1. Malcolm H. Kerr, America's Middle East Policy: Kissinger, Carter and the Future, IPS Papers 14(E) (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1980), pp. 8–9.

2. Ibid., p. 8.

3. Ibid., p. 9.

4. Avi Shlaim, "The Debate about 1948," International Journal of Middle East Studies 27, no. 3 (August 1995): 287–304.

5. Peter Theroux, Sandstorms: Days and Nights in Arabia (New York: Norton, 1990), p. 23.

6. William B. Quandt, Decade of Decisions: American Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967–1976 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 16.

7. Peter Grose, Israel in the Mind of America (New York: Knopf, 1983), p. 316.

8. Camille Mansour, Beyond Alliance: Israel in U.S. Foreign Policy, trans. James A. Cohen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 277.

9. Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), pp. 62, 93–94. Emphasis in original.

10. Henry Kissinger, "Stone's Nixon," Washington Post, 24 January 1996.

11. Dan Kurzman, Genesis 1948: The First Arab-Israeli War (New York: New American Library, 1970), pp. 190–191.

12. Outside the United States, Irish journalist Erskine Childers had investigated the broadcasts myth much earlier and found no evidence of any broadcasts or blanket orders from military commanders. His detailed analysis of the myth appeared in The Spectator, 12 May 1961, reprinted in Walid Khalidi, ed., From Haven to Conquest: Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem un til 1948 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987), pp. 795–803.

13. Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 290, 287.

14. Meron Benvenisti, Intimate Enemies: Jews and Arabs in a Shared Land (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), p. 200.

15. Ha'aretz, English Edition, 12 May 1998; Jerusalem Post, 12 May 1998; New York Times, 15 May 1998.

16. Bernard Reich, ed., An Historical Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Con flict (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1996). Philip Mattar pointed out the Israel-centered terminology and interpretation in a review of the encyclopedia in the International Journal of Middle East Studies 29, no. 3 (August 1997): 474–476.

17. Mattar review in the International Journal of Middle East Studies.

18. Baruch Kimmerling, "Academic History Caught in the Cross-Fire: The Case of Israeli-Jewish Historiography," History & Memory: Studies in Repre sentation of the Past, spring/summer 1995, 48.

19. Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: The Abduction of Lebanon (New York: Simon & Schuster Touchstone, 1990), pp. 452–453.

20. Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern Na tional Consciousness (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 14–15. Khalidi notes that Israel frequently imposes Hebrew or Arabicized Hebrew names on Arab locations. For instance, Jerusalem is called Yerushalaim in Hebrew and al-Quds al-Sharif in Arabic, but official Israeli documents in Arabic, as well as Israel's radio and television broadcasts in Arabic, use the word Urshalim, the Arabic translation of the Hebrew name

21. Kimmerling, "Academic History," pp. 48, 53–54.

22. Robert I. Friedman, "Selling Israel to America: The Hasbara Project Targets the U.S. Media," Mother Jones, February/March 1987, 25.

23. The statement was by Bassam Abu Sharif, a close adviser to Arafat. Martin A. Lee and Norman Solomon, Unreliable Sources: A Guide to Bias in News Media (New York: Carol, 1990), pp. 323–324. For a text of Abu Sharif's statement, see Journal of Palestine Studies 69 (autumn 1988): 272–275.

24. Article in the Israeli paper Davar, 5 August 1983, quoted in Noam Chomsky, Pirates and Emperors: International Terrorism in the Real World (Brattleboro, Vt.: Amana Books, 1990), pp. 27–28.

25. Edward W. Said, The Politics of Dispossession: The Struggle for Pal estinian Self-Determination, 1969–1994 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994), pp. 372–373.

26. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 410–411, 417.

27. Interview with a former government official who asked to remain anonymous.

28. Harold H. Saunders, The Other Walls: The Politics of the Arab-Israeli Peace Process (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1985), p. 10; interview with Saunders, 13 October 1997; and letter from Saunders, 9 July 1998.

29. Jervis, Perception and Misperception, pp. 143, 146.

30. Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, The Imperfect Spies: The History of Is raeli Intelligence (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1989), p. 215.

31. Interview with former government official.

32. Jervis, Perception and Misperception, p. 253.

33. Ibid., p. 237.

34. Richard B. Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 213–214.

35. Jervis, Perception and Misperception, p. 417.

36. Kissinger, "Stone's Nixon."

1. Mark Twain, The Innocents Abroad, or The New Pilgrim's Progress, Be ing Some Account of the Steamship Quaker City 's Pleasure Excursion to Eu rope and the Holy Land (reprint, Pleasantville, N.Y.: Reader's Digest Association, 1990), pp. 322–323, 394.

2. British journalist Robert Fisk in Pity the Nation, pp. 21–22, describes a meeting with an Israeli spokesman in 1980 in which he was given an undated book entitled Land Ownership in Palestine 1880–1948 filled with quotes, including Twain's, describing early Palestine as "a land of brigandage, destitution and desert."

3. Said, Orientalism, p. 192.

4. Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, p. 47.

5. Victor Wolfgang von Hagen, "Introduction," in John Lloyd Stephens, Incidents of Travel in Egypt, Arabia Petraea, and the Holy Land (reprint, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1970), p. xl.

6. Joseph L. Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East: Missionary Influence on American Policy, 1810–1927 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971), pp. 38–39. Thomson's book, first published in 1859, has been reprinted several times. One of these reprints is William Thomson, The Land and the Book: Biblical Illustrations Drawn from the Manners and Cus toms, the Scenes and Scenery of the Holy Land (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1954).

7. Fuad Sha'ban, Islam and Arabs in Early American Thought: The Roots of Orientalism in America (Durham, N.C.: Acorn Press, 1991), p. 117.

