed so as to render it less offensive to Christians.

Since the time of the conquest the Crown had recognized the importance of mosques for the Muslims' religious and communal life, and thus allowed the Mudejars to retain them, along with their cemeteries and pious endowments.137 From the Christians' perspective, the mosque was the physical symbol of Islam, just as the church was representative of their own religion. Fifteenth-century Valencian Christians begrudged the Mudejars their mosques and could take some comfort in the fact that, as a result of demographic change, mosques were greatly outnumbered by churches. While Mudejars might maintain and renovate the mosques they already had, the construction of new ones was quite a different matter.138 Some Christians perceived this as an insult to their own faith and an unwanted increase of the Islamic presence.

Fernando himself was sensitive to this issue. When he established the new morería in Castellón de Játiva it seems that he purposely did not provide for the building of a new mosque there. Not every Mudejar community had its own mosque, and the king probably supposed that Castellón's Muslims would pray in the mosque of nearby Játiva. Yet, by 1493 Castellón's Mudejars had built or set aside a particular house for a mosque. The matter concerned Fernando, and he ordered an official investigation to determine if the mosque had been built recently—it probably had been, considering that the morería itself dated only from 1480—how long it had been standing, and whether there had been a mosque there in the past.139 Perhaps he was willing to give the Mudejars the benefit of the doubt if some preconquest antecedent to the mosque could be found, but his queries suggest that he was not comfortable with the idea of the Christians of Castellón being subjected to the public display of Islam by an aljama of his own creation.

Similar sentiments prompted the king to relocate the mosque of Zaragoza from a site near a plaza "where the Christians socialize and ... receive from it [the mosque] much offense" to "another area more convenient, closer to the morería , or inside of it."140 Fernando was not questioning the right of Mudejars to worship as Muslims; he was, in his mind, protecting Christians from excessive exposure to Islam's ritual manifestations.

In another case Fernando's opinions emerge less clearly. The scene of conflict was the Vall de Ayora, where the lord of the town of Ayora, the Marqués de Zanete, was constructing a new morería and mosque in an effort to attract to the town Muslims from the surrounding communities of the valley. Don Gerubin de Centelles, the lord of the valley, strenuously objected, arguing that since the conquest the town had been

populated by only Christians. Now, with this new mosque, the town, which had only heard the invocation of the name of Jesus Christ, would resound with the Muslims' call to prayer and the name of Muhammad. Centelles, obviously trying to strike a nerve here, demanded that the king put a stop to the Marqués's initiatives, which were so detrimental to the faith. Fernando reacted by ordering the Marqués to cease construction pending a hearing of both parties. This measured reaction may be attributed to the rumor that the Marqués had procured a papal bull allowing him to construct a new mosque. Also, there was much more at stake than a new mosque; there was the additional question of conflicting seigneurial jurisdictions and the Marqués's prerogatives.141

As the preceding case suggests, what Christians found objectionable was not so much the existence of the mosque itself as the call to prayer five times daily from its minaret. Christians referred to the Muslims' call to prayer as the çala, employing this term for both the call (adhan * )—"Ashhadu anna Muhammad rasul* Allah* " ("I testify that Muhammad is the messenger of God")—and the prayer itself (salat * ), although clearly it was the former that vexed them. It is interesting that Centelles remonstrated against the name of Muhammad being invoked in Ayora, for the public chanting of the adhan * had long been forbidden, although perhaps to little effect in seigneurial areas, if Centelles's word can be relied upon. Taking their cue from Pope Clement V at the Council of Vienne (1311), the Aragonese kings—Jaime II (1318), reinforced by Martin I (1403) and Alfonso V (1417) after the leniency of Pedro IV—had enacted a series of prohibitions, so that by Fernando's reign Muslims could be notified of the hour of prayer only by the sounding of a horn, and even that was prohibited in the city of Valencia. Since what the Church deplored was the public chanting of the name of Muhammad, Fernando did not think it necessary to add to his predecessors' restrictions. After all, if the Mudejars were to be allowed to practice Islam, they needed to be apprised of the proper time for prayer.142

However, some of the more intolerant elements in Valencian society had other ideas. In 1477 placards had been posted in the capital calling for the tearing down of the minarets of all mosques.143 The Inquisitors, whom the king had thrust upon Valencia, came to represent the forces of religious extremism. In 1506 they threatened with excommunication and monetary fine (500 gold florins) all seigneurial officials in the region of the kingdom south of the Jijona River who permitted the Muslims to make the call to prayer, even "indirectly" with a horn. The Inquisitors, it seems, were not satisfied with extracting the judaizing cancer from within the Christian body; they desired to "Christianize" the entire kingdom, which entailed the suppression of Islam. On this score they differed with Valencian clergymen, or at least with those who had Mus-

lim vassals and seemed content with the existing arrangement. It is revealing that all three estates—military, royal, and ecclesiastical—complained to Fernando that the Inquisitors had violated the Furs, of which they had little knowledge. They noted that even canon law did not object to the Muslims' use of a horn. It is unlikely that Fernando would have supported the Inquisitors' initiative. The events of the crisis of 1500–1503 (see chap. 2) advised against further upsetting the Mudejars, who might have resorted to mass flight, utterly ruining barons, prelates, and towns.144

Along with the restriction of the ritual expression of Islam, the Crown also deemed it necessary to censure any demonstrations of disrespect toward the Catholic faith by Muslims. Alfonso V had demanded that Mudejars be punished for blaspheming in the name of Jesus Christ or the Virgin Mary, and during Fernando's reign legal procedure was taken against a number of Muslims, such as Ali Castellano of Alcira, who had to pay a fine of 50s "because he swore by the unclean parts of our Lord God."145 Muslims were also expected to make overt displays of their respect for Christianity by kneeling or turning aside when the Host was carried through the streets, and by ceasing work on Sundays and feast days, although they were permitted to labor in their fields on many of them.146 Fernando took great exception to the insolence of Mudejar blacksmiths and shoemakers in Tarazona who labored in public on Sundays and other feast days. When the priest elevated the Host during the Mass, the Muslims did "not cease hammering, striking iron, cutting and sewing," and even when Christian processions bearing the Host passed by the Muslims did "worse in the same manner without any respect or reverence, which is a bad example and by it service is done neither to our Lord God nor to us [the king]." Exasperated because he had already commanded that Muslim shops be removed from Christian areas of Tarazona, the king threatened to deprive the city's bailiff and jurates of their offices if they did not remedy the situation.147

Fernando favored a strict spatial separation of Islamic and Christian cults, so that his Christian subjects would not have to bear the affront of seeing mosques and hearing the Arabic chant of the mu'adhdhin, or of witnessing the Muslims' impudent disregard of their Lord. In other words, Islam was to keep a very low profile. No doubt the Church applauded Fernando's policy, or the enforcement of his predecessors'. Yet it is less clear that he acted in these matters in response to widespread popular demand or that the generality of his Christian subjects were as sensitive as he to these alleged insults to their faith; in Ayora and Tarazona, at least, it appears that they were not.148 In fact, Fernando found the occasional manifestations of laxness and tolerance by his subjects to be shocking.

Much to the king's chagrin, the church of the Virgen María de la Rapita, located within the limits of his own city of Tortosa, was the site of a display of understanding rarely seen along the Christian-Muslim interface. With the cognizance of the authorities, presumably both ecclesiastical and civil, Muslims from Valencia, Aragon, and Catalonia were congregating in the church on Islamic holy days for prayer and ceremony. As far as Fernando was concerned, this was far worse than the building of a mosque in a Christian town or the labor of Muslims on Sunday; this was the violation of a church's sanctity by what were to him the ungodly and unclean rites of Islam. His reaction to the news, shock followed by intense anger, shines through the formulaic rhetoric of the document:

Not without great astonishment and (?) we have learned of the tolerance which until now has been given in allowing the Moors of the said kingdoms to enter the church of the Virgen María de la Rapita, which is established and built within the limits of that city of Tortosa, to ululate and to venerate the festivals and things required of them by their Mahometan sect and diabolic custom, which is done and consented to in the greatest disservice of our Redeemer Jesus Christ and of his most glorious mother, our Lady.

Fernando fumed, perturbed "that in the temple ordained for veneration and honor of the Divine cult there is permitted to be done another thing that is manifestly repugnant to the order of the Holy Church and Christian religion." The king was determined to act decisively "as pertains to the service of our Lord Jesus Christ and of his pure mother, our Lady, and to the exaltation of the Catholic faith and the oppression of the disorders of the pestiferous and infernal Mahometan sect." The severity of the threatened punishment corresponded with Fernando's opinion of the gravity of the offense. Officials who permitted Muslims to enter the church were to be fined 1,000 gold florins, while the Muslims themselves who violated the royal prohibition were to be given capital punishment or made slaves of the king. Also, whoever had the keys to and custodianship of the church was to lose his life if he allowed Muslims to pray or leave votive candles there. The king further enjoined that the church undergo a symbolic cleansing. In the part of the church where the Muslims made their devotions—perhaps the part they used as a mihrab * (a niche indicating the direction of Mecca)—the window was to be covered and on the window were to be painted images of Christ and the Virgin, "so that by them [the paintings] all impurity may be purged and abolished."149

Because Fernando viewed the faith of Islam with such obvious aversion, particularly when it threatened to intrude on the religious con-

sciousness of the Catholic faithful, close social relations between adherents of that faith and Christians caused the king dismay. His opinion that the rites of Islam were somehow unclean implies that he feared Christians would be morally contaminated by extensive social interaction with Muslims. Fernando's sentiments were rooted not in a scorn for the Muslims as a distinct race, for there was little or no difference in the physiognomies of Spanish Muslims and Christians, but in a disdain for the religion that defined the Mudejars' ethnicity. There were, nevertheless, practical limitations to the institution of a rigid policy of social segregation. The Crown's encouragement of Mudejar economic activity—which meant their participation in most sectors of the economy and not just as servile agricultural laborers—militated against such a policy, for daily contact between Muslim and Christian in the workplace and market fostered a certain level of rapprochement that made social relations both possible and inevitable. If the king desired that the royal aljamas grow and prosper, he could not expect the Mudejars to remain in asphyxiating and impoverishing isolation. Religious concerns thus clashed with the Crown's fiscal interests. The contradictions or ambivalence perceptible in certain of Fernando's decisions are a reflection of this dichotomy.

The conditions stipulated by Fernando in his creation of an aljama in Castellón de Játiva are indicative of the state of affairs he deemed most preferable. He unequivocally commanded that the Muslims must inhabit a distinct morería and not mix in with the town's Christian residents.150 Ideally, this was what many Christians and Muslims would have desired, but sometimes necessity advised otherwise. To help make ends meet, Mudejars of the struggling and underpopulated morería of Valencia sold to Christians houses located within the morería . The issue here was not whether Christians could purchase houses located within a morería —this Fernando did not question—but whether they had to pay the taxes incumbent on the morería 's Muslim residents.151 Even when Fernando was intent on enforcing segregation, established local practice and relative indifference sometimes confounded him. While staying in Tarazona, he had decided that Jews and Muslims must be prohibited from having their homes and shops in Christian neighborhoods, "in order to avoid scandals and damages which could arise from it." Although the Jews and Muslims had dutifully returned to their respective quarters, Fernando was incensed when he learned that after his departure they had returned to live among the Christians "even more profanely than they were accustomed." Six years later word reached him that Mudejar craftsmen still had their shops outside of the morería , and that they worked in them on Sunday. It is significant that it was not an outcry from the Christian populace of Tarazona which had reached

Fernando's ears, but the complaint of only one citizen, Ferrando de Matalebreras.152

Because Muslims and Jews ritually slaughtered their animals as prescribed by their dietary laws, the Christians' purchase of meat from their butcher shops assumed religious implications. Fernando and his bailiff general seem to have ignored these implications on account of fiscal concerns, or at least that was the case initially. Thus, when the jurates of Castellón de la Plana forbade the Muslim butcher shop to sell meat to Christians, primarily because they themselves did not collect the sales tax on the animals slaughtered by the Muslim butcher, the bailiff general demanded that they revoke the prohibition since it was prejudicial to the Crown, from whom the Muslim butcher shop was rented.153 The Inquisitors, however, did not take royal revenues into consideration when, in 1488, they preached in the see of Valencia that Christians should not dare to eat meat slaughtered by Muslims and Jews, under penalty of excommunication. Predictably, this elicited a protest from the lords of Mudejar vassals, and they enlisted the influence of the bishop of Segorbe in Rome to get a papal bull exempting their lands from the Inquisitorial decree.154 There is no evidence that Fernando was privy to this Inquisitorial offensive, although his subsequent action in Alcira indicates that he at least approved of and so acted in accordance with its substance. By 1492 Fernando decided that Alcira's Muslim butcher shop did not need to be provided with as many sheep as before "inasmuch as now it is prohibited [that] the said Christians buy meat from the said [Muslim] butcher shop."155 Owing to the resistance of the nobility, it seems that the zeal of the Inquisitors was felt less on seigneurial lands than in royal towns.

If Christians and Muslims were going to mingle, and realistically this could hardly be prevented, then it was important that Muslims at least be easily identifiable. At the behest of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), Spanish monarchs had included in their legal codes legislation demanding that Muslims wear distinctive clothing, although this legislation was only intermittently enforced. Fernando attempted to correct the previous laxness, bidding the bailiff general of Aragon to see to it that the Mudejars wore their special apparel.156 In the kingdom of Valencia Juan II had called for the enforcement of Jaime I's ordinances demanding that all Muslims dress in distinctive blue garb; however, in return for a 60-pound payment he had exempted the Muslims from having a special tonsure. Fernando followed suit and in 1482 issued a royal proclamation that Muslims and Jews must wear their special clothing in the city of Valencia. Yet, four years later Fernando was expressing dismay that his father's orders were being disobeyed and that Muslims were dressing "like Christians, and many of them in silk doublets and

fine clothing."157 The king's interests in the enforcement of this legislation were partly political—so that incognito Muslim enemies could not kidnap Christians (see chap. 2)—and partly social. Regarding the latter, Fernando was anxious to prevent "inconveniences and scandals" of a sexual nature, especially relations between Muslim men and Christian women. His fears were not unfounded, for the documentation attests to the not infrequent violation of this sexual taboo.158 When the jurates of Zaragoza were outraged because Muslims visiting the fonduk (hostel) of the morería brought Muslim women there with them—actually their daughters—Fernando bade the jurates to let the Muslims be, "so that those Moors will abstain from having anything to do with Christian women."159 In any case, it seems that despite the king's expressed concern to prevent such illicit relations, the Mudejars still were not forced to wear the special clothing. This is indicated by the absence of any record of the penalization of a Muslim for violation of the dress code and by the near impossibility of regulating Mudejar dress outside of the few royal morerías .160

Fernando's anxiety about immoderate intimacy between Christians and Muslims may be considered within the context of the Catholic Monarchs' efforts to reform Spanish Christian society. Their program of reform for the Spanish Church, especially the religious orders, is well known. They were also preoccupied with the moral laxity of their subjects. In Valencia Fernando took measures to regulate prostitution and to prohibit gambling, profanity, sorcery, and usury.161 Still, this general interest in Christian morality does not minimize the fact that the comradeship of Muslims and Christians was perceived as a moral evil in itself or as the root of others. It is understandable how Fernando could have jumped to such conclusions, since Muslims and Christians were often found together partaking in Valencia's riotous tavern life. For instance, there was the disreputable Hostal del Palomar in Albaida, which Fernando wanted razed, because "there are committed many evils and damages, since many men of evil life and practices congregate there, and since it is found that Moors sleep with Christian women."162 In another tavern Muslims were fined for gambling with Christians.163

Despite its decline in population and wealth, the morería of Valencia still maintained its reputation as a center of lowlife. Orders were issued prohibiting gambling there and restricting the activities of Muslim prostitutes to the morería 's bordello.164 Muslim residents of the morería who received as guests in their homes intoxicated Muslim vagabonds or Christian men and women, thereby encouraging "scandals, fights, and disorders," were to be fined 10s.165 The Crown attempted to prevent such disturbances from spreading beyond the confines of the morería by forbidding Muslims to drink their wine in any place other than the royal

tavern.166 Also, Muslims and Jews visiting the city of Valencia were required to lodge at the royal fonduk in the morería and not at Christian inns.167 The same applied to other royal morerías that had their own fonduks. These restrictions had a double motive. On one hand, confining Mudejars to the royal tavern and fonduk curtailed the "many and great inconveniences, scandals, and other perils which arise from the cohabitation of Sarracens, Jews, and other infidels with the Christians."168 On the other hand, the restrictions ensured a steady flow of income from these royal monopolies.169 The repeated proclamation of them attests to the frequency with which they were violated.170

Fernando's measures to limit the public display of the Mudejars' religion and to promote the social segregation of Muslim and Christian all had their precedents in the legislation of previous monarchs, and it would be difficult to argue that the Catholic Monarch was more hostile than his predecessors toward Islam. In some areas where the king expressed concern, such as the Mudejars' distinctive clothing or their confinement to morerías and royal taverns for residence and recreation, the concern was not translated into consistent enforcement of proscriptive legislation. In others, such as the relocation of Zaragoza's mosque or the forbidding of Alcira's Muslims to sell meat to Christians, royal action was more decisive and in line with the views held by the aggressively anti-Islamic Inquisition. In any case, it is patent that Fernando, whether merely remonstrating or acting conclusively, desired to impede the mixing of Christians and Muslims, but without challenging the religious status of the latter.

Yet, considering the above instances of close and amicable relations between Muslims and Christians in Valencia, Aragon, and Catalonia, it seems that Fernando, in his desultory attempts to segregate Mudejars, was fighting a losing battle. Indeed, one might pose a disjunction between royal (and ecclesiastical) attitudes and those of a substantial portion of the Christian populace. Fernando's segregationist stance was inspired by a concern for the moral and spiritual well-being of his Christian subjects. His subjects, however, were probably not nearly as preoccupied with the state of their souls as he would have liked. Their concerns often were far more mundane. If their neighbors happened to be Muslims, it was perhaps easier to befriend them than to shun them. Christians in the capital knew Muslims of the local morería well enough to testify as character witnesses in their behalf.171 Making a living might mean cooperation with the Muslim tilling the adjacent plot of land, or selling goods to a large Muslim clientele, or even a business partnership with a Muslim.172 A Muslim of Alcira's acknowledgment of his debt to a Christian, written in Arabic and translated by the qadi * general, indicates the direction in which some business relationships might tend: "I Ageg,

son of Çahat Ageg, confess to you [my] singular and good friend, en Jacme Barbera, how I owe you twelve pounds."173 Alasdrach of Buñol and Ali Alcayet of Chiva preferred to lodge at the "Hostal de Angel" when they were in Valencia, because they were acquainted with the hosteler, Joan Jeroni.174 Deeper friendships between Muslims and Christians might flourish. Açen Muça's defense counsel tried to disqualify the testimony of the tailor Miguel Serra in favor of the plaintiffs, the family of the murdered Ubaydal (or Abdalla) Çentido, because Serra "was a very great friend, like a brother, of the said Ubaydal Çentido and is a very great friend of the sister of the said Ubaydal."175 Another friend of Ubaydal was the farmer Domingo Roda. While visiting his sister and attending to his lands in Mirambell, Domingo dined at the house of Ubaydal's sister with Ubaydal and another Muslim, Alfiquinet. After dinner, the three of them went for a stroll and talked, mainly about a Christian woman who had run off with some Muslims. (The defense impugned Domingo's testimony as well. That Domingo might have perjured himself for the sake of Ubaydal's family is impressive in itself.)176

When leisurely pursuing pleasure Muslims and Christians let questions of faith recede into the background. Taverns brought Christians and Muslims together just as surely as churches and mosques separated them. Even the capital's colorful Corpus Christi Day processions, in spite of their being a clear expression of the Catholic faith, attracted Muslims from all over the kingdom. And the Christians found nothing unusual in this; nor did they expect the Muslim onlookers to kneel and show obeisance. In fact, Muslims and Christians set out for and watched the processions together.177

That some Christians had no qualms about mingling so freely with Muslims was not the result of their having somehow come to terms with the religion of Islam, for on the theological plane there could be no Mudejar-Christian rapprochement. These Christians probably did not see themselves as somehow compromising their own religious beliefs. For them such interaction with Muslims was simply a way of life, a life in which secular pursuits often obscured spiritual concerns. In Valencia the pursuit of peace, the pursuit of wealth, and the pursuit of pleasure all frequently involved dealing with Muslims. Given the size of the Mudejar population, it could hardly have been otherwise. In his efforts to reform Christian society, Fernando was essentially asking his subjects to lead more spiritual lives. Success here might have rendered his segregative measures more enforceable. The failure to segregate the Mudejars was partly the consequence of the unwillingness and the inability of most Christians to live completely in accordance with the dictates of the Church.

The Question of Conversion

Nevertheless, Fernando was not alone in desiring a fuller separation of the Mudejars from the Christian population. There certainly were elements in Christian society who viewed the Muslims with resentment and fanatical hatred. They were willing to go much further than the king to solve the Mudejar problem. They advocated either the expulsion or the baptism of the Mudejars. Both methods would have the same result: a wholly Christian society. Economic and political considerations combined with the weight of tradition advised against the former course of action. The history of the Conversos strongly argued against the latter. Since 1391, when widespread anti-Jewish pogroms saw approximately one-third of Spain's Jews forcibly baptized, Spanish society had been plagued with the problem of Conversos. The Conversos either refused to assimilate and continued practicing Judaism, or, when they sincerely sought assimilation, Old Christian society rejected them on the grounds of their Jewish origins. From the 1440s until the reign of the Monarchs the issue of the Conversos was hotly debated, particularly in Castile, where acute social and religious discontent gave rise to numerous anti-Converso riots. It was the gravest of problems, to which the Monarchs responded with the establishment of the Spanish Inquisition, hoping to separate true Christians, both Old and New, from the crypto-Jews. When this proved impossible, to a large extent because of the persistent contact between the Converso and Jewish communities, the Jews were expelled from the peninsula.178 This was not, however, part of a larger plan to impose religious uniformity on Castile and Aragon; rather, it was a measure meant to solve a widespread socioreligious problem, of which the Mudejars were not a part. Even though these initiatives against the Conversos and Jews might have suggested to some that the conversion or expulsion of the Mudejars was the next step, Fernando himself did not entertain such designs. The Converso problem had shaken Castilian urban society to its very foundations and had raised serious questions about the premises on which Christian identity was based. It is highly unlikely that Fernando had the intention of creating a new class of Moriscos, thereby reenacting the Converso-Jew-Old Christian scenario. Whatever distaste Fernando had for Islam, his eyes were open wide enough to see that the Mudejar clung to his faith as stubbornly as the Jew.

Fortunately, the existence of a few documents in which Fernando speaks clearly on the question of Mudejar conversion enables us to move to more solid ground. One incident, in 1498, involved a young Muslim of Zaragoza (moratiço ) who had expressed to the archbishop his desire to convert to Christianity. Rather than urging the immediate

baptism of the Muslim, Fernando hesitated, requesting further information. He inquired whether the Muslim was of the age of discretion, that is, whether he was old enough to make a reasoned and sound decision in so important a matter as the abandonment of Islam for Christianity. He also wanted to know whether the Muslim had the consent of his parents or guardians to convert. Fernando did not wish to see an adolescent accept baptism on a whim, only to revert to Islam years later upon the realization that he had foolishly erred. The king reasoned that without parental consent the young proselyte would constantly be under familial pressure to abandon Christianity. Furthermore, Fernando was concerned that if the baptism were administered too hastily to an adolescent against the wishes of his family, the Mudejar community would perceive it as a form of forced conversion and, consequently, would be all the more opposed to Christianity. As the king summed up: "because if the said moratiço were baptized not having years of discretion against the will of the abovesaid [parents] it would be an exemplary case for all the others [Mudejars]. We would not allow such a thing to be done without considering it well."179 It is probable that Fernando had the Conversos in mind when he pondered this decision. It was notorious—certainly by 1498, when the Inquisition had already brought to light so much information on Converso practices—that adult Conversos often resumed a wholehearted observance of Judaism after having been raised as Catholics, and that the Conversos' crypto-Judaism was rooted in a closely knit family and communal life.180

Fernando's other enunciations on the proselytizing of Mudejars stem from his efforts to shield them from the attacks of overly zealous Christians. In one case, a preacher of the crusade was inciting the Christians of Zaragoza against the local Muslims with his inflammatory sermons. Fernando admonished him to preach without mentioning the Mudejars, pointing out that by defaming the Mudejars and provoking the Christians against them he would not make much progress toward their conversion. The king added significantly:

if you know some things that ought to be done with respect to the said Moors concerning their satisfactory and tranquil coming to the zeal of the holy Catholic faith, those things you should tell secretly to our governor so that he may provide in the matter, or you should intimate them to us by your letters.

That Fernando was interested in the conversion of the Mudejars there is little doubt; the crucial point is that he demanded peaceful methods in the attainment of that end.181 This is corroborated by the stance taken by Fernando in the years 1500–1503, when, after the rebellion and con-

version of Muslims in Granada, rumors were spread in Valencia, Aragon, and Catalonia to the effect that the king planned to convert all Mudejars, by force if necessary. Fernando firmly repudiated such plans and proclaimed that: "our holy Catholic faith in the conversion of the infidels admits neither violence nor force but [only] full freedom and devotion."182 The survival of the Crown of Aragon's Muslim communities intact throughout Fernando's reign is testimony to the king's sincere opposition to forced conversion.

As has been indicated, Fernando was pleased to accept the voluntary conversion of Mudejars. When the Marquesa de Moya, one of the queen's ladies-in-waiting, sponsored her Muslim slave Casamito, who had expressed his intention of converting and marrying a Christian woman, by apprenticing him to a Christian dyer of Valencia, the king approved of the idea. When, after four years of apprenticeship, Casamito had a change of heart and ran off with Muslim companions, Fernando ordered Casamito seized and turned over to the Marquesa.183

Whereas the king gingerly handled the case of the young Muslim of Zaragoza in order to avoid upsetting his parents and community, he had no doubt that Muslim children bereft of family and legal guardians were valid objects of proselytizing. After learning that Valencian Mudejars had bought a number of captive Malagan children ranging from three to ten years of age, Fernando commanded the bailiff general to take the children from their new masters, "so that they do not remain in their infidelity and may be turned to the Christian faith."184 Similarly, it was decided that black slaves from Guinea, who were perceived as having no religious status, should not be sold to Jews and Muslims, so that they, too, might be instructed in the Catholic faith.185 The same approach is evident in the royal decree of 12 February 1502, ordering the expulsion from Castile of all male Muslims older than fourteen and of all females older than twelve.186 Children, without the contrary influences of their families, could be raised as true Christians.

Once a Muslim accepted baptism, the king took care to see to it that the convert was well treated and that he or she did not feel in any way burdened by the new faith. In a litigation between Caterina, the daughter of a convert, and the Gaçenis, a Mudejar family of Tortosa, over the inheritance left to Caterina by her Muslim grandmother, the local bailiff had ruled in favor of Caterina. When the Gaçenis tried to appeal the decision, Fernando rejected their appeal on the grounds of its tardiness, but added that Caterina ought to remain in possession of the inheritance "lest she feel injury from the reception of baptism."187

Fernando was truly enthusiastic for the voluntary conversion of all his Mudejar subjects. The willing acceptance of baptism by the entire aljama of Teruel (Aragon) in 1502 filled the king with joy and high hopes.

After relating how all the Castilian Mudejars "converted to our holy Catholic faith out of free will," Fernando continued:

it seems to us that they have done the same in the city of Teruel, that marvelously, by the grace of the Holy Spirit, there all the Moors of that aljama have converted ... may it please God that all the others that remain in our kingdoms do the same ... from this we would receive much consolation.188

Although Fernando did not employ coercion with the Crown's other Muslim communities in the pursuit of wish fulfillment, the alleged freedom with which the Mudejars of Castile and Teruel converted demands scrutiny. The conditions for emigration offered to Castilian Muslims by the Monarchs—the abandonment of their children and Egypt as practically their only destination—makes one wonder whether they had any other choice but to accept baptism. The precise circumstances which led to the conversion of Teruel's aljama are unknown, but, given Teruel's proximity to Castile and the great anxiety that the rebellions and conversions in Granada and Castile must have caused them, it may be surmised that Teruel's Muslims accepted baptism under considerable psychological duress. Still, in an age when Muslims and Jews who opted for the baptismal chrism instead of the blade of a sword were judged by theologians to have acted out of free will, Fernando's definition of freedom was perhaps more reasonable than many.189

It is worthwhile to consider briefly the conversion of the Muslims of Granada and Castile, in order to raise a few points regarding the contrasting views of Fernando and Isabel on the methods of conversion. Although Fernando and Isabel ruled jointly, the final responsibility for policy in Castile and Granada fell on Isabel's shoulders. The same can be asserted for Fernando with respect to Aragon. While the Monarchs differed on the use of coercion in conversion, they seem to have agreed on the measures to be implemented in treating the problem of neoconverts, either Jewish or Muslim.

The surrender treaties reached between the Monarchs and the conquered Granadans were quite similar to the Mudejar treaties of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Even the efforts of Hernando de Talavera, the first archbishop of Granada, to proselytize the Muslims of Granada had their precedents in the activities of the Mendicant Orders in Valencia in the wake of that kingdom's conquest.190 That until 1499 the Monarchs had no intention of breaking the treaties is indicated by their permission to Portugal's expelled Mudejars to settle in Granada and Castile in 1497. However, by autumn 1499, it seems that the Monarchs, particularly Isabel, had grown impatient with Talavera's

policy of gradual conversion. Desirous of some results, a pretext was found for sending Cardinal Cisneros to Granada, namely, that Cisneros, acting with the powers of an Inquisitor, was to return to the fold of the Church the elches , Christians who had converted to Islam. This in itself was a breach of the capitulations, but Cisneros went further, not only pressuring the elches to convert but also proceeding against their children. Consequently, the Muslims of the Albaicín quarter of Granada exploded into rebellion.191

Fernando expressed disapproval of Cisneros's methods, noting that one might have expected as much from a man "who never saw Moors, or knew them."192 Isabel's silence suggests that she had few objections, and her approval seems to have overruled her husband's misgivings. In any case, the methods of Isabel and Cisneros were employed, so that the Muslims of Granada had to submit to baptism in order to be pardoned for their rebellion. While revolts were breaking out in the Alpujarras, once the Muslims there had heard of the treatment of their brethren in Granada, the Monarchs still did not envision the conversion of the entire kingdom. Letters were sent assuring the Mudejars of Ronda and Málaga that they would not be forced to become Christians. Yet, all the while, Cisneros was writing in terms of baptizing all Muslims. It is clear that the Monarchs' great error, if Isabel even considered it as such, was to send Cisneros to Granada, for he set in motion a train of events that was extremely difficult to stop. As successive rebellions were quelled in the Alpujarras and elsewhere in the kingdom (1500-1501), and baptism continued to be offered as a condition of pardon, along with the incentive of a partial remission of taxes, it became increasingly clear to the Monarchs that the bulk of the Muslim population was becoming Christian.193

In effect, a Morisco problem was in the making. López and Acién suggest that the Monarchs' final decision to "Christianize" the entire kingdom was financially motivated and came after the papal concession to the Monarchs of two-thirds of the tithes to be paid to the Church by all New Christians (bull of 22 March 1500).194 Although this was probably influential in the timing of the Monarchs' decision, the most telling factor was the fear of Morisco-Muslim contact and all the danger that implied for the Catholic faith. The Monarchs expressed this concern in their instructions for Cisneros and the governor, the Count of Tendilla, just after the rebellion in the Albaicín:

it seems to us that those who convert should not be around the Moors for the necessity that they have of being instructed in the things of our faith ... they [Cisneros and Tendilla] should write to us if it appears that it ought to be provided that they [the converts] not live among the Moors.195

Prevention of the contamination of the recent converts by Islam prompted the royal proclamation of 20 July 1501, forbidding all Muslims to enter the, by now, Christian kingdom of Granada, "under pain of death and of loss of all their property." Fernando and Isabel made clear their desire "that the said conversion remain for always in the said newly converted, so that they might be good Christians." Only the threat of extreme penalties could ensure that the neophytes would "not have any cause to err in the things of our holy faith by communicating with the said Moors, who could come from other parts to this said kingdom."196

By September 1501 the Monarchs had decided that the Mudejars of Castile must also accept baptism or abandon the peninsula. They ordered the corregidor of Córdoba not to pressure the Mudejars to convert, but to inform them that if they remained Muslims, they would have to leave the kingdom.197 Finally, on 12 February 1502 the order was issued that all Muslims must depart from Castile. In the order an explicit connection is made between the earlier Converso-Jew dilemma and the potential for a similar Morisco-Muslim problem:

Considering ... that since the major cause of the subversion of many Christians that has been seen in these our kingdoms was their participation and communication with the Jews, that since there is much danger in the communication of the said Moors of our kingdom with the newly converted and they [the Moors] will be a cause that the said newly converted may be drawn and induced to leave our faith and to return to their original errors ... as already by experience has been seen in some in this kingdom and outside of it, if the principal cause is removed, that is, to expel the said Moors from these our kingdoms and lordships, and because it is better to prevent with the remedy than to wait to punish the errors after they are made and committed ... it is right that they be expelled.198

In the final analysis, the protection of the faith of the neoconverts was the determining factor in the Monarchs' steps to "Christianize" Granada completely and to present the Castilian Mudejars with the choice of baptism or expulsion. Once a large number of Muslims in Granada had been converted, the threat to the health of the entire Christian body was too great if the New Christians were allowed any contact with the contagion of Islam. That much the Monarchs had learned from the Jews and the Conversos.

That the Mudejars of Valencia did not meet the same fate as their coreligionists in Castile was due to a number of factors, the most obvious of which was the absence of a large group of Muslim converts to Christianity in Fernando's dominions. The absence of a Morisco problem in Valencia had much to do with the king's opposition to forced

conversion and his stand against those who were proposing baptism of the Mudejars from 1500 to 1503. Fernando's forthright position in his own realms contrasts markedly with his wavering disapproval in Isabel's Castile. Moreover, in Valencia the conversion of the Mudejars could have been carried out only in the face of fierce opposition from the nobility. Throughout the years 1500–1503 the military estate warned Fernando of the dire consequences a forced conversion would have: the ruination of the economy and a bloody Mudejar insurrection. At the Cortes of Zaragoza (1502) and at the Corts of Barcelona (1503) and Monzón (1510) Fernando had to promise that he would not convert the Mudejars of the Crown of Aragon.199 The Mudejars of Castile lacked any substantial support. Numbering only 17,000 to 20,000 persons and located largely in urban morerías , Castile's Muslims had no great lords willing to plead their case before the queen. On the contrary, the Castilian municipal governments eagerly enforced the Monarchs' orders (1480) for the placement of Mudejars in separate morerías , and they had to be instructed to prevent Christian violence against the Mudejars during the rebellions of the Alpujarras.200

There is almost no comparison between the situations in Valencia and Granada. In Valencia Muslims and Christians had been coexisting for well over two centuries, and, although there were problems, society remained cohesive. Valencia's Christians and Muslims had long ago experienced the initial shock of having to inhabit the same kingdom. As for Granada, one is hard pressed to speak of a single society; rather, it was more a case of two societies that had glowered at each other across the Granadan frontier being forced together by virtue of Granada's conquest. The Castilians, moved by crusading zeal and characterized by a religious extremism fed by the anti-Jewish and anti-Converso hysteria of the previous century, had little regard for the privileges granted to the subject Muslims in the surrender treaties. When they were thrust into close quarters with the Muslims, the latter were frequently dispossessed of their lands and otherwise abused. The Muslims' resentment of the conquerors was thus enhanced. Perhaps it was only the small number of settlers (40,000 by 1498, in comparison with 250,000 to 300,000 Muslims) that forestalled the explosive Muslim rebellion that Cisneros and the Monarchs managed to provoke.201

Those historians who see in the marriage of Fernando and Isabel the creation of a unified Spain, or who see the Monarchs as having aimed at directing the destiny of one Spanish state, may well assert that the New Christians of Castile and Granada still could have been influenced by the Muslims of the Crown of Aragon and, therefore, may ask why the Monarchs did not convert the latter in order to prevent this eventuality. The answer lies in the fact that Fernando alone ruled in Aragon, and

that Aragon and Castile still had sufficiently distinct societies and governments to allow for the cordoning off of Aragon from Castile, so that Fernando's Mudejars could not enter Isabel's realms. The same interpretive framework can be employed to explain the extension of the Spanish Inquisition from Castile into Aragon. Fernando established the Inquisition in his realms because, like Castile, they, too, were plagued by the heresy of judaizing Conversos; he did not do so because he and Isabel were utilizing the Inquisition as a tool to control their Spanish state. It was reason of faith, not reason of state, that crossed state boundaries and brought the Inquisition to Aragon.