8. Von Hagen, "Introduction," p. xxxviii.

9. Quoted in Sha'ban, Islam and Arabs, pp. 118–119, 178–179.

10. Said, Orientalism, pp. 3, 19. Emphasis in original.

11. Thierry Hentsch, Imagining the Middle East, trans. Fred A. Reed (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1992), p. xii.

12. Said, Orientalism, pp. 45–46, 86, 205.

13. Sha'ban, Islam and Arabs, pp. 20, 25, 195–199.

14. Hentsch outlines the progression of this enmity in Imagining the Middle East.

15. Ibid., pp. 130–131, and Ammiel Alcalay, After Jews and Arabs: Remak ing Levantine Culture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 145.

16. Michael W. Suleiman, "Palestine and the Palestinians in the Mind of America," in U.S. Policy on Palestine from Wilson to Clinton, ed. Michael W. Suleiman (Normal, Ill.: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1995), pp. 10–11.

17. Sha'ban, Islam and Arabs, pp. 32–34, 46.

18. Suleiman, "Palestine and the Palestinians," p. 13.

19. Sha'ban, Islam and Arabs, p. 91.

20. Beshara Doumani, "Rediscovering Ottoman Palestine: Writing Palestinians into History," Journal of Palestine Studies 82 (winter 1992): 8.

21. Barbara McKean Parmenter, Giving Voice to Stones: Place and Identity in Palestinian Literature (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994), p. 12.

22. Sha'ban, Islam and Arabs, pp. 132, 134–135.

23. Twain, The Innocents Abroad, pp. 355–357.

24. Sarah Graham-Brown, Palestinians and Their Society, 1880–1946 (London: Quartet Books, 1980), p. 10.

25. Stephens, Incidents of Travel, p. 330.

26. Sha'ban, Islam and Arabs, pp. 97–98.

27. Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy, p. 157, and Suleiman, "Palestine and the Palestinians," p. 13.

28. Cited in Alcalay, After Jews and Arabs, p. 67.

29. The original quote—"a country without a nation for a nation without a country"—came from Lord Shaftesbury in 1839. Suleiman, "Palestine and the Palestinians," p. 11.

30. Doumani, "Rediscovering Ottoman Palestine," p. 9.

31. See Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, particularly chs. 5 and 6, for a discussion of the development of Palestinian identity in the early years of the twentieth century.

32. Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), p. 53.

33. Parmenter, Giving Voice to Stones, p. 26.

34. Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy, pp. 27, 55–56.

35. Ibid., p. 27.

36. I. L. Kenen, Israel's Defense Line: Her Friends and Foes in Washington (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus, 1981), p. 8.

37. The Division of Near Eastern Affairs, so named from the 1920s through the 1940s, was the State Department's line office dealing with the Middle East. During this period, the division answered to the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs. In the 1950s, these organizations were renamed and, in the case of the higher level entity, given new geographical responsibilities. The Division

38. Grose, Israel in the Mind of America, pp. 42–43.

39. Quoted in Jack G. Shaheen, "Remembering Both Qana and Oklahoma City Massacres," Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, July 1996, 20.

1. August Heckscher, Woodrow Wilson (New York: Scribner, 1991), p. 23.

2. Ibid., pp. 138, 396.

3. David Jacobs, An American Conscience: Woodrow Wilson's Search for World Peace (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), p. 50, cites an incident illustrative of Wilson's attitude toward blacks and possibly toward colonial peoples. Questioned during his presidency by a cabinet member who asked him whether he was aware of a policy in federal government agencies that forced black and white workers to sit in separate rows of desks and use separate lavatories and other facilities, Wilson replied in a memorandum that he knew of the policy and approved of it. This was a "natural" way for blacks and whites to share office space, he observed, and was the way each race wanted things.

4. For a recapitulation of Wilson's views on the Palestine question, see Hisham H. Ahmed, "Roots of Denial: American Stand on Palestinian Self-Determination from the Balfour Declaration to World War Two," in U.S. Policy on Palestine from Wilson to Clinton, ed. Michael W. Suleiman (Normal, Ill.: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1995), pp. 27–58.

5. Edward Tivnan, The Lobby: Jewish Political Power and American Foreign Policy (New York: Simon & Schuster Touchstone, 1988), p. 17.

6. Ahmed, "Roots of Denial," pp. 35–36.

7. Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy, pp. 80–83, 88–89.

8. Ibid., pp. 89–91, 102, 155–162.

9. Ibid., p. 178.

10. Seth P. Tillman, The United States in the Middle East: Interests and Ob stacles (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 59.

11. Ahmed, "Roots of Denial," p. 35.

12. "An Interview in Mr. Balfour's Apartment, 23 Rue Nitot, Paris, on June 24th, 1919, at 4: 45 p.m.," in Khalidi, From Haven to Conquest, p. 198.

13. Ibid., p. 197.

14. "Memorandum by Mr. Balfour (Paris) Respecting Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia, 1919," in Khalidi, From Haven to Conquest, p. 208.

15. See George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1980), pp. 80–81, and David Fromkin, A Peace to End

16. Quoted in Ahmed, "Roots of Denial," p. 29.

17. Grose, Israel in the Mind of America, p. 91.

18. Ahmed, "Roots of Denial," p. 36, and Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy, pp. 199–200. The text of those sections of the King-Crane Commission report on Palestine is contained in Khalidi, From Haven to Conquest, pp. 213–218.

19. Ibid.

20. Ahmed, "Roots of Denial," p. 44.

21. Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy, p. 206.

22. Ahmed, "Roots of Denial," pp. 41, 43.

23. Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy, p. 178.

24. Ahmed, "Roots of Denial," p. 36.

25. "An Interview in Mr. Balfour's Apartment," pp. 196–197.

26. Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 3d ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p. 73.

27. Ahmed, "Roots of Denial," p. 45.

28. Ibid., p. 49.

29. Lawrence Davidson, "Competing Responses to the 1929 Arab Uprising in Palestine: The Zionist Press versus the State Department," Middle East Pol icy 5, no. 2 (May 1997): 100–102, 106, and Lawrence Davidson, "Press, State Department and Popular Perceptions of Palestine in the 1920s" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, November 1994), p. 34.

30. Grose, Israel in the Mind of America, p. 69.

31. Examples are cited in Ahmed, "Roots of Denial," p. 36; Davidson, "Competing Responses," pp. 101–103; and Frank E. Manuel, The Realities of American-Palestine Relations (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1949), pp. 182–201.

32. Quoted in Davidson, "Press, State Department and Popular Perceptions," p. 15.

33. Quoted in Grose, Israel in the Mind of America, p. 90.

34. Manuel, The Realities of American-Palestine Relations, p. 218.

35. Quoted in Davidson, "Press, State Department and Popular Perceptions," p. 7.

36. Ibid., p. 17, and Ahmed, "Roots of Denial," p. 32.

37. Davidson, "Press, State Department and Popular Perceptions," p. 16.

38. Quoted in Mohammed K. Shadid, The United States and the Palestini ans (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. 26.

39. Quoted in Lawrence Davidson, "Zionism, Socialism and United States Support for the Jewish Colonization of Palestine in the 1920s," Arab Studies Quarterly, summer 1996, 5.

40. See Lawrence Davidson, "Historical Ignorance and Popular Perception:

41. Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy, pp. 71–72, 101.

42. Davidson, "Press, State Department and Popular Perceptions," pp. 2, 5, 9, 19, 24, 27, and Davidson, "Competing Responses," p. 96.

43. Davidson, "Press, State Department and Popular Perceptions," pp. 14, 17–20, and Davidson, "Competing Responses," pp. 95–96, 99–100.

44. Davidson, "Competing Responses," p. 96.

45. Ibid., pp. 95–97, 99–100, and Davidson, "Press, State Department and Popular Perceptions," pp. 14, 17–20.

46. Davidson, "Press, State Department and Popular Perceptions," pp. 2–4, 17, and 35, note 29.

47. Ibid., p. 34, note 2.

48. Davidson, "Competing Responses," p. 95.

49. Laurence Michalek, "The Arab in American Cinema: A Century of Otherness," Arab Image in American Film and Television, supplement to Cineaste 17, no. 1 (n.d.), copublished with the American-Arab Anti-Discimination Committee, pp. 3–9.

50. Ibid., p. 3.

51. Grose, Israel in the Mind of America, p. 51, and Donald Neff, Fallen Pil lars: U.S. Policy towards Palestine and Israel since 1945 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995), p. 18.

52. Kenen, Israel's Defense Line, p. 9.

53. Lawrence Davidson, "The Press-Zionist Connection vs. the State Department: Competing American Responses to the 1929 Arab Uprising in Palestine" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, November 1996), pp. 23 and 35, notes 79 and 80.

54. Lawrence Davidson, "Debating Palestine: Arab-American Challenges to Zionism, 1917–1929" (unpublished manuscript, 1997), pp. 5–21.

55. J. C. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine (New York: Norton, 1950), p. 18.

56. Grose, Israel in the Mind of America, p. 67, suggests that the American Federation of Labor's 1916 endorsement of Zionism was motivated by leader Samuel Gompers's fear of a glut of Jewish immigrant workers.

57. Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, pp. 121–122.

58. Tessler believes that the refusal of most mainstream Zionist leaders to accept the legitimacy of Palestinian Arab desires for self-determination intensified the Arab view of Zionism as a mortal threat. Ibid., p. 168.

1. Doris Kearns Goodwin, No Ordinary Time: Franklin and Eleanor Roo sevelt: The Home Front in World War II (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994),

2. Grose, Israel in the Mind of America, p. 115.

3. See Abba Eban, Personal Witness: Israel through My Eyes (New York: Putnam, 1992), p. 80; Grose, Israel in the Mind of America, pp. 130–131; Morgan, FDR, pp. 583–588; and Goodwin, No Ordinary Time, pp. 101–102, 453–454.

4. Grose, Israel in the Mind of America, pp. 130–131.

5. Geoffrey C. Ward, A First-Class Temperament: The Emergence of Frank lin Roosevelt (New York: Harper & Row, 1989), pp. 59, 250–255, and Morgan, FDR, p. 23.

6. Tivnan, The Lobby, pp. 19, 22, and Evan M. Wilson, Decision on Pales tine: How the U.S. Came to Recognize Israel (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), p. 55.

7. Dan Tschirgi, The Politics of Indecision: Origins and Implications of American Involvement with the Palestine Problem (New York: Praeger, 1983), pp. 72–74.

8. Goodwin, No Ordinary Time, pp. 100–102, 173–174, 397.

9. Tschirgi, The Politics of Indecision, p. 36. Roosevelt had earlier referred to Britain's having "promised Palestine to the Jews." See Grose, Israel in the Mind of America, p. 134.

10. Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p. 173.

11. Tschirgi, The Politics of Indecision, p. 36.

12. See Table l, "Number of Immigrants Annually by Race. Total Number of Persons Registered as Immigrants," in A Survey of Palestine: Prepared in December 1945 and January 1946 for the Information of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991), p. 185. Figures given in Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p. 170, bring the total of Jewish immigrants for the same period to 331, 518.

13. Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p. 170.

14. See Appendix I, "Population, Immigration, and Land Statistics, 1919–1946," in Khalidi, From Haven to Conquest, pp. 841–843.

15. Grose, Israel in the Mind of America, pp. 138–139.

16. Tschirgi, The Politics of Indecision, pp. 90–91.

17. Quoted in ibid., p. 113.

18. Quoted in Wilson, Decision on Palestine, p. 54.

19. Tschirgi, The Politics of Indecision, p. 31.

20. Wilson, Decision on Palestine, p. 2.

21. Tschirgi, The Politics of Indecision, p. 31.

22. Ibid., p. 47.

23. Kenen, Israel's Defense Line, p. 9.

24. Tschirgi, The Politics of Indecision, pp. 48–49.

25. Tivnan, The Lobby, pp. 22–23.

26. Ibid., p. 24, and Grose, Israel in the Mind of America, pp. 172–174.

27. Kenen, Israel's Defense Line, p. 18; Wilson, Decision on Palestine, pp. 27, 45; and Manuel, The Realities of American-Palestine Relations, p. 312.