Fernando's Mudejar policy was a subtle one, comprising a number of variables that he dexterously balanced, one against the other. Mudejarism was fostered in order to increase the population of and the taxes paid by royal aljamas, while the protection afforded Mudejars by the Crown was of an ambivalent sort, compensating Muslims for the injuries perpetrated on them without providing an effective deterrent through punishment of the offenders.

Mudejar economic activity was encouraged, while their social interaction with Christians was discouraged. The Mudejars' practice of Islam was sanctioned and their forced conversion forbidden, but, at the same time, Islam was abhorred, baptism was welcomed, and the concept of free will in conversion at times bordered on the dubious. Fernando, in whom were combined the craftiness of the Machiavellian politician and the religious fervor of the crusader, could carry on in this manner because he considered all of the variables. Others were more single-minded, and, with respect to the religious minorities, this was the case of the Inquisitors.

The Spanish Inquisition, established to extirpate heresy from the Christian body, found it difficult to restrict itself to that task alone. The Inquisitors quickly concerned themselves with those forces threatening Christian society not only from within but also from without. Because the heresy the Inquisitors were combating was a judaizing one, the Jews themselves, the source of heresy, became the Inquisition's target. Not surprisingly, the Inquisition played a fundamental role in the expulsion of the Jews. Although before 1500 there was practically no population of converts from Islam, and therefore no threat of an "Islamizing" heresy infecting the Christian body, the Inquisitors nevertheless set their sights on the Mudejars. In the process of putting the Christian house in order the Inquisitors decided that the only way to do so effectively was to remove all nefarious influences, which meant ridding Spain of both Jews and Muslims.

Early in its history in Valencia the Inquisition displayed a tendency to

exceed the bounds of its proper jurisdiction. In 1482 Juan Cristóbal de Gualbes, the Inquisitor General of Aragon, clashed with the lieutenant bailiff general of the kingdom, Berenguer Mercader. The conflict was centered on a Jewess of Murviedro, Dolçina, whom Mercader had freed from the Inquisition's jail and refused to relinquish to the Inquisitors. Mercader maintained that although the Inquisition could interrogate Jews, it could not punish them, either by imprisoning them or, as it had done in the past, by torturing them. To do so was to encroach upon royal prerogatives, which it was the duty of the bailiff general to protect. Gualbes's argument is revealing, for it indicates the Inquisition's intention to proceed against Jews and Muslims as well as heretics. The Inquisitor cited a provision of King Martin—obviously in reference to the papal Inquisition—"in which he expressly commanded ... all his officials that they not hinder the Inquisitors in their inquisition to be made against the Jews and Moors."202

Seen in this light, the Inquisition's attacks against the sale to Christians of meat slaughtered by Jews or Muslims (1488) and against the Muslims' call to prayer (1506) appear more sinister. It seems that the Inquisitors had some sort of plan in mind, first to restrict contact between Muslims and Christians, especially in matters with religious connotations, and then to suppress all manifestations of Islam. On Mallorca in 1491 the Inquisitors, among a number of other excesses, proceeded against approximately twenty unbaptized Muslim slaves for chanting the salat * , and by 1508 the Inquisitors in the kingdom of Aragon were going so far as to coerce Muslims to receive baptism.203 Officials and noblemen in Valencia, Mallorca, and Aragon complained that the Inquisitors were violating local laws and argued that they had no business meddling in these matters.

The Mudejars themselves were not slow to understand the Inquisition's intentions, and so began to fear that institution more than any other. In 1502, after news of the conversion of Castile's Mudejars reached them, Valencia's Muslims were gripped by a fear that they were next in line and that the Inquisition planned to proceed against them, as Muslims. This fear was based on the Inquisition's seizure of two Muslims, who, the Inquisitors maintained, were incarcerated for having dissuaded and threatened other Muslims receiving baptism. Significantly, these Muslims were being baptized in the palace of the Inquisition.204 It mattered little to the Inquisitors that neither criminal procedure against Muslims nor proselytizing Muslims fell within the realm of their duties. In their campaign against the religious minorities the Inquisitors used every opportunity to further their goal of an entirely Christian society.

It is worth repeating that the Crown of Aragon's Mudejars were neither converted nor expelled during Fernando's reign. Nevertheless,

it was Fernando who loosed the Inquisition on Valencian society. The king's view on all the Inquisition's activities is difficult to pinpoint. On the question of the Muslim and Jewish butcher shops he seems to have agreed with the Inquisitors; regarding other matters he was silent. However, on one issue—the use of force in religious conversion—Fernando did speak his mind loudly and clearly. Consistent with his stance in Valencia during the years 1500–1503, in 1508 he sharply rebuked the Inquisitors of Aragon for attempting to force Mudejars to convert, reminding them that only voluntary conversion through conviction is pleasing to God.205 Although Fernando and Isabel were able to control the Inquisition, it was not long before it took on a life of its own, an effective and insidious apparatus, feeding and feeding off of Spain's religious passions. However durable the Muslim-Christian modus vivendi in Valencia was, there were certainly a number of Christians who concurred with the Inquisition in its drive toward religious uniformity. The Inquisition's presence only served to augment the ever-present hostility toward the Muslim. This is not to suggest that the anti-Muslim violence of the Germanías was in any way Inquisitorially inspired; the cause of that violence was far more complex. It is only to raise the question of how long Valencia's Muslim-Christian convivencia could have withstood the assaults of the Inquisition, an institution that allowed no room for ideological alternatives and made the question of religious identity an obsession. The tradition of Mudejarism that Fernando so vigorously upheld was probably partly undermined by an institution of his own creation.

The Ottoman Turks

As the architect of Spain's foreign policy, in which the defense of Christendom often coincided with the furthering of Aragon's Mediterranean interests, Fernando treated with an array of Islamic states ranging from Granada to the eastern Mediterranean. Of these, the expanding empire of the Ottoman Turks posed the greatest threat. During the initial years of Fernando's reign the danger seemed very grave. In 1480 the forces of Mehmet the Conqueror besieged the island of Rhodes defended by the Knights Hospitallers and, worse still, in August of that year captured the city of Otranto on the Italian mainland. Considering this a prelude to the conquest of Sicily, an Aragonese possession, of Naples, and perhaps of Rome itself, Fernando took the Hospitallers under his protection and sent them military and financial support. Spain further responded by dispatching to Italy two fleets, Castilian and Aragonese, to assist in the Christian counterattack. This aid, however, proved un-

necessary as the death of Mehmet compelled a Turkish withdrawal from Otranto in September 1481.9

During these critical months, Spain's ascendancy over Islam in the West suddenly seemed precarious. Turkish advances rendered the sultanate of Granada more formidable and the allegiance of Fernando's Muslim subjects more uncertain. Fernando was anxious about the possibility of a Mudejar reaction to Ottoman successes. In December 1480 he wrote to his councillors and governor in Valencia and reminded them of the Turkish entry into Italy, suggesting that this Islamic threat to Christendom could have immediate and dire consequences at home. Noting the kingdom's proximity to Granada, the king fretted over the fact that it had such a large number of Muslim inhabitants who were well armed and had access to its castles and fortresses. Having had to postpone the crusade against Granada to counter the Turkish menace, Fernando determined at least to neutralize the Mudejars, test they "make some effort in our disservice and that of our Lord God and in damage of that kingdom." He therefore commanded that all the Muslims in the kingdom be disarmed and denied access to fortresses, which included removing from office any Muslims exercising custodianship (alcaydies ) over castles. All this was to be done so that "we may be without any fear of the said Moors."10

However, Fernando added that his officials should act in this matter as they deemed best, without causing any "inconvenience or scandal."11 In effect, this meant that they could do very little. Although arms control could be effectively exercised in the royal cities and towns, where Muslims were either fined for bearing arms or granted license to do so,12 it was unfeasible on seigneurial lands.13 Documents from 1487 and 1502 describe the Mudejars as still armed to the teeth.14 As for the custodianship of castles, this probably was not a problem, for there is no evidence of Mudejar alcaydes . The more important question is whether there was a real need for these preventive measures. At this point there does not seem to have been any Mudejar activity even suggesting insurrection. Whatever pleasure or hope Valencia's Muslims might have derived from Islam's distant progress, Turkish advances in Italy had insufficient impact on the structure of power in Valencia to have given them any illusions as to the possible success of a revolt. Accordingly, Fernando's officials seem to have thought it best to keep only a cautious eye on the Mudejars without unnecessarily upsetting them by the application of a firm hand.

Fernando was not alone in his uneasiness over the Mudejars' intentions. In February 1481, having already ordered the religious houses of Valencia to pray for divine aid against the Turks,15 the jurates of the city of Valencia cautioned the king that necessity demanded the taking

of some action regarding the great number of Muslims residing in the kingdom. For them, the Mudejars' presence was a threat to the public peace. Despite the opinion of the seigneurs of Muslim vassals, who preferred maintenance of the status quo, the jurates urged Fernando to take measures to preserve the kingdom from "irreparable ruin."16 It is difficult to say what measures they had in mind. In any event, no further action was taken. Given the probable opposition of the barons, who were in a better position to know of the Mudejars' plans than were the more apprehensive jurates, the efficacy of any expedient would have been minimal.

The Turks continued to preoccupy Fernando throughout the 1480s. Rumors of the massing of Turkish armadas in 1484 and 1485 and the Turks' attack on Malta in 1488 moved him to strengthen Sicily's fortifications. The conflict between the Turks and Mamluk Egypt suggested to Fernando the utility of an alliance with the Mamluk sultan, Qa'it* Bay* . In 1488 Spain shipped wheat to Egypt—the revenues from its sale were to help finance the war against Granada—and, after the Mamluk victory over Turkish forces, Fernando proposed further aiding the Mamluks with a naval force of fifty caravels. This understanding between Fernando and Qa'it* Bay* lasted until the latter allied with the Ottoman Bayezit II in 1491.17

Although himself fully capable of cutting across ideological boundaries to ally with Mamluk against Ottoman, Fernando still doubted that the fealty of his own Muslim subjects was of sufficient strength to counterbalance the political implications of their religious adherence to Islam. He was prone to lend credence to even the more farfetched stories of Mudejar anti-Christian activity. For instance, in 1480 he commanded an investigation into the matter of certain Aragonese Mudejars who had allegedly incited the Mamluk sultan to destroy Christian churches in Jerusalem.18

Nevertheless, Fernando can hardly be blamed for expressing concern over the information that reached him in 1487. It involved an Islamic alliance linking the Mudejars and the Turks to Granada as a reaction to the Nasrids' desperate situation. It was reported that for the past six years the Valencian aljamas had been sending financial aid in support of the war effort of the Nasrid sultan. For Fernando, already into his sixth year of grueling campaigning in Granada, this news must have been particularly galling. But that was not all. The Mudejars had dispatched to "the Turk" (Bayezit II) two envoys, one from Játiva, the kingdom's largest morería , and the other, a certain Pacoret, from Paterna. They were to inform Bayezit of the Catholic Monarchs' war against Granada and that if he did not send aid all would be lost. Specific suggestions were made as to how the Turks could be most effective. Bayezit was to

send "his people" to Valencia, and there, and in the other Spanish kingdoms, 200,000 Muslims would rise up in their favor and bring about the "damage and destruction of the Christians." The Moors of Valencia were preparing themselves for this eventuality. It was said that each Muslim had in his home more arms than were necessary for any one person.19

The king's reaction was surprisingly restrained. He ordered three officials to find out if there was any truth in these rumors. Their conclusions were to be sent to Fernando in letters under closed seal, so that he himself could decide on suitable punishment for the Muslims and the morerías implicated.20 Again, as in 1480, there survive neither responses to the king's queries nor record of the punishment of Mudejar rebels.

That in both cases official inquiry produced no damning evidence against the Mudejars should not suggest that Fernando dwelled in a crusader's dream world filled with phantoms of Muslim conspirators. A distinction must be made here between intention and act. According to Fernando's informants, a Mudejar uprising was contingent on the entry of Ottoman forces into Spain. That Bayezit, his hands full in the East and in Egypt, was in no position to mount an invasion of the western Mediterranean, much less of Spain, and, thus, could not lend any substance to Mudejar plans, does not exonerate the Mudejars of the intention of rebellion under propitious circumstances. It is very much within the realm of possibility that Mudejar-Ottoman contact had, in fact, been established.

By 1487 Nasrid poetic appeals for assistance had reached both Mamluk and Ottoman courts. Also, the Egyptian chronicler Ibn Iyas* records that in A.H. 892 (A.D. 1486–1487) Nasrid ambassadors arrived in Cairo requesting that Qa'it* Bay* send an army against the Spanish Christians. Qa'it Bay responded with a message to Fernando, warning him that if he did not halt his attacks on Granada, reprisals would be inflicted on the clergy of Jerusalem and Christians would be denied access to the holy places. Bayezit, his interest aroused by the Nasrid appeal, dispatched the privateer Kemal Reis to the western Mediterranean on a mission of reconnaissance. Reis is thought to have made direct contact with Granadan Muslims somewhere along Spain's southeastern coast. He and his Ottoman corsairs based themselves in Bougie and Bône and on the island of Jirba, and from there conducted raids on Christian coasts and shipping. Reis was active in the area until 1495, when he was recalled to Istanbul by Bayezit.21

Fernando's response to reports of a Mudejar embassy to the Turks (23 April 1487) after the arrival of the Nasrid ambassadors and poetry in the Mamluk and Ottoman courts, and probably not long after Kemal Reis sailed into western Mediterranean waters, gives to these reports

a ring of truth.22 Their veracity is supported further by their specific identification of the two Mudejar envoys. Fernando's informants had emphasized three points: (1) Mudejar financial aid to Granada; (2) a Mudejar appeal to the Ottomans that Granada was desperately in need of help against the Christian onslaught; and (3) Mudejar assurances of their rising in tandem with an Ottoman invasion. The central factor was the Mudejar preoccupation with Granada's fate. It was more than coincidental that the Mudejar embassy was sent within a year of the Nasrids' decision to take diplomatic initiatives in the hope of alleviating their grave situation. Communication between Valencian and Granadan Muslims was frequent, as they were closely linked by ties of kinship and commerce23 and often crossed each other's national borders with or without official license.24 Both groups realized that the Turks were Granada's only hope and acted accordingly. It is certainly possible that Mudejar envoys in conjunction with Granadan Muslims met with Kemal Reis somewhere along Spain's southeastern coast, perhaps near Almería, a city with which Valencian Muslims had close relations.25 In this scenario "the Turk" with whom the Mudejars made contact would have been Kemal Reis, not Bayezit II. An alternative to an Iberian rendezvous was a Maghriban one, perhaps at Reis's base in Bougie, which was more accessible than Istanbul. The Mudejars were certainly in touch with Ottoman corsairs by 1502.26 Earlier contacts, while there was still some hope for the Nasrids, do not seem improbable.

After this episode the spectre of a Mudejar-Ottoman conspiracy ceased to haunt Fernando. Once Granada was conquered the threat of a Turkish invasion in relief of the Nasrids was removed, and with it the possibility of an Ottoman-inspired Mudejar insurrection.

Granada

For Spanish Christians the Ottoman Turks were a relatively new arrival in the Mediterranean arena of religion and politics. Their main theater of operations lying in the East, the Turks were an unfamiliar foe whose aggressive expansion filled the Spanish with dread, each Turkish conquest conjuring up images of atrocity and horror.27 It is not surprising that this "Turkophobia" sparked rumors of a Mudejar revolt in the Ottomans' favor. In contrast, the Spanish were well acquainted with the Muslims of Granada. For centuries the rulers of Granada, the Maghrib, Castile, and Aragon had engaged in a bewildering complexity of alliances as a means of maintaining an uneasy balance of power. The permeable Granadan frontier had seen the regular passage of both raiding parties and merchants. In Granada there lay little of mystery and

even less to fear. The union of Castile and Aragon deprived the Nasrids of the surest means of ensuring their state's survival, the ability to play off one Christian kingdom against the other.28 Cognizant of the fact that the Nasrids were on the defensive, Fernando did not trouble himself over the possibility of an invasion from Granada with an attendant Mudejar rising. This scenario was more characteristic of thirteenth-century than of late fifteenth-century conditions. Only when an Ottoman offensive threatened to overtake western Europe, thereby enhancing the offensive capacity of western Islam, did Fernando give serious consideration to the implications of the Mudejars' ambivalent loyalty. Otherwise, Mudejar dissidence and shadowy allegiance to Granada was little more than one of the accustomed nuisances of frontier life, a thorn in the side perhaps, but not a threat to the state.

The initial years of Fernando's reign were characterized by a continuation of the traditional contacts between Granada and the Crown of Aragon. Until the crusade began in earnest, Valencian merchants, both Christian and Muslim, plied the short-distance maritime trade between the ports of Valencia and Almería. As late as October 1482, the bailiff general and the jurates of Valencia were requesting that the qa'id * (alcayt ) of Almería treat Valencian merchants with favor.29 Having recently concluded a pact with the qa'id of Almería and the sultan of Granada, the jurates of Valencia corresponded with Almerian officials and with the sultan himself regarding the affairs of Valencian merchants. In one case, the jurates sought the release of the merchant Perot Miquel, whom the Almerian authorities had unjustly arrested on account of the debts of another Christian merchant.30 Mudejars from various morerías continued the trade with Almería that had been monopolized by the Valencian merchant families Ripoll, Bellvis, Xupio, Benxarnit, and Razbayda until the sack of Valencia's morería in 1455. Other Mudejars travelled there to collect the inheritances of deceased relatives or to study Arabic.31 Likewise, business drew to Valencia Granadan Muslims such as Abdalla Çalema of Almería, who returned to Valencia, his former home, as an agent of Almería's qa'id and to settle accounts with his own creditors.32 The outbreak of war understandably necessitated the restriction of movement between Granada and Valencia, thereby disrupting the flow of trade.

While Muslim and Christian merchants resided comfortably in each other's cities under official protection, both sides engaged in the desultory frontier warfare of the lightning raid and the taking of booty and captives. Although the kingdom of Valencia was not contiguous with the sultanate of Granada, Muslim raiders found that the intervening kingdom of Murcia, mountainous and sparsely populated, provided little impediment to their incursions.33 On account of their relatively ex-

posed position, Orihuela, Elche, and Alicante had formed, in 1399, a Hermandad (Brotherhood) with the Mudejar aljamas of the area. Because the Mudejars were known to act as spies for the Granadan almugavers (raiders), one clause of the charter of the Hermandad demanded that the aljamas pay the ransom of any Christian captured by the Muslims. The Christians were to do the same for any captive Mudejar whom the neighboring Castilians might carry off. The Hermandad had dissolved by 1407, so that the Catholic Monarchs found themselves confronted with the same frontier problem. Thus, in 1483 Isabel was compelled to command that action be taken against those Mudejars of Murcia who were bearing arms and abetting Granadan enemies by hiding them in their homes.34

The Granadan Muslims who were able to infiltrate Murcia encountered little hindrance to their entry into Valencia. In September 1481, Fernando felt obliged to act decisively on the matter. He deplored the fact that Muslims were secretly entering the kingdom from Granada and perpetrating many crimes against the persons and property of Christians travelling on the kingdom's roads. The king was aware of Mudejar collusion with the enemy, pointing out that the almugavers were making themselves inconspicuous in the kingdom's large morerías by mixing in with and thereby increasing their populations. Fernando sought to remedy the problem by more tightly controlling the kingdom's roads. Any Muslim seen traveling by unaccustomed routes was to be seized and brought before the bailiff general for judgment. Fernando was particularly interested in the prosecution of the guides (adelils ), presumably Mudejars, captured in the company of enemy Muslims. They were to be handed over to royal officials and punished in exemplary fashion.35 These measures would affect only those Mudejars clearly working with the almugavers as spies and guides. Entire morerías , the majority of whose inhabitants probably turned a blind eye to the comings and goings of the Granadan visitors, would escape chastisement. Two years later the kingdom still had its share of Granadan infiltrators. Consequently, Fernando reissued the above orders.36

It may be that this state of affairs was partly responsible for the royal proclamation made in the city of Valencia in 1481. So that they might be easily distinguished from the Christians, the Jews and Muslims were to wear special symbols—blue garments, beards, and tonsures in the case of the latter.37 In 1486 Fernando explicitly cited the Mudejars' failure to wear symbols as being a factor which enabled them, incognito, to assault and kidnap Christians. However, the addition of Muslim sexual relations with Christian women to the list of resultant evils suggests that social issues were at least as compelling in the issuance of the royal proclamation.38 Royal officials, then, had to contend with two forms of

Muslim dissimulation: the incognito almugaver mixed in with the Mudejar population, and the Muslim in Christian attire concealing his religious affiliation. Detection and capture of almugavers and Mudejar spies would have been extremely difficult.

Nevertheless, there were some successes. In 1480 there were still pending from 1475 cases of Valencian Muslims accused of the crime of collera , the kidnapping of Christians for sale as slaves in Islamic countries.39 Mudejars of Nompot, near Alicante, and Aspe were arrested for the same crime.40 Almugavers captured in Murcia and in an area as far north as the Vall de Uxó were to be interrogated about their mode of operation and the accessories to their crimes.41 Enhanced travel restrictions proved effective. Mudejars traveling on the prohibited backroad linking Tibi to Cocentaina were seized.42 Others who had journeyed to Granada without royal license were caught and punished with enslavement.43 There was surprisingly little arbitrary seizure of Mudejars by royal officials, which excess Fernando's road controls might well have provoked. In any case, the forays of almugavers with the collusion of Mudejar colleagues seem to have ceased after 1483. This was due to the escalation of the war against Granada, which forced the Nasrids into a defensive posture. Also, the war brought more stringent border controls, so that Murcian Muslims could enter the kingdom only through the city of Orihuela.44 Therefore, the war that erected a barrier to commercial traffic also shielded Valencia from the depredations of Granadan almugavers .

During the decade-long crusade against Granada Fernando does not seem to have viewed the Mudejars as a serious military problem. Strategies were not adapted for the eventuality of a Mudejar rising in Granada's favor, nor were preventive measures taken beyond the investigation of rumors. It is true that after the taking of Alhama, in an effort to raise subsidies for the war from the estates of Valencia, the king warned various nobles and prelates that on account of its large Muslim population and its proximity to Granada the kingdom could be in some danger were Granada not conquered.45 However, Fernando probably should not be taken too seriously here. Such a warning was a bargaining ploy, not an honest assessment of the real possibilities of a Nasrid counteroffensive. It is possible that at this early stage of the war (January, 1483) Fernando still had the Ottoman threat at the back of his mind. Indeed, it was only with respect to the Turks that Fernando had even suggested the impracticable disarming of all Mudejars. The Nasrids lacked the Turks' offensive capabilities and appeared weak before the combined power of Aragon and Castile. Fernando could afford to be confident that Christian dominance in Valencia would circumscribe Mudejar disloyalty to the few who intrigued with almugavers and cor-

sairs. The royal confidence was well founded, for not a Mudejar sword was unsheathed in defense of the beleaguered Nasrid sultanate.

If reluctant to draw their swords, it may be that the Mudejars were more willing to empty their purses in support of the Nasrids. In December 1486, it was reported that all the morerías of the kingdom, seigneurial as well as royal, were providing the sultan with annual subsidies equaling the value of the hides of all the animals they had slaughtered, probably during the ^c id * al-kabir * , the festival commemorating the sacrifice of Abraham.46 Five months later the report was more detailed. Apart from their embassy to the Turks, the Mudejars had been sending financial support to the Nasrids since 1481. In each morería the faqih * was charged with the responsibility of collecting funds from every Muslim. In addition to proffering financial aid, the Mudejars were doing what they could to turn toward the sultan the favor of the Divine. The faqih s were leading their congregations in a prayer that beseeched God to exalt the sultan of Granada and to destroy the Catholic Monarch and his hosts, along with "other ignorant words of blasphemy that offend the ears." The king, exasperated, ordered investigation and, if necessary, punishment. As for the results, the documents are silent.47

It seems reasonable that in lieu of military activity the Muslims of Valencia would have resorted to the collection of funds to assist the monarch of the last Islamic state on Spanish soil. A subject minority, the Mudejars derived moral and spiritual sustenance from the existence of that remnant of al-Andalus to which they were bound by both religion and kinship. José Hinojosa Montalvo suggests that the Nasrid sultan exercised a spiritual leadership over the Valencian Muslims, noting that in 1455 the sultan had expressed his concern about the welfare of the Mudejars by sending to the Valencian authorities a strong protest over the sack of the city's morería .48 It is possible that the Mudejars invoked the name of the reigning Nasrid in their Friday prayers. They might have taken it a bit further by praying for his victory over Fernando's armies. Their effort to make contact with the Turks in the Nasrids' behalf, if true, is another indication of their deep attachment to the Granadan sultanate. Still, beyond the inaudible sinking of Muslim hearts, the fall of Granada had no further reverberations in Mudejar Valencia.

The exigencies of the war against Granada did not drastically alter Fernando's Mudejar policy. So long as the Mudejars displayed their obedience by paying taxes and refraining from anti-Christian violence on a large scale, Fernando felt free to pursue a relatively "liberal" wartime policy. Given the size of Valencia's Muslim population, their well-known contacts with Granada, and the Ottoman danger, a policy of cruel repression would not have been exceptional. Two factors probably dissuaded Fernando from resorting to harsh and hasty expedients. One

was the very size of the Muslim population, which cautioned him against an oppression that might have provoked a rebellion more quickly than the feelings aroused by the war itself. The other was his assumption that the nobles could control their own Muslim vassals, and his realization that they would likely oppose any extreme departure from the traditional Mudejar policy. Thus, Fernando exercised discretion and restraint in response to the reports of Mudejar insurgency. A reading of the documentation indicates that the conduct of the war did not significantly disturb Mudejar communities in their local economic and social pursuits.

The war had its greatest impact on the Mudejars' freedom of travel. Royal control of Mudejar movement was nothing new, however. Alfonso V had established in 1418 that Muslims living in areas north of the Jijona River could not travel south of the Jijona without the permission of the bailiff general. This measure was meant to prevent their passage into Granada and Castile.49 Although economic fluctuations must be taken into account, since the majority of Mudejars traveled south for commercial reasons, an examination of the number of travel licenses granted each year can be helpful in determining the effects of the war.50

The decrease in the number of licenses granted during the war years 1485 through 1490, although only moderate until 1489 and 1490, reflects a more stringent wartime policy. In 1491, once Almería and Baza had fallen and the capture of Granada seemed certain, almost twice as many licenses were granted as in the busiest prewar year of 1481. This spurt of activity indicates a Mudejar reaction to the bailiff general's relaxation of the previous stringency. This high level continued in 1492 and 1493, except now Mudejars could travel to Castile and Granada as well as beyond the Jijona River. Postwar population shifts stimulated by Fernando's policy (see below) account for much of this movement. The

marked decrease in the number of licenses granted after 1494 can perhaps be attributed to a gradual cordoning off of the former sultanate as an aid to Talavera's missionary efforts. The mere trickle from 1500 through 1502 was due to the revolts in the Alpujarras and to the subsequent conversions of the Muslims of Granada, Murcia, and Castile.51 From this it can be ascertained that royal policy in Valencia was precautionary and mildly restrictive rather than unduly repressive. Except for the itinerant retail merchants, most Mudejars would not have found such restrictions especially burdensome.

Fernando's postwar policy was an affirmation of his belief in the continuing viability of Mudejarism. Satisfied that Valencian society had survived the shocks of the Granadan campaigns and the worst of the Ottoman threat without major incident, he saw no problem in encouraging the settlement of Granadan Muslims in Valencia. After all, as the "royal treasure" the Mudejars were a valuable asset to which the Granadans were merely an addition. Muslims from Vera, Almería, and Granada were settled in a number of Valencian localities.52 Valencian Muslims with relatives in Granada were allowed to retrieve them for relocation in Valencia.53 Even those Granadans who had first opted for the Maghriban sites of Oran and Tunis were given a second chance to become royal vassals in Fernando's kingdom.54 For both conqueror and conquered the lure of material benefits outweighed the ideal of life in a land of religious uniformity.

Another aspect of this postconquest "liberalization" was the issuance of licenses for travel to and from the new kingdom of Granada. Freed Muslim slaves who had chosen to remain in Valencia were permitted to return home to Granada to visit relatives and to take care of personal affairs.55 Some Mudejars took advantage of the opportunity to enjoy the splendor of Granada's Islamic culture. A Muslim from the Vall de Uxó went there to study Islamic law.56 This state of affairs was to last only a few years, after which time Fernando's more balanced approach was thwarted by the extremism of Isabel and Cardinal Cisneros.

The Maghrib

The papal concession of indulgences for a crusade against North Africa and Spain's subsequent conquests along the southern Mediterranean littoral—Melilla (1497), Mers-el-Kebir (1505), Penón* de Vélez (1507), Oran (1509), and Algiers, Bougie, and Tunis (1510)—suggest a confrontation between Christianity and Islam so sharp as to have again thrown the question of Mudejar allegiance into relief. However, because the crusade was more apparent than real, particularly with respect

to the Crown of Aragon, and because the Mudejars themselves had played a role during the previous centuries of Catalan-Maghriban relations, Mudejar contacts with Maghriban Muslims presented no more of a problem than those they maintained with Granada.

The key to understanding Fernando's relative lack of distress over the Mudejar-Maghriban connection, which could have compounded the difficulties presented by the rumored Ottoman-Nasrid-Mudejar conspiracy, lies in the political circumstances of his Maghriban adversaries. Rent by internal divisiveness, with each sultan's power base urban-centered and dependent on shifting alliances with the Berber tribesmen controlling the countryside, the Maghriban sultanates were incapable of presenting a united front to the Spanish, much less of mounting an offensive. They lacked the military organization and the gunpowder technology to offer effective resistance. Even if they had been anxious to place themselves under the protective wing of the Ottomans, the latter were in no position to shore up the defenses of western Islam until they defeated the Mamluks in 1517. Indicative of the debility of the Maghriban states is the fact that during the war against Granada they remained largely on the sidelines.57

It would be difficult and perhaps overly artificial to disentangle Fernando's crusading fervor from the geopolitical and commercial motives behind the expansion into North Africa. Still, it seems that in his formulation of a Maghriban policy worldly considerations were more weighty. The conquest of Granada itself compelled the Spanish to gain a foothold in the Maghrib. Without the Nasrid buffer state Spain's southern coastlines were susceptible to the raids of Maghriban corsairs, whose forces were substantially augmented by Granadan refugees desirous of vengeance on the Christian conquerors. The corsairs' depredations coupled with the restiveness of the subject Granadan population threatened the survival of the new kingdom and advised the taking of strategic points along the North African coast, from which the sea lanes could be better controlled. The lure of African gold made sites such as Melilla, a terminus of the Saharan caravan routes, more attractive. Strategic considerations guided the Spanish endeavor to establish dominion over the island of Jirba, which, along with Malta, would have allowed for the control of the seas between Sicily and Tunisia. The Crown of Aragon's wider Mediterranean interests, which, when the French advanced into Naples, diverted Fernando from the African crusade, seem to have dictated the ultimate course of his Maghriban policy. The invasion and settlement of the African interior were favored by Cardinal Cisneros, an embodiment of the crusading spirit who funded and personally led the expedition against Oran. The Cardinal's aspirations were more akin to those of Queen Isabel, whose dying wish was

for the continuation of "the conquest of Africa and the war for the faith against the Moors." Fernando, however, preoccupied with Italian affairs, was unwilling to put forth the resources such an enterprise would have required. The logical conclusion to the crusade against the Moors as suggested by the Granadan experience, namely, Christian settlement and conversion of the indigenous population, was not attempted. Rather, Fernando was content to maintain a string of coastal garrisons, or presidios , designed to protect the coasts and commerce of Spain and Italy against Maghriban attacks, and hopefully to establish control over the Maghriban commercial networks. The outcome of Fernando's African crusade was determined as much by the desire to establish Spanish hegemony in the western Mediterranean as by a zeal to subjugate the infidel.58

The crusades against Granada and Africa, both largely Castilian enterprises, did not radically change the main contours of Valencia's relations with the Maghrib. Throughout the fifteenth century Valencians engaged in commerce there. The volume of this commercial traffic, never great, seems to have diminished somewhat at the end of the century, owing to the Maghrib's internal strife and to the Castilian offensive. The trade was usually carried by Christian ships, Valencian, Venetian, or Genoese. Imports included animal hides, wax, luxury items such as ostrich plumes, and, of course, African gold. The exports most in demand in the Maghrib were textiles and illegal articles of trade, such as arms, iron, sulfur, and alum. In the latter half of the century 56 percent of this trade was with Hafsid* Tunisia. This accorded well with Fernando's promotion of the sale of Sicilian wheat there.59

Maghriban merchants, the majority from Tunis and Oran, were frequent visitors to Valencia. Usually arriving on the Venetian galleys that regularly traveled the route between the Maghrib and Valencia, these merchants were granted royal license to conduct their business in the kingdom for periods of one year or more.60

The waters of the Mediterranean which allowed for the establishment of commercial ties between Christendom and Africa also provided the corsair with an ample field of action. Although corsairs were certainly capable of criminal acts against their coreligionists, Mediterranean piracy was, nevertheless, an essential element of the larger struggle between Christianity and Islam. Neither officially sanctioned nor ideologically inspired, piracy was no less cruel to its victims than crusade or war. It constantly threatened to undo the friendship fostered by commerce. But like commerce, piracy was profitable to Christian and Muslim alike, reaping rewards in booty and slaves. Christian merchants easily made the transition to piracy when it suited their interests. They victimized Muslims plying the Maghriban coastal trade and even those

making the pilgrimage to Mecca.61 On land Muslims were no safer. They were stolen away from their homes and sold into slavery.62 In response to the complaints of the sultan of Tunis, Fernando had to admonish Christian merchants to cease the kidnapping of Muslims who entered their ships to inspect their wares.63

Perhaps because of their overall military weakness, the Maghriban sultanates often resorted to privateering as a means of inflicting damage on the increasingly aggressive Iberian powers. The Catalan, Balearic, and Valencian coastlines were constantly plagued by Maghriban corsairs. With respect to Valencia, this piratical activity seems to have increased in the latter third of the fifteenth century.64 Indeed, the correspondence between the jurates of Valencia, Murviedro, and Cullera is filled with reports of the sightings of Maghriban galleys. Not only did Muslim corsairs wreak havoc on Valencia's coastal shipping, they also made daring forays onto the mainland. The objective was always the taking of booty and Christian captives. For instance, corsairs from Bougie set upon a galley transporting wheat to Gandía, killing two Christians and capturing another,65 while in another case, ten Christian fishermen were borne off.66 There is an interesting exchange of letters between the bailiff general and the jurates of Castellón de la Plana regarding the strategy to be employed against Muslim raiders ensconced on a nearby island. The jurates, whose plan was to move against the corsairs whose signal fires they had spotted, wanted to be guaranteed full rights to any Muslim they were taking the trouble to capture. On this point the bailiff general concurred, but he suggested laying an ambush for the entire raiding party instead of nabbing only a few scouts.67 Given such harrowing conditions, efforts had to be made to improve the system of coastal vigilance and defense, particularly at Oropesa in the north and at Guardamar in the south.68 Ships were manned and armed to patrol Valencia's coastline.69 Although these measures had some efficacy, resulting in the capture of Maghriban corsairs,70 Muslim galleys still slipped through. The situation, which probably worsened after 1492, when the corsairs found many new Granadan recruits,71 became especially critical in 1502 and 1503.72

The sequel to the piratical episodes was the ransoming of captives. In Valencian society this was a matter of great concern, for it was always feared that Christian prisoners would be induced to renege on the Catholic faith. The Order of Mercedarians remained active in the redemption of captives,73 and some towns, such as Biar, had special funds reserved for this purpose.74 While families worked to ransom loved ones and lords their vassals,75 the king did what he could to lend a hand. In 1489 Fernando instructed his ambassador to Tunis to congratulate the new sultan on his accession, to promise him support against his uncle

ruling Tripoli, and to demand the release of all the Christians imprisoned in Tunis, or at least of those of high rank.76 In another case, the proceeds from the estate of a condemned Converso were granted to a man from Elche trying to ransom his son held in Bougie.77

Inhabiting a kingdom marked by the comings and goings of Maghriban merchants, slaves, and corsairs ensured that Valencia's Muslims were bound to the Maghrib by much more than an abstract religious and cultural affinity. A concrete Mudejar-Maghriban connection was further sustained by the officially sanctioned travel of Mudejars to Maghriban ports, especially Tunis, but also Oran, Algiers, and One. Allowed to remain there for one year, they traded, visited relatives and collected the inheritances of those deceased, studied Arabic, made pilgrimages (most likely to North African shrines instead of Mecca, given the limitations of time), or simply enjoyed a bit of tourism.78

Mudejars had kinfolk in the Maghrib as a result of two complementary patterns of minor population movement. On one hand, Mudejars were sometimes permitted to emigrate to North Africa, although never in great numbers.79 On the other hand, Maghriban prisoners of war—either victims of Christian piracy or pirates themselves—who had been ransomed by Mudejar aljamas sometimes preferred permanent residence in Valencia to a return to their birthplaces.80 Thus, Valencian and Maghriban might trade places, the difference lying more in the religion of their respective suzerains than in the circumstances of their community life. The settlement of Granadan Muslims in Valencia after 1489 further complicated the picture, so that within the Christian kingdom itself the Mudejar might rub shoulders with a variegated throng of Muslims. Some sense of this is conveyed in the confessions of the Malagan Muslim Caçim Abdalla before the tribunal of the bailiff general. Caçim had journeyed from Segorbe to the city of Valencia in the company of two Mudejars, from Cocentaina and Oliva. While in Valencia he met Mahomat Arayz of Oran, whom he questioned about employment opportunities in the area. Having no luck finding employment, the two turned to petty theft, which landed them in the bailiff's court.81

The ease with which contact could be established between Muslims of various origins must have increased the potential for Mudejar involvement in anti-Christian activity. Captive Maghriban corsairs and recently conquered Granadans, embittered over their own fate, might have inspired Mudejars to take up their cause.82 The corsairs valued the Mudejars for their knowledge of the kingdom's coastline and interior. If the latter were willing, the corsairs could establish a network of spies and guides to facilitate their infiltration of Valencian territory. Plans for piratical raids could be made and messages sent with Mudejars and

with Maghriban merchants and ransomed captives crossing to North Africa.

To the good fortune of the kingdom the majority of its Mudejars seem to have declined to risk participation in such subversive action. Still, the corsairs were able to find volunteers. Some of the aforementioned Muslims accused of the crime of collera could have been acting in concert with either Granadan or Maghriban raiders. The documents are not always clear on this point.83 There is no doubt about the guilt of the Mudejar of Cocentaina, who was captured by the people of Alcudiola when they beat off the attack of 100 corsairs from Oran.84 One captive corsair told how his party was guided from Guardamar inland to Rojales by a Mudejar of Albatera.85 It is also possible that when the corsairs left behind their own spies, the latter were hidden by Mudejar communities.86 Even more striking is the information received by the jurates of Valencia, that Bablaguer, a Mudejar of Oliva, was piloting a corsair squadron of six ships sailing out of Oran.87

According to the bailiff general, the Mudejars of the coastal towns were the most troublesome. Those possessing fishing boats would, under the pretense of fishing, lead to the kingdom's shores the galleys of corsairs intent on capturing Christians. These "fishermen" would also help Muslim slaves to escape in their boats. Because his own prohibitions against the Muslim ownership of fishing boats had not been obeyed, the bailiff requested that Fernando apply the force of royal authority. He suggested that the king enact the same prohibition, with the addition that if Muslims had to fish they must do so in Christian boats. Violators should be punished with slavery and their lords penalized as well.88 Yet it seems that Fernando did not follow the bailiff's recommendations.

The absence of energetic royal action to curb such Mudejar activity was probably due to the fact that it was not a widespread phenomenon. Even taking into account the difficulty of its detection, the few instances in which the royal authorities actually discovered Mudejars plotting with Maghriban enemies seem to indicate this. Indeed, in 1502, in their effort to persuade the king that Valencia's Muslims ought not to be converted, the nobles argued that in the past, when they were not afraid of being forcibly baptized, the Mudejars often advised Christians of the coming of corsairs.89 Although the nobles were clearly acting out of self-interest, their argument likely held a considerable amount of truth, for if the Mudejars often associated with corsairs, they would not have been so highly valued as vassals. In 1503, the lords of Benidorm, Polop, and Calpe—all coastal towns—beseeched Fernando to permit the safe and unpenalized return of their Muslim vassals who had fled to the Maghrib during the disturbances of 1502. They maintained that while in Africa

their vassals did not capture Christians, but picked up information regarding "the damage that the Moors from beyond would like to do." Fernando, impressed, complied with their request.90 Thus, the intelligence network between Muslims of opposite Mediterranean shores could work both ways, sometimes to the kingdom's benefit.

The fact that Fernando did not govern his Muslim subjects with an iron hand does not mean he threw all caution to the winds. Just as the war against Granada had necessitated some restriction of Mudejar movement to the southern zone of the kingdom, it also resulted in the cessation of Muslim travel between Valencia and the Maghrib. The bailiff general's alternating stringency and liberality in the granting of licenses for travel abroad to Mudejars roughly parallels the pattern of the bestowal of licenses for internal travel. After 1484 no licenses were granted, but in 1491 the restriction was gradually lifted. As for the commercial activity of Maghriban merchants in Valencia, it reasserted itself in 1486, and, while not evident in 1487 and 1488, rose markedly in 1489 and continued until 1500.91 Interestingly, this commerce was curtailed at the time of the Muslim revolts in the Alpujarras (1500–1501), but not after the declaration of a crusade against Africa in 1494. Fernando and his bailiff general were guided primarily by a sustained interest in the kingdom's economic welfare. They did not wish to curb the trade carried by Valencian and Maghriban Muslims any more than was absolutely necessary.

The formulation of policy on Mudejar emigration to the Maghrib, although apparently of great relevance to the kingdom's security, was also dictated by the economic interests of the most powerful sectors of Valencian society. While the king might make temporary monetary gains by permitting the emigration of those Mudejars able to pay the required duties,92 the Mudejars' long-term value to the purses of the monarch and the secular and ecclesiastical lords ensured that they were conceded the privilege of emigration only rarely, if at all. If royal and seigneurial reluctance to open the doors to Mudejar emigration had been based on a fear that their erstwhile vassals might return in the guise of enemy corsairs and soldiers, then they would not have allowed them to travel to the Maghrib for temporary visits, for, if the Mudejars so wished, a year's sojourn in Africa could become a permanent change of residence.93 The permeability of the Mediterranean frontier, a condition created by the policies of both Christian and Muslim rulers, offered the Mudejars numerous opportunities to cause trouble. Emigration would not have made a substantial difference in this potential. At any rate, there is little evidence from Fernando's reign that Valencia's Muslims were clamoring for permission to emigrate.94 Only during the years of crisis after 1500 did this become the case.

The Mudejars

Considering the question of Mudejar loyalty in more general terms, it seems reasonable to posit that many of Valencia's Muslims harbored sentiments of allegiance to the wider Islamic world. Such sentiments made them potential insurgents against the government of the Christian state in which they resided. The course of action followed by the Mudejars was guided by their assessment of the realities of the distribution of power among Christian and Islamic polities in the West, by the habits of thought and action resulting from more than two centuries of coexistence with Christians, and by Iberian and Maghriban traditions of self-interested political alliance which often cut across religious boundaries.

The history of Mudejar rebellion in the kingdom of Valencia is a useful indicator of how the Mudejars evaluated their own position. The rebellions progressively decreased in both incidence and ferocity over the centuries. In the thirteenth century they were numerous and threatened the new kingdom's survival; in the fourteenth century they were few and ineffective; and in the fifteenth century there were no incidents, save for the minor disturbances caused by the messianic preaching of a Muslim claiming to be sent by God.95 There are three explanations for this trend. First, Christian settlement gradually but decisively shifted the population ratio, so that if in the thirteenth century Christians had been awash in a sea of Muslims, by Fernando's reign Muslims constituted only 30 percent of Valencia's population. The sheer numerical weight of the Christians and the increasing solidification of the structures of Christian authority brought home to the Mudejars the futility of rebellion. Second, as Christian power made itself more apparent within the kingdom, the debility of the states of western Islam offered to the Mudejars little prospect of succor in the event of their rising. By Fernando's reign the tables had turned to such an extent that, far from expecting aid from the Nasrid sultan, the Mudejars had to take up collections on his behalf. Third, it seems that the longer the Mudejars endured their state of subjection to Christian lordship, the more tolerable that burden became. The bitterness, resentment, and fear felt by the conquered for the conqueror gradually gave way to acceptance and familiarity. As Valencia's society evolved, with Muslim-Christian interaction at its core, the original relationship of colonialist Christian conqueror to vanquished Muslim subject was transformed into the more tolerable, albeit highly imperfect, one of social majority to minority. The conditions that had made the Muslim bristle in the thirteenth century were accepted with greater equanimity in the fifteenth century.

Under these conditions the Mudejars weighed their options. It is significant that the question of Mudejar rebellion was raised only with

reference to the Ottoman Turks. Ottoman victories in the East raised a faint glimmer of hope that Granada might be saved and Islamic rule reestablished in Valencia. Thus they offered the Turks their support in the unlikely event of an invasion of Spain. Long shot that this was, the Mudejar-Ottoman conspiracy probably never went beyond an exchange of encouraging words between Mudejar envoys and the corsair Kemal Reis.

An understanding of political and military reality determined the Mudejar reaction to the crusade against Granada. Because the Nasrids were besieged throughout the war, it was clear that a Mudejar revolt would not meet with any reciprocal Nasrid action. That they begged the Turks to relieve Granada is indicative of the Mudejars' realization that alone they could do very little to turn the tide of military events. Financial aid, as an expression of their identification with Iberia's last Muslim suzerain, was the only alternative. In the end, the fall of Granada was accepted with resignation.

The assistance given to Granadan almugavers and Maghriban corsairs by the few Mudejar extremists—a label applicable to those who were bold enough to translate into action their discontent with Christian authority—was an accustomed feature of frontier life. The quasi-institutional framework for the redemption of captives existing on both sides of the Mediterranean was prepared to deal with the eventuality of the raid. The reluctance of the king to police his Muslim subjects and his willingness to settle still more Muslims in Valencia after 1489 attest to the fact that the extremists' activities were but an irritant insufficiently widespread to elicit a change in traditional Mudejar policy. For the majority of Mudejars, aware of the extremists in their midst, the necessities of survival and the benefits accruing from assiduous labor outweighed the meager gains to be had from spying for pirates. Indeed, abstinence from such rebelliousness ensured that the king would continue his protection of their freedom to trade and pursue family business, which redounded to their material benefit. In political terms, frontier raiding was not about to alter the structures of power long in place. Few Mudejars were willing to jeopardize their physical and economic security for the limited rewards of insurgence.

This is not to suggest that the Mudejars were insensitive to the plight of their fellows. On the contrary, they displayed considerable commitment and sense of responsibility for their Muslim brethren, but they did so in areas where they could be most effective. Rather than making war, they aided prisoners of war; and rather than vainly rebelling against their Christian lords, they acted on behalf of the victims of oppression. Mudejars helped Muslim prisoners break out of seigneurial jails;96 they spirited away from brothels Muslim women forced into a life of

prostitution,97 and at times they violently resisted the efforts of royal officials to punish members of their communities.98

Most impressive was Mudejar assistance to Muslim slaves and captives. The aljamas often aided and harbored runaway slaves. A number of documents mentioning the whereabouts of runaways sound a similar note: the runaways traveling through and hiding in the morerías of the kingdom.99 This suggests that some sort of network was organized between the morerías for the purpose of abetting escaped slaves. Although details are lacking as to the degree of communication between the aljamas and the manner in which they marshaled their human and material resources on behalf of the runaways, the records do shed some light. For example, Muslims of the morería of Valencia participated in the jailbreak of a Muslim slave.100 Another aljama received a female runaway and married her off to one of its members.101 Muslims of Denia provided fugitives with a seaworthy boat and provisions for making the journey to North Africa.102 Owing to such covert activities, the royal authorities recognized by 1493 that they had a real runaway problem on their hands.103 Nine years later they threatened a general investigation of all the morerías in the kingdom. The Mudejars disingenuously countered with the argument that although individual Mudejars might have aided runaways, this did not necessarily implicate entire Mudejar communities.104

In a more licit fashion Mudejar aljamas also ransomed or purchased Muslim captives, sometimes directly off the auction block. The aljamas became especially active in this regard in 1488 and 1489, when 385 Muslim prisoners from recently conquered Málaga were brought to Valencia for sale.105 For example, in one large sale the aljama of Valencia purchased nineteen Malagan captives, all at least sixty years of age. Apparently, the Mudejars wished to prevent these elders from suffering the indignity and hardship of slavery.106 Many of these ransomed captives stayed in Valencia permanently and were able to reimburse the aljamas with the alms they begged from individual Mudejars. Alms-giving, a religious duty for all Muslims, thus acquired a special significance. As one Mudejar explained it: "among Moors of the present kingdom such is the practice ... that when they encounter a captive who is begging for the love of God they give [alms] to him."107 Through aiding enslaved Muslims, both foreign and Valencian, the Mudejars met the claims made on them by membership in an international Islamic community without rashly inciting the wrath of a Christian king whose power they could not hope to challenge.

Despite all that has been said about the possibilities of Mudejar disloyalty, it should not be assumed that all or even most of Fernando's Muslim subjects understood contemporary events in terms of Muslim-

Christian confrontation, or that each one contemplated what might be done for the cause of Islam. Beneath all the rhetoric of crusade lay the weighty determinant of self-interest. In explaining the defection of Valencia's Mudejars to Castile during the midfourteenth-century wars, John Boswell emphasizes the history of "self-interested and shifting patterns of loyalty among both the Christian and Muslim populations of the area ... abandoning one Muslim lord for another in the twelfth century or a Muslim for a Christian in the thirteenth."108 Similar circumstances obtained in the fifteenth century. Fernando, therefore, could astutely play off one Granadan faction against the other. Maghriban cities readily accepted Fernando as their suzerain in return for protection against Muslim enemies.109 It is hardly surprising that Fernando's wars against Islamic states did not provoke massive Mudejar defection when a fragmented and divisive Maghrib or a declining Granada were the alternatives to Valencia. Even within Valencia the Muslims expended as much energy in internecine quarreling and family feuding as they did in cooperative defiance of Christian authority.110

Some sense of the Mediterranean kaleidoscope of interests and loyalties, material, political, and religious, may be gleaned from a consideration of the careers of a few Granadan and Valencian Muslims. Caçim of Granada came to the kingdom of Valencia after the conquest and settled in Paterna. After some years he decided to emigrate to Oran, and once there he joined a company of corsairs. He returned to Valencia intent on capturing Christians, but unfortunately was himself taken prisoner.111 Çayde, a potter from Málaga, was captured along with his family en route to the Maghrib. He confessed that "by the will of God they wished to travel to the land of the Moors in order to die as Moors."112 Not all emigrés found that life in the Maghrib was to their liking (not to mention the ransomed Maghriban captives who chose to remain in Valencia). One Muslim from Baza who went to Africa "to seek adventure" returned to Valencia in order to become a Christian.113 Another from Málaga endeavored to return to Granada "after not liking the said land [North Africa]."114 Among the Valencian Muslims returning home after the panicked flight to the Maghrib in 1502 was Azmet Aniza of Alcudiola. He longed for Valencia, "because in that land [Africa] he did not have what [was necessary] to live."115 Stated bluntly, some Muslims, so long as they could practice Islam, preferred eating in Valencia to starvation in an Islamic land. Pragmatism, survival instinct, striking the best deal possible with one's lord, and the Valencian Muslim's deep attachment to the land of the Sharq al-Andalus —these factors weighed more heavily in the balance than ideology for many of Fernando's Muslim subjects, both old and new.

The Christian Populace

Perhaps most difficult to gauge is the extent to which popular Christian hostility against Valencia's Muslim population was aroused by the king's almost constant espousal of the crusade against Islam. Whereas royal strategy and Mudejar response can to a certain extent be interpreted as having resulted from an assessment of political reality and opportunity, an understanding of popular Christian attitudes toward the religious minorities is more elusive, mainly because they were so often rooted in stereotype, imagined wrong, and irrational fear. The material success of a few individuals could earn for an entire minority group the animus of those Christians resenting the economic advancement of their social inferiors. Violence might be perpetrated for reason of crusade or for alleged minority complicity in the spreading of plague, reasons that often masked more base economic and personal motives. The violence initiated by the few could easily spark a social riot involving mass participation. Popular attitudes and their behavioral manifestations were unpredictable, volatile, and at times uncontrollable.

The state of affairs during Fernando's reign seemed propitious for an eruption of anti-Muslim violence. For those Christians who had not experienced the loss of a loved one to Maghriban and Turkish enemies the licensed begging for ransom money by the victims and their relatives brought them face to face with the results of Muslim aggression and cruelty. Seeking alms and recounting their tales of woe, these victims disseminated the seeds of fear and hatred. There were the casualties from the eastern front. The son of a Greek count, having lost his hand in battle against the Turks, came to Spain to raise the ransom for his mother and two sisters.116 A Hungarian, who had to ransom his father within two years on pain of the latter's conversion to Islam, was allowed to beg for alms not only in Christian parishes but also in the kingdom's morerías .117 Islam, in some way, would pay. Closer to home, the Valencian brothers Redo told how when captives in Tunis "they proposed to lose life, even if they should be afflicted with injuries, labors, and tortures, rather than deny the name of Christ."118 Bernat Selles of Oropesa bewailed the plight of his two daughters, aged eight and two, whom corsairs had borne off, "because their tender age is so much in danger of denying the faith of our Redeemer."119 It would not have been unusual if such aggrieved Christians had labeled the Mudejars as somehow responsible.

In addition to the tension evoked by the insecurity of Mediterranean frontier life, there was the preaching of the crusade, first against Granada, then against North Africa, and finally against the Turks.120 What-

ever Fernando's political intentions were and for whatever ends he employed the crusading funds, the frequent preaching of crusade indulgences must have given to the populace the impression of an almost constant mobilization for holy war. Fernando had definite ideas as to how he wanted the crusade to be preached and what sort of atmosphere was to be created:

you [the governor] should work and see to it that the see and the twelve parishes of that city [Valencia] present themselves with their banners, drums, and trumpets, and with their procession in form, and the bearer [of the bull] whom the particular parish will present should take the cross in his hand on the pulpit before the people and should perform all the acts and things most suitable for drawing the people to devotion and to take the bulls of the holy crusade.121

A similar order was issued with respect to all the cities and towns.122 Moreover, each royal victory in Granada was celebrated by the chanting of "Te Deum" in the cathedral of Valencia and by a procession in honor of the Virgin Mary.123

Preaching a crusade against Islam in a kingdom with numerous Muslim communities presented obvious difficulties. Preachers would have to exercise considerable discretion so as not to implicate the Mudejars in their anti-Muslim harangues. The preacher's audience would have to distinguish between their Muslim enemies and their Muslim neighbors. Yet, how muddy the waters must have been when Mudejars were suspected of collusion with Valencia's Muslim foes. Understandably, some overly zealous preachers were unable or unwilling to make any distinctions. In 1457, in the aftermath of the violence of 1455, a Dominican friar in Valencia preached the persecution of the Mudejars. As punishment, the Order's provincial prior removed him from the city.124 As a prelude to the Germanías ' attacks on Muslims in 1521, a Franciscan of Játiva, with crucifix in hand, cried "Long live the faith of Christ and war to the Sarracens!"125

Fernando was well aware of the trouble that could be caused from the pulpit. In 1482 he instructed the archbishop of Zaragoza to make sure that the sermons preached in the churches of his see were not such that would incite the people against the local Muslims and Jews.126 In 1496 he had to reprimand the preacher of the African crusade in Zaragoza for inflaming the souls of his Christian audience against the local Muslims, so that, without reason, its members would wish to maltreat them. Fernando advised the preacher, "it seems to us you could preach your bulls without speaking of the Moors [of Zaragoza presumably]."127

Surprisingly, there were no similar royal commands to preachers in

Valencia, the kingdom where the preaching of the crusade had the greatest potential for provoking violence. However, the kingdom's nobility did complain that the Inquisitors were agitating in the see of Valencia against the Christians' eating of meat slaughtered by Muslims and Jews. This had more to do with the eradication of heresy than the crusade.128 The mobilization for the crusade does not seem to have inspired in Valencia an unleashing of Christian hostility against the Mudejar population. Preachers and populace managed to perceive the difference between domestic and foreign Muslims. That this was so is indicated by the fact that when Muslims were assaulted the victims were Maghriban, not Valencian. In 1496 and again in 1497 it was necessary to proclaim publicly "that no one should dare to maltreat the Moors of Barbary [North Africa]."129 It was more than coincidental that this violence occurred during the years of the preaching of the African crusade. In commanding that Maghriban merchants be treated benignly and that violent energies be reserved for corsairs and Maghriban armies Fernando was perhaps asking too much of his subjects.

Even though royal authority managed to persuade Christians to restrain their aggressive proclivities, the protracted struggle with Islam still dimmed their view of the Mudejars. One of the ordinances of Valencia's guild of cordmakers expresses the sentiment that all Muslims are the implacable foes of Christianity and that in the event of war the Mudejars are the natural allies of their Maghriban brethren. In justification of the exclusion of all Muslims from the guild and the practice of their trade, the officers of the guild argued that the Mudejars

with cunning and crafty ways ... work to learn and wish to know how to make all those things that are for the exercise of war in order to be able to fight with and make war against the Christians, and thus they try among other things to learn the trade of cordmaker and to know how to make crossbow string, which string it is prohibited to transport to the land of the Moors.130

This ordinance, approved by the king in January, 1497—the year of the capture of Melilla—makes sense in the context of the crusade against Africa. Still, economic motives must be regarded as partly responsible for the exaggeration of Mudejar ill will. The guild was ensuring that Muslim cordmakers would not encroach on its monopoly, which included a thriving trade with the Muslims of the Vall de Uxó, who specialized in the fabrication of hemp sandals.131

One can only surmise why Christian resentment and suspicion of the Mudejars, always evident among certain elements of the populace, were translated into extreme violence in 1455 and 1521, but not during Fer-

nando's reign. Certainly, a measure of good fortune and official vigilance were responsible for preventing the realization of the potential for spontaneous violence. That such potential existed is illustrated by an incident that occurred on Corpus Christi Day, 1491, in the capital. While the throng of Christians and Muslims watched the processions, a Mudejar seized the opportunity to murder his Muslim enemy. Many Christians, believing that a Christian was the victim, grabbed their arms with the intention of moving against the Moors. Only the timely intervention of municipal officials prevented a riot.132 This was, however, an isolated incident.

Because so much of Fernando's reign was enveloped in an atmosphere of holy war, which naturally underlined the Mudejars' essential dissidence, the absence of organized or widespread anti-Mudejar violence suggests that the ideological and military confrontation between Christianity and Islam was, in itself, not the decisive factor in the engendering of social violence. That confrontation was not decisive because, however much it was enhanced by the Catholic Monarchs, it was nothing new. The Granadan almugaver , the Maghriban corsair, and the seditious Mudejar were all familiar figures, as were the Maghriban merchant and the docile Mudejar farmer and artisan. While the former group threatened to render Muslim-Christian coexistence impossible, the latter made it workable. The centuries of experience along the Mediterranean frontier that had gradually tamed the rebellious Mudejars had also taught the Christians to make the economically essential distinction between Muslim friend and Muslim foe.

Because the crusades against Granada and Africa were primarily Castilian enterprises, it may be that their promotion in Valencia received only a lukewarm response. Certainly, a number of Christians paid little heed to the calls for crusade and followed the dictates of self-interest. The victims of Christian piracy were frequently other Christians.133 Christian merchants pledged a twelve-year-old Christian boy as collateral in their dealings with Maghriban Muslim and Jewish merchants.134 Christians illicitly transported arms to Maghriban Muslims and to the Turks,135 and they piloted the fleets of Maghriban corsairs through Christian waters.136 If Christians could deal with the Muslim enemy in this way, small wonder that the quiescent Muslims at home were left unharmed.

More decisive than the long-standing Islamic-Christian conflict in sparking the flames of violence against the Mudejars were acute social and economic problems, the reverberations of which were felt throughout society. The latent hostility between Christian and Muslim could explode into violence in times of great distress. Social struggle and reform gave way to religious conflict and forced baptisms. As members of

Valencian society the Mudejars occupied particular socioeconomic niches that linked them by bonds of interest to specific Christian social groups. When economic stress placed the latter in conflict with other Christian groups, not only were the Mudejars affected by virtue of their special alliances, they were also singled out on account of their religious difference.

Although historians have not precisely explained the causation of the attack on the morería of Valencia in 1455, it seems that considerable economic distress in combination with the Nasrid threat created the necessary conditions. Plague had hit Valencia in 1450, claiming 11,000 lives in the capital alone. In 1455 drought and a rise in prices added to the calamity. The initiators of the violence were those who would have been most affected by economic dislocations: "vagabonds, apprentices of artisans as men foreign to the city, of poor and minor condition." As might be expected, the rioters looted the Muslims' homes.137

The anti-Muslim action of the Germanías (1521) occurred at a time when social tensions had reached their peak after years of increasing economic hardship. The demographic recovery of the kingdom since the 1490s had not sparked economic growth; instead, productivity in the industrial and agrarian sectors had diminished, causing in the second decade of the sixteenth century an inflation of the prices of basic foodstuffs which especially burdened poorer artisans and farmers. The Germanías , "brotherhoods" consisting primarily of artisans who rose in revolt in 1519, initially sought only to reform the existing social and political system; but they rapidly radicalized and soon were striving to overturn that system. The victims of the Germanías ' revolution were to be the privileged classes—the urban oligarchs and especially the nobility—those deemed most responsible for an oppressive fiscal and judicial administration and who had abused their privileges to the detriment of the lower classes.138

The place held by the anti-Muslim violence in the evolution of the revolutionary movement shows that its primary cause was neither the fear of a Mudejar fifth column nor religious antagonism. In September 1519, Carlos I permitted the artisans of Valencia to arm themselves for purposes of defense against the threatening Turkish corsairs, in effect giving the Germanías ' movement a legal foundation. This Turkish threat did not move the Germanías to take violent action against the Mudejars, even if some Christians might have looked askance at them. Indeed, the Germanías , moderate at first, did not even broach the Mudejar question until the summer of 1521, when the movement was "in full revolutionary radicalism." The murder and forced baptism of the Mudejars seem to have had little, if anything, to do with the menace of Valencia's Islamic enemies. This violence, however, had much to do with the Germa -

nías ' desire to damage their main enemies within the kingdom, the seigneurs. Because Mudejar vassals farmed the land and provided revenue for many a Valencian noble, indeed often paying more taxes than their Christian counterparts, killing or converting the Muslims, the Germanías reasoned, would deliver a crippling blow to the nobility. Not surprisingly, the Germanías ' determination in this regard became particularly marked after their battles with seigneurial armies in which many Mudejars served. Attacks on royal morerías occurred only after the Germanías had vented their wrath on seigneurial Muslims.139 The radical Germanías ' statement of their intentions "to raise souls to heaven and to put money in our purses" points to economic resentment as another factor moving them to the perpetration of violence. Their principal victims in areas of royal jurisdiction were the wealthier Muslims of the irrigated zones who were competing with Christians for free lands.140 In sum, the attacks of the Germanías on the Mudejars were precipitated by economic and social forces distinct from the fundamental religious antagonism. Violence erupted when the network of social and economic relations, which normally helped to allay the ideological tension between Christian and Muslim, was itself radically distorted, thereby bringing that tension to the fore.

Years of Crisis: 1500–1503

The rumblings of change and the origins of crisis for Valencia's Mudejars issued neither from the crusades against Islam nor from within Valencian society itself, but from Granada and Castile, where Queen Isabel and Cardinal Cisneros pursued a harsh and injudicious Mudejar policy that resulted in the elimination of Mudejarism.

It has been recounted how problems began in Granada in late 1499 when the patient and benevolent archbishop Talavera was superseded by the immoderate Cisneros with his brand of conversion by coercion. There followed the revolt in Granada's Albaicín (December 1499), rebellions in the Alpujarras, the region of Almería, and the Sierra Bermeja (1500–1501), the pacification and conversion of the kingdom of Granada's Muslims (by May 1501), and, finally, the expulsion or baptism of the Mudejars of Castile (12 February 1502). It is worthwhile to recall the difficult conditions for emigration offered to the Castilian Mudejars. They were allowed to emigrate only to Egypt. The lands of the Crown of Aragon and those of Maghriban and Ottoman enemies were declared off-limits. Also, male children of less than fifteen years and females of less than thirteen were to be left behind, presumably for a thorough

Catholic indoctrination. As in past centuries, the indigenous labor force remained, but this time under the illusion of religious uniformity.141

If Fernando had thought his own kingdoms could remain immune to the tragedy of conflict and conversion transpiring in Granada, he was grievously mistaken. It took little time for news and rumors about these momentous events to reach Valencia. Only two months after the Alpujarras had risen in revolt, the jurates of Valencia reported to Fernando (29 February 1500) that on account of these incidents certain persons of ill will were propagating rumors to the effect that all the Muslims in Valencia were to become Christians, either voluntarily or by compulsion. These rumors had reached the ears of the Mudejars who, fearing for their personal safety, were trading and traveling as little as possible. The jurates, who in the wake of Ottoman victories had asked the king to take measures against the Mudejars, were now requesting that he take action against those murmuring of the Mudejars' conversion.142

The jurates do not identify the rumor-mongers. Undoubtedly, there were Christians in Valencia—Inquisitors, lower clergy, those resentful of Mudejar economic success—who approved of Cisneros's methods and were hoping to see a similar Mudejar policy instituted in their kingdom. Also, there might have been concern that the revolts in the Alpujarras and around Almería would inspire insurrection among Valencia's Muslims. In this light, the raids of Maghriban corsairs on Valencian and Andalusian coasts would have acquired more sinister implications. Perhaps the rumor-mongers reasoned that baptismal waters would erase the Mudejars' affiliations with Muslims outside of the kingdom.

Fernando wasted little time in responding to the jurates' plea. On 5 March 1500 he issued orders to the officials in those areas of the kingdom with large Muslim populations—Valencia, Játiva, Alcira, Castellón de la Plana, Villarreal, Oliva, Gandía, Valldigna, Murviedro, and the Vall de Uxó—and repeated the jurates' reports, but in more detail. The king labeled those promoting violence against the Mudejars as "malevolent persons ... moved ... by some sinister and grave intentions." Hence, they had disseminated the false rumor "that it would be and is our [Fernando's] intention and will to reduce by force to the holy faith and Christian religion all the Moors of the said kingdom [Valencia]." Fernando had little use for such propagandists, seeing them less as misguided religious zealots than as troublemakers who desired "to move all the people against the said Moors and to seek occasions to riot and rise against them." Not surprisingly, the Mudejars "fearing these novelties ... refuse to leave their communities to conduct either business or commerce."143 Fernando insisted that such rumors were not only detrimental to the entire kingdom, but also were contrary to his own inten-

tions. Although events in Granada had suggested otherwise, the king declared the principle that "our holy Catholic faith in the conversion of the infidels admits neither violence nor any force but [only] complete freedom and devotion." Those who continued to say the contrary were to be punished. All the morerías of the kingdom, both royal and seigneurial, were to be placed under royal protection and no one was to dare inflict physical or verbal abuse on the Muslims. Anyone disturbing the Muslims in their peaceful existence was to suffer penalties beyond those demanded by the Furs , commensurate with the violation of a royal safeguard.144

The subsequent cycle of rebellion and conversion or emigration in Granada and Castile, culminating in the decree of 12 February 1502, detracted from the efficacy of these commands and kept tongues wagging. By September 1501, the rumors had spread to Catalonia, compelling Fernando to issue the same orders to officials there.145 On 20 February 1502, the orders had to be reiterated in Valencia.146

Royal correspondence with the bailiff general of Valencia between March and June 1501, regarding the emigration of Mudejars through the port of Valencia, reflects the evolution of royal policy during these crucial months. On 8 March 1501 Fernando reprimanded the bailiff for permitting the emigration to North Africa of Muslims from Aragon, Catalonia, and other areas, when he had expressly forbidden the emigration of all Muslims from any of his kingdoms.147 The bailiff responded with surprise to this new order, arguing that he had given licenses only to Muslims of Castile and Navarre, not to those of Valencia, whose emigration he knew had been prohibited in the Corts of 1488.148 Although the bailiff promised obedience to royal wishes, he was again reprimanded (24 April 1501) for licensing the emigration of Catalan and Aragonese Mudejars.149 At this point Fernando must have felt some uncertainty regarding the complete pacification of Granada and the final formulation of a Mudejar policy for Granada and Castile. His primary concern was to maintain order and to prevent the mass flight of Spain's Mudejars to the Maghrib. Satisfied that the port of Valencia had been effectively sealed off, the king was still compelled to command officials in Valencia and Catalonia to stop Valencia's panicked Mudejars from embarking on boats in the area of Tortosa.150

Once sure that the rebellions in Granada had been definitely quashed, Fernando modified the emigration policy. On 25 May 1501 he allowed for the emigration of all Mudejars of the Crown of Aragon, so long as they paid the usual passage duties. However, this did not apply to Castilian Mudejars, regarding whose passage the bailiff general would have to confer with the king, "so that according to the time we can command you what will most fulfill our service."151 Fernando and

Isabel were probably already considering the conversion of Castile's Mudejars and so wished to curtail their movements. The lifting of restrictions on the Mudejars of his own kingdoms was perhaps intended as a display of good faith to assuage their anxiety. Only twenty-five Aragonese Mudejars took advantage of the opportunity.152 Although there are no records of the emigration of Valencian Muslims, the nobles were complaining in September that many Muslims were doing so with license of the bailiff general.153 Fernando's permission of this emigration was a breach of the prohibitive legislation passed in the Corts of 1488. In any case, by February 1502, the final "Christianization" of Castile necessitated that Valencia's door to the Maghrib again be slammed shut.

No one in the kingdom of Valencia had greater sensitivity to the pulse of Mudejar life than the noblemen on whose estates the majority of Mudejars were vassals.154 They saw firsthand the Mudejar reaction to the Monarchs' Castilian policies. If Valencia's Muslims had been uneasy on account of the fate of their recently conquered fellows in Granada, the conversion of Castile's Mudejars, who had lived under Christian rule for as long a time as themselves, brought them to the verge of panic. On 12 April 1502, the military estate of Valencia informed Fernando of this in no uncertain terms.

Two things were kindling fear in the Mudejars' souls. First, the proclamation that all Muslims of Castile must either convert or emigrate led them to believe that the king would also compel them to convert "per indirectum." Valencia's Muslims had no illusions about the supposed freedom of choice offered by the Monarchs to the Castilians, and were aware of the difficult conditions attached to their emigration ("they have to become Christians or they have to leave the kingdom [Castile] in a certain manner and under certain conditions contained in the said proclamation"). They understood the Monarchs' method of conversion by indirect coercion—that is, anything short of dragging Muslims to the baptismal font—which, although it might satisfy Catholic theologians, would mean for them, as Muslims, an unwilling submission in the most trying of circumstances. The prohibition against Muslims entering and trading in Castile further aroused the Mudejars' suspicions.155

Second, the Mudejars believed that the Inquisition was going to proceed against them for having dissuaded Muslims from conversion and for having claimed that Islam is a better religion than Christianity. The Inquisitors' imprisonment of two Muslims led them to think that a general Inquisition of all Muslims was being planned. The Mudejars were "beside themselves with fear," because it was true that they all defended their religion, and that in their mosques the faqih s* preached the merits of Islam and warned that Christianity leads to damnation. They

reasoned that this would provide the Inquisitors with sufficient excuse to punish them, and that, in order to escape the Inquisition's unendurable penalties, they would either have to convert or flee.156 From the Jews' experience the Mudejars had learned the lesson of the connection between conversion, Inquisition, and the horrors of the auto-da-fé.