28. Quoted in Tschirgi, The Politics of Indecision, p. 27.

29. Ibid., pp. 25, 27.

30. Ibid., p. 18.

31. Bruce J. Evensen, Truman, Palestine, and the Press: Shaping Conven tional Wisdom at the Beginning of the Cold War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1992), p. 179.

32. Robert Lacey, The Kingdom (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981), pp. 267–272.

33. Neff, Fallen Pillars, pp. 25–26.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid., p. 25.

36. Wilson, Decision on Palestine, p. 33.

37. For a biography of the Mufti, showing his gradual radicalization through the years, his efforts to thwart the Zionists, and his flirtation with the Nazis, see Philip Mattar, The Mufti of Jerusalem: Al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Palestinian National Movement (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).

38. Neff, Fallen Pillars, p. 109.

39. Mattar, The Mufti of Jerusalem, p. 99.

40. Ibid., p. 122.

41. See Ann Mosely Lesch, Arab Politicsin Palestine, 1917–1939: The Frus tration of a Nationalist Movement (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1979), for a study of Arab political organization and the development of local Palestinian nationalism in the British Mandate period. Lesch demonstrates the impact Britain's iron hand and the Zionists' political strength had on the Arabs' ability to establish effective political organizations.

42. See Muhammad Y. Muslih, The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), for an examination of early Palestinian nationalism. Muslih maintains that Palestinian nationalism evolved not only because of and in opposition to Zionism but alongside it and that it would have emerged as separate from broader pan-Arab nationalism even had Zionism not existed.

43. Lesch, Arab Politics in Palestine, p. 234.

44. See Avi Shlaim, Collusion across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zion ist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), for a history of secret British-Zionist-Transjordanian cooperation in the decades before Israel's creation in 1948 and Transjordan's absorption of the areas of Palestine that were to have formed an Arab state according to the United Nations partition resolution.

45. Eleanor Roosevelt, The Autobiography of Eleanor Roosevelt (reprint, New York: Da Capo Press, 1992), p. 325.

1. Shlaim, "The Debate about 1948."

2. Benny Morris, "A Second Look at the ‘Missed Peace,’ or Smoothing Out History: A Review Essay," Journal of Palestine Studies 93 (autumn 1994): 78–79.

3. Quoted in David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), p. 620.

4. Quoted in Clark Clifford, with Richard Holbrooke, Counsel to the Presi dent: A Memoir (New York: Random House, 1991), p. 25.

5. Wilson, Decision on Palestine, p. 149.

6. Clifford, Counsel to the President, pp. 14, 24.

7. Grose, Israel in the Mind of America, p. 294.

8. Michael J. Cohen, Truman and Israel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 27.

9. Merle Miller, Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman (New York: Berkley, 1974), pp. 230–232.

10. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. 2, Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1956), p. 137, and Grose, Israel in the Mind of America, p. 200.

11. Truman, Memoirs, vol. 2, pp. 137, 140.

12. Cohen, Truman and Israel, pp. 50–55, and Grose, Israel in the Mind of America, p. 194.

13. Cohen, Truman and Israel, pp. 51–53.

14. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Depart ment (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 177.

15. See Table 5, "Estimate of Population of Palestine by Race," in A Survey of Palestine, Prepared in December 1945 and January 1946 for the Information of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, vol. 1, p. 143.

16. Quoted in Truman, Memoirs, vol. 2, pp. 134–135.

17. Ibid., p. 159.

18. Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 177.

19. Truman, Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 133.

20. George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1990), p. 24.

21. See, for instance, Cohen, Truman and Israel, p. 27, and Eban, Personal Witness, p. 140.

22. McCullough, Truman, p. 611, and Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. 1, Year of Decisions (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955), p. 69.

23. Miller, Plain Speaking, pp. 232–233. Emphasis in original.

24. Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S Tru man, 1945–1948 (New York: Norton, 1977), pp. 320–321; Tschirgi, The Poli tics of Indecision, p. 236; McCullough, Truman, p. 599; and Truman, Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 160.

25. Grose, Israel in the Mind of America, p. 229, and Miller, Plain Speak ing, p. 234.

26. Quoted in McCullough, Truman, pp. 599, 608.

27. Cohen, Truman and Israel, p. 59.

28. Ibid., p. 82.

29. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1948, vol. 5, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 695; hereafter FRUS 1948.

30. Quoted in Tschirgi, The Politics of Indecision, p. 184.

31. See Donovan, Conflict and Crisis, p. 316, for another example.

32. Quoted in Cohen, Truman and Israel, p. 77.

33. McCullough, Truman, p. 604, and Donovan, Conflict and Crisis, p. 325.

34. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis, p. 321.

35. Cohen, Truman and Israel, pp. 83–84, and Grose, Israel in the Mind of America, pp. 270–271.

36. Grose, Israel in the Mind of America, pp. 264–266, and Cohen, Truman and Israel, p. 83.

37. Cohen, Truman and Israel, pp. 78, 80–81.

38. Clifford, Counsel to the President, p. 5, and Donovan, Conflict and Cri sis, p. 329.

39. Clifford, Counsel to the President, pp. 3–25.

40. Cohen, Truman and Israel, p. 59.

41. Grose, Israel in the Mind of America, p. 191.

42. Wilson, Decision on Palestine, p. 17.

43. Grose, Israel in the Mind of America, pp. 190, 207, and Tschirgi, The Politics of Indecision, p. 156.

44. Evensen, Truman, Palestine, and the Press, pp. 51, 56, 58, and Wilson, Decision on Palestine, p. 115.

45. Alixa Naff, Becoming American: The Early Arab Immigrant Experience (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985), presents a comprehensive portrait of the early Arab American community.

46. Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, Friends in Deed: Inside the U.S.-Israel Alliance (New York: Hyperion, 1994), p. 364, citing a New York Times review of the scholar's book.

47. Eban, Personal Witness, pp. 79, 91.

48. Kenen, Israel's Defense Line, p. 38.

49. Ilan Pappé, The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947–1951 (London: I. B. Tauris, 1994), pp. 24–26.

50. Quoted in Tschirgi, The Politics of Indecision, p. 299, note 42.

51. Quoted in Neff, Fallen Pillars, p. 36.

52. A former British Foreign Office official, Christopher Mayhew, recalls that as a newly appointed junior minister at the Foreign Office in 1946 he was immediately approached by a Zionist group and that Zionist lobbying was constant thereafter, whereas the Arabs exercised no such pressure. He cannot, he says, "remember ever being lobbied by an Arab, let alone a Palestinian."

53. Wilson, Decision on Palestine, pp. 76, 79.

54. Kenen, Israel's Defense Line, p. 41.

55. For a review of the UNSCOP mission, as well as of the thinking of UNSCOP delegates before and during the mission, see Pappé, The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, pp. 16–33.

56. Evensen, Truman, Palestine, and the Press, p. 130.

57. Ibid., pp. 126–129.

58. Ibid., pp. 155, 159–160.

59. See ibid., especially pp. 9, 13, 118, 152–155.

60. Quoted in ibid., pp. 88–89. Emphasis added.

61. Quoted in Abdelkarim A. Abuelkeshk, "A Portrayal of the Arab-Israeli Conflict in Three U.S. Journals of Opinion: 1948–1982" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1985), p. 132.

62. Evensen, Truman, Palestine, and the Press, pp. 155, 181–182.

63. Ibid., p. 162.

64. Abuelkeshk, "A Portrayal," pp. 127–130.

65. Evensen, Truman, Palestine, and the Press, pp. 161–163.

66. U.S. Department of State, FRUS 1948, pp. 607–609.

67. Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, pp. 61ff., describes the successful effort by the Jewish military force, Haganah, in early April 1948 to secure key road axes in order to neutralize Arab villages in areas populated by Jews and to relieve the isolation of rural Jewish settlements.

68. For assessments of the comparative strengths of the Jewish/Israeli and Arab forces, see ibid., p. 22; Benny Morris, 1948 and After: Israel and the Pal estinians (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 14–16; and Nadav Safran, From War to War: The Arab-Israeli Confrontation, 1948–1967 (New York: Pegasus, 1969), p. 30.

69. Michael W. Suleiman, "American Public Support of Middle Eastern Countries: 1939–1979," in The American Media and the Arabs, ed. Michael C. Hudson and Ronald G. Wolfe (Washington, D.C.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1980), pp. 24–25.

70. Anne O'Hare McCormick, "‘There Is No Present Tense in Israel,’" New York Times Magazine, 13 February 1949, 7. This Times Magazine article followed a ten-part series by McCormick in the Times newspaper that had appeared in January.

71. Gertrude Samuels, "The Three Great Challenges to Israel," New York Times Magazine, 16 October 1949, 13.

72. Gertrude Samuels, "Israel of the Future—A Dream and a Plan," New York Times Magazine, 20 November 1949, 9.

73. Gertrude Samuels, "Israel: Contrasts and Conflict," New York Times Magazine, 30 October 1949.

74. See Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, pp. 49–52.

75. The examples are from the Nation, quoted in Abuelkeshk, "A Portrayal,"

76. James G. McDonald, My Mission in Israel 1948–1951 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1951), p. xi.

77. Manuel, The Realities of American-Palestine Relations.

78. Anne O'Hare McCormick, "Israel Alters Levant Balance in Molding of a New Nation," New York Times, 10 January 1949.

79. Anne O'Hare McCormick, "Recognizing the Realities in the New Palestine," New York Times, 15 May 1948.

80. Cited in Neff, Fallen Pillars, p. 73.

81. Ibid.

82. Quoted in Abuelkeshk, "A Portrayal," pp. 141–142.

83. Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, pp. 293–294; see also the entire chapter "Conclusions," pp. 286–296.

84. McDonald, My Mission in Israel, p. 175.

85. Roosevelt, The Autobiography of Eleanor Roosevelt, pp. 326–327.

86. Saunders, The Other Walls, p. 6.

87. Eban, Personal Witness, p. 125.

88. U.S. Department of State, FRUS 1948, 22 June 1948, pp. 1133–1134, and 23 June 1948, pp. 1134–1137.

89. Ibid., 15 November 1948, pp. 1595–1596.

90. See Shlaim, Collusion across the Jordan, for a lengthy study of the years of discussion and cooperation between the Zionists and King Abdullah that led up to Transjordan's capture of the Arab parts of Palestine in 1948.

91. See Neff, Fallen Pillars, p. 111.

92. See, for instance, a Henderson memo to George Marshall dated 22 September 1947, cited in ibid., pp. 46–47.

93. U.S. Department of State, FRUS 1948, 1 July 1948, pp. 1173, 1184.

94. Neff, Fallen Pillars, p. 69.

95. See Morris, 1948 and After, Chapter 9: "The Initial Absorption of the Palestinian Refugees in the Arab Host Countries, 1948–1949," pp. 289–321, for a review of Arab problems with the absorption of the refugees and of U.S. and other relief efforts.

96. Morris, The Birthofthe Palestinian Refugee Problem, Chapter 9: "Solving the Refugee Problem, December 1948–September 1949," pp. 254–285, gives a detailed description of the ultimately fruitless political negotiations about the refugee problem.