The lords of the military and ecclesiastical estates had already warned the Inquisitors of the great damage the kingdom would suffer if, by their actions, they provoked a Mudejar revolt. In reply, the Inquisitors had assured them that the Mudejars' fears were unfounded and that they had imprisoned the two Muslims only because the latter had come to the palace of the Inquisition in order to dissuade and threaten other Muslims who were there to be baptized. The lords were planning to circulate the Inquisitors' response among the Muslims so as to assuage their fears on at least that score.157

For the complete restoration of calm the nobles deemed that royal intervention was essential, and they advanced weighty arguments to prompt it. They reminded the king that the Mudejars constituted the economic foundation of the kingdom and that, were they forced to abandon it, the economy would crumble. The churches, the knights, the urban rentier class, and the artisans would all be grievously affected. Given the interdependence of the economy's components, "[when] some are destroyed, all are destroyed." Already the Muslims were so distraught that they no longer wished to work and ceased paying rents to their lords. Instead, they were hiding their movable goods in mountain caches and selling what they could of their remaining property.158

Worse still, the present state of affairs was driving the Mudejars to the brink of violent reaction. The nobles, who in previous years had been much less concerned than either the king or Valencia's jurates about possible Mudejar collusion with Muslim enemies, were now raising the specter of Mudejar insurrection. They warned that there were more than 22,000 households of Muslims in the kingdom, who were well armed, had an intelligence network, and lived near impregnable mountain fastnesses. Because the Mudejars were so apprehensive that conversion might be forced on them, any untoward movement on the king's part could result in the deaths of Christians and Muslims and in the destruction of much property, all redounding to the irreparable damage of the kingdom. At this point the nobles maintained that the Mudejars, who had once warned Christians of the approach of Maghriban corsairs, would now welcome them. Notice of the sighting of at least seventeen corsair galleys made this argument more pointed. Although the nobles had an obvious interest in exaggerating the peril in which the kingdom might be placed, the Mudejars' desperation was real enough.

Indeed, the Mudejars had boats hidden along the coast, and it was

suspected that they were using them to escape to Africa. Already more than thirty Muslims had fled from Polop, while the lord Bernat de Almunia found that he was losing vassals each day. If the king did not do something to put the Muslims' fears to rest it would be almost impossible to prevent their departure.159

The nobles' communication to Fernando of 24 May 1502 reveals that the king had, in fact, ordered the viceroy, his sister Juana, the Queen of Naples, to take measures, but that the nobles were not at all pleased with the royal provisions. Fernando had intended to freeze Mudejar movement: Mudejars were not to change their vassalage; they were not to sell their possessions; and they were not to have boats or go near the sea, all under penalty of enslavement. The nobles felt that such provisions would do anything but inspire confidence among the Muslims, who would perceive them as preliminary to their forced conversion. Therefore, they had convinced the viceroy to delay their public proclamation. Again the nobles insisted that Fernando interdict all interference by the Inquisitors in the affairs of Muslims. The king must give assurances that Castilian Mudejar policy would not have a Valencian sequel.160

By July the situation still had not improved. On the contrary, the imprudent actions of the viceroy had served only to enhance the Mudejars' fears. At the instance of one of her servants, a certain Micer Julio, whose slave had run away, Queen Juana was conducting an investigation of the Mudejars' assistance to runaways. Throughout the month of June citations were affixed to the doors of the mosques of each morería , commanding the aljamas to send representatives to appear before the viceroy to answer the charges. The Mudejars feared that those aljamas found guilty would be offered the choice of conversion or expulsion. The citations had so terrorized the Muslims that when one was posted in Altea the entire Muslim population of 170 climbed into Turkish ships and fled the place within two days. The barony of Callosa lost twenty-five vassals in the same way. Representatives of all three estates were moved to confer with the viceroy, and they persuaded her to revoke the citations. Then they turned to the king and requested that he put a halt to all such procedures.161 Nevertheless, throughout the summer and fall of 1502 Mudejars persisted in their attempts to flee Valencia. A number of them were captured at the coast before they could board boats and sail to Africa.162

During these panic-filled months there came to the fore the Mudejars' contacts with Maghriban corsairs and their Ottoman allies operating out of Maghriban ports. Muslim piratical activity noticeably increased in 1502 and 1503. Valencia's coasts were so harried that in April 1502, the capital and other coastal towns established a warning system that utilized smoke signals to advise not only of the enemy's approach

but also of the size of his fleet.163 Ships were outfitted to patrol the coastline.164 Moreover, it appears that the corsairs grew bolder and that the size of their raiding parties increased. Almoradi and Benidorm were attacked by forces of more than 100 and 180 Muslims, respectively.165 The corsairs' greatest success occurred in August 1503, when a party of more than 600 burned Cullera and captured at least 200 of its inhabitants.166

This increase in the Maghriban and Turkish corsairs' determination to inflict damage on Christian Spain was probably related to the peninsular developments of 1501 and 1502. The conquest of Granada in 1492 had already filled the corsairs' ranks with bitter Granadan Muslims. The revolts of the Alpujarras and the Monarchs' harsh policy in Granada likely would have done the same.167 During these years Valencia's Mudejars maintained communication with the port cities of the Maghrib. Thus, when the corsairs set sail to plunder and terrorize Valencia's coasts they also had in mind assisting the kingdom's Muslims.

It seems that the Mudejars and the corsairs had prearranged plans for the escape from Valencia of those Mudejars fleeing the threat of forced baptism. Preparations might have been made as early as 1500, when the rumors of the Mudejars' forced conversion were first propagated. In any case, it is clear that when the corsairs arrived, the Mudejars were waiting for them on the shore. In May 1502 it was reported that corsairs had arrived near Corbera and that Mudejars of the coastal areas were boarding their ships.168 In July the jurates of Valencia were more explicit, saying that Muslim galleys were arriving "with the intelligence that they have from some Moors of the present kingdom" and were carrying off many Mudejars to the Maghrib. Most recently, Muslims from Valldigna and from Piles had departed in this manner.169 When news reached Valencia of the massing of a combined Turko-Maghriban fleet of eighteen ships in Bougie and Algiers, three reasons for the expedition were advanced: to capture ships returning from the Levant; to take booty and Christian captives on the Valencian coast; and to pick up those Muslims wishing to depart the kingdom for fear of forced baptism.170 The ultimate destination of this particular fleet is unknown, but what is more certain is the flight of an undetermined number of Mudejars from Valencia, and many of them in the ships of Maghriban and Ottoman corsairs.

It is significant that in this desperate situation the Mudejars chose flight instead of armed rebellion. On one hand, it reflects the Mudejars' sense of impotence before Christian power in Valencia. On the other hand, the willingness to abandon their homes and possessions shows that for the Mudejars the freedom to practice Islam outweighed all other considerations. When forced to convert in 1525, the Mudejars of

the Sierra de Espadán would resort to armed resistance.171 Nevertheless, in 1503 Fernando managed to restore some calm by assuring all parties in the Corts of Barcelona and in the Cortes of Zaragoza that the Mudejars could continue to live as Muslims in the lands of the Crown of Aragon.172 Consequently, a number of Mudejar refugees returned home from the Maghrib.173 As long as they could practice Islam, these Valencian Muslims preferred to do so in Valencia. Other Mudejars, however, were less convinced by royal assurances and thought that they could see the handwriting on the wall, the good intentions of the king notwithstanding. Thus, as late as July 1504, the bailiff general was still expressing concern that some Mudejars were secretly leaving for North Africa in hidden boats and persuading others to join them.174

The continuing anxiety of those Mudejars who refused to believe that royal promises alone could protect them most likely was evoked by the unabated circulation of rumors that the Mudejars were, indeed, to be baptized or expelled. Once this idea had been planted in the minds of some Christians, it could not be easily eradicated. Consequently, in the Cortes of Monzón (1510) Fernando again had to promise that the Mudejars would remain unmolested. Likewise, in 1517 Carlos I was compelled to issue a proclamation denying any intention on his part of expelling the Muslims of Valencia and Aragon.175 As long as order was maintained, the promises of Fernando and Carlos were kept. But when the revolt of the Germanías threw Valencian society into a turmoil and created the conditions for radical social change, the enemies of the Mudejars, perhaps inspired by the example of Cisneros in Granada twenty years earlier, made the Mudejars' worst fears a reality.

The international clash between Christianity and Islam did not have in Valencia an impact sufficient to unravel the resilient fabric of Muslim-Christian coexistence. The Mudejars did not express their identification with Islam by rebelling against their crusading king; nor did that king harshly oppress his Muslim subjects while warring with Islamic states. The occasional Mudejar collusion with Muslim enemies was borne as a customary feature of frontier life, an insignificant annoyance in comparison with the economic benefits accruing from the Mudejar presence.

The survival of Mudejarism in Valencia during the years of crusade owed much to the outlook and determination of Fernando. The king's reply to the warning of Qa'it* Bay* in 1489 affords further insight into his stance on the question of minority enclaves. As we recall, the Mamluk sultan had threatened to persecute Jerusalem's Christian clergy if the Monarchs did not halt their attacks on Granada. Fernando responded by explaining that the war against Granada was not so much a religious

war as a politically justifiable reconquest of lands taken from the Spanish Christians by the Muslims more than 700 years ago. He also noted that the Christian offensive had been provoked by the continual depredations of Granadan Muslims on Spanish Christians. To clinch his argument Fernando reminded the Mamluk of Spain's long tradition of Mudejarism in which Muslim subjects were guaranteed the freedom to practice Islam and the protection of their persons and property. If Granada's Muslims chose to remain in Spain, they would be accorded the same treatment.176 In essence, Fernando was arguing that Christian conquest neither precluded Muslim-Christian coexistence nor demanded religious uniformity. In light of the later conversions in Granada and Castile, Fernando's reply appears the height of cynicism. However, Fernando's Mudejar policy in the lands of the Crown of Aragon thrusts into relief the difference between his approach and that of his wife Isabel, and suggests that his reply was, in fact, sincere. In Fernando's mind the tradition of Mudejarism was still one worth maintaining.

A key factor in explaining why Valencia's Christians and Muslims did not rise up against each other in response to the promotion of crusade is that, for them, Christian-Muslim conflict, on either the local or the international scale, was not anything new. Ever present in the social formula of convivencia itself was the element of ideological antagonism, which was either mitigated or aggravated by economic and social factors. Indeed, economic and social distress, which tended to thrust religious differences into relief, was usually most responsible for the eruption of violence. More novel than war with Islam was the harnessing of Aragon to the Castilian juggernaut, which, while it allowed for the final conquest of Granada, also unleashed forces within Valencia that threatened its tradition of Mudejarism. Although the union of the two Crowns set the stage for Spain's imperial achievements, it redirected the destinies of its constituent societies in sometimes tragic ways.

Mudejar Officials

The chief Muslim official under the Crown of Aragon was the qadi * general, or royal qadi , whose authority extended over the Mudejars of all Crown lands—the kingdoms of Valencia and Aragon, and the principality of Catalonia. The qadi general's function was primarily judicial, and he had appellate jurisdiction over all Islamic courts. While there is ample evidence of the qadi general's judicial activity within the kingdom of Valencia, there is little to suggest that he exercised his authority outside of Valencia, except perhaps in Tortosa (Catalonia).3

In the fourteenth century the qadi general had also held a large number of other offices in Borja and Huesca in Aragon, and in Játiva and Valencia. Because these posts were of necessity held in absentia (the

qadi* general at this time resided in Zaragoza), this situation gave rise to abuses and to conflicts between the qadi general and his appointed substitutes.4 The problem seems to have been largely rectified by the time of Fernando's reign, during which the qadi general held only one other office in absentia, that of qadi and scribe of the aljama of Tortosa. To this office Mahomat Bellvis, the qadi general, appointed as his substitutes Mahomat Çaragoçi during the reign of Juan II, and Sabat Abaig at the outset of Fernando's reign. Bellvis demanded only that his substitutes recognize his appellate jurisdiction.5 Bellvis and Abaig seem to have had no jurisdictional disputes. That the qadi general also functioned as qadi of the city of Valencia is readily explained by the fact that he resided in its morería . The substantial reduction of the capital's Muslim population since 1455 rendered the duties of this position less burdensome, which, in any case, he shared with a lieutenant qadi .6

The letters of appointment of the qadi general allude to the office's scribal function: "alcadi scriva general."7 It may be inferred that as scribe the qadi general corresponded in Arabic with the officials of various aljamas, informing them of the decisions or executive orders of the king and bailiff general. Mahomat Bellvis was also appointed as interpreter, or torçimany , for the bailiff general. His task here was to interrogate the Maghriban and Granadan captives brought into the port of Valencia, in order to determine whether they were captured legitimately under conditions of war ("justi belli"). If so, the captives could then be sold as slaves.8 The qadi general was the prime intermediary between the king and his Muslim subjects. He had a hand in most Mudejar affairs that concerned the Crown, such as determining the Crown's share of Muslim inheritances or arbitrating the explosive disputes between feuding Muslim families.9

The qadi general was paid an annual salary of 200s, in addition to a fee for services in each case requiring his intervention.10 However, for the Bellvis family, which held the office of qadi general throughout Fernando's reign, such remuneration did not, as will be explained, constitute the main source of their wealth.

The qadi general was appointed by the king, and the office was a lifetime appointment. Mahomat Bellvis, who had been appointed qadi general in 1458 upon the death of his father Ali, was granted the prerogative to choose one of his sons to succeed him in office.11 In 1484 Mahomat on his deathbed chose his eldest son, Ali, as his successor.12 Ali held the post until at least 1501. The Bellvis family continued to monopolize the qadi generalship until the mass conversions in 1525. The Bellvis were indeed a dynasty of sorts, for members of this illustrious Mudejar family, or at least an Aragonese branch of it, had served the Crown in this capacity since the midfourteenth century.13

In each aljama the preeminent official was the qadi * . Because Islamic law encompassed both religious and secular affairs, the qadi 's role as judge lent him great moral and political authority. Under his purview fell civil and criminal litigation, family matters, such as marriage, divorce, and the guardianship of orphans, and the administration of mosque properties. The qadi also had a notarial function in the drawing up of marriage contracts and wills. The qadi of Játiva was paid a salary of 60s annually. While there is no indication that the qadi s of smaller aljamas were given a salary by the Crown, it is probable that they were remunerated by the courts for their various juridical services. Perhaps more important than the material benefits derived from the office was the great esteem the qadi commanded in the Mudejar community. The continuity and vitality of Islam under the Crown of Aragon was in great measure due to the persistence of this institution.14

The kings of Aragon well understood the essential role of the qadi . From the time of the conquest through the fifteenth century most of the royal provisions regulating the government of Muslim aljamas call for the creation of a qadi . However, over the course of centuries important changes had taken place. In the thirteenth century Jaime I had promised nearly every conquered Muslim city the right to elect its own qadi yet by the midfourteenth century royal officials were themselves appointing the qadi s of most royal aljamas. This gave rise to flagrant abuses: the appointment of royal favorites, ignorant of Islamic law as qadi s, and, worse still, the appointment of Christians to the office.15 By the late fifteenth century the most galling of these irregularities had been corrected. Under Fernando no Christian occupied the post of qadi , nor did the king bestow the office on unlettered favorites. The Bellvis were certainly well suited for the office of qadi general. Fernando took care to appoint as qadi s candidates deemed suitable by the aljama. Indeed, his appointment of Çahat Valenti as qadi of Játiva seems to have been little more than the confirmation of a unanimous choice made jointly by the aljama and the local bailiff.16 Although no royal aljama seems to have regained fully the right to choose its own qadi* , the absence of complaints on the part of aljamas regarding the inadequacy of qadi s indicates that the bailiffs made their choices only after consultation with the leading men of the aljamas.17

Not every royal and seigneurial aljama had its own qadi . The small size of some Mudejar communities, such as Castellón de Játiva, made the presence of a qadi an unnecessary luxury. The residents of such communities were able to bring their cases before the qadi 's court located in a larger town in the vicinity. For instance, Muslims of Castellón de Játiva fell under the jurisdiction of the qadi of Játiva,18 as did the residents of seigneurial aljamas in the area, like Sumacárcel.19 Because

of the large amount of business the qadi * of Játiva had to handle, he had an assistant called the sub-qadi (or sotsalcayt ).20 In accordance with the decree of Alfonso III, many seigneurial aljamas must have had their own qadi s.21 In the documentation there are references to qadi s in Paterna, Alcocer, Gandía, Aspe, Elda, and other places.22

It is arguable that in the kingdom of Valencia the faqih * , or jurisconsult, played a role equal in importance to that of the qadi. Faqih s seem to have been ubiquitous in the kingdom. Their function as notaries and as legal advisors, formally in the qadi 's court, or informally in the community at large, supplemented that of the more institutionalized qadi . But by virtue of their teaching in Mudejar schools and their preaching in the mosques, the influence of the faqih s was perhaps more far-reaching than that of the qadi s. They gave shape and Islamic meaning to Mudejar daily life in even the most isolated rural villages. Only rarely did the royal authorities recognize these vital functionaries. It seems that the faqih s of most royal aljamas were not royal appointees, but that individual aljamas chose them on the basis of their piety and legal knowledge.23 When the faqih of the aljama of Valencia died, the king followed the lead of the aljama, which took special care to choose a new faqih of sufficient erudition.24 Because the Crown did not pay a salary to the faqih s, the aljamas assumed the responsibility themselves and supported them with the rents from mosque properties.25 It is not certain that the faqih s attained the same degree of importance in Aragon and Catalonia, although they are evident in a number of Aragonese aljamas. It may be that the higher level of Arabo-Islamic culture in Valencia and the greater access of the Valencian Mudejars to the centers of Islamic learning in Tunis and Almería allowed for the greater proliferation of ^c ulama* ' (learned men) in the southern kingdom.26

Because the amin * is referred to in the documentation far more than any other aljama official, one is left with the impression that he was the paramount official in the aljama. From the perspective of the royal and seigneurial bureaucrats, this was certainly the case. Whereas the qadi and faqih were most responsible for the moral and spiritual well-being of the aljama, the amin acted as the principal intermediary between the aljama and the fiscal machinery of the Crown and nobility.27 The letters of appointment for the amin s of royal aljamas describe their duties as "holding, collecting, maintaining, and defending the rights and regalian taxes of the lord king, just as the other amin s of the said morería were accustomed to do in times past."28 The amin was the aljama's financial officer and was responsible for the collection of royal and seigneurial taxes from the residents of the morería . He kept the accounts of the aljama, apparently in Arabic, and turned over the account books to the royal or seigneurial bailiff at the end of each fiscal year.29 When new

Muslim vassals of the Crown wished to settle accounts with their former lords, the bailiff general often wrote to the local amin * , asking him to cooperate in the matter. The extant Arabic correspondence of various fifteenth-century amin s shows that it was the amin whom the royal bailiffs notified when they wished to collect outstanding debts or taxes from the Muslims of a particular aljama. Also, the amin usually represented his aljama in any litigation concerning its finances.30

Because the amin s were responsible for transferring the revenues exacted from the aljamas to royal or seigneurial coffers, they were usually appointed by the royal bailiffs, although some aljamas had the privilege of choosing their amin .31 Some, amin s held their office for life, while others served for a term of a few years.32 Most seem to have received a salary from the receipts of their office.

Although his role as tax collector might have earned for the amin the resentment of other members of the aljama, his close relations with the royal bailiff or with his lord, and his executive power in fiscal affairs and in cases of debt gave him considerable influence in the community. The nobility, even more so than the Crown, placed considerable trust in the amin s, whose authority was consequently greater on seigneurial lands than in royal morerías . On seigneurial lands many amin s seem to have acquired a police function and were responsible for maintaining order. For instance, when a Muslim of Cárcer wounded a vassal of Alberique, it was the amin of Alberique who chased after and captured the assailant.33 Most amin s responded fittingly to the trust of their lords and viewed the interests of the aljama and its lord as their own. The amin s were usually in the forefront of the resistance to royal officials sent to confiscate the property of indebted lords and aljamas. When a royal porter was sent to collect the crops and revenues of Castellnou in order to liquidate the 140-pound pension owed by its lord, the amin hid the crops in the local castle and refused to permit the porter to enter.34 However, some amin s proved to be unreliable and unworthy of their lord's confidence. Ali Sardi illicitly abandoned the lordship of Bétera and took the account books with him.35 Also, the señora of Gaibiel blamed the amin and adelantats for heading the "conspiracy" which resulted in the departure of all her Muslim vassals.36 Given the influence and the authority placed in the hands of the amin s, it is not surprising that it was an office which many Mudejars sought to hold.37

Closely associated with the amin were the adelantats , or jurates, whose role, since the thirteenth century, had come increasingly to resemble that of the Christian jurates of the universitas . When creating the new aljama of Castellón de Játiva, Fernando decreed that it should have jurates, whom he described as "rectors and administrators."38 Most aljamas had two adelantats , although a large aljama like Játiva might have

as many as four.39 The adelantats were elected annually by the aljama. According to the electoral system that seems to have prevailed in most royal aljamas, the adelantats for the coming year were chosen by the aljama's councillors (see below) and the current adelantats .40 In some Aragonese aljamas the system was different and corresponded to the local Christian method of insaculación , in which aljama officials were chosen from among those candidates whose names had been placed in a sack (sometimes by the Crown or local authorities).41 In Valencia Christian officials seldom interfered in the aljamas' elections, although Fernando was once compelled to intervene when the bailiff of Játiva attempted to appoint adelantats more obedient to his wishes.42

Because the adelantats were elected, they were more representative of the community's interests than the appointed amin * . The adelantats probably worked with the amin to apportion taxes among the aljama's members in a judicious manner. Of course, the adelantats ' powers as popular representatives were limited, for ultimately they had no choice but to acquiesce in royal and seigneurial wishes. As pointed out above, the aljama could make few decisions of any import, so that the adelantats lacked the legislative power of Christian jurates. Nevertheless, as administrators and representatives of the aljama, the adelantats were active in representing their aljama in litigation, in voicing complaints to the Crown, in leasing the utilities of the morería , and in sharing with the amin leadership in matters of community defense (on seigneurial lands).43 Documents describing the actions of Mudejar communities often note the participation of the amin and adelantats , sometimes joined by qadi * or faqih * .44 Even though the adelantats did not receive any remuneration for their services, the office seems to have carried with it a certain amount of prestige, which made its possession desirable in the eyes of some Mudejars.45 Unlike the fourteenth century, when elected adelantats had to be threatened with heavy fines lest they avoid the duties of their office,46 the Mudejars of fifteenth-century Valencia seem to have been willing enough to serve. It was only in Aragon that a Muslim pleaded that he not be forced to hold the office if elected. Perhaps the disastrous financial situation of most Aragonese aljamas caused the Muslims to view any office associated with tax collection as particularly distasteful.47

Some aljamas had a larger council, which was elected by the aljama and was likely composed of the heads of leading families. The councillors (the aljama of Valencia had ten) jointly made all major decisions affecting the aljama.48 The adelantats chosen by them were, therefore, representatives of the council and executors of the council's wishes. When the aljama of Játiva struggled with the local bailiff over the annual

servicio that the latter claimed the aljama was obliged to grant to him, the aljama claimed that the servicio had been given to the bailiff gratuitously by "some jurates of the morería ," but that it "was not solemnly decided upon in the council of the aljama."49 The aljama "in council" had, in fact, resolved that the bailiff should receive nothing at all. The consensus of the councillors appears to have been weightier than the opinion of any one official in the determination of aljama policy.

Beyond the core of qadi * , faqih * , amin * , adelantats , and council, there were some auxiliary officials mentioned only rarely in the documentation. Some aljamas, such as Játiva, Orihuela, Monforte, and Alcoy, had a çalmedina (sahib * al-madinah * ). This official seems to have had an executive function, assisting in the execution of the commands of the aljama's council and its qadi . He also had a hand in maintaining order in the morería through the appointment of police to apprehend malefactors and through control of the morería 's jail.50 In Játiva he was custodian of the keys to the morería and the supervisor of its market.51 The aljamas of Játiva and Valencia also had a clavari , or treasurer.52 To these officials may be added others, such as scribes, messengers, porters, and ritual slaughterers.53

Wealth and Power in the Aljama

Previous historians have suggested that Mudejar aljamas were governed by plutocracies.54 However, for reason of either lack of documentation or different focus of study, historians have done little in the way of identifying these elite families and correlating their civil service to their possession of wealth. The resources at our disposal for doing so are limited. For instance, information on the landholdings of these families is lacking. Fortunately, the tax records of royal towns provide enough data on Mudejar officials and their farming of fiscal revenues to allow for the drawing of some tentative conclusions.

The leading Mudejar family in the kingdom was the Bellvis family, in whom the combination of wealth and power is especially evident. Although the qadi general received a modest annual salary of 200s, the emoluments accruing from all of his juridical services must have been substantial. Still, the main source of income for the Bellvis family was international commerce. They had been active in the trade with Almería since at least 1417. By Fernando's reign their business interests had taken them further afield.55 Mahomat Bellvis, and his sons Ali, Yahye, and Çahat, a spice merchant, conducted commercial negotiations in Italy, Tunis, and Alexandria, as well as in Almería. The preeminence of

the Bellvis family in the capital's aljama is further indicated by the fact that one of its members normally served as adelantat or councillor in addition to holding the office of local qadi * .56

Another prominent member of Valencia's aljama was its faqih * , Abdurrazmen Mascor. The faqih himself was a landowner,57 but his brother Çahat was involved in commerce with Almería, where he traveled with Abdurrazmen's black slave Mobarrich.58 The residence of other members of the Mascor family in Almería must have facilitated Çahat's trading there.59 Evidence of the faqih 's substantial wealth is the 1500s settlement that his heirs paid to the bailiff general so that the Crown would not confiscate the part of the estate the faqih had bequeathed to his son (most likely worth far more than 1500s), who had abandoned it when he emigrated to the Maghrib.60 The faqih had also willed property to his widow, brother, and two sisters.61

Turning to Játiva, the dominant family of the aljama there, at least until 1496, was that of its qadi s, Yuçeff and Ubaydal Alçamba. Yuçeff served as qadi perhaps until 1490, when Ubaydal (his son?) succeeded him and remained in office until 1496.62 Their monopoly of the local Islamic judiciary was complete, for Yuçeff's brother, Yahye, was the aljama's sub-qadi * until his emigration to the Maghrib in 1485.63 Yahye's son Yuçeff next fulfilled the duties of the sub-qadi * until his death in 1494.64 No doubt the Alçambas were men of considerable erudition, and their attachment to Islam was demonstrated by the emigration of at least one of them to the dar * al-Islam * (lands of Islam; Islamdom).65 The family also seems to have possessed some wealth. Although information on the Alçambas' properties is lacking, Yuçeff Alçamba's brother, Axer (both are referred to as "Benyaye"), was the lessee of the morería 's butcher shop in 1478 and 1490 (and perhaps during the intervening years, the records of which are lost), for which he paid rents of 1000s and 1200s.66 In 1484 Yahye Alçamba was charged with the collection of royal revenues in the entire city of Játiva.67 Another indication of the Alçambas' prestige, not surprising for the qadi s of the kingdom's largest morería , was the marriage of the daughter of Yahye Alçamba, the sub-qadi , to the son of Mahomat Bellvis, the qadi general.68 By marrying among themselves the Mudejar aristocrats—if they can be described as such—maintained or enhanced their status and affluence.

The aljama of Játiva took some care in finding a suitable replacement for Ubaydal Alçamba as qadi . It, along with the local bailiff, chose Çahat Valenti, who had already proved his ability as the qadi of the seigneury of Alcocer. By this time (1496) Çahat had probably accumulated substantial capital. In 1480 he and his son journeyed to Almería to sell merchandise valuing 6000s.69

After the demise of Yuçeff Alçamba (1494), Abdurasmen Mangay

was appointed sub-qadi * . Abdurasmen was a person of some estimation in the community, which had already elected him adelantat in 1492.70 His family, although perhaps not rich, was not without means. In 1485 Abdurasmen had been licensed to travel with his servant Yuçeff to the southern region of the kingdom on business.71 It seems that many of Abdurasmen's relatives were artisans, for from 1490 onward a number of them—Çahat, Mahomat, Ali, Coayat—appear as lessees of some of the morería 's workshops and utilities, such as the soap factory, for 160s to 220s, the olive press, for 30s to 60s, and so on.72 However, during Abdurasmen's tenure of office the resources at the Mangays' disposal seem to have increased. In 1495 Abdurasmen himself leased the butcher shop for 1600s,73 and in subsequent years other members of the family rented the more lucrative utilities, like the butcher shop—rented jointly by Ali Mangay and Abdalla Lirida, a former adelantat , in 1496—and the ovens.74 The experience of the Mangays suggests that the holding of an important office was beneficial for family fortunes, perhaps because it earned them the favor of and influence with the royal authorities.

In the aljama of Alcira one of the most notable families was the Paziar family. They served as its amin s* from the outset of Fernando's reign until at least 1503.75 At the time of the expulsion of the Moriscos a wealthy landowner named Paziar was the amin for Alcira's Moriscos.76 Mahomat Paziar, appointed in 1479, replaced Çahat Trilli, a saddler, who after his term of office continued to rent the saddle workshop.77 The Paziars, however, possessed far greater wealth than did their predecessor. Just after his appointment Mahomat purchased the morería 's fonduk, in order to provide his newlywed son Çahat with a "genteel house."78 Before being appointed amin himself in 1493, Çahat kept busy by investing family money in leases of the butcher shop and in farms of the town's agricultural tithes.79 During his father's declining years, 1488–1493, Çahat was the de facto amin .80 Çahat's investments seem to have reaped profits, for in 1491 he was able to farm the sales tax on meat for the huge sum of 10,800s.81 By 1501 Azmet Paziar, probably Çahat's son, was renting the butcher shop in partnership with a Christian, Jacme Barbera.82 Because the amin s were cogs in the Crown's fiscal machinery, they were well situated to turn to their own advantage the Crown's tax farms and utilities. Some officials, like the Paziars, were more astute in this respect than others, such as Çahat Trilli.

In the aljama of Castellón die la Plana none of the families seem to have had as firm a grip on the reins of power as did the Alqambas in Játiva or the Paziars in Alcira. Leadership in the aljama was hotly contested and the office of amin changed hands among the feuding families almost every year (in contrast to Alcira, where the amin was appointed for life). Almost all of the amin s had served on the aljama's council of

ten, which had the thankless task of choosing the two adelantats, one from each of the feuding factions.83 There is evidence about the financial status of only one of these families, the Bocayos. Thomas Glick has identified an Asmet Bocaxo (or Bocayo), a carter by trade whose family owned a substantial amount of land in the parish of St. Nicolas. Asmet himself, who possessed at least eight fanecates of irrigated huerta land, is known to us through the fines he incurred for irrigation infractions.84 Another family member, Sat Bocayo, was active in selling and purchasing land, most of it unirrigated vineyard.85 Given the close ties between Mudejar agnates, the amin * Yuçeff Bocayo probably had some share in his family's landed wealth.86

There is less information on the officials of seigneurial aljamas. María del Carmen Barceló Torres has identified a prominent family of qadi s* in Benaguacil, the Benamirs, who held this office throughout the fifteenth century. The prestige of this family was later manifested in the person of the Morisco noble, Don Cosme de Abenamir.87 Barceló Torres also points out that some seigneurial amin s* , who, as has been suggested, had greater authority than royal amin s, enjoyed certain privileges and were exempted by their lords from paying rents for their land.88 In this way the seigneurial amin s acquired influence and slowly accumulated wealth, a tendency accentuated in the case that the office passed from father to son.

An extremely interesting case is that of Ali Gehini, the amin of La Foyeta (near Alberique). On Ali's death 10,000s to 12,000s were found hidden in the walls of his house. Muslims who knew Ali described him as a rich and powerful man, as rich as any knight in the kingdom. Ali had many servants in his house, and his two sons led a life of leisure, passing their time with companions in taverns. It appears that the prime source of Ali's wealth was his store, where he sold woolen cloth and other items.89

It is doubtful that many other officials of seigneurial aljamas were able to accumulate as much wealth as Ali Gehini. However, some farmed the taxes of the estates of their lords, from which they must have earned some profits. For example, Yuçeff Castelli, the amin of Fraga, and Joan de Calatayu, a resident of Cocentaina, jointly farmed the taxes of Fraga for an annual payment of 175 pounds.90 The faqih * of Buñol and the qadi * of Chiva traveled to Valencia to confer with the lord of Carlet concerning the farming of the agricultural tithes.91 Although the lords were perhaps more likely to farm out their taxes to aljama officials in whom they had confidence, they also did so to other Mudejars with sufficient means. Mudejar tax-farmers are evident on a number of seigneuries, such as Areñol, Bechí, and Picasent.92

All this having been said, one probably should not go so far as to

regard this Mudejar civil service elite as a distinct social class, lording it over the mass of poorer Muslim farmers and artisans. First, considering Valencia's plural society in its entirety, it is apparent that every Mudejar, no matter how affluent or influential within his own aljama, was, by virtue of his religious affiliation, the social inferior of even the most miserable Christian.93 The Mudejar official's recognition of this fundamental social reality conditioned his view of himself vis-à-vis the other members of his aljama; it had a leveling effect, limiting his social aspirations and enhancing his sense of sameness with his fellow Muslims on the basis of a shared ethnic identity. Confronted with a socially superior Christian majority, the Mudejar official's cultural identification with the minority community was a factor in his social outlook just as compelling as his level of affluence or his administrative position.

Even when viewing the aljama turned in on itself it is difficult to perceive a clear-cut social hierarchy. True, one might describe Mudejar upper, middle, and lower classes on the basis of relative affluence, but this differential economic status was not translated into sharp social stratification. Mudejar officials for the most part originated from the undistinguished mass of farmers and artisans. For instance, Abdurasmen Mangay, the sub-qadi * of Játiva, was a scion of a family of artisans, as was Çahat Trilli, the amin * of Alcira before the Paziars. The Bocayos of Castellón de la Plana owned a substantial amount of land, but were, nonetheless, a family of carters and farmers. And Ali Gehini, that rich and powerful amin of La Foyeta, was really little more than a successful shopkeeper. True, many of these officials perhaps owned more land, were more successful in their trades, or invested their money more wisely than others; still, they were by and large from the same socioeconomic background as their poorer fellows. Moreover, it is uncertain whether enough of these civil service families retained their positions long enough to have constituted a distinct upper class or an aristocracy with common class interests. The Paziars of Alcira, for instance, seem to have been newcomers to the office of amin in 1479. The Alçambas of Játiva seem to have died out or emigrated by 1496. The Mascors did not maintain their prominence in Valencia's aljama after the faqih * Abdurrazmen's death. The class structure of Mudejar aljamas, such as it existed, was characterized more by fluidity of movement up and down the socioeconomic scale than by immutability of status.

The primary focus of the Mudejar's social allegiance was not to a particular class, but to his family, normally an extended family or lineage group bound together by the solidarity between agnates. Dissension within the aljama was expressed in feuding between families and not in class struggle. Indeed, the intensity of Mudejar feuding, essentially a contest for material wealth and status, derived from the very

absence of marked social categorization. Mudejar families could unabashedly challenge one another and jockey for status because within the aljama there was minimal class consciousness. The social organization of the aljama is better viewed as a horizontal alignment of competing lineage groups, some richer than others, than as a vertical hierarchy of social classes. One family, or several, might achieve dominance over the others for any number of reasons—the successful prosecution of a feud, the accumulation of considerable material wealth, or the control of local office—but such dominance was often only ephemeral and was not predetermined by birth.94

Notwithstanding the affluence of some families, the religious elites, the qadi s* and the faqih s* , constituted the most influential group in Mudejar society. As a group their economic backgrounds were diverse: the qadis tended to be richer and had more influence with the Christian authorities, while the faqih s were often poor and were supported by the community. Their erudition and piety lent them great prestige and, because of their diversity of background, their influence was pervasive and was felt by all socioeconomic groups. Their moral authority counterbalanced the influence of those whose status was based on affluence and the holding of office alone.95

Even if among the Mudejars the variant degrees of wealth did not result in the formation of correlative social classes, it is still important to understand that there indeed was such variation. Some Mudejar farmers, craftsmen, and merchants prospered, while others were abysmally poor. Because the historiography on the sixteenth-century Moriscos tends to overshadow that concerning the Mudejars, it may be unduly assumed that the economic conditions of the Mudejars in the fifteenth century were just the same as those of the Moriscos. Following the logic of this assumption, the Mudejars would have been almost exclusively servile small farmers tied to the lands of their lords. Yet, one must consider how larger structural changes affected the Mudejars' economic position in the fifteenth century. As has been suggested in chapter 1, the kingdom's underpopulation in the fifteenth century and the need of the towns and the landed nobility for Mudejar labor afforded the Mudejars considerable opportunity for economic advancement. That Mudejars frequently seized such opportunities is evinced in their change of vassalage and socioeconomic mobility. As for the sixteenth century, there were two factors behind the change in the Muslims' economic situation. The first was ideological. After the forced baptism of the Mudejars in 1525, many abandoned the towns and fled to seigneurial lands. In order to continue their Islamic practices and to escape the scrutiny of ecclesiastical authorities, the Moriscos had little choice but to submit fully to the will of their lords, now their protectors. Furthermore, although Moriscos continued to work as muleteers and carters, numerous restric-

tions were placed on Morisco travel and, most important, they were forbidden to change vassalage. The Moriscos lived under conditions of economic restraint which the Mudejars of the previous century had not experienced. The second factor was demographic and economic. In the sixteenth century, especially during the latter half, Valencia, like almost all of Europe, experienced a huge growth in population and an attendant rise in prices. Consequently, even if the Moriscos could change vassalage, there was much less of a demand for their labor and they had far less bargaining power with their lords. The rise of prices had a devastating effect on the seigneurial economy, since fixed rents were substantially devalued. The seigneurs perforce raised rents when they could and oppressed their Morisco vassals still further. By the time of the expulsion (1609) the Moriscos were probably, in economic terms, far more depressed and less diversified than their late fifteenth-century forebears.96

Before entering upon an examination of Mudejar economic life it will be useful to cite a few examples of rich and poor Mudejars, in order to provide some sense of the spectrum of Mudejar economic status. Several figures have already been encountered who may be described as well-to-do, such as Çahat Paziar and Ali Gehini. It is worthwhile to recall Fernando's concern that Muslims were dressing in a manner that made them indistinguishable from Christians. The problem was not just that the Mudejars were not wearing their special blue garb, but that they were dressing sumptuously, in "silk doublets and fine clothing."97 In 1493 the king refused permission to emigrate to "a rich Moor of Játiva."98 Another failed attempt at emigration brings to light Abdulmalich Roget, a Mudejar originally from Huesca who had resided in Valencia for a number of years. When the bailiff general hindered Abdulmalich from embarking on a caravel at Tortosa, the caravel's patron sailed off with the Muslim's goods: "many sacks of merchandise, clothing, furniture, gold, silver, and pearl, which clothing and merchandise are worth more than 350 gold ducats."99 It is not unusual to encounter Muslims offering their gold jewelry as collateral in commercial transactions.100 The licenses issued to Mudejars for travel to the southern region of the kingdom for commerce or other business reveal that twenty-six of these merchants, carters, and artisans had Muslim servants (moços ) attending them.101

These servants were not the most indigent Mudejars. There were the orphans, divorcées, and widows who resorted to prostitution in order to survive.102 There was a substantial body of mendicants—as many as 200 begging licenses were issued in one year—who wandered throughout the kingdom begging alms from their brethren "for the love of God."103 And, of course, the number of slaves was large. Many of these were prisoners of war from Granada and the Maghrib, and others were

enslaved as punishment for capital crimes.104 But more to the point are those Mudejars who were enslaved because they could not pay their debts or seigneurial dues. Such slaves are ample testimony to the fact that a number of Mudejars eked out the most meager of livings, existing on that fine line between subsistence and starvation. For example, Azmet Çalema of Daimuz, who owed his lord 98 pounds for wheat, rents, and seigneurial dues, was forced to hand over his eighteen-year-old daughter in debtor's servitude to a Genoese merchant, a creditor of his lord. Two months later Azmet's situation had not improved, for his twelve-year-old daughter was next sent into the service of the Genoese. The case of Azmet Çalema was not so unusual.105

Economic Life

Affluent or indigent, most Mudejars passed their lives engaged in one of the following activities: farming, tending livestock, manufacturing, or retail merchandising. Not infrequently these occupations overlapped. Many an artisan farmed land or traveled about selling his wares, while farmers often raised livestock. A detailed consideration of these economic pursuits will reveal much about the Mudejars' daily life and how they adapted to changing economic conditions. It will also provide insights into how Muslims and Christians in Valencia were able to coexist and interact fruitfully, despite glaring ideological differences. Both the king and the nobility favored the continued presence of the Mudejars for their agrarian and commercial activities. But the stability of Valencia's Muslim-Christian convivencia hinged on far more than the interests of the Christian aristocracy; it involved the Mudejars' constant interchange with Christian merchants, humble artisans, and farmers. If the aristocracy and the Mudejars stood in relation to each other as lord and exploited vassal, Muslim and Christian artisans, merchants, and farmers dealt with one another on a more or less equal footing, their economic activities being complementary as often as they were competitive. Such mundane concerns were decisive when rapprochement on a theological basis remained unattainable. Tolerance was a product of material life, not a religious or political ideal.

The Besant Tax

Each Muslim household paid a tax known as the besant , a tribute symbolic of their subject and inferior status in a Christian society. In this way it was similar to the jizyah , or poll tax, paid by the dhimmi s* in Islamic societies, though the jizyah differed in that it fell on every male beyond the age of puberty. While the besant continued to be collected from the Mudejars of the kingdom of Valencia in the fifteenth century, its collection seems to have fallen into abeyance in Aragon and Catalonia.5

The besant was not an especially burdensome levy; each household paid 3s 4d annually. The Muslims of Castellón de la Plana paid a higher besant of 4s, the explanation for this probably lying in that aljama's later foundation.6 The aljama of Valencia, still suffering from the effects of the sack of 1455, was exempted from payment of the besant . Temporary exemption was also offered as an inducement to new vassals in the morería of Játiva.7 Impoverished Mudejars were perforce excused from payment. In the large aljamas of Játiva and Alcira (table 3) the number of Muslims not paying ranged from 5 to 15 percent of the total population in any given year.8 Although the Crown might be lenient with individual Muslims, the remission was only temporary. Once he had sufficient funds, the Muslim in arrears had to satisfy all outstanding besants (table 4). It followed that the Muslim dissolving his bonds of vassalage to the king had to discharge his besants before departure to seigneurial lands.9

The varied patterns of vassalage, land tenure, and residence complicated the collection of the besant (see tables 5–10). A number of Muslims, while royal vassals in specific aljamas, continued to live in or later changed their residence to seigneurial lands. Fortunately for the aljamas' finances, the besant was assessed only on individual households, so that the aljama was not made to compensate for the unpaid besants of absentee vassals. The responsibility of collecting from these vassals thus fell to the local bailiffs, who seem to have carried out this task efficiently. Muslims dwelling in the lordships of Alcocer, Alberique, Catadau, and Valldigna are recorded as having paid the besant to the bailiff of Alcira. Likewise, the bailiff of Murviedro collected from royal vassals resident in Algimia.10

Also linked to the Mudejars' status of a conquered and dissident minority was the requirement that they have a royal license to bear arms, beg for alms, and practice prostitution. The fees charged by the Crown for these licenses figured as only a minor source of royal revenue, and, although not especially high, must have proved burdensome to mendicants. It is probable that such licenses, as well as those granted to Mudejars. for travel and emigration, were more important as a means of controlling the movement and activities of the Muslim population. Chapter 2 discussed how suspicions about a Mudejar fifth column prompted the king to recommend stricter control of Mudejar arms-bearing and to curtail the granting of travel licenses. Because most mendicants and many prostitutes were itinerant, the demand that they bear licenses allowed for some surveillance of transient Muslims.11 It is not surprising that the bailiff general expressed the most concern about unlicensed Muslim beggars and prostitutes during the years 1499–1503, when revolts in Granada and the resultant Mudejar fears and attempted

flight created a potentially explosive state of affairs.12 Like the besant , these licenses were more important for what they signified—in this case, a restriction of the Muslims' freedom of movement and a basic royal mistrust of Mudejar intentions—than for the revenue they brought to the king.

Public Utilities

The royal monopoly of utilities providing vital community services assured the Crown a steady flow of annual income. The Crown controlled

butcher shops (carnicerías ), ovens, mills, baths, taverns, and a variety of other services, such as tanneries and dyeworks. Generally, the local bailiffs rented out these utilities in public auction to the highest bidder, Christian, Muslim, or Jew. The lessee gave the Crown a fixed annual rent derived from what he earned from control of the utility. The rental of these utilities in public auction meant that the rents were subject to fluctuations consonant with the realities of the marketplace and the prevailing prices of commodities.

Few utilities were specifically linked to Muslim communities as such. The size of an aljama and the clauses of its foundation charter determined whether it need have, for instance, its own special oven. To take another example, the prevalence of Muslim artisans in certain crafts, such as saddlemaking or dyeing, resulted in the consistent Muslim rental of the local saddleworks and dyeworks, which were perhaps also attached to the morerías . However, on account of Islamic and Jewish dietary laws, quite similar in many details, it was necessary for Muslims and Jews to have their own butcher shops. It seems that every Mudejar community had this privilege, which, as Burns points out, may be equated with an extension of religious privileges. In Castellón de la Plana the Muslims shared a butcher shop with the Jews.13

Despite the religious complications implied in the rental of a Muslim butcher shop to a Christian, it was an established practice and seems to have raised no complaint from Mudejar leaders. In Alcira and Játiva Christians and Muslims alternated in their rental of the Muslim butcheries, depending on who could offer the highest bid.14 The butcher shop of the new morería of Castellón de Játiva was the one exception to the usual rental arrangements. There Fernando conceded to Joan Bleda, already the concessionaire of the Christian butcheries, the Muslim butchery perpetually and in enfiteusis, at an annual rent of one morabatí . In any case, whoever the lessee or concessionaire, the butcher who actually slaughtered the meat had to be a Muslim. Thus, in the terms of the concession of the Muslim butcher shop to Joan Bleda it was stipulated "let its butcher be a Sarracen and not a Christian."15 Presumably the lessees either sublet the butcheries to Muslim butchers or paid them a salary. Unfortunately, the documentation, concerned mainly with the rents accruing to the royal treasury, reveals next to nothing on Muslim butchers and their arrangements with the lessees. One glimpse is offered in the plea of Joan Lopiç, a merchant and lessee of the Muslim butcher shop of Játiva, to whom the Muslim butcher, al-Ayeret, owed 262s 6d for the sheep slaughtered in the butcher shop.16 Apparently the lessee had furnished the animals necessary for the aljama's consumption, and the butcher, who slaughtered and sold the meat, was expected to reimburse the lessee from the proceeds. The absence of Mudejar grievances

on this score suggests that Muslim butchers consistently functioned as the all-important intermediaries between lessees and Muslim consumers.

Crown supervision extended beyond rental of the butcher shop to ensuring that the abattoir was provisioned with sufficient livestock—sheep, goats, and beef cattle—to meet the demands of local consumption. Crown pasture land was therefore allotted for grazing the flocks of the royal butcheries; these flocks were exempted from payment of the herbatge , a tax on the use of Crown pastures.17 The Crown sometimes stipulated precisely how many head of livestock the lessee ought to provide. In Castellón de Játiva the Christian butcher shop was to be furnished with 250 head, and the Muslim butcher shop with 150, although Joan Bleda, the concessionaire, later complained that the bailiff was forcing him to have slaughtered for the Muslims an excessive amount of meat, much of which was left to rot in the summer sun.18 One clause of the lease of Joan Sancho stated that if he did not provide sufficient livestock for Játiva's Muslim butcher shop the Muslims could slaughter meat in the Crown abattoir for themselves.19 Neither royal provisions nor leases specify the sale price of meat, nor do they suggest that Muslims were charged more for their meat. Lessees were admonished only to sell the meat at "accustomed prices," which were set more by the local market than by royal guidelines.20 There is no evidence indicating that lessees engaged in any price speculation regarded by aljamas as immoderate or burdensome.

Apart from the renting of butcheries, the Crown also collected a sales tax on each pound of meat, known as the sisa del carn (sisas were also imposed on bread, wine, and other essential commodities). Information from Gandía (1492) indicates that the sisa paid there was 1s per pound of billy-goat and ram, 9d per pound of she-goat and ewe, and 4s 6d per pound of beef.21 The rates of the sales tax in Murviedro (1483) were only half as high as those paid in Gandía.22 The explanation for the difference in sisa rates lies in the Crown's concession of the right to collect the sises to many municipal governments, which were then able to establish the local rates. The aljama of Játiva paid the bailiff to farm out the sales tax collected in its butcher shop and market.23 Leaving the collection of the sales tax in the hands of municipal governments created problems, for at times the jurates arbitrarily raised the sales tax rates, prompting resistance from lords with lands within the general limits of Gandía and from the aljama of Murviedro.24 In Castellón de la Plana the jurates were not allowed to exact the sisa from the local Muslims, which induced them to prohibit Christians from purchasing meat in the Muslim butcher shop where they could escape the sales tax.25

Because the butcheries provided such an essential commodity, they

were lucrative utilities. The almost unique restriction of their services to the members of a particular aljama rendered the butcheries a highly appropriate and efficient means of aiding an aljama in financial straits, without affecting the rest of the local economy. Since 1376 the aljama of Valencia had enjoyed the privilege of renting its own butcher shop and retaining the proceeds from the rental to defray its own expenses. Such revenue was so crucial to the aljama's finances after 1455 that when the guild of Christian butchers attempted to place restrictions on the Muslim butcher shop's sale of meat, the aljama pleaded that it did not have any "other substance or property with which to pay the royal taxes and rents that it is ordinarily obliged to pay."26 The aljama of Daroca (Aragon) benefited from a like royal concession, and it was allowed to retain the sales tax collected in its butcher shop as well.27 The Crown met the aljama of Játiva halfway: the lessee paid half the butchery rent to the Crown and half to the aljama's treasurer.28

Some Muslims tried to evade the Crown's close supervision of the sale of meat by slaughtering meat outside of the Muslim butcheries, sometimes in Christian butcheries, and then selling it at more competitive prices. Mahomat Paziar, Alcira's amin * , whose son was renting the butcher shop, and the aljama of Daroca both complained about the losses they were sustaining from the activities of these "free-lance" butchers.29

Another important royal monopoly related specifically to the Mude-jars was the institution of the alfondech or fonduk. Described in the documentation as a "hospitium maurorum," and located within the confines of the morería , the fonduk functioned as an inn for Muslim travelers and merchants, and, almost invariably, as a center for Muslim prostitution. As suggested in chapter 1, the fonduk was an adjunct to a royal policy of social segregation. That a fonduk was created in the fledgling morería of Castellón de Játiva suggests that all other royal morerías had one.30 However, perhaps only the fonduk in Valencia bore any resemblance to the thirteenth-century institution described by Burns as "at once a public inn, goods depository, mail drop, center for any notarial or customs services, and exhibit hall ... it could elaborate into a home-away-from-home."31 The continued success of Valencia's fonduk lay in the capital's preeminent role in the kingdom, and in the entire Crown of Aragon, as a center of domestic and international commerce, and as the arrival and embarkation point of the Venetian galleys that carried Maghriban merchants and their cargoes. The small size of Valencia's aljama should not blind one to the fact that through the city there traversed a large transient Muslim population, Valencian and foreigner, slave and free. The fonduk was leased for terms of two to four years, with the annual rent steadily increasing from 1,000s (1479–1483) to

3,000s (1498–1502). Only in 1490, on account of a plague that discouraged Muslims and Jews from traveling to the capital, did the fonduk suffer.32 Still, the lodging of Muslims in other hostels was a consistent problem, and Diego de Soria, the lessee in 1490, complained that the bailiff general was protecting an innkeeper who had Mudejars from Arevalo (Castile) as guests.33 Seigneurial Muslims were exempted, at least temporarily, from the necessity of lodging in the royal fonduk.34

Allied to the leasing of Valencia's fonduk, and likewise sustained by the large number of Muslims visiting the capital, was the rental of an office unique to the capital, that: of the basto (i.e., "baton," symbolic of the possession of the office and its policing function) or guard of the bailiwick of the morería . This office, rented to Joan de Vich (1481–1488) and to his son Joan after his death, had little to do with the normal duties of a local bailiff, which in Valencia were incumbent on the resident bailiff general. Rather, the basto exercised a supervisory and policing function in the morería . He managed the royal tavern and bordello, regulated the practice of prostitution in the morería , and collected the required tax (dret de tarquena ) from the Muslim prostitutes or their pimps. He also saw to it that Muslims did not bear arms in the morería , travel at night without a lamp, gamble, drink wine outside the royal tavern, or dress in excessive finery, all infractions being punishable by fine.35 The basto and the lessee of the fonduk, or alfondeguer , likely worked closely together, since the guests of the fonduk might well have indulged in the pleasures of the tavern and bordello.

In the other royal towns the offices of the alfondeguer and basto were combined in the person of the former. Wine, if it was drunk anywhere in the morerías , was most likely served in the fonduks. In Zaragoza the fonduk also housed the morerío 's jail, and the alfondeguer served as its jailer.36 Gambling seems to have been forbidden throughout the kingdom, so that the fonduks were freed of this vice. The prominence royal leases give to prostitution as a source of income for the fonduks' concessionaires indicates that most fonduks were quasi-bordellos where the alfondeguers were responsible for collecting the tarquena from the prostitutes. In contrast to its firm stand against gambling, the Crown seems to have concluded that prostitution could be more effectively regulated than eradicated, and, as was so often the case, regulation translated into fiscal profits. Every Muslim prostitute in the kingdom had to purchase from the bailiff general for 18s a license to ply her trade.37

The fonduks of Alcira and Játiva brought little revenue to the Crown. In 1479 a member of the important Mudejar family of Paziar purchased the building housing the fonduk of Alcira so that he could provide a "genteel home" for his newlywed son. The bailiff and aljama concurred on this, feeling that Paziar's remodeling of the house would help to

beautify the morería . The resultant problem was that another house for the permanent establishment of a fonduk could not be found, inasmuch as none of the local Muslims were interested in selling. It seems that for most of Fernando's reign Alcira's morería lacked a fonduk, although occasionally individuals were paid for the use of their home for this purpose.38

Játiva's fonduk was in a state of considerable disrepair, and desultory efforts were made to refurbish it, even constructing special rooms for the prostitutes. Although Muslim saddlers rented a part of the fonduk as a shop, few were willing to rent it for its intended purpose. The royal prohibition against gambling seems to have taken all life out of the place, and the tax records state that the prohibition was, indeed, the cause for the reluctance of potential lessees. Even when lessees were found, the fonduk, because it attracted so much lowlife, did more harm than good. In 1495 the aljama complained that Christian youths were sneaking into the fonduk through a window and spending the night in the morería . Worse still, the wife of the Christian lessee was traipsing about "dishonestly dressed" and tempting Muslim youths.39 Perhaps the aljamas of Játiva and Alcira reasoned that they were well rid of such riffraff as were associated with the fonduks; Muslim visitors could easily be lodged in someone's home.

Public baths, necessary for ritual ablutions and purification and essential as centers of social intercourse, were fixtures in the life of most medieval Muslim communities. Islamic Valencian towns had been no exception, and presumably most Mudejar aljamas continued to support baths, however modest or elaborate. By Fernando's reign Mudejar baths had ceased to be a source of Crown income. Probably the Crown had ceded to each aljama control over its own bath. As in the case of the butcher shops, such concessions would have aided the aljamas in attaining or maintaining solvency. The Mudejar bath of Játiva, however, was an exception and remained a Crown monopoly. Because the aljama of Játiva was by far the largest in the kingdom, the revenues accruing from its Mudejar taxes and from the rental of its morería utilities were substantial when those from many smaller aljamas were negligible. Consequently, the Crown was loath to alienate its monopoly over any of the utilities servicing the aljama of Játiva. Játiva's Mudejar bath was always leased to Muslims at an annual rent ranging from 640s to 1,100s.40 On the question of whether Jews might use the Muslim baths, Fernando vacillated. First, in 1488, he commanded that the Muslim aljama must permit the Jews to have access to the baths, otherwise royal rents would decrease. Two years later he changed his mind and forbade such contact between Jews and Muslims in the baths, deeming it "pernicious," as he perhaps viewed the exposure of anyone to Judaism at this juncture.41

In terms of the pervasiveness of the royal monopoly, the situation of Mudejar ovens was similar to that of the baths. In the kingdom of Valencia only the two ovens of the morería of Játiva—the forn maior (large oven) and the forn menor (small oven)—were leased by the Crown, and for considerable rents.42 Inasmuch as communal ovens served individual neighborhoods, it seems likely that most other morerías had their own ovens, although, unlike the Jews with their baking of matzoh, Muslim baking had no ritual significance. Just as the Christians of Mislata baked their bread in the Muslims' oven, it may be that smaller aljamas made use of Christian ovens. In 1496 two of Murviedro's ovens were rented by Muslims.43 In Catalonia, the morerías of Tortosa and Lérida both had ovens, the rent from the former going toward the support of the local castle.44

The Crown also had a monopoly over mills, essential appurtenances to agricultural and industrial life. Mudejars were allowed to grind their wheat and barley wherever they wished. Apparently, Fernando had followed the bailiff general's advice and discarded his plan to construct in Játiva one royal mill that all of the aljama's Muslims would have to use. In every town Mudejars were active as lessees of royal mills.45 The morería of Játiva had its own olive mill or press (almacera ) which was rented from the Crown and served the needs of Muslims bringing in their produce from nearby olive orchards. The Mudejars of Játiva continued to participate in the local paper industry, and a paper mill was leased to them.46

The activity of Mudejar artisans in certain local crafts and industries allowed the Crown to maintain a monopoly over certain workshops probably located within or adjacent to the morerías . In Alcira Muslim saddlers rented the saddleworks from the Crown, as did Muslim dyers the dyeworks of Murviedro. Játiva's morería had a much larger industrial complex, its Muslims renting saddleworks, dyeworks, a tannery, and a workshop devoted to the fabrication of soap.47 Whatever success the king had in augmenting the populations of his morerías might have enhanced Mudejar participation in local industries monopolized by the Crown, thereby fueling the local economy and perhaps raising the rents of industrial workshops.

On account of its large size, the morería of Játiva had its own marketplace or suq (Catalan açoch ), and, unlike the other royal morerías , its own mustaçaff (or çalmedina) , who served as inspector of the market and of its weights and measures. Municipal officials, however, challenged the aljama's right to appoint its own mustaçaff . In any case, Játiva's aljama was unique in leasing from the Crown its market as well as the weights-and-measures service (pes e açoch ). The lessees were individual Mudejars and the rent was understandably steep, ranging from 1,060s to 2,000s per year.48

The rents of some Crown utilities, particularly those in Játiva, increased markedly, although not necessarily consistently, over the course of Fernando's reign. The raising of rents was stimulated by the leasing of utilities to the highest bidder. In Játiva the Crown offered further incentive by, in effect, sharing the increased profits with the lessee, who was remunerated with a percentage—approximately 10 to 15 percent—of the difference between the current rent and that of the previous year.49 The lessee's bid was likely based on an informed prediction of the size of the clientele having recourse to the utility's services and of the fee that could be charged to the consumer for use of those services. Increases in the size of local populations would have encouraged higher bids.

Besides acting as consumers and lessees (e.g., table 11), Mudejars played another important role with respect to Crown utilities by providing the skilled labor necessary for their maintenance or improvement. In some cases the lessees themselves effected the improvements, as did the saddlers renting the saddieworks of Alcira.50 It was more usually the case that Muslim carpenters and masons maintained the serviceability of royal ovens, baths, fonduks, mills, and official market scales. Unskilled labor was also needed for the procurement and transport of materials, such as wood, sand, and stone.51 Thus, around the Crown utilities, providing essential services to the Mudejar populace and needed revenue to the king, there developed a community of interests, involving king, lessee, consumer, and laborer. (See tables 12–14 for further listings of Crown revenue.)

The king also exercised direct lordship over certain houses and lands in royal towns that were rented to Mudejars. The rents received from Mudejar lessees were negligible, ranging from 2s to 5s per year for a house, and from 2s to 12s per year for land. In Alcira, which had the largest number of Mudejars leasing homes and land from the Crown, the aggregate of rents never amounted to more than 104s 6d in any one year.52 Muslim lessees were allowed to sell the rented property to either Muslim or Christian buyers, although there was a sales tax, called the lluisme , collected from the vendor, which amounted to 10 percent of the sale price. The lluisme was paid by both Muslim and Christian vendors.53

Cena, Peyta , Tithes, and Other Taxes

Muslims, Christians, and Jews each year paid regular taxes known as cena and peyta . The cena originated as a feudal duty of hospitality paid by each town on the visit of the itinerant royal court, and was more

properly known as the cena de presencia . When the court became more stationary a cena de absencia was levied, which evolved into a fixed annual tribute, termed variously as cena de absencia, cena reyal , or simply cena . The aljama of Játiva paid a cena of 600s per year. The tax lists for the aljama of Alcira have no entry for the cena , but occasionally the peyta entry is written as peyta e cena or just cena , which, if not merely a scribal error, suggests that the aliama's peyta payment comprised both peyta and cena . Before 1455 the aljama of Valencia had paid 100s per year for the cena . Regarding the other aljamas in the kingdom, the scribes included their cena contributions with those of the Christians in the account books.54

In the kingdom of Aragon and Catalonia Fernando was avid to collect the cena , particularly in Catalonia, where, as a result of the civil war, the cena had not been paid during the years 1461–1479. All previous

remissions conceded by Juan II were nullified, despite the objections of the Catalan Muslim and Jewish aljamas.55 The Aragonese and Catalans were also obliged to pay separately the cena de primogenito , which Fernando collected on behalf of the princes Juan and Miguel. The annual cena rate for most Muslim aljamas of Aragon-Catalonia (the Jews' rates were usually higher) was 33s 4d, although the Muslims of Tortosa paid twice as much.56

It is extremely difficult to pinpoint exactly what was meant by the term peyta . Leopoldo Piles Ros maintains that in the kingdom of Valencia the peyta was an annual levy on all property-holders which included the cena del rey o primogenito , and was applicable toward the payment of the salaries of royal justices, jurates, and other officials, and toward the defraying of other royal expenses. This view is substantiated by the complaint made by the lord of Gilet "on account of some peytes that the

jurates and universitas of the said town of Murviedro are violently attempting to impose on certain lands possessed by some Sarracen vassals of the said noble."57 It also helps to explain why the scribes at times recorded the aljama of Alcira's payment of the peyta as including the cena . Indeed, in Valencia the cena is only infrequently mentioned as a separate tax and usually seems to have been regarded as a part of the more amorphous peyta . The Mudejars of most royal towns paid their peyta along with the local Christians. Thus, the Muslims of Onda were described as paying all the "peytes and contributions" that the Christians of the town were accustomed to pay, while the charter founding the new aljama of Castellón de Játiva obliged it to contribute along with the Christians to the payment of the "peytes, sises , and other impositions."58 Before 1455 the aljama of Valencia had paid an annual peyta of 250s, whereas during Fernando's reign only the aljama of Alcira paid its 100s peyta separately from the Christians. The singularity of this arrangement was conducive to conflict between Alcira's jurates and the aljama, for the jurates insisted on trying to collect the peyta from the aljama as was the practice in other towns.59

In Aragon-Catalonia the peyta had a somewhat different significance. There, as Macho y Ortega suggests, the peyta became by the fifteenth

century a lump-sum substitute for the payment of a wide array of taxes. The high annual peyta rates burdening the Arago-Catalan aljamas support this interpretation. The aljama of Tortosa was obliged to pay a peyta of 160 pounds (3,200s), while those of Borja and Daroca had to pay 3,000s and 700s, respectively.60 Given the precarious financial state of these aljamas, it is difficult to see how they could have paid any other taxes beyond these peytes , which alone were almost insupportable.

Another regular tax, less burdensome than the cena and peyta , was the morabatí . This tax, granted to Jaime I (1266) in exchange for a royal promise never to tamper with the coinage, had a set rate of one morabatí (7s) and was to be collected every seventh year from each household, of whatever faith, owning property worth fifteen or more morabatins . Like the peyta , it was, in effect, a form of property tax. By the fourteenth century it was not collected at regular seven-year intervals, but often more frequently. However, during Fernando's reign greater regularity in collection was established; the morabatí was exacted every six years, in 1481, 1487, 1493, and 1499. In Aragon the morabatí was collected only in the region of Huesca.61

A fairly lucrative source of revenue for the king was the share he received from the inheritances of royal Mudejar vassals. The records neither state explicitly what percentage of the deceased's property normally constituted the Crown's share nor note the total value of the property, from which the portion accruing to the Crown could be calculated. In fact, the Crown bureaucracy dealt with cases of Mudejar inheritance on an ad hoc basis, the royal portion being exacted without fail for a variety of reasons, and not only from those Muslims who died intestate and without legitimate heirs. Rubrics such as the one found in the records of the bailiff of Onda—"Revenues from [the inheritances of] the Moors and Mooresses who died without heirs, of which part goes to the lord king"—are misleading. Mahomat Hubaydal of Onda had to render to the Crown and to the Order of Montesa, which exercised lordship over Onda, 92s 10d from the inheritance left to him by his father.62 After the death of Abdurrazmen Mascor, the faqih * of Valencia, the bailiff general noted that the "king has succeeded to a certain portion of the said inheritance of the said faqih * ," and then went on to instruct the procurator of the Vail de Uxó to allow the wife, brother, and two sisters of Mascor to collect the property left by the deceased in the valley.63 Indeed, the taking of a royal share from the estates of deceased Mudejars was so established a practice that the aljama of Játiva simply paid an annual inheritance tax of 400s, in lieu of Crown interference in every inheritance case.64

Nevertheless, within the limitations of a system in which the fiscal demands of an overarching Christian bureaucracy meshed with the

Mudejar administration of civil affairs in accordance with the Shariah, the Islamic laws of inheritance were largely respected. For instance, so long as they were royal vassals, the siblings and other relatives of the Mudejar who died intestate and childless were allowed to divide the inheritance among themselves (subtracting, of course, the royal share), as the Qur'an* required. Operative, in effect, was a two-tiered process. At one level the royal qadi * adjudicated the division of the inheritance between the legitimate heirs as the will of the deceased and the Shariah demanded. This entailed the resolution of any attendant complications or litigation, such as ensuring that Mudejar widows were put in possession of their bridewealth before their husband's property was divided. In one case the qadi had to effect a compromise between the brother and the husband of a deceased woman before the king could receive his portion of the inheritance.65 The royal qadi 's participation, noted by the scribes in the records of almost every inheritance case, was crucial for two reasons. First, the qadi guaranteed that the Shariah was observed, thereby allaying potential Mudejar grievances that the Crown was excessively encroaching upon their legal autonomy. As a key figure in the kingdom's bureaucracy working closely with the bailiff general, the qadi could enlist the executive power of the latter to ensure that Mudejar wills were properly executed. With the counsel of the lieutenant qadi , the lieutenant bailiff general instructed the bailiff of Murviedro to protect the rights of the sisters Fatima and Mariem to a carob orchard bequeathed to them by their father, Mahomat Nayna.66 Second, while upholding the Shariah, the qadi also had the king's interests in mind, so that both royal Muslim heirs and the king received their due. When the faqih * of Petrés ruled on the division of the property left by a Mudejar woman of Murviedro, it was deemed detrimental to the royal revenues and to the qadi 's prerogatives, for a seigneurial faqih was not about to trouble himself over whether the Crown received its portion.67

Some marginal notes of the scribe of the Maestre Racional are quite revealing as to the complexity of procedure in Mudejar inheritance cases, involving first the Islamic-Arabic execution of the will and then the Christian-Romance collection and recording of the Crown's share. Clearly, the qadi was the pivotal figure, attending to both Mudejar and Crown interests. The scribe begins by stating that the figures he is recording were taken from a Romance translation of an Arabic "act of the inventory of the property and adjudication of the said inheritance carried out by the said qadi ." He then carefully notes the share of the inheritance to be collected by the Crown:

certain deductions having been made, there remain for division from the value of the property 255 pounds 5s, of which the part that pertains to the

lord king—that is, the portion of the brother of the said Fatima [the deceased] who is not a vassal of the lord king—is only 28 pounds 7s 2d, since all the rest pertains to Abdalla Perpiu—one third by legacy—and to the husband, and to the mother, and to the sister of the said Fatima.68

These marginalia also show one of the ways by which the Crown, on the second level of inheritance procedure, could come into possession of a sometimes substantial portion of the inheritance, that is, when the heir of a royal vassal was himself not a royal vassal. This contradicted a provision of Pedro IV (1337), which allowed children and relatives who were seigneurial vassals to inherit the property of royal Mudejar vassals, and vice versa. However, this provision seems to have had little practical effect, or at best for only a short time, since by 1363 Pedro himself no longer observed it.69 Certainly by the fifteenth century the general rule was that only royal vassals could succeed to the property of royal vassals. This helped to maintain the integrity of the royal patrimony. Therefore, the sister-in-law of Mahomat Fandaig, a seigneurial vassal, was denied access to the property of her deceased sister, a royal vassal in Valencia.70 Actually, with respect to the aljama of Valencia, the Crown had taken matters one step further: only royal vassals residing in the city had inheritance rights. Çahat Alatar forfeited his portion of his dead brother's property to the king because he lived outside of the city.71

The obverse of the Crown's exacting supervision of the inheritances of its own vassals was its, and its vassals', forfeiture of any claims to the estates of seigneurial Muslims. Valencian patterns of land tenure could, however, complicate matters somewhat. For instance, when the bailiff of Villarreal notified the bailiff general that a seigneurial Muslim of Bechí, who had died intestate and childless, happened to have property in Villarreal, he was ordered to confiscate the property on behalf of the king.72

The Crown demanded its due from even the most meager inheritances. Two Muslim widowers of Castellón de la Plana each paid 50s from the estates of their wives, who, it seems, had left them next to nothing.73 However exacting, even avid, royal bureaucrats were in their administration of Mudejar estates, their actions drew no protests from Mudejars. No doubt the scrupulousness of the qadi * in handling inheritances within the framework of the Shariah softened the impact of Christian bureaucratic intrusions in a sensitive area of family law. Moreover, Fernando's reign was no different in this respect from those of his predecessors. It may be that Játiva's aljama fared best. By paying a simple inheritance tax its members were irritated less by a grasping Christian bureaucracy, and, given the size of its population, 400s per year was probably cheaper in the long term.74

Through an array of tariffs, tolls, and taxes the Crown was able to derive revenue from the commercial, agricultural, and pastoral activities of Muslim and Christian alike. These taxes were not too burdensome, for the king did not wish to depress the economy by discouraging the enterprise of his subjects. Many of these tariffs and tolls were collected at the kingdom's borders, on royal roads, and in the markets of royal towns, and were, therefore, paid by both royal and seigneurial vassals, whose marketing of crops, pasturing of flocks, and peddling often took them beyond the confines of their respective hamlets and towns.