97. Pappé, The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 230, gives the figure of twenty-five thousand, of whom aproximately ten thousand were allowed back as part of a project off a milyre unification. Deborah J. Gerner, "Missed Opportunities and Roads Not Taken: The Eisenhower Administration and the Palestinians," in U.S. Policy on Palestine from Wilson to Clinton, ed. Michael W.

98. Shadid, The United States and the Palestinians, pp. 55–68, provides a summary of U.S. resettlement proposals in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations.

99. Abbas Shiblak, "Residency Status and Civil Rights of Palestinian Refugees in Arab Countries," Journal of Palestine Studies 99 (spring 1996): 36–45, details the restrictions on residency and civil rights imposed on Palestinians living throughout the Arab world.

100. U.S. Department of State, FRUS 1948, 13 December 1948, pp. 1660–1661. Emphasis added.

101. Shlaim, Collusion across the Jordan, p. 388.

102. Eban, Personal Witness, pp. 49–50.

103. Quoted in Shlaim, Collusion across the Jordan, p. 475.

1. Suleiman, "American Public Support," p. 26.

2. Eban, Personal Witness, p. 225.

3. See Robert H. Ferrell, ed., The Eisenhower Diaries (New York: Norton, 1981), p. 318.

4. Emmet John Hughes, The Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years (New York: Atheneum, 1963), pp. 17–18, 25.

5. Eban, Personal Witness, p. 178.

6. Hughes, The Ordeal of Power, p. 26, and Gerner, "Missed Opportunities," pp. 105–106, note 5.

7. Steven L. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), p. 60.

8. Ferrell, The Eisenhower Diaries, p. 318, and Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 64.

9. Gerner, "Missed Opportunities," p. 91.

10. For a summary of Eisenhower administration Middle East policy, see Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East, pp. 31–66.

11. Quoted in Gerner, "Missed Opportunities," p. 87.

12. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 92.

13. Quoted in Gerner, "Missed Opportunities," p. 88. Emphasis added.

14. Ibid., pp. 95–97.

15. Eban, Personal Witness, pp. 218–221.

16. Ibid., pp. 218, 294.

17. Ibid., p. 223, and Kenen, Israel's Defense Line, pp. 66, 69.

18. Melman and Raviv, Friends in Deed, pp. 84, 88.

19. Quoted in Grose, Israel in the Mind of America, pp. 314–315.

20. Quoted in Abuelkeshk, "A Portrayal," pp. 150–152, 165–167.

21. Melman and Raviv, Friends in Deed, pp. 107–108.

22. Michalek, "The Arab in American Cinema," p. 5.

23. Art Stevens, The Persuasion Explosion: Your Guide to the Power and In fluenceof Contemporary Public Relations (Washington, D.C.:Acropolis Books, 1985), pp. 104–105.

24. Melman and Raviv, Friends in Deed, p. 109, and Tivnan, The Lobby, p. 51.

25. William Stivers, America's Confrontation with Revolutionary Change in the Middle East, 1948–83 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), pp. 38–42.

26. Zaha Bustami, "The Kennedy-Johnson Administrations and the Palestinian People," in U.S. Policy on Palestine from Wilson to Clinton, ed. Michael W. Suleiman (Normal, Ill.: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1995), p. 115.

27. Ibid., pp. 114–116, and Shadid, The United States and the Palestinians, pp. 68–69.

28. Bustami, "The Kennedy-Johnson Administrations," pp. 113–114.

29. Tivnan, The Lobby, pp. 53–54, 56, and Melman and Raviv, Friends in Deed, p. 100.

30. Quoted in Bustami, "The Kennedy-Johnson Administrations," p. 114, and Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 99. Kennedy frequently said in speeches that because he felt an emotional attachment to his own ancestral homeland, Ireland, he fully understood the attachment of U.S. Jews to Israel. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 95.

31. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, pp. 99–100, and Melman and Raviv, Friends in Deed, p. 101.

32. See Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, pp. 107–109, for background on the Hawk sale.

33. See Melman and Raviv, Friends in Deed, pp. 95–104, for a description of the discovery of the nuclear complex and U.S.-Israeli discussions about it. When confronted, Israel acknowledged building a reactor and claimed it was for research purposes only, although certain aspects of the construction refuted this contention. Israel has never officially acknowledged possessing nuclearweapons capability and now employs a standard evasion—that it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the region. The United States did secure a promise from Israel that it would permit Americans to inspect the Dimona facility, but some Israelis have openly acknowledged that they deceived the U.S. inspection team. Eban has said that the Israelis built false walls, concealed doorways and elevators, and constructed dummy installations when the inspectors arrived so that they would find no evidence of weapons production. Ibid., p. 103.

34. A former CIA official who asked to remain anonymous recalls that "to the intelligence community the evidence was in controvertible that Israel had

35. Cited in Andrew Cockburn and Leslie Cockburn, Dangerous Liaison: The Inside Story of the U.S.-Israeli Covert Relationship (New York: Harper-Collins, 1991), p. 90.

36. Ibid.

37. Quoted in Kenen, Israel's Defense Line, p. 173.

38. Tivnan, The Lobby, p. 59, and Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 128.

39. Merle Miller, Lyndon: An Oral Biography (New York: Putnam, 1980), p. 477.

40. Tivnan, The Lobby, pp. 59–60.

41. See William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution; and Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 576, note 42; and Eugene V. Rostow "Resolution 242—a Historical Perspective," in Can Israel Survive a Palestinian State? ed. Michael Widlanski (Jerusalem: Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, 1990), pp. 98–109.

42. Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 43, 56, 61, and 515, note 56; Neff, Fallen Pil lars, p. 139; Donald Neff, Warriors for Jerusalem: The Six Days That Changed the Middle East in 1967 (Brattleboro, Vt.: Amana Books, 1988), pp. 235–236, 307; Tivnan, The Lobby, p. 67; and Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 156.