The peatge was a transit duty on commercial use of the roads, collected in each locality from "all the persons who enter, pass through, or sell livestock and other merchandise."75 For instance, Muslims of Ribarroja bringing goats into the kingdom from Castile had to pay the peatge ,76 as did the vassals of barons who herded their livestock into the district of Játiva, although only once per year and not every time their flocks crossed over into royal lands.77 It was not unusual for certain baronies and their vassals to have franquesa , or exemption, from the payment of the peatge and similar tolls. Barons were often moved to complain when collectors of the peatge exacted tolls from their exempt vassals.78 During Fernando's reign additional exemptions were conceded only to certain Muslims of the morería of Valencia, probably as a means of aiding individual members of a financially prostrate aljama. In contrast, Fernando denied exemptions to Granadan Muslims settling in communities where the financial situation was less dire.79

Other taxes affecting merchants and shepherds were the lleuda , a tariff imposed on goods imported into major towns and cities; the quema , a tariff on goods imported from Castile; the portatge , a bridge toll; the herbatge , a grazing fee collected for the use of certain pastures; and the montatge , a sheepwalk toll. Some Mudejars were involved in the royal collection machinery, such as Amet Samaris, who was appointed custodian of the quema in the district of Aspe.80

The Crown exercised a monopoly over the production and sale of salt. Some Valencians found royal control over access to this essential commodity particularly irksome, and so attempted to obtain it fraudulently or elsewhere. The lessees of the royal saltworks of Játiva were often immersed in litigation with those they accused of procuring salt fraudulently, among whom were Muslims of Antella and the Vall de Serra.81 In 1503 the bailiff general considered it a special problem that Mudejars "use other salt [sal estranya ] that is not from the monopolies of the lord king."82 Nevertheless, at the same time Muslims labored in salt production on behalf of the king, and also turn up as agents for Játiva's saltworks.83

Muslims and Christians holding lands in territories under the direct

lordship of the king all had to pay the terç de delme , that is, one-third of one-tenth (i.e., 3.33 percent) of their produce of whatever sort. The terç de delme originated in the crusader's patronage right by which King Jaime I had retained for the Crown one-third of the ecclesiastical tithe, leaving the other two-thirds to the Church. As was the case with most other taxes, the terçes de delme were farmed out under contract to the highest bidder. In Alcira Mudejars were prominent as lessees of the terçes of local collectories (or tax-collection districts).84

Regarding the other two-thirds of the tithe owed to the Church, the situation was somewhat more complex. Theoretically, Mudejars were not liable to pay ecclesiastical tithes and first-fruits for lands that had always been held by Muslims; the obligation was incumbent only on those lands that Muslims had acquired from Christians. It seems, however, that by the late fifteenth century most, if not all, Mudejars farming on royal land were paying tithes. A royal order treating the city of Valencia with its district and huerta states quite clearly that all persons "of whatever law [i.e., religion], status, or condition" must give one-third of the tithe to the Crown and the other two-thirds to the episcopal official.85 Implicit in the complaint of the bishop and chapter of Cartagena, that Muslims and Christians of Agost were evading payment of the tithe by threshing their wheat outside of Agost where the tithe collector could not find them, is the assumption that farmers of both faiths normally paid tithes. Royal proclamations against such tithe evasion were to be posted throughout the diocese of Cartagena.86 It is understandable how Mudejar liability to pay tithes had become the norm. Considering the not infrequent sale of Christian land to Muslims, and the Muslims' ability to change vassalage, which often entailed the purchase or rental of new land, the amount of property held by Muslims since time immemorial must have steadily diminished. Most seigneurial Muslims probably paid the tithe only indirectly, the lord making the direct payment from the rents he received from his vassals. Litigation surrounding Valencian Mudejar liability to tithes is, in contrast to the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, conspicuously absent.87

Quite different from the apparent normalcy prevailing in Valencia, in the kingdom of Aragon the tithe question continued to create considerable tension between the Church and the Mudejars and their royal and seigneurial lords. The bishop and chapter of Tarazona were most aggressive in the campaign to exact tithes from Mudejars. In 1479 they reached an agreement with the lord and aljama of Conchiellos, whereby the Muslims cultivating lands in the huerta and mountains of Tarazona, and in Conchiellos itself, would pay tithes and first-fruits; as for those lands immemorially Muslim (moriegas ), the lord would pay their tithes.88 Later, the chapter was engaged in a tithe litigation with the

aljamas of Torrellas and Santa Cruz.89 The most difficult suit pitted the chapter against the aljama of Borja. The chapter complained to the king in 1489 that Borja's Muslims refused to pay their tithes "and this not only for their properties which were from Moors, but even for those which have been of Christians and have come to them." The canons argued that by virtue of provisions of Queen María and of a papal bull they had the right to collect these tithes, but that the aljama had enlisted the support of the Justice of Aragon against them. Eleven years later the suit was still unresolved, and Fernando had to reprimand sharply the bishop and the chapter for decreeing an interdict in Borja against the local Muslims.90 Even more serious was the attempt of the archbishop of Zaragoza to obtain from the pope a bull authorizing the Aragonese clergy to collect tithes from the Muslim vassals of all barons. Fernando felt compelled to foil the archbishop's plan. It was probably a desire to avoid provoking an already uncooperative Aragonese nobility that moved the king to act decisively.91

Extraordinary Taxes and Aljama Finance

In the realm of regular taxation royal policy was only mildly discriminatory against the Mudejars. Muslims and Christians both paid for the use of utilities, and both were liable to the annual peyta and cena and the commercial tariffs and agricultural tithes. That Muslim and Christian taxpayers are often indistinguishable in royal account books, and that Muslims participated freely in the collection machinery as lessees of utilities and tithe collectories indicates a rough parity of Muslim and Christian before the fiscal bureaucracy. The annual payment of the besant singled out the Muslims, although the tax had greater significance as a symbol of the Mudejars' subject status than as a source of royal revenue. The share of Mudejar inheritances demanded by the Crown was another expression of its ultimate authority over a conquered population and its property.

The extent of the religious minorities' fiscal servitude to the Crown becomes clear only upon consideration of the extraordinary taxes that burdened them. Fernando's descriptions of the Mudejars as "our coffers" and "servants of our chamber" were not empty rhetoric but were firmly rooted in the king's understanding that he could freely impose new taxes—servicios graciosos or donativos —on his Muslim (and Jewish) subjects with or without their consent. Whereas the local laws of his individual kingdoms limited the demands Fernando could make on his Christian subjects, and the representative Cortes at times rejected these

demands outright, there were not institutional restraints on his taxation of the Mudejars. That the Muslims' very raison d'être in a Christian society was founded on their economic usefulness had as its logical conclusion a royal policy that would seek from them maximum fiscal benefits. Long-term fiscal considerations, however, advised against rapacity in the short term, for a consistent and reliable income from the aljamas was the preferable state of affairs. Nevertheless, political and economic urgencies sometimes resulted in a less cautionary policy, with the consequence that aljamas were financially devastated by extraordinary royal exactions. Aljamas were often forced to borrow funds in order to meet the Crown's demands, and this, combined with subsequent interest payments and regular taxes, could cripple an aljama's finances, leaving it in a state of indebtedness for years at a time. Aljamas that were not deep "in the red" struggled to maintain solvency. The wealth of individual Mudejars notwithstanding, the financial troubles of Muslim communities were symptomatic of their corporate dependence on the needs of the royal treasury.92

Fernando's numerous military campaigns and foreign adventures were a constant drain on the resources of the royal treasury, and it was necessary to tap all available sources of funds. The royal Muslim aljamas of the kingdom of Valencia were, of course, called on to contribute what they could, although they were burdened less frequently by royal servicios than were the aljamas of Aragon. Considering the greater prosperity of the kingdom of Valencia and the greater financial stability of its Muslim aljamas, the heavier taxation of the Aragonese aljamas seems a bit illogical. However, the determinant of royal fiscal policy vis-à-vis the Mudejars was not so much what the aljamas could give—as for what they would give, they had little choice—as what the Christians and their Cortes were able and willing to concede. It seems that the number of extraordinary taxes exacted from the aljamas of a particular kingdom related inversely to the amount of funds provided by the Christians of that kingdom. In other words, what Fernando could not procure from the kingdom as a whole he tried to compensate for with servicios imposed on royal aljamas. The kingdom of Valencia, particularly its capital city, granted to the king a number of generous "aids," whereas the kingdom of Aragon, less wealthy than Valencia, exceedingly parochial in its interests, and highly uncooperative, gave much less toward royal enterprises, conceding funds only for the campaigns to recover Roussillon, and for those in Navarre and, belatedly, in North Africa (1510).93

One extraordinary tax collected from all of Fernando's subjects, Muslim, Christian, and Jew, in all of his kingdoms was the maridatge , used to defray the expenses of the weddings of the king's children. The

maridatge was imposed four times, on the occasion of the marriages of the Infantas Isabel (1491), Juana (1496), Maria (1500), and Caterina (1502). The amount of maridatge collected from each community was determined by the number of its households and its wealth. Judging by the maridatges paid by Muslim aljamas in Valencia on the occasion of the marriage of Juan II's daughter Elionor (1477), the maridatge could be quite burdensome. At that time the aljama of Játiva contributed 4000s, that of Alcira 220s, and a large seigneurial aljama like that of Bétera 550s.94 The imposition of the maridatge was capable of disrupting an aljama's precarious financial affairs. Thus, in 1502 the aljama of Castellón de la Plana was compelled to take out a loan in order to do its part for the weddings of María and Caterina.95

Apart from the maridatges the Valencian aljamas were obliged to contribute other servicios . Still pending from the previous reign was a servicio of 40,000s which the military estate had promised Juan II in 1463. Fernando ordered that this sum be collected from the nobles and from the universitates and aljamas of their Christian and Muslim vassals.96 In 1482 the Muslim aljamas were asked to make a donation (donatiu ) of 15,041s on the occasion of Queen Isabel's entry into the kingdom. The sums paid by certain aljamas were 3,900s by that of Paterna, 260s by that of Castellón de la Plana, 650s by that of Monforte, and 91s by that of Murviedro.97 In 1485, when the king needed further funding to press his campaign against Granada, he turned to his Muslim and Jewish vassals. The Jews of Murviedro and the Muslim aljamas, particularly that of Játiva, on account of its size and relative wealth, were to give to the king as large a servicio as they could afford.98 The convoking of the Corts in Orihuela in 1488 occasioned another servicio to which the entire kingdom was liable. The aljama of Alcira alone was required to pay 40 pounds.99

For the kingdom of Aragon the list of servicios demanded of its Muslim and Jewish aljamas was considerably longer, although, as we shall see below, the resources at their disposal to pay them were, in the case of the Muslims, decidedly less. In 1481 all Muslim and Jewish aljamas were asked to provide a servicio of an unspecified sum.100 In 1484 all royal Muslims were expected to contribute as much as they could spare to the king's effort to capture Roussillon.101 Furthermore, from 1484 through 1487 the Jews and Muslims were paying "some quantities" for the Granadan campaigns,102 when, in contrast, the Cortes of Aragon refused to provide aid for a royal enterprise so far beyond the kingdom's frontiers. In 1494 and 1495 the Mudejars were asked to pay still more servicios in amounts potentially devastating for aljama finances. The king sought 8,000s from the aljama of Zaragoza and 6,000s from that of

Borja, although these sums perforce were reduced to 6,000s and 5,400s, respectively.103

On two occasions Fernando displayed a definite canniness in the tack he took when demanding servicios from the Mudejars. In Aragon in 1484 and again in Valencia in 1485, instead of requesting lump sums from each aljama, the king ordered his officials to obtain from individual Muslims servicios consonant with their personal wealth.104 Because aljamas normally divided servicio payments equally, the inability of impoverished Muslim families to contribute reduced the servicio the aljama could offer, even if the aggregate wealth of aljama members could well support the full servicio requested. By taxing Muslims on an individual basis Fernando spared the poor, many of whom would not have paid in any case, and exacted from the wealthier families as much as possible and likely much more than these families would have otherwise contributed. Consequently, the king probably received via individual assessment a larger total servicio . Furthermore, by approaching Muslim families individually, much of the wrangling and quarreling that plagued aljamas in their own internal tax collection was avoided. When the collection of lump servicios was left to aljama officials some Muslims were emboldened to avoid payment, claiming that they possessed a royal exemption, or, conversely, aljama officials might create tension by taxing certain families in excess.105 However, individual Muslim families were less likely to evade the royal bureaucracy, and, since with individual assessment the equal apportionment of servicio contributions per household was rendered inoperative, wealthier Muslims who found themselves being more heavily taxed than their poorer fellows could not cry foul.

Although the account books; do not reveal how much of the servicios requested were actually deposited in the royal treasury, it is probable that the king usually received from his Muslim subjects the desired sums. At times Fernando was quite insistent, indicating to his officials that the Muslims should be compelled to pay if they did not do so voluntarily.106 When preoccupied with pressing international concerns, the king was not likely to pay much heed to the grievances of his Muslim subjects.

The apparently harsh and unrelenting attitude of the king when demanding extraordinary servicios , induced by the pressing needs of the moment, such as the campaigns in Roussillon and Granada, was by necessity tempered with the application of more far-sighted and benign measures. As Boswell has demonstrated for the reign of Pedro IV, the Crown's judicious granting of remissions and deferments of tax payments was essential in alleviating an aljama's sometimes insupportable

tax load, in effect striking a balance between its needs and those of the aljama.107

Although it was preferable to receive from the king a remission or a deferment, the aljamas had a means of raising capital in order to pay taxes: they could, with the permission of the king, borrow money through the sale of annuities, or pensions de censals . The creditor purchasing the censal delivered a sum of capital to the aljama at an annual interest rate of 6.6 to 10 percent, and, in return, the aljama paid annual pensions to the creditor (censalista ) until the price of the censal was paid off. Normally, as part of the censal contract, the aljamas, and their individual members, had to mortgage their property. Default of the payment of a pension resulted in the confiscation and sale of an aljama's property. In the fifteenth century the censal was an instrument of credit of central importance in the financing of the debts of cities, aljamas, and individuals, especially the nobility. Belenguer Cebrià has shown how Fernando wreaked havoc on the city of Valencia's finances: by exacting such large "loans" from the city, he forced the municipality to sell increasing numbers of pensions, which created an unwieldy public debt.108 On a much smaller scale, Fernando's permission to his aljamas to sell pensions, although providing them with ready capital to make tax payments, in the long run sometimes encumbered them with crushing public debts and made the rentier or censalista class a Mudejar nemesis.

For the most part Valencia's royal aljamas managed to pay their taxes, both ordinary and extraordinary, without having to sell pensions or to ask the king for remissions. However, that this was not always the case suggests that some aljamas, even when meeting fiscal demands, did so only with difficulty. As has been mentioned, the additional burden of the maridatges for the Infantas Maria and Caterina compelled the aljama of Castellón de la Plana to sell a censal in order to raise 870s.109 Extraordinary taxes also put the aljama of Alcira into financial straits, causing it to take on a censal of 600s, probably to pay the maridatge of the Infanta Juana, and two years later another censal of 800s in order to make the contribution occasioned by the convocation of the Corts (1488). In addition, Fernando allowed the aljama to defer its payment of the peyta in 1497 and again in 1503. In both cases the aljama was able to pay its outstanding peyta the following year, which indicates that its financial troubles were not especially grave.110

The poverty of the aljama of Valencia, which had only partially recovered from the destruction of the morería in 1455, was atypical. The reduction of the aljama's taxes to an annual lump sum of 25 pounds (500s) was alone insufficient to cure its financial ills. In 1481 and in 1483 Fernando remitted the aljama's annual payment, on account of "the poverty that is in it." These remissions, combined with the orders of

Juan II and Fernando that the aljama's creditors (censalistas ) reduce the debts burdening it, enabled the aljama to attain sufficient stability to pay its lump tax from 1484 through 1503.111 The king further aided the aljama by commanding Christians who had purchased property within the morería to pay the property taxes for which the Muslims were liable, and by obstructing the effort of the butchers' guild to impose restrictions on the Muslim butcher shop, inasmuch as the aljama derived essential revenue from the sale of meat.112

Royal regulation of Mudejar finances extended beyond the level of the corporate aljama to that of the individual Muslim family. The king's intervention in the financial affairs of Muslim families consisted of granting them licenses to sell annuities (table 15). The licenses stipulated the maximum sum of money that could be borrowed through the censal , and these sums ranged from as little as 10 pounds to as much as 75 pounds. The Mudejars invested the funds mainly in the purchase of land and homes or in home improvements. It was expected that the debts thus incurred would be liquidated within four years. The Mudejars granted such licenses by Fernando's bailiff general were all royal vassals in the morerías of Valencia and Alcira. Such financial paternalism on the part of the Crown ultimately worked in favor of its own treasury. By ensuring that Mudejar vassals borrowed and invested money wisely, at the same time often bettering the physical plant of the royal morerías , the king hoped to foster their prosperity and, indirectly, that of the aljamas. Wealthier aljamas, of course, meant that the king would have a more reliable source of servicios .113

The much graver financial situation of many Aragonese and Catalan aljamas presented a greater test to royal benevolence. The Aragonese aljamas, it seems, had never fully recovered from the effects of the fourteenth-century wars between Aragon and Castile, and throughout the fifteenth century were often on the verge of ruin. Catalonia's Muslims probably suffered during the wars that ravaged the province during Juan II's reign. Neither Aragon nor Catalonia could boast of an economic growth such as Valencia enjoyed from which the Mudejars might have benefited. At the outset of his reign Fernando was faced with the prospect of taxing Muslim communities whose resources were already dwindling. His initial zeal to recover revenues relinquished by his father was quickly dampened. For instance, in 1480 Fernando annulled Juan II's partial reduction of the peyta ordinaria paid by Borja's aljama (from 3,000s to 2,000s), but in the following year, after having permitted the aljama to sell a censal of 15,000s in order to pay its diverse debts, he realized his error and extended the reduction of the aljama's peyta obligation until 1498.114 Indeed, the king responded to the aljamas' complaints of poverty and declining population with a fiscal policy

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marked largely by realism and restraint. The numerous demands of extraordinary servicios from the aljamas were balanced by remissions of the payment of regular taxes. During the years 1480–1485 and 1490–1495 (the documentation is unclear about 1485–1490) Fernando exempted Huesca's Muslims from paying their peyta of 1,450s; and later he ordered an investigation of the extent of the aljama's population decline and of its poverty so as to ascertain whether its taxes needed to be further reduced.115 Fernando maintained throughout his reign Juan II's reduction of the Tortosa aljama's peyta obligation from 160 pounds to a mere 50 pounds.116 Daroca's Muslims were granted a twenty-year remission of their annual peyta payment.117 Even with a lighter regular tax load, some aljamas still insisted that the servicios were onerous and had to be reduced. The aljama of Huesca sought a reduction of its maridatge obligation, and the aljamas of Zaragoza and Borja were conceded reductions of their 1495 servicios .118 The king took additional measures to ameliorate the situation of aljama finances. He allowed the Mudejars of Albarracín to open their own store for the sale of staples and to use the profits for defraying communal expenses.119 The aljama of Darcoa was similarly permitted to turn to its own account the proceeds from the sisa on meat and butchery rental.120 Fernando made sure that Muslim masons of Zaragoza were paid proper wages for their labors on the royal aljafería , so that the resources of the aljama for sustaining its tax burden were not depleted.121

Royal taxation formed only one part, albeit the most important part, of the Mudejars' financial dilemma. The necessity of raising capital induced the aljamas to sell annuities, which, while in the short-term providing them with immediate funds, in the long term compounded their debt problems. Scarcely possessing the financial resources to pay royal taxes, much less to pay annual pensions to censalistas , aljamas were compelled to sell more annuities just to make other pension payments. Consequently, the public debt of Aragonese and Catalan aljamas spiraled, often becoming quite unmanageable. Much of the responsibility for this state of affairs must be placed on the shoulders of Fernando and his predecessors, since the Mudejars could not sell pensions without royal license. The remission or reduction of taxes, therefore, solved only part of the problem; the Mudejars still had to deal with the censalistas waiting to foreclose on their mortgages.

Fernando dealt with the problem of the censals weighing on Mudejar aljamas in two ways. First, he permitted the aljamas to sell more pensions, a not especially prudent course of action. The aljama of Albarracín sold a censal of 4,000s in order to pay other pensions, and the aljama of Zaragoza sold a censal of 6,800s for the same purpose.122 The public debt of Borja's aljama mounted ruinously: in 1480 it sold a censal of

15,000s to liquidate diverse debts; in 1496 it took on another censal of 80,000s in order to pay other pensions; and in the same year the king permitted it to sell a censal of 4,000s so that it could meet its sisa obligations.123 The second approach was to order the creditors harrying the aljamas to reduce the pensions owed them, that is, to renegotiate the aljamas' debts. In this manner Fernando provided temporary relief to the aljamas of Albarracín, Teruel, Huesca, and Tortosa.124 However, there were limits to the losses the creditors were willing to sustain, and, inasmuch as the aljamas were bound by contract to pay the pensions, Fernando could only briefly delay the inevitable. Thus, although the king was able to shield Albarracín's Muslims from the censalistas in 1484, by 1488 he had little choice but to allow for the foreclosure on their mortgaged property.125 Nor should it be imagined that Fernando was the staunch defender of Mudejars against grasping creditors, for in the case of pensions owed by aljamas to Conversos condemned by the Inquisition he did not act in the aljamas' best interests. Here Fernando had an ideal opportunity to assist struggling aljamas significantly by simply waiving the pensions payable to the condemned. Instead, he rewarded a royal servant with the pensions owed to a Converso by the aljama of Teruel, and, after a six-year deferment, allowed the Inquisition to collect from the aljama of Huesca a pension owed to one of its victims.126

The king's exercise of some moderation in his fiscal policy did not achieve the reinvigoration of the finances of the Aragonese and Catalan aljamas. Given the desperate situation in which some aljamas entered Fernando's reign, it is unlikely that anything less than complete and long-term remission of regular taxes and servicios would have been a suitable remedy. In both Tortosa and Teruel, despite royal efforts to provide relief, Muslims were selling their property and leaving the morerías because they lacked the means to meet their tax obligations. Fernando responded by having all Muslim property sequestered and inventoried so as to ensure that at least some royal taxes would be paid.127 At best, by alternating tax remissions and reductions with the exaction of needed servicios , Fernando enabled the aljamas to make some contribution to the royal treasury while maintaining a precarious financial existence.

Fernando's treatment of the Mudejars of Aragon-Catalonia did not differ significantly from his handling of his Muslim vassals in Valencia. In both cases royal fiscal policy was characterized by a limiting of the Crown's voracity to demands that the aljamas could reasonably afford to meet. Aragonese and Catalan aljamas suffered more as a result of factors largely extrinsic to royal policy; their difficulties in supporting their tax burdens stemmed primarily from their integration in local econo-

mies that still had not recovered from the traumas of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. If the Valencian Mudejars' share in their kingdom's greater prosperity allowed them to bear royal taxes with more ease, the king was no less keen to exact his due from the Muslim servants of his Valencian treasury.

Seigneurial Aljamas

Unfortunately, there are no seigneurial account books similar to those of the royal bailiffs from which a detailed study of seigneurial taxation of the Mudejars might be made. The few cartas pueblas studied by Miguel Gual Camarena provide some information on the various taxes demanded from Muslims who resided on seigneurial lands, but reveal nothing about the ability of the Muslims to pay them. Blanket generalizations regarding a seigneurial fiscal regime cannot be offered, since the situation seems to have varied from one barony to another. Still, on the basis of the cartas pueblas a few general comments are possible.128

To a large extent the seigneurial fiscal regime was quite similar to that of the Crown. Like royal vassals, seigneurial vassals were obliged to use the public utilities and workshops—ovens, mills, taverns, ironworks, saddleworks, and the like—owned by their lord, and they, too, had to pay a fee for the privilege. They were likewise liable for the rents of their homes and land, the tithe (terç de delme ), and property taxes (peyta [or almagram , as it was sometimes called on seigneurial lands]). However, there seems to be little doubt that seigneurial vassals bore a heavier tax burden. In addition to the annual rent on their land, they were also obliged to give their lord a certain percentage of their harvest (these percentages varied from seigneury to seigneury), and sometimes a certain number of chickens or a certain amount of honey each year. On some baronies vassals were required to sell agricultural and pastoral products to their lord at a price lower than the market price.

In most cases it seems that the lords exacted more from their Muslim vassals than from the Christians (in contrast to royal towns, where taxation was relatively equitable). Thus, in his efforts to attract Mudejars to his new morería in Ayora Don Rodrigo de Mendoza promised the Muslims that he would "not demand from them any tax other than those the Christians are obliged to pay."129 And in 1526 the recently converted Moriscos specifically requested of Carlos I "that they not be pressed to pay more or less [taxes] than the Christians."130 Sometimes the Mudejars had to give the lord a higher percentage of their harvest, but usually their heavier tax burden consisted of the sofras , a series of personal services they owed to their lord. Such services might include working in

the lord's vineyards and huerta , provisioning the lord's house with wood and charcoal, transporting crops to the lord, maintenance and repair of the lord's utilities, and weaving linen and silk for the lord. The Mudejars were paid a low daily wage for their labors.131 That most Mudejars chose to remain on seigneurial lands despite an option to move to royal morerías suggests that the Mudejars had other noneconomic reasons for doing so, and that perhaps life there was not as difficult as the preceding list of taxes and services would indicate. In the previous chapter it was pointed out that some seigneurial Muslims were able to prosper, in part through pursuing a strategy of renting or purchasing land outside of their seigneuries, where they were not liable for the heavy seigneurial dues. In the sixteenth century the Moriscos living on seigneurial lands probably felt their lord's exactions much more keenly, since prevailing conditions deprived them of the options available to their fifteenth-century predecessors.

The picture of relative financial stability that has been drawn regarding the royal aljamas of the kingdom of Valencia cannot easily be extended to include their seigneurial counterparts. There is evidence that a number of seigneurial aljamas had financial difficulties, which in part derived from the insolvency of their lords. This royal-seigneurial dichotomy mirrors that which seems to have existed between the prosperity of the capital and perhaps of other towns and the economic stagnation of at least some rural areas. While agrarian productivity seems to have declined between 1410 and 1518, textile production and commerce in the capital experienced growth until the final decades of the fifteenth century. The agrarian decline was a consequence of the plagues that swept over the kingdom throughout the fifteenth century (1411, 1428, 1439, 1450, 1459, 1475, 1478, 1489, 1508, 1519) and left many areas seriously underpopulated. Although urban areas also suffered greatly from the plagues, their populations, or at least that of the capital, were replenished by immigration from Castile.132 Such conditions, although allowing individual Muslim and Christian farmers to take more land under cultivation and thereby prosper, were detrimental to the finances of the landed nobility and the corporate universitates and aljamas of their Christian and Muslim vassals.

The reduction in the amount of land being farmed resulted in decreasing revenues for the nobility. Lords could not easily increase the productivity of their estates, for even when their enterprising vassals tilled idle land they tended to do so in areas outside of the seigneury. Furthermore, the progressive substitution of rents in kind for rents in cash seems to have stimulated greater expenditure on the part of the nobility, who found, however, that their diminishing monetary income was insufficient to support the lifestyle to which they had grown accus-

tomed. Thus many nobles entered into a state of indebtedness and raised more money through the sale of pensions to prosperous urban merchants or to other lords who possessed the funds to invest.

Seigneurial aljamas and universitates were implicated in the lords' debts, because when the lords sold pensions they normally mortgaged their properties and the rents they received from their vassals as security for the payment of the pensions. Consequently, if a lord defaulted on his pension payment, the creditor could initiate executions against the property and rents of the lord's vassals. Or, in what amounted to the same thing, as a lord's monetary resources dwindled he might compel his universitates and aljamas to take on ("cargasen") the responsibility of the pension payment themselves. In both cases, either through the lord's default or through formal assumption of the responsibility of payment, the vassals found themselves paying their rents to their lord's creditors. The creditors in effect replaced the lord as rent collector.133

As long as the pensions owed by the lord did not exceed the amount of rent the lord normally received the vassals could tolerate the demands of the creditors, for it made little difference whether the creditor or the lord's tax farmer collected the rent. However, when the rents proved insufficient to liquidate outstanding pensions, the vassals were then faced with the attempts of the creditors to confiscate and auction off the properties and possessions remaining to them, as a corporation or as individuals, after tax payment. For those vassals who barely met the fiscal demands of their lords, additional exactions on the part of the creditors might prove disastrous.

The aljamas and universitates of Benaguacil, Paterna, and la Pobla (collectively called the antich patrimoni ), whose lord was the Infante Enrique, were burdened with numerous pension obligations that, Fernando admitted, had been taken on by his royal predecessors and other lords (e.g., the 1,480s annual pension sold by the Count de Luna to a knight).134 Because the rents were insufficient to meet all the pension payments, Fernando took measures to excuse the aljamas and universitates from all superfluous payments and expenses, and therefore relieved them of the responsibility of paying the 500s salary of the advocate of the antich patrimoni .135 However, that such a measure would have provided only minimal relief is clear from subsequent claims against the Infante and his vassals by the Count of Oliva (1495), the Count of Trivento (1501), and Joan Ferrando, a lawyer (1502), for 5,107s, 8,400s, and 166s 8d, respectively.136

The powerful Duke de Cardona and his aljamas—Benicanena, Beniopa, Alcarea Nova, Benipeixcar, and el Real, all located in the huerta of Gandía, and those of the valleys of Guadalest and Confrides and the town of Ondara—were constantly engaged in legal battles with

their creditors over outstanding pensions. One document from 1486 lists no less than nineteen creditors, among whom were noblemen, urban citizens, and the Hospital of Holy Innocents in Valencia.137 For instance, at least 180s were owed to Dona Yolant de Aragon, 8,000s to the knight Françi Crespi de Valldaura, and 500s to Luis de Vilanova.138 It seems that during the period covered by this study only a few of these debt cases were resolved. The Duke de Cardona would argue that excessive executions against the property of his vassals would cause them to abandon their lands.139 Or if the king actually commanded that executions be made, the Duke would see to it that they were carried out moderately and according to strict guidelines he himself had set.140 The success of the Duke and his aljamas in evading their creditors may be attributed to the fact that the Duke was, as the knight Françi Crespi complained in frustration, a "potent person."141

The Infante Enrique and the Duke de Cardona certainly were not alone in endangering the financial stability of their aljamas and universitates through their own excessive borrowing. One also finds creditors harrying the Count of Cocentaina and his vassals in the town of Elda, or the lords and aljamas of Dos Aguas, Alacuás, and Novelda.142 It is difficult todetermine from the debt litigation just how much of a threat was posed to the solvency of seigneurial aljamas by having to satisfy their lords' creditors. Presumably, some lords had the good sense not to overextend themselves to the point that their debts could not be covered by the rents they received from their vassals. The aljamas of such lords would not have been placed in any jeopardy. However, other lords were not so concerned about maintaining a balanced budget. They eventually were forced to plead with their creditors to renegotiate their pension payments, for they feared that execution against their vassals' mortgaged property—beyond the normal rent payments—would force the vassals to flee and settle elsewhere. And these fears were not exaggerated in some cases. Many Muslim vassals abandoned the seigneuries of Dos Aguas and Olocau rather than endure the confiscation of their goods by their lords' creditors.143 In such cases the lords and the remaining vassals were left in even direr straits, for with fewer vassals less land could be cultivated, and with the consequent smaller harvests there would be even less revenue available for satisfying the creditors. And, as has been seen, new vassals were difficult to come by.

However, the financial difficulties experienced by some seigneurial aljamas cannot always be attributed to the imprudent spending of their lords, for many aljamas sold pensions to raise money on their own account. An aljarna might need to borrow money for any number of reasons, such as purchasing grain after a poor harvest or a flood, or buying materials for repairing the local irrigation system.144 Apparently,

aljamas had been borrowing money in this fashion since the late fourteenth century. Thus Francesch Vilar, a priest beneficed in the church of Santa María del Mar in Barcelona, sued the aljamas of the Vall de Uxó for 81 pounds 10s in outstanding pensions. This pension had been sold by the aljamas in 1383 to a citizen of Barcelona, Arnau Alos, who subsequently bequeathed it to the church of Santa María.145 The same aljamas also owed 216s 8d in pensions to the heirs of one Bartholomeu Ros.146 The aljama of Elda sold numerous pensions in its own behalf, distinct from those which had been sold by their lord, the Count of Cocentaina. In 1497 the aljama concluded an agreement with eighteen of its creditors, among whom were noblemen, merchants, and clergymen, including the cardinal-bishop and chapter of Zaragoza and the monastery of Poblet. Realizing that the aljama's goods and rents were sufficient for little more than to pay the salaries of the officials sent to confiscate them for the payment of outstanding pensions, the creditors decided to stay the order of execution and renegotiate the aljama's debt, so that the aljama would be left with some means of paying future pensions.147 Other aljamas involved in suits with their creditors were those of Ribarroja, Villamarchante, and Mislata, although none of these seems to have had debt burdens like that of the aljama of Elda.148

It is probably wise to refrain from making any general conclusions as to the widespread financial difficulties of seigneurial aljamas. The evidence is too scanty and scattered, and it is not at all clear from the documents that the creditors' claims were always valid and acted upon or that the aljamas were unable to pay the pensions. In any case, it is certain from the study of Eugenio Císcar Pallarés that the problem of seigneurial insolvency was far more serious in the latter half of the sixteenth century. At that time considerable inflation devalued the lords' cash rents (prices were, in contrast, relatively stable in the late fifteenth century) to such an extent that not even the huge population increase—50.9 percent between 1563 and 1609—and the consequent growth in agrarian production could close the gap between expenses and income and relieve the lords' financial troubles. The situation of the vassals also worsened. Unable to change vassalage because of an overabundance of labor, and left with less land to farm owing to the progressive subdivision of family properties, they were hard-pressed to meet the increasing fiscal demands of their lords.149 Therefore, a more modest conclusion may be offered: during Fernando's reign there are evident signs of the later crisis of the seigneurial regime.

Islamic and Christian Legal Systems: Autonomy and Convergence

For the medieval Muslim the law, or Shariah, was of essential importance, the very foundation of religious identity. The Shariah derived from two sources: the Qur'an* , God's revelation; and the Sunnah , the statements and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad, preserved in the hadith * , orally transmitted statements by and about the Prophet eventually written down by legal scholars. Encompassing both the religious and the secular, and Shariah guided religious practice, set forth moral values, and created a framework for private and, theoretically at least, public life. The Christian authorities had long recognized the Muslim and Jewish minorities' legal identities, often referring to them as adherents of distinct "laws" instead of different religious beliefs. Royal enactments applicable to subjects of all three faiths were therefore often addressed to persons "of whatever law or status."2

As stipulated in the thirteenth-century treaties between Jaime I and the conquered Muslims of Valencia, the latter were granted legal autonomy and the ability to administer justice according to çuna and xara (Sunnah , here probably meaning the Muslims' local customary law, and Shariah).3 Pedro IV confirmed this basic Mudejar right, commanding that all cases between Muslims, both civil (see tables 16 and 17) and criminal, were to be judged according to the Shariah (1337).4 Of course, if Islamic law were to remain in force among the Mudejars, the Islamic courts had to be maintained and manned by Muslim judges, or qadi s* . Alfonso IV provided for the establishment of a sufficient number of qadi s in royal towns and on those seigneuries where the lords had criminal jurisdiction over their vassals (1329). Furthermore, Alfonso permitted the qadi s to delegate their powers to substitutes competent to administer justice in their absence.5 The measures taken by the jurates of Alcoy, and approved by Juan II, for the creation of a new morería there (1468) attest to the continuing importance of Mudejar qadi s:

let there be made or created a qadi * in the said morería , who may judge and have the power and faculty to judge the litigations arising between the said Moors, who will live in the said morería , according to Sunnah and Shariah, just as is accustomed among Moors of other morerías of the said kingdom.6

At the pinnacle of Valencia's Islamic judiciary was the qadi general, or royal qadi . During the years covered by this study this post was held by various members of the Bellvis family—Mahomat until 1484, and Ali from 1484 until at least 1501—who resided in the capital. Along with a

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variety of other duties, the qadi * general exercised appellate jurisdiction over the kingdom's Islamic courts. Beyond his court, the Mudejar dissatisfied with the decision of a local qadi could have recourse only to the bailiff general or the king.7

Although in the thirteenth century accusations against Muslims by Christians were heard in Islamic courts,8 by Fernando's reign it was established procedure to try all cases between Muslims and Christians (see table 18) in Christian courts according to the Furs .9 Confining our present discussion to those cases involving only Muslims, it appears that even they were frequently adjudicated in Christian courts. This was far truer of criminal than of civil litigation. This state of affairs may be explained in part by the legislation of Jaime II, which provided that the bailiff general was to have ultimate jurisdiction over all criminal and civil cases between Muslims resident on royal and ecclesiastical lands (1298). The governor general was later granted a similar jurisdiction over the cases of seigneurial Muslims. The qadi s were still supposed to have primary jurisdiction in these cases.10

However, by the midfourteenth century the intervention of Christian magistrates in Mudejar litigation was far more frequent than the occasional ruling by bailiff or governor warranted by Jaime II's legislation. Boswell found that Christians were constantly meddling in the Muslims' judicial proceedings. Between 1355 and 1365 89 percent of all cases involving only Muslims were heard by Christian judges, and often were decided according to Christian and not Islamic law. Put in an advantageous bargaining position by the fortunes of Pedro IV's war with Castile, a number of the kingdom's aljamas were able to wrest from the king guarantees that henceforth they would be judged according to the Shariah.11

The picture derived from the documentation of Fernando's reign contrasts strikingly with the Mudejars' juridical woes in the midfourteenth century. There was only one complaint about Christian interference in Muslim cases, and this was voiced by the aljama of Valencia. The aljama began by recalling the allegedly long-established judicial procedures: "for the past great while by ancient custom and practice observed without contradiction in all the present kingdom of Valencia the cases and litigations which involve Moor against Moor, both civil and criminal, were decided according to Sunnah and Shariah." Now, however, the aljama complained, "sometimes obstacles and impediments are placed so that such litigations are not judged or decided in the aforesaid form," which was manifestly prejudicial to the Muslims of Valencia's morería . The king responded with the command that "all the litigations, both civil and criminal, involving Moor against Moor should be determined according to Sunnah and Shariah." Anyone violating this

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order was to pay the heavy fine of 1,000 gold florins.12 As is evident from Boswell's study, the aljama exaggerated the supposedly ideal conditions of earlier days, for there certainly had been frequent and excessive "contradiction" of the "ancient custom."

At any rate, the articulation of only one complaint does not mean that elsewhere Christian officials remained aloof from all Mudejar litigation. On the contrary, they were often active in the conclusion of such cases. The point of contrast between the midfourteenth century and Fernando's reign is not that in the latter period Christian intervention was lacking; rather, it is that in the late fifteenth century the Mudejars for the most part did not perceive such Christian involvement as interference or as a violation of their privileges. The exception, the aggrieved aljama of Valencia, may be explained by the greatly reduced population of the morería (since 1455) and the burgeoning Christian population of the city, perhaps more apt to interfere in Muslim affairs than previously.

It is difficult to explain this contrast, or to trace a clear line of development from the midfourteenth to the late fifteenth century. Boswell's concluding remarks on the judicial process provide a useful point of departure. He argues that even though Christian officials frequently violated the judicial autonomy that had been promised to the Mudejars in the thirteenth century, "the system of interlocking justice prevailing under the Crown of Aragon in the fourteenth century may represent a successful departure from the general pattern of institutional separation between Christians and Muslims." This system ultimately satisfied the needs of the greater part of both communities.13 Indeed, at the root of the Mudejars' acceptance of the judicial status quo was likely a progressive accommodation between the Islamic and Christian legal systems. Such accommodation paralleled and contributed to the Mudejars' increasing sufferance of Christian rule reflected in their relative political quiescence under Fernando. In other words, Valencia's Muslims became more accustomed to the participation of Christian magistrates in their judicial affairs and more willing to plead their suits before Christian courts.

One must also take into account the chronological focus of Boswell's study, which covers the years of the war between Castile and Aragon (1355–1366). The upheaval and disorder of these years likely afforded unscrupulous Christian officials an unusual freedom to abuse Mudejars and to usurp their judicial prerogatives. Perhaps the restoration of order and Valencia's greater stability in the fifteenth century were less propitious for the blatant violation of Mudejar privileges. In any case, the Mudejar grievances expressed to Fernando were scarcely concerned

with infringements on their judicial autonomy. Given the active role still played by Valencia's Islamic judiciary and the persisting importance of the Shariah among the Mudejars, it may be supposed that many of the fourteenth-century abuses had been corrected. Islamic justice continued to be administered in Valencia, and the posts of qadi * and faqih * were not mere sinecures apportioned among the king's Muslim favorites. This being the case, it is necessary to establish in what areas the Islamic courts still had exclusive jurisdiction, in which types of cases the jurisdictions of Islamic and Christian courts overlapped, and in such cases of jurisdictional convergence, how Muslim and Christian magistrates divided their juridical labors.

Almost all criminal cases between Muslims were tried before Christian tribunals: royal and ecclesiastical vassals in the courts of the bailiff general or local bailiffs, seigneurial vassals of lords with only civil jurisdiction in the court of the governor, and seigneurial vassals of lords with criminal jurisdiction in the court of the lord and his justice.14 However, this did not thereby exclude the qadi s* and Islamic law from the judicial process. Burns describes how in the thirteenth century the exercise of criminal justice by Mudejar courts was placed under the supervision of royal bailiffs. Gradually, as it came to be viewed as a function of the bailiff's court effected with the assistance of Muslim jurists, the nature of the court was transformed.15 Thus, by 1329 Alfonso IV could command that on royal lands and seigneurial lands with criminal jurisdiction the Christian magistrates "ought to exercise [their] jurisdiction and inflict penalties with the counsel of Sarracen judges, commonly called qadi s* "16 In those cases requiring a qadi 's* participation, which were, of course, judged according to Islamic law, the qadi 's role necessarily would have been central, not merely advisory. Documentary references to the "counsel of the qadi " are misleading and ought not to obscure the fact that Islamic justice was being administered, even if under the auspices of a Christian court. In such cases the presiding Christian official served to ensure that the qadi 's sentence was duly executed, for Muslims were not permitted to administer capital or corporal punishment themselves. He also saw to it that the proceeds from any monetary fines imposed were delivered to royal or seigneurial treasuries.

For our purposes there are two categories of criminal cases to be considered: those in which a qadi intervened and which were decided according to Islamic law, and those which were handled only by Christian judges according to the Furs . An understanding of the development of judicial institutions in Islamic lands will help to clarify how Mudejar criminal cases were apportioned among the Islamic and Christian courts.

In Islamic lands there was a practical distinction between those criminal offenses for which God had defined a punishment—known as hadd * offenses—which fell under the jurisdiction of the qadi 's* Shariah court, and those concerning which neither the Qur'an* nor the Sunnah made explicit provisions, and which, therefore, were handled either by the police (shurtah * ) in their judicial capacity or by the court of complaints (mazalim * ) of the ruler. Outside of the hadd offenses, the Muslim ruler had discretionary powers to determine, for the public good, what constituted an offense and the punishment it merited.17

The hadd * offenses, for which there were divinely ordained penalties, were illicit sexual relations—premarital sex and adultery—slanderous accusations of unchastity, theft, wine drinking, and armed robbery.18 Mudejar qadi s, as the dispensers of Shariah justice, probably would have been most insistent on retaining their competence in such cases. This is precisely what the documentation indicates. Almost all of the criminal cases that mention the activity of a qadi concern hadd offenses, particularly illicit sexual relations and theft. The Shariah prescribed harsh penalties for these crimes. The penalty for adultery was death by stoning, and that for the sexual misconduct of an unmarried woman was one hundred lashes. In such cases the intervention of a Mudejar judge is usually explicitly indicated in the documents, and if not, it may be presumed by the invoking of Shariah penalties. For instance, the lord of Gilet, "with the counsel of our [royal] qadi Bellvis," sentenced his adulterous vassals, Mahomat Vaquer and Marien Tagormia, "that according to Sunnah and Shariah they should be overwhelmed by stones [unto death]."19 Mahomat Bayrini of Onda paid to the bailiff a fine of 100s in lieu of the twenty-five lashes his unwed daughter was to receive "because she was found in a room with a Christian of the said town and was judged by the qadi of Villarreal with the license of the qadi de Bellvis [qadi general]."20 Corporal and capital punishments were normally commuted either to the payment of a fine, or, more often, to enslavement to the king or lord. Despite the show of mercy here, royal and seigneurial justice was nevertheless cruelly exploitative. These royal and seigneurial slaves were later sold to the highest bidder, the payments going to the coffers of the king or lord.21

Although some cases of Mudejar theft were judged by Christian officials alone according to the Furs ,22 most involved a qadi 's counsel and Shariah penalties, either the amputation of the right hand or flogging. As with adultery, the sentences were often commuted to a monetary fine or enslavement. The accounts of the bailiff of Játiva record the receipt of 600s from Çuleymen Alahuy "because he was condemned to have his hand amputated for having stolen, along with others, a large pot from the hostal ... for which sentence was given by the qadi by Sun -

nah and Shariah."23 Two Muslim thieves, from Málaga and Oran, were made royal slaves after the qadi * general passed sentence. Ironically, the Muslim from Oran had just recently been manumitted.24

Another case of theft from Játiva sheds further light on the place of Islamic law in such cases. Ali Yalle of Benillup appeared before the bailiff of Játiva and denounced Yuçeff and Çatdon Zam Zam, who lived in the area of Játiva, for having stolen goods from his home. Two days later the royal prosecutor intervened in the case, to which Yuçeff Zam Zam objected, maintaining that the case must be decided according to the Shariah, inasmuch as it was "Moor against Moor," and citing a provision of Pedro IV to that effect. The bailiff agreed with Yuçeff, recalling a recent precedent in which the bailiff general had ruled on another case of Muslim theft in concurrence with Pedro IV's provision. However, just as the bailiff began to try the case as Yuçeff requested-presumably with the counsel of the qadi —the bailiff general ruled that since the royal prosecutor had already initiated proceedings the case should be decided by the Furs . Most likely the bailiff general was attempting to obviate additional legal expenses. In the end, because Yuçeff Zam Zam refused to relent, the case was brought before the bailiff general's tribunal.25

The prosecution of those Mudejar criminals for whose offenses there were no prescribed Shariah penalties does not seem to have required the participation of a qadi . The great majority of such crimes that appear in the documentation are homicides and other acts of violence. The Muslim perpetrators of such acts were tried in the courts of the royal and seigneurial magistrates whose task it was to maintain the public order—bailiffs, governors, and seigneurial justices. Furthermore, since murderers seldom remained at the scene of the crime, it was necessary to bring into play the kingdom-wide network of royal officials to apprehend them. Mudejar judges did not have such manpower at their disposal. Thus, when a Muslim of Valldigna, sentenced by the local justice for the murder of another Muslim, fled from the valley, the viceroy ordered royal officials to hunt him down.26 In another case, a royal constable was commanded to bring to justice fifteen Muslims who had broken into the home of a Muslim widow, abusing her and her daughter.27 Mudejar judges seem to have been content to allow their Christian counterparts to proceed in such cases howsoever the Furs required.

While royal and seigneurial justice in Valencia certainly differed from that administered by Muslim rulers, it is nevertheless worth noting by way of comparison that it was also the non-Shariah courts of the latter that meted out punishment for homicide and other such disturbances of the public peace. Originally, homicide had been more a matter of private justice, as allowed for by the Qur'anic* maxim of just retaliation

(qisas ). However, it eventually became a public concern, at which point justice in such cases was administered by the courts of the police (shurtah * ).28 As will be seen in chapter 6, local bailiffs not only punished Mudejar murderers but also supervised settlements between the victim's family and the murderer through the latter's payment of compensation, or blood money. In a sense, the local bailiffs were asserting their public authority to encourage feuding Muslims to reach a private settlement. The Crown, of course, received its share of the compensation payments.29 It appears, then, that Mudejar judges participated in those criminal cases which in Islamic lands pertained to the jurisdiction of the Shariah courts, while they left in the hands of royal and seigneurial officials those cases over which the jurisdiction of the qadi 's* court had been superseded by that of the shurtah or mazalim * courts of Muslim rulers.

The amount of civil litigation between Muslims that comes to light in the documentation, and therefore somehow involved the Christian courts, is relatively small in comparison with the far greater number of civil and criminal cases between Muslims and Christians, and the criminal cases involving only Muslims. The obvious explanation is that the majority of Mudejar civil suits were heard in the Islamic courts and, consequently, did not come to the attention of Christian officials. Royal provisions, while granting to Christian judges considerable leeway to preside over Muslim criminal cases, are much less ambiguous in their position that in civil litigation between Muslims the court of first instance should be that of the qadi . In 1337 Pedro IV ruled that the bailiff general was to have jurisdiction over the criminal cases of the Muslims of Valencia's morería , but that their civil cases were to be handled by the qadi of the morería .30 It is doubtful that the small number of Mudejar civil cases referred to in the Christian documents is an accurate indication of either the amount or the variety of cases tried by the Islamic courts. The high degree of violent conflict in Mudejar society (see chap. 6) hints at a wide range of civil litigation involving only Muslims. It is probable that most Mudejars preferred to settle their differences peacefully in the forum of the qadi 's court or through the arbitration of the ubiquitous faqih s* .

A handful of Muslim civil suits never came before a qadi 's court and were treated by the Christian courts alone. Usually there was good reason for this. Legal controversies pitting one Muslim aljama against another were best resolved by the laws of the kingdom. The claim of some Muslims of Geldo against the aljama of Segorbe was judged by the lieutenant bailiff general in Segorbe, though with the counsel of a doctor of law, whose opinions were meant to counterbalance any bias the lieutenant bailiff, a resident of Segorbe, might have in the aljama's favor.31

In some instances lords identified their Muslim vassals' interests so strongly with their own that lawsuits that originally might have been solely between Muslims soon involved a lord as one of the claimants, and so found their way into the Christian courts. This seems to have occurred when the knight Gracian de Monsorin took up the cause of his Muslim vassal in her dispute with Çahat Piten of Petrés concerning the ownership of land. Of course, the loss of the land might have affected Monsorin, the probable real owner of the land, as much as it would have his vassal, who rented the land from him.32

Muslims most often pleaded before Christian courts against their fellows in order to set in motion the executive machinery of the royal bureaucracy against recalcitrant debtors and those who lived at a distance from them. Mudejars sought the king's justice for its relative efficiency and coercive power. Even the decisions of the qadi * general carried little weight without the backing of the bailiff general to enforce them. For example, when Abraym Xativi fled from Alcira with the 500 goats at issue between himself and Çahat Ageg, Çahat prompted the bailiff general to have his officials find Abraym and the flock.33 When Mahomat Roget took his sister's robe (aljuba ; Arabic jubbah ) and gave it as security to a Jew of Murviedro, Mahomat's father and sister requested that the bailiff see to the robe's return, since it had not been Mahomat's to give away.34 Fuçey Zignell of Valencia was informed by the bailiff that his property in Valldigna would be sold if he did not pay to his relatives in Tabernes the money he owed "for the causes and reasons contained in a Moorish letter and/or obligation."35

Two other civil cases indicate that Mudejars found the Furs to have applicability in questions concerning commercial transactions and property rights. One case concerned an alleged debt owed by the purchaser of some cloth.36 In the other, the plaintiff, Yuçeff Rodona, demanded that the mulberry trees of Azmet Beniale be removed from his land. It is significant that Yuçeff based his claim on the "constitution of Játiva."37 Through the conduct of commerce and the exchange of property with Christians as well as with Muslims, the Mudejars of necessity acquainted themselves with the details of the Furs and local customary law as they applied to their particular transactions. Still, it is unlikely that in such matters there would have been much substantial difference between the Furs and Islamic law as it was administered by Mudejar judges. The Mudejars'wide-ranging economic activities made it unfeasible for them to operate, even among themselves, by a different code of commercial law. Moreover, since so few of these commercial cases were judged in Christian courts, one must presume that the qadis had adapted their legal practices to meet the needs of a situation in which the regional economy was regulated by a framework of Christian law. Even in Isla-

mic lands it was in the area of commercial law that the Shariah had proven most malleable and Muslim jurists most innovative.38

In those civil cases decided by Islamic law but involving Christian magistrates there was a clear division of labor: the qadi * passed judgment and the Christian official saw to the execution of the qadi 's sentence. This can be seen in the judicial disputes over inheritance. In one case, the lieutenant of the qadi general ruled that two Muslim sisters should receive a carob orchard allegedly bequeathed to them by their father. The bailiff of Murviedro was then ordered to put them in secure possession of the land.39 Also revealing is the litigation "over certain inheritances," which aligned a Muslim vassal of Cárcer and a resident of Játiva's morería against some other Muslims of the morería . The bailiff general's order to the lieutenant bailiff of Játiva is couched in terms that obscure the qadi 's essential judicial function: "do justice in the said matter with counsel of the qadi of the lord king in that morería ." The bailiff general's concluding remarks indicate, however, that it was the qadi who handed down the decision in the case: "And if the said qadi [of Játiva] is considered suspect [i.e., biased] by one of the said parties, you [the lieutenant bailiff] should determine whether the said suspicions are to be admitted, and in such case that they have to be admitted you should administer prompt and expeditious justice with the counsel of another qadi unsuspected by the said parties."40 The royal official's function was primarily supervisory and executive.

As the above case indicates, the royal official's role was nonetheless of great importance. The presence of royal authority encouraged the equitable administration of justice by the qadi . Furthermore, the royal official could be turned to as a board of appeal, at which point the case was ushered through the appropriate channels of the royal bureaucracy to the tribunal of the qadi general and bailiff general. Thus, when Çaat Siquuti appealed the sentence of the qadi of Játiva (literally, of the lieutenant bailiff with counsel of the qadi ), the case was sent on to the qadi general for a final ruling. When Çaat argued that the qadi general, due to family connections with the qadi of Játiva, was predisposed to confirm the sentence, the king commanded the bailiff general to reexamine the case, this time with the counsel of the lieutenant of the qadi general, a neutral party.41

The guidance and supervision of the royal bailiffs were crucial for the conclusion of another extremely complex litigation. The case between Azmet Xerica, the vassal of a canon of Játiva, and the Muslim vassal of the lord Lançol de Lançol, was initially ruled on by the qadi of Játiva in favor of Azmet. Lançol then brought to the bailiff of Játiva the letter of another qadi that demanded the revocation of the first qadi 's sentence. Perplexed, the bailiff turned to the bailiff general. The latter, along with

the qadi * general, decided that if the second qadi 's revocatory letter was based on the testimonies of new or reinterrogated witnesses, then the first sentence should stand (this decision was based on a recent precedent in which the qadi general had counseled the bailiff general that witnesses could not be reinterrogated once sentence had been given); however, if there was a just cause for appeal without the introduction of new testimonies, then the bailiff of Játiva, counseled by the local qadi -and faqih * , was to consider the appeal.42 More than two months later the case was still unresolved. The bailiff was now ordered to attempt to bring the parties to a settlement, but, failing that, he was to hear the opinions of the qadi and faqihs Lançol had introduced into the case and to render judgment, again with the counsel of Játiva's qadi and faqih . Finally, the bailiff general, seconded by the qadi general and his lieutenants, one being the faqih of Valencia, ordered that the sentence (of the qadi of Játiva?) be executed.43

The procedure through which Muslim magistrates judged cases between Muslims under the auspices of the bailiff's court is referred to in the documents as "the Moorish process." The Muslim officials involved were remunerated for their juridical labors. After having collected a 5,000s fine from Muslim thieves of Játiva, who had been judged according to the Shariah, the bailiff of Játiva was commanded, by way of general principle, that "if some Moorish process will be made by the çalmedina or the qadi of the said morería see to it that they are paid for the writing of the said Moorish process according to their labors."44 Anxious to keep court costs at a manageable level, the Crown frowned on the unnecessary intervention of royal officials in the cases of Muslims. Thus, when the royal prosecutor meddled in a case under the consideration of the qadi general, the bailiff general expressed his disapproval in this manner: "I stand amazed that the process which was made against that [Muslim] is Moorish and that the prosecutors and the notary [nevertheless] are asking for a salary."45 The prosecutor had no business interfering in a case not being judged according to the Furs .

One can only surmise the kinds of cases treated by Valencia's Islamic judiciary without any Christian intervention. It is probable that much of this litigation was in the area of family law, which, in the words of Noel Coulson, was "generally administered in accordance with strict Shariah doctrine.... because [it] ... was regarded as a particularly vital and integral part of the scheme of religious duties."46 As indicated above, qadis were often called on to resolve any problems associated with the execution of Mudejar wills. Evidence from Aragon, where, owing to their greater degree of acculturation, Muslims were probably more willing to plead their lawsuits before the Christian authorities, suggests that problems stemming from marriage—divorce or breach of contract—

and guardianship of minors also came before the qadi 's* court.47 In Valencia qadis were instrumental in the drawing up of marriage contracts.48 In attending to such matters Mudejar judges were probably much less flexible in their interpretation and application of the law than they were in the area of commercial litigation.

Beside the formal judgeship of the qadi , one must also take into account the juridical activity of the faqih * , or jurist. In Valencia's Mudejar communities the jurists were accorded great status, largely on account of their knowledge of the law. In fact, in 1526 the newly converted Moriscos stated that the faqihs devoted their lives to the study of jurisprudence.49 They utilized their knowledge in two ways, formally, in the qadi 's court, and, informally, in the community at large. Regarding their formal function, the detailed discussion (see above) of the case involving the participation of the qadi of Játiva, a second qadi , and finally the qadi general shows that each qadi was attended by at least one faqih . In other words, the jurists acted as advisors to the judges in the Islamic courts. According to Maliki* law, the school of law long dominant in both Spain and North Africa, the qadi was required to consult jurisprudents before passing judgment. The Mudejar faqih's formal role may be viewed as a survival of the institutionalization of the qadi 's council (shura * ) in al-Andalus.50

Equally, if not more important, was the faqih 's role as an informal arbitrator in the Mudejar community. There is evidence of jurists, outside of court, executing wills, offering legal advice to parties involved in litigation, and counseling couples with marital problems.51 The faqih s played a role, analogous to that of the Maghriban mufti s* , who offered their legal opinions (fatwa * ) either verbally or in writing to both the populace and the qadi s when requested.52 The importance ascribed by historians of Islamic law to the mufti s in bridging the gap between the strict orthodoxy of the Shariah and the changing necessities of daily life seems applicable to the position of the faqih s in Valencia. In their adjustment to life as a minority in a Christian society, Valencia's Muslims needed guidance from those possessed of a legal acumen sufficient to interpret and modify the substance of the Shariah as the exigencies of their situation required, while preserving the law's spirit. The dearth of documentary evidence about the faqih s is due probably as much to their informal and largely verbal adjudication as to the almost complete loss of Arabic documentation.

In sum, Muslims and Christians appear to have arrived at a system of sharing judicial responsibilities in cases involving only Muslims, which both minority and majority found satisfactory. The Islamic courts, manned by qadis and their faqih advisors, handled the hadd * criminal offenses and handed down decisions according to the Shariah in a large

portion of the civil cases coming before them, especially those in the realm of family law and to a lesser degree those concerning commerce and property. Royal and seigneurial magistrates helped to ensure the execution of the decisions of Mudejar judges, and administered the king's justice to those Muslims who, by their violent acts, were a threat to the common good. Meanwhile, the faqih s* , scattered throughout the Mudejar population, met the legal needs of many Muslims. Owing to their good offices it may be that many of the disputes between Mudejars never reached the courts as litigation.

Muslims in Christian Courts: Jurisdictional Conflict

The foregoing account lends the impression that the judicial system of the kingdom of Valencia ran smoothly and efficiently with hardly a snag. This was for the most part true to the extent that in cases between Muslims the Muslim and Christian judiciaries were content with their respective spheres of jurisdiction and with the division of juridical labor when collaboration was necessary. However, regarding those cases over which the Christian courts had exclusive jurisdiction, namely, the Mudejars' non-hadd * crimes and litigation between Muslim and Christian, this impression bears little relation to the reality of late medieval Valencia. The administration of justice to Mudejars, and apparently to Christians as well, was fraught with obstacles created by the strife between those officials who presided over the kingdom's various tribunals. The main problem was that royal, municipal, and seigneurial officials were unwilling to recognize the boundaries of their respective jurisdictions. While at times jurisdictional conflict arose from an official's honest mistake and erroneous interpretation of the law, most often it was the result of a willful trespassing on the jurisdictions of others. Such official bickering affected Muslim plaintiffs and defendants, although the resultant confusion might work to the benefit of the latter.

Three types of jurisdictional conflict are apparent in the documentation: (1) the bailiff general and the local bailiffs against the governor general and his lieutenants; (2) the local bailiffs against the municipal justices; and (3) lords and seigneurial officials against royal and municipal officials. The royal towns found this dissension to be so troublesome that in the Cortes of Monzón (1510) their representatives complained to the king that "many times it happens in your city and kingdom of Valencia contention and difference over jurisdiction between the governor and bailiff, and their surrogates and lieutenants, and the justices of the royal towns of the said kingdom." No specific mention was made of the

cases involving Muslims.53 The clash of antagonistic officials in such cases, therefore, was only part of a more widespread phenomenon.

It was long established that the bailiff general and the local bailiffs were to have jurisdiction over those Muslims living on royal and ecclesiastical lands. Since the fourteenth century the local bailiffs, though subordinate to the bailiff general, had acquired greater power to administer justice to the inhabitants of the local morerías .54 It was not so much that the bailiff general's powers had been reduced as that the increasing complexity of administration necessitated the more frequent delegation of his authority to local representatives of the Crown. This tendency was especially marked in Játiva, where, owing to the very large population of its morería , close Crown supervision was essential. For the most part, the bailiff of Játiva and the bailiff general were able to attend to their respective duties without stepping on one another's toes. However, royal directives were occasionally issued to ensure that this cooperation continued. In 1405 King Martin had ordained that "the local bailiff of Játiva should have no power concerning the cases of Sarracens pending before the bailiff general."55 Fernando was more concerned with hindering the flow of cases in the opposite direction, and so commanded the bailiff general that he should, as little as possible, issue pardons to or make settlements with those Muslims whom the bailiff of Játiva had already sentenced.56 In both cases the idea was to prevent redundancy and additional legal expenses.

Quite unlike the relative ease with which any tension between the bailiff general and local bailiffs was smoothed over was the great difficulty in resolving the discord between the bailiffs and the governors (i.e., the different regional governors and their lieutenants). The governor was supposed to have jurisdiction over only those seigneurial Muslims whose lords did not exercise criminal jurisdiction on their lands. However, the governors were not satisfied with this limited judicial competence. They frequently interfered in the cases of Muslims that properly belonged to a bailiff's jurisdiction. Simply stated, their motives were financial; they wished to divert more cases to their courts in order to collect for themselves and their subordinates the proceeds from monetary fines and settlements. Of course, the bailiffs, as the guardians of the royal patrimony, were equally determined to defend their jurisdictions and thereby, as they often claimed, "the rights and revenues of the lord king."57

Játiva and its region were the main judicial battleground between the bailiffs and the governors. Logically, the royal town with the largest morería drew the highest degree of gubernatorial interference. For this reason, among others, Fernando confirmed, at the request of the aljama of Játiva, the privileges that Alfonso V and Juan II had granted to it.

Among the privileges was that placing Játiva's Muslims under the exclusive jurisdiction of the bailiff general and the bailiff of Játiva.58 This confirmation of privileges, however, had minimal impact.

Early in Fernando's reign the bailiff of Játiva, Joan Dezpuig, and the lieutenant governor beyond the Júcar River, Francesch de Malferit, were at loggerheads. After Dezpuig's lieutenant imprisoned a Muslim criminal, Malferit's men proceeded to pardon the Muslim. Dezpuig responded by issuing a proclamation that called for the revocation of all pardons and safe-conducts previously granted to Muslims and Jews. Malferit next attempted to prevent the public crier from making the proclamation. Failing that, Malferit had the Muslim in question arraigned before his court and reached a settlement with him. According to Dezpuig, Malferit had forced the royal prosecutors to cooperate in the matter. At Dezpuig's request, the bailiff general sent off an angry letter to Malferit, reminding him that in such cases pertaining to the jurisdiction of the bailiff only the king could interfere. Moreover, he required the prosecutors to denounce Muslims before the bailiff and no one else. The case, therefore, was to revert to Dezpuig's court.59 The bailiff general's words were not heeded for long. By 1487 Fernando was compelled to reprimand the governor general for pardoning Christian and Muslim criminals of the district of Játiva, thereby giving others "boldness to live evilly."60

The bailiff of the new morería of nearby Castellón de Játiva, given jurisdiction over the Muslims like other local bailiffs, seems to have felt especially beset by the judicial encroachments of the lieutenant governor. In 1482 Fernando was informed that the bailiff and the local Muslims "dreaded" being called before the court of the lieutenant governor. The king responded by remitting all cases involving the bailiff and Muslims of Castellón to a citizen and a jurist of Játiva for consideration.61 Eventually, the jurisdiction of the bailiff of Castellón de Játiva was incorporated within that of the bailiff of Játiva.62

Despite the seemingly incessant bickering, differences were resolved and justice administered. The account books of the bailiff of Játiva reveal that the bailiff and the lieutenant governor many times extricated themselves from these judicial quagmires by simply splitting the proceeds from individual cases. For instance, of the 150s fine paid by the chicken thief Mahomat Melich, the bailiff received 75s and the lieutenant governor the other 75s.63

It should not be thought that the governors were always in the wrong. Of the two arguments between the bailiff of Játiva and the governor concerning the prosecution of Muslims for sexual relations with Christian women, the king decided one in favor of the governor.64 Furthermore, the resolution of other jurisdictional disputes hinged on such

legal hairsplitting that it is difficult to know whose interpretation of the law was correct. For instance, in March 1482 the bailiff general reprimanded the lieutenant governor for having tried a Muslim of the seigneury of Manuel for the murder of another Muslim of the same place. Since Manuel was located within the limits of the district of Játiva, a royal town, and since its lord did not possess criminal jurisdiction, the bailiff general maintained that the case belonged to his jurisdiction. The lieutenant governor agreed that, yes, Manuel was located within the district of Játiva, but countered by citing a ruling of the jurist Domingo Masco (21 July 1457), according to which the governor was to have jurisdiction over all seigneurial Muslims inhabiting lordships "within the boundaries [i.e., the surrounding districts] of the royal cities and towns where the lord king has criminal jurisdiction."65 In his reply the bailiff general corrected the lieutenant governor's reading of Masco's decision, stating that the governor, indeed, had jurisdiction over seigneurial Muslims, "but only if the said towns, castles, and hamlets and places are not located within the boundaries [i.e., district] of some royal city or town."66

Here, however, the bailiff general was wrong, and he probably knew it; for just four months prior (December 1481) to this dispute with the lieutenant governor, the king had made a decision on precisely this question of law in the governor's favor, even citing the opinions of Domingo Masco as authoritative support.67 A royal letter of July 1483 seems finally to have disabused the bailiff of his pretensions on this point.68

The bailiffs and governors also managed to come into conflict over another closely related fine legal point, that is, whether or not royal bailiffs had jurisdiction over seigneurial Muslims who committed crimes in royal towns (as distinct from the wider districts of towns) or on royal roads. In February 1481 the king answered this question in the affirmative: "the Moors of the barons [who are] delinquent in the royal cities, towns, or roads, even those who live on royal lands, both [vassals] of knights and of citizens, are totally under the forum and jurisdiction of the said bailiff general and local bailiffs."69 Fernando reiterated this position the following year.70 The governors, however, true to form, did not abide by the substance of these decisions. There are two possible explanations: either confusion and legal misinterpretation, or a determination to encroach on the bailiff's jurisdiction, whatever the decisions of the usually absent king. The latter seems most likely, since until at least 1489 the governors frequently interfered in the judicial procedures of local bailiffs against seigneurial Muslims who had committed crimes in the royal towns. For example, the lieutenant governor challenged the jurisdiction of the bailiff of Villajoyosa over a Muslim of the lordship of

Finestrat who had assaulted a Christian of Villajoyosa.71 The governor of la Plana meddled in similar fashion when Muslims of the seigneury of Nules were cited to appear before the bailiff of Burriana for crimes committed in Burriana.72 In sum, legal misinterpretation, a disregard for the law even when properly understood, and a desire to extend authority and thereby to increase revenues all contributed to the almost constant strife between the offices of the bailiff and the governor.

The governor general and his lieutenants were not the only nemeses of the bailiff general and the local bailiffs. The municipal justices also were prone to impugn the jurisdiction of the bailiffs over the king's Muslim and Jewish vassals. This was part of a more general tendency displayed by municipal governments, which encouraged the settlement of Mudejars in their towns only to attempt to secure for themselves an inordinate portion of the resultant increased revenues properly belonging to the Crown. In some towns the justices seem to have had as allies the royal prosecutors. In a letter to the Crown prosecutors of Játiva Fernando expressed a clear understanding of the financial motives prompting them to accuse Muslims before the courts of either the local justice or the lieutenant governor: "so that you might more easily conclude settlements with those Moors and Jews and secure a larger part of the settlements."73

While one might ascribe gubernatorial interference partly to a misinterpretation of the law, it is far more difficult to give municipal justices such benefit of doubt. The law was unequivocal with respect to the exclusive jurisdiction of the local bailiffs in cases involving Muslims or Jews: "by the laws and privileges of that kingdom of Valencia ... all cases of Sarracens and Jews, both civil and criminal, should be brought personally before the bailiff of that city or town under whose jurisdiction were committed the aforesaid offenses and cases." At best, local criminal justices had a role in the execution of sentences against Muslims condemned to death or to the mutilation of a limb.74 Nevertheless, the bailiff general often was compelled to remind municipal justices and jurates that they had no right to try Muslims or make executions against their property. For instance, he rebuked the justice and jurates of Liria not only for initiating procedure against Muslims for their crimes, but also for releasing them after the bailiff had arrested them.75 There is only one case in which a municipal justice voiced anything close to a legitimate reason for proceeding against a Muslim. The justice of Játiva, who had confiscated the arms and other possessions of Muslims as securities for the fines they incurred for gambling, maintained that he had done so because the Muslims had been found playing dice with Christians. Had it been a question of only Muslims gambling, the justice argued, he would not have penalized them.76

The lords of Mudejar vassals were at the center of much jurisdictional squabbling. Seigneurial judicial competence varied from place to place. Some lords were entitled only to civil jurisdiction over their vassals, while others, especially the powerful magnates like the Duke of Gandía, were empowered to exercise criminal jurisdiction as well.77 The king might grant full jurisdiction to a lord as a reward for services rendered. When Fernando ceded to his vice-chancellor, Joan Pages, lordship over Pobla Tornesa, Benicacim, and Montornés, he stipulated "You and yours can force, punish, and castigate them [Sarracenos] as your and their vassals, and you can exercise over them criminal and civil and all jurisdiction."78 Some lords with criminal jurisdiction were nevertheless restricted in their ability to administer capital or severe corporal punishment. Thus, Bernat Sorrell, the lord of Geldo, at first allowed the lieutenant bailiff of Segorbe (Geldo was located within the "general boundaries" of Segorbe, where the Duke of Segorbe had supreme jurisdiction) to proceed against his Muslim vassal, guilty of assault. However, after the victim recovered the case was remitted to Sorrell, because now the assailant no longer deserved capital punishment.79

Lords prized and jealously guarded their judicial prerogatives for the revenues accruing to them from monetary penalties. They bitterly resented the intervention of royal and municipal officials in the business of their seigneurial courts, although this occurred often enough. There were a number of quarrels between the Cardinal of Valencia, who was the lord of Valldigna, and the bailiff general. They arose because the Muslims of Valldigna were in the habit of appealing the decisions of the justice of Valldigna to the bailiff general. In fact, the Muslims had recourse to the bailiff general so frequently that the king appointed a special assessor specifically for assisting the bailiff in handling their appeals.80 While this practice was perfectly licit, inasmuch as the bailiff general was the final court of appeal for any Muslim in the kingdom, the officials of Valldigna still complained that the bailiff general, under the pretext of his appellate jurisdiction, was attempting to make his the court of first instance in the Muslims' cases. The king, therefore, cautioned the bailiff to interfere as little as possible.81 At times Valldigna's officials refused outright to release arrested Muslims into the bailiff's hands.82 In the case of two wandering Muslims who had committed theft in Játiva, the Cardinal's men summarily hanged them, despite the fact that their appeal was pending in the court of the lieutenant bailiff general.83

Lords vied with royal magistrates for judicial authority throughout the kingdom. Turning south, one finds the bailiff general and the governor disputing the jurisdiction over a Muslim murderer of Albatera, only to hear the lord of Albatera chime in that both were wrong and that

the Muslim ought to be arraigned before his court.84 Further north near the capital, the bailiff general and the criminal justice of Valencia attempted to arrest a Muslim vassal of Catarroja who had carnal relations with a Christian prostitute. Joan Canoguera, Catarroja's seigneur, argued that he had purchased jurisdiction over the place from Juan II for 75 pounds, and, therefore, the royal officials had no right to interfere. Even after the bailiff general bought back the jurisdiction from Canoguera, the latter shrewdly asserted that he could still rule on this case because the crime had been perpetrated before he gave up his jurisdiction. In the end, the case was remitted to the royal council and then to the governor for sentencing.85

The discord between seigneurs and town officials over judicial questions may be seen as a component of a more general social tension between urban and rural areas. The lord of Alberique complained about the initiatives of Játiva's prosecutors against his vassals and other Muslims implicated in violence on his seigneury.86 Officials of Gandía antagonized the lord of Jaraco for much the same reason.87

The Mudejars' change of vassalage, which exacerbated the fiscal rivalry between the nobility and the Crown and the royal towns, also caused considerable jurisdictional turmoil. This is reflected in the objection of the military estate to a privilege that Castellón de la Plana had obtained from the king. The privilege gave to the lieutenant governor of la Plana competence in all cases concerning crimes which had been committed by new Muslim vassals of Castellón when they were still seigneurial vassals. The nobles argued that by virtue of their criminal jurisdiction their former vassals were still liable to answer to them for their previous crimes.88

The lords' objection is understandable, for it seems that Mudejars took advantage of the Crown's avidity for new vassals in order to avoid the penalties of seigneurial courts. Thus, when Manuel Lanqol, the lord of Gilet, was in the midst of passing judgment against Mahomat Hubequer, apparently his vassal, the prosecutor of Murviedro, stopped the proceedings by claiming that the Muslim was a royal vassal.89 Don Enrique de Rocasfull, the lord of Albatera, was similarly hamstrung in the administration of justice to a Muslim vassal, who, much to his surprise, had changed vassalage.90 In such cases royal and municipal officials either knowingly abetted the Muslims in their evasion of seigneurial justice or were simply hoodwinked. Royal vassals less frequently enlisted seigneurial support to frustrate Crown magistrates. However, it occasionally happened, as when the officials of the seigneury of Carlet protected their "new" vassal, Mahomat Ametler of Alcira, who had already been sentenced to enslavement to the king.91

From the aforementioned complaint of the royal towns in the Cortes

of Monzón (1510) it appears that during Fernando's reign jurisdictional controversy was never completely resolved. This is further evinced in the aggression of the Germanías, especially those of Játiva, Alcira, and Murviedro, against the surrounding lordships, for the question of jurisdiction was one of the many points of contention between the seigneurs and the urban citizenry. Judicially, as in other respects, the Mudejars were in the vortex of a larger socioeconomic conflict, the explosion of which would prove catastrophic for them. In the meantime, so long as order reigned, justice was administered, but not without intermittent starts and stops.