43. Published as Eugene V. Rostow, "Israel in the Evolution of American Foreign Policy," in The Palestine Question in American History, ed. Clark M. Clifford, Eugene V. Rostow, and Barbara W. Tuchman (New York: Arno Press, 1978), pp. 46–104. A version of Rostow's presentation at this symposium was also published as "The American Stake in Israel," Commentary, April 1977, 32–46.

44. Quandt, Peace Process, p. 377, and untitled article by Eugene V. Rostow in Approaching Peace: American Interests in Israeli-Palestinian Final Status Talks, ed. Robert Satloff (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1994), pp. 37–40.

45. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, pp. 126–127, 140; and Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 38–40.

46. Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presi dency, 1963–1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 293; Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, pp. 139, 141; Miller, Lyndon, p. 481; and Quandt, Peace Process, p. 37. See Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 25–48, for a comprehensive description of U.S. actions in the crisis period leading up to the outbreak of war on June 5, 1967. Quandt concludes that as the crisis went on, Johnson's admonition to Israel turned from a "red light" on launching a preemptive attack to a "yellow light" that clearly signaled acquiescence to Israel's

47. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 129.

48. Ibid., pp. 123–124.

49. Quoted in Bernard Reich, The United States and Israel: Influence in the Special Relationship (New York: Praeger, 1984), p. 206.

50. Miller, Lyndon, pp. 477–478.

51. Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation, pp. 100–104. The remark about the difficulty of dealing with Nasser is by Malcolm Kerr.

52. Neff, Warriors for Jerusalem, pp. 102–103.

53. Johnson, The Vantage Point, pp. 303–304.

54. Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation, p. 38.

55. Ibid., p. 40, and Bustami, "The Kennedy-Johnson Administrations," pp. 113, 126.

56. Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 21–35.

57. The term myth of Arabism is used in Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, pp. 184–185.

58. See Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 54–56, and Neff, Warriors for Jerusa lem, pp. 235–237.

59. The withdrawal clause of the resolution deliberately omitted the definite article from in front of "territories" in order to leave the extent of the required withdrawal ambiguous.

60. Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p. 433.

61. For a description of the impact of the Holocaust on Israelis, before and since the Eichmann trial, see Tom Segev, The Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust, trans. Haim Watzman (New York: Hill & Wang, 1993).

62. Marc H. Ellis, Beyond Innocence and Redemption: Confronting the Holocaust and Israeli Power: Creating a Moral Future for the Jewish People (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1990), p. 2.

63. Suleiman, "American Public Support," p. 20.

64. Eban, Personal Witness, p. 314.

65. Segev, The Seventh Million, pp. 353, 425.

66. Ibid., pp. 389–390, 392.

67. Tivnan, The Lobby, p. 63; Melman and Raviv, Friends in Deed, pp. 136, 139; and Reich, The United States and Israel, p. 196.

68. Suleiman, "American Public Support," p. 18.

69. Barrie Dunsmore, "Television Hard News and the Middle East," in The American Media and the Arabs, ed. Michael C. Hudson and Ronald G. Wolfe (Washington, D.C.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1980), p. 74, and Melman and Raviv, Friends in Deed, pp. 365–366.

70. Ellis, Beyond Innocence and Redemption, pp. 2–15.

71. Cited in ibid., p. 195, note 21.

72. Interview with a Palestinian American who asked to remain anonymous.

73. UN official George F. Kossaifi, in The Palestinian Refugees and the Right of Return, Information Paper 7 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, 1996), pp. 4–7, estimates the numbers of refugees from the West Bank at 148,000 and from Gaza at 87,000, and gives differing estimates from a number of other sources. Neff, Warriors for Jerusalem, pp. 320–321, gives the figures as 178,000 from the West Bank and 38,000 from Gaza.

74. Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p. 426.

75. Ibid., p. 464.

1. Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 65–66, and Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), pp. 50–51, 563–564.

2. Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 347, 351, 564.

3. For a description of the differences between the global and the regional approaches to foreign policy, see Charles F. Doran, "The Globalist-Regionalist Debate," in Intervention into the 1990s: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Third World, ed. Peter J. Schraeder (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1992), pp. 55–71.

4. Parker, The Politicsof Miscalculation, p. 156, and Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 354, 368–369.

5. Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 73–74; and Donald Neff, "Nixon's Middle East Policy: From Balance to Bias," in U.S. Policy on Palestine from Wilson to Clinton, ed. Michael W. Suleiman (Normal, Ill.: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1995), pp. 142–143.

6. Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p. 477, and Kissinger, White House Years, p. 348.

7. Nixon, RN, p. 479; Kissinger, White House Years, p. 372; and Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 80, 83.

8. For a discussion of the situation in Jordan in 1970, see Cobban, The Pal estinian Liberation Organisation, pp. 48–52; Alan Hart, Arafat: A Political Biography (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), pp. 284–323; and Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 98–108.

9. Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 98–108.

10. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 594, and Nixon, RN, p. 483.

11. Hart, Arafat, pp. 277–281, 355; Quandt, Peace Process, p. 112; and Neff, Fallen Pillars, p. 175.

12. Nixon, RN, p. 483.

13. Ibid., pp. 283, 481, 786; Neff, "Nixon's Middle East Policy," p. 133; Quandt, Peace Process, p. 524, note 2; and Melman and Raviv, Friends in Deed, p. 148.

14. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 179; Neff, "Nixon's Middle East Policy," pp. 157–158, note 3; and Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), pp. 202–203.

15. Nixon, RN, p. 481. Emphasis in original.

16. Ibid., p. 249.

17. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 341.

18. Edward R. F. Sheehan, The Arabs, Israelis and Kissinger: A Secret His tory of American Diplomacy in the Middle East (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1976), p. 173, and Tivnan, The Lobby, p. 87.

19. Kerr, America's Middle East Policy, p. 14.

20. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 342.