Muslims in Christian Courts: Judicial Procedure

Despite the more than occasional jurisdictional disputes, Muslim plaintiffs undauntedly continued to appear before Christian courts to plead their suits against both Muslims and Christians. Such disputes, which originated more in the magistrates' acquisitiveness than in a widespread disrespect for the law, were probably far more vexing for the contending judges than for Muslim plaintiffs and defendants. Once bailiffs, governors, and justices settled their differences and the legal machinery of the court was set in motion, Mudejars could be confident that the due process of law would be respected and justice done. Relative to the bulk of litigation found in the documentation Mudejar complaints of immoderate or illegal procedure by the Christian courts are very few. To some degree the propensity of rival judges to stray beyond their proper jurisdictions and their willingness, for fiscal reasons, to hear the cases of most anyone served as a crude system of checks and balances. The governor's or the seigneurial justice's knowledge that Muslims could always have recourse to the bailiff general, or, conversely, the local bailiff's awareness that the governor or municipal justice would avail themselves of any opportunity to intervene must have curbed excesses in court and encouraged fairness on all sides simply as a means of avoiding the interference of rival courts. More important, neither the king nor the lords were prepared to permit their appointed judges to abuse their vassals in court. In the competition between the Crown and the nobility for Muslim vassals it was perhaps as important to guarantee the Mudejars fair treatment in court as to offer them tax breaks. The prevailing conditions, which were so conducive to this rivalry, afforded the Mudejars room to maneuver, manifested in their change of vassalage and their judicial appeals to higher or rival courts. Since royal authority and the subjects' contentment were largely predicated on the ability of the king

to provide justice, blatant injustice to Mudejars in the courts, both royal and seigneurial, was usually corrected by the king and his bailiff general.

The legal mechanisms for the handling of the cases of Muslims in Christian courts were well established by the reign of Fernando. Muslims appeared in court as both plaintiffs and defendants in litigations with Christians, and it was not unusual for them and Christians to file suit as coplaintiffs or to be arraigned as codefendants.92 Once in court and removed from jurisdictional controversy, cases concerning Muslims presented few procedural dilemmas. Christian magistrates were not perplexed by the prospect of having to hear the pleas of Muslim plaintiffs or receive the testimonies of Muslim witnesses. Nor did the Mudejars find the chamber of a Christian tribunal to be unfamiliar or intimidating territory. On the contrary, the conduct of Mudejars in the various trials often reflects a familiarity with the legal system and a facility in skirting its pitfalls. Far from being victimized by coteries of Christian judges and lawyers, the Muslims were sometimes able to manipulate the system to their own advantage. This was a necessary and positive form of acculturation.

In Christian courts Muslims and Jews took oaths proper to their own religions. While Christians swore on the Gospels, and the Jews, according to the Furs, on the Ten Commandments, the Muslims swore on the Qur'an* .93 In the trial records the Muslims are usually described as having "made an oath ... to our Lord God and to the qiblah of Muhammad, turning the face toward midday and saying the words that Moors are accustomed to swear."94

Trials followed a standard procedure, the length of which varied according to the complexity of the case and the gravity of the crime. (For instance, cases of homicide usually required the laborious interrogation of witnesses, which was often unnecessary in many minor civil suits.) In their most extended format, usually in criminal cases, trials were conducted as follows: (1) the prosecutor presented the accusations, which were sometimes followed by further and more detailed accusations of the plaintiff; (2) the court received any confessions the defendant wished to make; (3) the defense counsel and/or the defendant responded to the specifics of the prosecution's accusations; (4) the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution were presented; (5) the testimonies of the witnesses for the defense were presented; (6) the above witnesses were cross-examined by the defense and the prosecution, which sometimes included the depositions of new witnesses intended to impugn the testimonies of previous witnesses; and (7) the presiding judge rendered judgment and passed sentence.95 Even in cases of what were deemed the most execrable of crimes, restraint was exercised and due process scrupulously observed. When word reached the bailiff

general that a Muslim had forced a Christian boy of Sueca to commit sodomy with him, he sent a notary to Sueca to receive "information of the said case and detestable crime and judicial confessions from the said Moor and ... the account of the said boy."96

The same respect for proper procedure was displayed in cases of Muslim violence against Christians. Mahomat Ayub, accused of the murder of a Christian of Teruel, was able to have removed from the panel of judges treating the case a lawyer whom he thought to be prejudiced against him.97 Ali Ubequer, who had wounded a Christian of Murviedro, delayed the bailiff's procedure against him through clever legal maneuvering.98 When Alfonso Mendo dropped the assault charges he had leveled at Çahat Salamo, all legal action was duly ceased.99

Christian procurators (procuradors ), usually notaries given power of attorney, frequently represented Muslims in court. The Christian procurator might also act as a Muslim's defense counsel, and some notaries seem to have been court-appointed public defenders. There is no evidence suggesting that the procurators were in any way negligent in the causes of their Muslim clients. For the notaries such dereliction of duty probably would have resulted in an undesired loss of clientele.100

Muslims were in no way restricted from bringing charges against Christians. Thus, when the widow Axa Christelli was unable to appear in court to make the requisite formal accusations against the knight Gaspar de Monsorin and his squire for the murder of her son, the viceroy obliged her by sending an official to Algimia to record her accusations and to seize the accused for trial.101

A somewhat thornier issue was that concerning witnesses in cases between Muslims and Christians. The Furs had originally provided that in such cases witnesses from the religious group of the defendant were required to prove the defendant's guilt. In other words, a Christian filing suit against a Muslim needed the testimony of at least one Muslim as proof. In 1301 Jaime II significantly modified the law to the detriment of the Mudejars by admitting the testimonies of two reputable Christians as sufficient proof against a Muslim.102 It is difficult to perceive how the law was translated into practice on this question. In some cases when witnesses are mentioned their faith is not identified, or when witnesses are identified there are enough Muslim and Christian witnesses produced by both sides to preclude any quibbling on the grounds of the specific question treated by the Furs . Perhaps most telling is the notable absence of any queries concerning the admissability of witnesses, Muslim or Christian. Muslims do not seem to have been in any way limited as to the witnesses they might produce in their own behalf, as long as the witnesses were reputable and honest persons. Indeed, at a Muslim's request court notaries were sent out to record the testimonies of the wit-

nesses specified. When Seydi Melvix, acting as procurator for other Granadan Muslims (new settlers in Valencia?) in a litigation with the bailiff general beyond the Jijona River, wished to bring forth witnesses "to prove certain clauses," a notary of Orihuela was dispatched to examine the witnesses and record their depositions.103 Muslims could also use Arabic documents as legitimate evidence in Valencia's courts.104 Suits between Muslims and Jews did not create any special problems.105 Even in cases in which Muslims were not implicated, their testimonies as witnesses were acceptable. In order to defend himself and his town of Ondara against the royal prosecutor, Don Joan de Cardona produced a long list of Muslim and Christian witnesses who were to be duly interrogated.106

Another potential source of problems in cases between Muslims and Christians was the question of by which law, Christian or Islamic, a Christian judge should sentence a guilty Muslim. Jaime II quashed any possible Christian complaints that convicted Muslims were being punished too leniently when sentenced according to the Shariah by ruling that, for any crimes committed by Muslims against Christians, the Muslims were to be sentenced by the law that demanded the heaviest penalty.107 This was to the manifest disadvantage of the Mudejars. However, it seems that during Fernando's reign all Muslims culpable for crimes against Christians were penalized in accordance with the Furs .108

Occasionally Muslims were pardoned for their crimes, although this was by no means a frequent occurrence.109 Far more usual was the Crown's granting of safe-conducts (guiatges ) against prosecution and arrest to accused or convicted Muslims. The king or the bailiff general determined the length of time during which such safe-conducts were valid. The safe-conducts protected Muslim debtors who needed more time to settle accounts with their creditors. Procedure against Muslims for more serious crimes, such as theft or homicide, was likewise halted until they could gather the funds necessary for the payment of fines and settlements.110 Also, the courts sometimes released Muslims on bail. Those who posted bail were called caplleuators . Both Muslims and Christians acted as caplleuators for Muslim defendants. It was understood that the Muslim would return to court for trial when the presiding magistrate requested. Failure to appear resulted in execution against the property of the caplleuators, who were held responsible for the defendant's absence.111

Royal authorities sometimes employed torture as a means of extracting confessions from Muslim criminals. Although Muslims were theoretically exempt from torture in the kingdom of Aragon, such was not the case in Valencia.112 Still, the courts resorted to torture only rarely, and almost always in cases of crimes against the state. An amin * of Alcudia

was tortured for having counterfeited money.113 Other Mudejars implicated in the crimes of Maghriban Muslims suffered the same fate.114 The bailiff general's court tortured a Tunisian Muslim accused of abetting runaway slaves, but he nevertheless remained close-mouthed.115 However, the mere threat of torture was sufficient to make Ubaydal Allepus of Bétera confess to the murder of another Muslim.116

In general, Muslims received equitable treatment in the Christian courts. The king and the bailiff general sought to promote fairness in the kingdom's judicial system by correcting the blatant favoritism of magistrates either through replacing them or through balancing their partiality with the opinions of disinterested doctors of law. Also, attempts were made to neutralize the influence of powerful persons on local judges. Owing to the system of appeals, both Muslims and Christians could have their cases reconsidered by superior judges. If this sometimes lengthened the judicial process excessively, it nevertheless guaranteed that in most cases justice was fairly administered.

Muslims relied on the solicitude of the Crown to prevent injustice. When Abrahim Alaxera was involved in a property dispute with the knight Perot Sanç he turned to the viceroy, "inasmuch as the said mossen Perot Sanç is a knight and principal person in that city [Játiva] and the said Moor [Abrahim] is a simple and defenseless person." At Abrahim's request, a doctor of law from Valencia was added to the case to counterbalance Sanç's influence.117 In a similar instance, the viceroy ordered another knight of Játiva to appear before the royal audience, so that his suit with a Muslim woman might be decided justly. The knight had employed threats to hinder the woman's procurator from defending her, and had thereby obtained from the justice of Játiva two judgments in his own favor.118

The litigants' expectation that the courts would render judgment impartially, and that the Crown would do its best to ensure that this was so, inspired them to scrutinize closely the motives of the presiding judges and jurists. Consequently, Muslims and Christians often based their appeals to higher courts on the allegation that such and such local magistrate or jurist was "suspect," that is, that he favored the opposing party. Mudejars resorted to this legal ploy many times, but, one suspects, not always with complete sincerity. The king and bailiff general usually obliged them by removing the "suspect" magistrate from the case. When the king appointed Pere Prats of Orihuela to hear a canon's appeal of a sentence passed against him and in favor of his converted slave, Carmesina ("de genere sarracenorum"), the latter impugned the honesty of Prats, arguing that he was a relative of the canon. Prats was replaced forthwith.119

The Crown's willingness to respond to such allegations and to satisfy

the aggrieved parties could lead to the removal of numerous judges and lawyers before justice was finally administered. After Fernando responded to the appeal of a noblewoman, who maintained that the bailiff general's assessor was "suspect," by replacing the assessor with two doctors of law, the opposing party, a Muslim of Murviedro, countered by claiming that the two lawyers were biased. The king was forced to find two more lawyers.120 Still more confusing was the litigation between Dona Lorença de Loriz and certain Muslims of Gandía concerning pensions allegedly owed by the latter. After numerous appeals and before a panel of three jurists was finally appointed to render a conclusive judgment on the case, the Muslims had challenged the impartiality of two jurists—one of them the governor's assessor, who, they argued, did not like to revoke judgments he had already pronounced—and Dona Lorença, that of three others.121

After two centuries of being increasingly drawn into the sphere of the Christian legal system, the Mudejars had acquired an essential understanding of how it functioned. They knew what limitations there were on the powers of magistrates, what kind of evidence was decisive for the conclusion of a case, and what channels they had to go through to have their appeals heard by superior courts. Thus, some Muslims of Bechí made an appeal to the bailiff general, maintaining that they had been denounced before the bailiff of Villarreal without legitimate evidence and then needlessly harassed and molested by the same bailiff. The king supported the Muslims, voiding the bailiff of Villarreal's initiatives and ordering the bailiff general to rule on the case.122 Abdalla Xax of Castellnou, involved in a litigation with a creditor, a merchant of Valencia, displayed an ability to operate effectively in the Christian courts. He successfully demanded that the merchant's account books be examined as evidence by the court. He also managed to have the justice of Segorbe intervene in the case, although the justice was later removed because, as was alleged, he showed Abdalla excessive favor.123

The Mudejars utilized their grasp of the complexities of the legal system not only to defend themselves against the malfeasance of the Christian judiciary but also, through cunning and deceptive legal maneuvers, to evade the magistrates' issuance and execution of sentences against them. In particular, they turned to their own advantage the officials' propensity to trespass on the jurisdictions of others and the slowness, or sometimes lack, of communication between the different levels of the kingdom's judicial hierarchy. This is evinced in the case of Ali Gombau. Ali, a vassal of Joan de Vallterra and tax farmer for his lord in Areñol, had been judicially condemned by his lord for the debts he owed him. Ali then fled from Areñol to the court of the viceroy, who had never heard Vallterra's side of the story. Ali claimed that he was a

royal vassal and prompted the viceroy to proceed against other vassals of Areñol for the rents purportedly owed to him. By means of such chicanery Ali was able for a time to take the legal offensive against Vallterra.124

Other Muslims took advantage of the bailiff general's willingness to hear their appeals in order to escape the punishment of local bailiffs. Through the telling of half-truths, such as the claim that their safe-conducts had been violated, they managed to convince the bailiff general to stay the execution of local bailiffs against them.125 Some Muslims actually procured safe-conducts from unwitting or pliant officials in order to delay procedure indefinitely.126

Even the king, having no previous knowledge of a case, could be duped. A Muslim adulteress of Gilet, who had already been sentenced and enslaved by her lord, was able, by concealing the facts of the case, to move the king to appoint the bailiff of Murviedro to consider her appeal. However, when the king learned of the truth of the matter, he revoked the bailiff's commission.127

The Mudejars can hardly be blamed for availing themselves of every possible legal protection, even if at times dishonestly. The protection afforded the Muslims by the king and the nobility, usually self-interested, did not deter townsmen and barons from committing crimes against them. The law was the Mudejars' refuge, a flimsy but sometimes effective barrier of defense necessary for a minority in so many ways at the mercy of the whims of the majority.

The king and his watchdog, the bailiff general, were anxious to guarantee the Mudejars the security of a fair hearing in the kingdom's courts. They were willing to hear almost any Mudejar appeal and were quick to reprimand any magistrate who strayed from the proper judicial procedures. The problem here, as in other cases of abuse of Muslims, was that reprimands and corrections were not followed by penalization of the offending official. For instance, Joan de Vich, an official of the lord of Albalat, hanged a Muslim for certain crimes, even though he had received an order from the governor forbidding such action. Vich, at first sentenced to death in absentia, was later pardoned by the king.128 At most, unscrupulous officials were commanded to release the Muslim in question to a superior court and to appear themselves to explain their actions. The lieutenant governor south of the Júcar River was summoned before the viceroy to explain why he had harassed Abrahim Menne and denied to him the right of appeal.129 The bailiff general issued similar subpoenas to the officials of Valldigna, who had imprisoned and tortured a Muslim of Simat without having passed a legitimate judgment against him,130 and who later illicitly imprisoned a royal vassal for not having paid the tax on wheat to the abbot.131

Still, even though the offending officials were not punished, the Muslims eventually received a fair hearing in court. Moreover, such occurrences were far more the exception than the rule. It must be stressed that, in general, the Muslims were not at a disadvantage in the Christian courts. In the cases between Muslims and Christians for which we know the results (see table 18) it appears that on the whole the Muslims might have fared better than their Christian opponents. Although almost all of these decisions were mentioned by the scribes only because they were in the process of being appealed, the initial decisions of the judges nevertheless provide us with a useful and roughly accurate picture of how the Mudejars fared in the Christian legal system. Of the forty-two cases considered, twenty-three, or 54 percent, were initially decided in favor of the Muslim party. This rough parity of Muslims before the law explains why they were not greatly troubled by the prospect of appearing in Christian courts. The gradual erosion of the Mudejars' judicial autonomy was a largely painless process resulting from the diminution of their demographic weight in Valencia and from their increasing integration, although not assimilation, into the society and economy of the kingdom. It correlated with an acculturative process through which the Mudejars acquired the practical know-how essential for holding their own in the Christian courts while, at the same time, retaining for their own Shariah courts the administration of justice in those matters most meaningful for their religious identity.

Muslim-Christian Litigation: A View of Valencian Society

The interpretation of a given litigation, or a number of them, poses problems for the historian. Because lawsuits and complaints comprised a large part of the affairs handled by the Crown authorities, the less contentious and routine occurrences of daily life have been lost from view. It is all too easy for historians to amplify the significance of the evidence at their disposal, to find in a series of commercial lawsuits a widespread economic problem, or to see in a homicide the eruption of class and ethnic violence. Some litigations, like many of those associated with commerce and property, were random events arising haphazardly from the daily social and economic interchange of a society. They had no repercussions beyond the lives of the individuals whom they immediately concerned and no connection with others of their kind. Other judicial disputes, while not of great import as isolated events, when linked to others of their type formed a larger pattern. In the aggregate they could affect a large part of society and were expressions or harbingers of

serious tensions. Here we will briefly discuss the various types of litigation between Muslims and Christians as a means of providing a view of some facets of Christian-Muslim relations in Valencia. Care will be taken to distinguish between the litigation as a random event and the litigation as part of a larger social problem.

Quite a few cases involved Christian lords and Muslim vassals as allies. This can be accounted for by the symbiotic relationship between lords and vassals, and their mutual concern for seigneurial properties and finances. Lords sometimes took a special interest in the lawsuits of their Muslim vassals. When the governor passed sentence against a Muslim vassal of the Duke of Segorbe in her litigation with a Christian, the Duke "on account of his certain interest felt vexed and prejudiced," and therefore appealed to the king.132 Lords and vassals also appeared in court as coplaintiffs or codefendants in disputes with adjacent seigneuries over irrigation, livestock, and boundaries. The resultant armed clashes might lead to arraignment for more serious charges. The noble Luis Ladro and "some almugavers and some Sarracens" were denounced before the royal audience for having set fire to Relleu.133

Seigneurs and their aljamas most often banded together against their creditors, the censalistas , who sued in court for the payment of the pensions owed them. As the financial situation of many seigneuries worsened, the lords and aljamas became more evasive and their creditors, many of them urban folk, ever more insistent. The debtor-creditor relationship between the landed nobility and the town citizens contributed to the tension between the two-social groups. This tension expressed itself in other court battles concerning the right of municipal governments to collect taxes from the vassals of neighboring seigneuries or to penalize lords and vassals for improper use of the irrigation systems.134 Cases such as these, by themselves not of great moment, cumulatively provided some of the tinder for the conflagration of the revolt of the Germanías .

Yet, the symbiosis between lords and Muslim vassals was a delicate one, easily upset when their interests diverged. Most suits pitting lord against vassal arose from any action on the part of the vassal that threatened to diminish the revenues received by the lord. The bailiff of Játiva ruled on a case in which the lord of Genovés disputed the right of a female vassal to marry another Muslim, probably from another seigneury.135 That the lord feared his vassal's change of residence and the consequent loss of seigneurial dues is suggested by another case in which the lord of Argelita resisted the attempt of a Muslim of Triega to sell the property owned by his wife in Argelita.136 Apparently lords preferred that their female vassals marry local boys. The lord's fiscal concerns led to the leveling of charges at those vassals who defaulted on

their rent payments, especially those who abandoned the seigneury without settling accounts. For instance, the lord of Alberique sought from the king the prosecution of his former amin * who was still indebted to him for the purchase of some wheat.137 The tendency of insolvent vassals to seek refuge in other seigneuries, the lords of which were often happy to receive them, complicated matters further. Thus, Joan Miralles, lord of Beniala, asked the viceroy to proceed against his debtor vassals whom the lord Ramon Pujades was protecting.138 Already familiar to us is the large body of litigation between seigneurs and their former vassals residing either in royal morerías or on the lands of other lords. Most of this litigation concerned the lords' resistance to the efforts of their erstwhile vassals to cultivate and collect the harvest from the lands they continued to rent on their seigneuries.139

While the lawsuits that aligned lords and vassals against creditors, townsmen, and other seigneuries attest to grave tensions straining the kingdom's socioeconomic structure, those between individual Muslims and Christians arising from commercial transactions reflect another reality equally important, but far less dire. Such cases, usually involving the claims of unpaid vendors against indebted buyers, reveal some of the few difficulties encountered by Muslims and Christians in the wide-ranging trade between them in land, livestock, agricultural produce, and a variety of manufactured goods. There is nothing in this type of litigation indicating widespread Muslim-Christian animosity on the basis of economic competition. Commercial claims were not made by or against Muslims on religious grounds; they were not a divisive force in Valencian society. Rather, they are fragmentary evidence of the regular economic interaction between Muslims and Christians, which, because it was normally unencumbered by legal problems, never aroused the interest of the royal bureaucracy.140

A consideration of the crimes that Muslims committed against Christians does not reveal a special pattern of Mudejar criminal activity. Muslims were accused of theft, vandalism, gambling, defrauding the lessee of the royal saltworks, tax evasion, and the possession of false money.141 However, Mudejars were by no means notorious for such crimes, for Christians committed them as well. Nor is there an easily perceptible link between Mudejar criminality and their relatively oppressed status. The victims of Mudejar crimes seem to have been more often Muslims than Christians. Mudejar actions to correct perceived injustices were directed against their official and seigneurial oppressors and not against the Christian populace as a whole. Any causal relationship that might have existed between poverty—a social ill which did not especially afflict the Mudejars as a group—and crime,

particularly theft, would have applied as much to Christians as to Muslims.

Turning to cases of homicide and assault involving Muslims and Christians, these do not point toward any dramatic trends in social violence. It is important to distinguish between the random violence occurring for any number of reasons in the context of distinct personal relationships and the systematic violence of the mob directed against a specific social group. Regarding the latter type, although it had occurred as recently as 1455, in the form of the attack on Valencia's morería , and would occur again in 1521, when the Germanías murdered or forcibly baptized thousands of Mudejars, it did not happen during the reign of Fernando.

Random violence, however, was not unknown. Yet, lest one think that Mudejars were always the victims of Christian hoodlums, it is worth noting that there were eight cases in which Muslims were the perpetrators of assault and homicide. In four of these cases the violence seems to have arisen from personal disputes. For instance, Hubaydal Baçanet wounded Luys Lançol in the face and hand.142 In Játiva Coayat Çarahi, a juglar , and some Muslim companions threw Rodrigo Castanyeda into an irrigation ditch and tried to injure him further.143 At times individual Muslims reacted violently to official pressure. This seems to have been the case with Azen Satmer, who struck the justice of Manises in the face.144 In three cases Mudejar violence was linked to the conflict between seigneuries, or between seigneuries and towns. As part of the recurrent troubles between the lordship of Gilet and the town of Murviedro, Ali Ubequer of Gilet and Domingo de la Lança of Murviedro had a brawl during which the latter was wounded.145 One case of feuding between seigneuries saw unidentified Muslims raid the home of the lord of Náquera and mortally wound one of his vassals.146 Some of the less sanguinary crimes of Mudejar vassals also fit into the broader picture of seigneurial feuding. For example, a Muslim of Cox was accused of breaking into the home of the lord of Albatera. Characteristically, his lord refused to cooperate in the judicial procedure against him.147 The lord of Dos Aguas brought charges against Muslim vassals of Resalany and the Vall de Tous for having descended upon his lands and released Muslim prisoners from his jail.148

The murder of Muslims by Christians conforms to the picture already sketched of powerful Christians, mostly knights and noblemen, abusing the vassals of their rivals as a means of indirectly injuring them. A Mudejar woman complained to the king that the noble Pere de Montagut and his squires had killed her son.149 Two Muslims of Játiva also turned to Fernando when a local lord imprisoned a fellow Muslim, as a

result of which the latter died, apparently of epilepsy.150 Although in both cases the king ordered the initiation of legal procedure, it is unlikely that the murderers, in these cases or others, were ever punished. A constable was fined for the murder of a Muslim slave, but only so that the slave's master could be reimbursed for his lost property.151 Reprehensible as such violence was, it is nevertheless significant that its perpetrators were largely restricted to the ranks of unscrupulous nobles and officials, men who acted for calculated political and economic motives. Violence against Muslims was not for the most part inspired by religious fanaticism, and the large majority of the Christian populace did not engage in it. In fact, Muslims sometimes joined Christians, their fellow vassals, in attacking Muslims of rival seigneuries.152 Moreover, Christian violence against Muslims was greatly exceeded in terms of both ferocity and frequency by that between Mudejars. To explain all Christian violence against Muslims as a manifestation of religious animosity is too simplistic. True, Christians displayed greater temerity in their acts against Mudejars because the latter were Muslims; nevertheless, their actions had a firm political and economic foundation related to the complex tensions and rivalries in Valencian society. And, as we have seen, the Mudejars were not always ones to take such abuse lying down.

Legal Oppression

A perusal of the judicial disputes between Muslims and Christians does not disclose the infliction of gross injustices on the Mudejars by the kingdom's courts. On the contrary, such litigation shows that the laws of the kingdom were for the Mudejars more often a source of protection against Christian aggressors than an oppressive burden. To discover the true legal oppression of the Mudejars, one must look beyond their lawsuits with Christians to the cases in which they were penalized for the violation of laws that applied almost exclusively to them. Mudejars were arraigned, tried, and harshly punished for acts that the authorities viewed as crimes only because they had been committed by Muslims, believers of an "inferior" religion that also constituted a political threat. The same body of laws that often protected the Mudejars from the aggression and abuse of Christians also brought home to them with brutal clarity their socioreligious inferiority and political subjection in a Christian kingdom.

One area in which the laws of the kingdom weighed heavily against the Mudejars was that of sexual relations between Muslims and Christians. Boswell has convincingly described how these laws established a

sexual and religious double standard that facilitated the sexual exploitation of Muslim women by Christian men.153 Still, it is a point worth belaboring, especially since the situation in some respects seems to have deteriorated by the late fifteenth century.

The Furs provided that in the case of a Muslim man sleeping with a Christian woman, both parties were to be burned alive. In the case of a Christian man sleeping with a Muslim woman, however, the man received no punishment whatsoever, while the woman was punished according to Islamic law for fornication or adultery (unless she was a licensed prostitute), which meant either flogging or death by stoning.154 The Islamic penalties were invariably commuted to enslavement. Thus, as Boswell concludes, "those members of the society with no power, i.e., Muslims and women, were penalized for unions which were permissible for members with power, i.e., Christian men."155

The severity of the prescribed penalties did not deter Muslims and Christians from such liaisons. The abundance of Christian and Muslim prostitutes in the kingdom made deterrence extremely difficult. In fact, in the large majority of illicit unions between Muslim men and Christian women the women were prostitutes. The law, however, made no distinctions with respect to the status and profession of the Christian woman, so that Muslims were punished for sexual relations with Christian prostitutes as well as with Christian wives and daughters. In one case Muslims were actually sentenced to be burned alive for having availed themselves of the services of a Christian prostitute, although probably because some coercion was involved.156 Still, in most cases the criminal proceedings against Muslim males for sexual crimes did not result in a death sentence. Neither the king nor the nobility could afford to lose the services of Muslim vassals in this way. Thus, some guilty Muslims were heavily fined. Abrahim Murçi was fined 400s for having merely solicited a Christian woman (prostitute?),157 while Azmet Mufferix paid the hefty fine of 1,000s for having slept with a prostitute.158 Those who lacked the resources to pay such fines were probably enslaved. In this way the lord still retained the services of his vassal, or at least cashed in on the sale of the slave.

It is difficult to know whether or not Christian women were punished for these liaisons. It seems that legal procedure was initiated against Catherine, the wife of Christofol Pujol, for her affair with Ayet Capo.159

There were very few instances of sexual relations between Christian men and Muslim women who were not prostitutes or slaves. Cases like that of the Muslim girl of Liria who ran off with her Christian lover, Jaume Ricarder, converted to Christianity, and set up house with him, were a rarity (the girl's father accused Ricarder of abducting his

daughter).160 The jealousy with which Mudejar fathers guarded the chastity of their daughters—against other Muslims, and certainly all the more against Christians—precluded such liaisons.

The sexual exploitation of Muslim women is most evident in the authorities' promotion of Muslim prostitution, which went hand in hand with the flagrant interference of Christians in the private lives of Muslims. The motives of all Christians involved—king, lords, and owners of female Muslim slaves—were blatantly economic. The Crown's legal stance on the question of Muslim prostitution set the tone for all related abuses: Muslim women could practice prostitution only with a license purchased from the Crown; all unlicensed prostitutes were to be penalized with enslavement to the Crown. On a number of occasions the bailiff general dispatched deputies to arrest all unlicensed prostitutes, who, the bailiff noted, were plying their trade "in great damage and detriment of the rights and revenues of the ... lord king."161 Once arrested, these women were sold into slavery for the profit of the Crown. Their new masters often put them out as prostitutes and retained the earnings of the women for themselves, despite the laws prohibiting such practices.162 Thus, these enslaved prostitutes were forced to commit for another's profit the same acts for which they had originally incurred punishment.

Realizing that revenues were to be had from the promotion and regulation of Muslim prostitution, royal and seigneurial authorities sought new recruits from among the condemned in the Islamic courts. There the authorities commuted to slavery the Islamic penalties to which the qadi * had sentenced Mudejar adulteresses. Many of these slaves were probably put to work in the royal brothels. If the aljamas did not object to Christian interference in this sensitive area, it was because the rigid sexual mores of the Mudejars relegated adulterers and fornicators to the status of social and family outcasts. The enslavement of these women to the Crown was, the Mudejars realized, by no means a merciful act, but a form of execution more gradual than stoning, albeit no less symbolic of their social death in the eyes of the Muslim community.

However, Christian interference in the Muslims' private lives became excessively predatory. Christians hovered about like vultures waiting to feed off the sexual transgressions and social miseries of Muslims. They acquired a knowledge of Mudejar laws and customs to suit their own purposes. This would explain the bizarre case in which Manuel Lançol, the lord of Gilet, accused a Muslim couple of Murviedro of living in sin, of not being legally married according to Islamic law. Although the qadi general found that Lançol's accusations were justified, this hardly excuses such prying into Mudejar family matters. What Lançol hoped to gain is unclear; perhaps he bore a grudge against the couple for having

moved from Gilet to become royal vassals in Murviedro.163 It is, in any case, difficult to imagine a disinterested Christian concern with Muslim morality.

By the latter half of Fernando's reign the bailiff general was going so far as to order his subordinates to seek out and apprehend Muslim men and women who had committed adultery. Significantly, this order was contained in the same letter that demanded the arrest of all unlicensed prostitutes.164 Together, the two formed a cruel and relentless strategy in which the sexual exploitation of Mudejar women for the financial gain of the Christian authorities is patent: all Muslim adulteresses were to be arrested, punished, and reduced to enslaved prostitution; and all prostitutes were to be licensed, taxed, and regulated by the Crown. The case of Axa of Villamarchante, a widow and mother of three, attests graphically to this policy. While in Valencia, Axa met Çale Duraydach from the Vall de Uxó. He took her to a hostel and there they slept together. As they lay together, a royal constable burst into their room and demanded to know whether they had committed "adultery" (really fornication, since she was a widow). Axa confessed to her "crime" and so was brought before the tribunal of the bailiff general. The bailiff and the qadi * general sentenced her to death by stoning, which sentence, of course, resulted in her enslavement to the Crown.165 Of Axa we know no more, but an educated guess as to her fate could be posed. It is, in any case, clear that the basis for this systematic and humiliating exploitation of Muslim women was the law that allowed Christian men to enjoy the sexual favors of Muslim women with impunity. There stemmed from this law a growing assumption on the part of the governing classes of the kingdom that their political authority and professed religious superiority over the Mudejars gave them the moral authority to judge Muslim sexual misconduct by standards far more rigorous than those which they applied to members of their own faith. Ironically, this assumption was associated with their increasing understanding of the Mudejars themselves and of the rigidity of their sexual mores. Sadly, they could think only of exploiting that understanding for their own profit.

There also existed a body of laws that may be described as policing measures, laws facilitating the scrutiny of Mudejar activities and movements. The political and fiscal concerns of the king and the nobility led them to restrict the Mudejars' freedom of movement, because they were a dissident, but economically valuable, minority. It was thought that some Mudejars harbored political allegiance to Islamic states and perhaps wished to emigrate there. Thus, Mudejars needed royal licenses to travel to Granada or the Maghrib, or even to the southern part of the kingdom. Usually they were prohibited from emigrating to Islamic

lands. Even wandering Muslim mendicants were required to have licenses to beg from their coreligionists. Those who were caught traveling or begging for alms without these licenses were punished, and usually harshly. Most unlicensed mendicants were enslaved to the Crown and then sold to the highest bidder.166 The ease with which Mudejars could be enslaved for such infractions forcefully emphasized their subject status and the very real limitations on their freedom. The phenomenon of Muslim slavery itself resulted in a number of cases in which Muslims were accused of abetting runaway slaves.167 The Mudejars' aid to runaway slaves is striking testimony to their acute awareness of just how precarious their position was; they were prepared for the eventuality of the loss of freedom.

In addition, there was the series of laws that required of the Mudejars obeisance to a faith so inimical to their own. Although it is unlikely that Muslims were actually forced to kneel in the street as Christian processions passed by, and although Muslims and Christians frequently associated and socialized in manners deemed inappropriate by the Crown and the Church, the very existence of such laws reminded the Mudejars of Christianity's present superiority over Islam. And, indeed, Muslims were fined for such indiscretions as swearing in the name of the Christian God.168 Furthermore, as long as the laws were on the books, there always hung over the Mudejars' heads the possibility that these laws would all be enforced in their full rigor. This is exactly what the Inquisitors and their backers desired.

Even if some Mudejars prospered in Valencia and had no intention of leaving, the knowledge that they could not depart if they so wished, that their movements were restricted and subject to the scrutiny of royal officials, that they were, in effect, prisoners in their own land, all this must have constituted a form of psychological oppression and alienation just as painful as more blatant forms of physical abuse. The law for the Mudejars was, like so many other aspects of their existence, a double-edged sword, both protective and oppressive; it afforded them justice within the framework of a politicoreligious system which was in a number of ways essentially unjust.