21. Quandt, Peace Process, p. 115.

22. Ibid., pp. 118–119, 146–147, and Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Con flict, p. 211.

23. Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1991), pp. 209–210, and Cockburn and Cockburn, Dangerous Liaison, pp. 76–77.

24. Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 119–120, and Mansour, Beyond Alliance, pp. 104–105.

25. Neff, "Nixon's Middle East Policy," p. 158, note 14, and Ian Williams, "The US Veto in a Changing World," Middle East International, 2 May 1997, 11.

26. Tillman, The United States in the Middle East, p. 52.

27. Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 1276–1280, 1295–1300.

28. Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 114, 116.

29. Quoted in Melman and Raviv, Friends in Deed, p. 157. Emphasis in original.

30. Suleiman, "American Public Support," p. 15.

31. Tivnan, The Lobby, p. 72.

32. Kenen, Israel's Defense Line, p. 109.

33. Mark H. Milstein, "Strategic Ties or Tentacles? Institute for National Security Affairs," Washington Report for Middle East Affairs, October 1991, 27–28. Emphasis added.

34. Ibid.

35. State Department statements in October 1970 on the Palestinian issue are cited in Quandt, Peace Process, p. 535, note 2, and Shadid, The United States and the Palestinians, p. 96.

36. The administration deliberately skirted the Palestinian issue during the two U.S.-Soviet summits in 1972 and 1973. See Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 1247–1248, 1494, and Quandt, Peace Process, p. 143.

37. Sunday Times of London, 15 June 1969.

38. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 759, 786, 1248–1249, and Sheehan, The Arabs, Israelis and Kissinger, p. 108.

39. Sheehan, The Arabs, Israelis and Kissinger, p. 135.

40. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 624–629.

41. The arrangement worked satisfactorily until 1979, when Fatah's intelligence chief, Ali Hassan Salamah, who enforced the agreement by tracking down suspected Palestinian terrorists and warning the CIA and Western governments about planned terrorist operations, was assassinated in Beirut, probably by Israeli agents. For the story of this PLO contact with the United States, see David Ignatius, "PLO Operative, Slain Reputedly by Israelis, Had Been Helping U.S.," Wall Street Journal, 10 February 1983, and David Ignatiusand Tewfik Mishlawi, "PLO Strife Poses Problem for U.S., Moderate Arabs," Wall Street Journal, 6 June 1983.

42. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 1036–1037.

43. Ibid., pp. 624–625, 1036.

44. Ibid., p. 624.

45. Ibid., p. 1037.

46. Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 201–202.

47. Ibid., pp. 217–218, 226–227.

48. Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, pp. 485–486.

49. Quoted in Lawrence I. Conrad, ed., The Formation and Perception of the Modern Arab World: Studies by Marwan R. Buheiry (Princeton, N.J.: Darwin Press, 1989), pp. 359, 361.

50. Tillman, The United States in the Middle East, p. 212.

51. Ibid., pp. 211–212.

52. Harold H. Saunders and Cecilia Albin, Sinai II: The Politics of Interna tional Mediation, 1974–1975, FPI Case Study 17 (Washington, D.C.: School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 1993), p. 84, and George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East, p. 152.

53. Saunders and Albin, Sinai II, p. 35.

54. Quandt, Peace Process, p. 251.

55. See Gerald R. Ford, A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford (New York: Harper & Row and Reader's Digest Association, 1979).

56. Saunders and Albin, Sinai II, p. 34.

57. Ford, A Time to Heal, pp. 245, 286–288.

58. Quandt, Peace Process, p. 237; Sheehan, The Arabs, Israelis and Kissin ger, p. 167; Ford, A Time to Heal, p. 286; and Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 221.

59. Sheehan, The Arabs, Israelisand Kissinger, p. 176; Ford, ATimeto Heal, p. 245; and Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 237–238.

60. Interview with Harold Saunders, 13 October 1997.

61. Cited in Shadid, The United States and the Palestinians, p, 89.

62. Sheehan, The Arabs, Israelis and Kissinger, pp. 167–168.

63. Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation, p. 114.

64. Saunders credits Congressman Lee Hamilton, then chairman of the

65. U.S. Department of State, "Department Gives Position on Palestinian Issue," Department of State Bulletin 73 (1 December 1975): 797–800, contains the full text of the Saunders statement.

66. Saunders and Albin, Sinai II, p. 87, and Saunders, The Other Walls, p. 9.

67. Saunders, The Other Walls, p. 9, and Quandt, Peace Process, p. 244.

68. Quandt, Decade of Decisions, p. vii.

69. Interview with Saunders.

70. Cited in Shadid, The United Statesandthe Palestinians, pp. 90–91. Also see these pages for an earlier speech in the Senate by Oregon's Mark Hatfield showing an unusual degree of understanding of the origins of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

71. Georgie Anne Geyer, "The American Correspondent in the Arab World," in The American Media and the Arabs, ed. Michael C. Hudson and Ronald G. Wolfe (Washington, D.C.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1980), pp. 65–66.

72. Ibid., p. 67.

73. Dunsmore, "Television Hard News and the Middle East," p. 74.

74. Ibid., p. 75.

75. Ibid., pp. 74–75.

76. Geyer, "The American Correspondent," pp. 68, 70.

77. Arthur Fromkin, cited in William J. Drummond and Augustine Zycher, "Arafat's Press Agents," Harper's, March 1976, 24–27.

78. Cited in William R. Brown, "The Dying Arab Nation," Foreign Policy, spring 1984, 42.

79. Bernard Lewis, "The Palestinians and the PLO," Commentary, January 1975, 32–48.

80. Ibid., p. 40.

81. Hisham Sharabi, "A Look Ahead: The Future State of Palestine," in The Palestinians: New Directions, ed. Michael C. Hudson (Washington, D.C.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1990), pp. 155–156.

82. Saunders, The Other Walls, p. 12.

1. Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirsofa President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), pp. 273–275.

2. Harold Saunders, talk on presidents at Hofstra University (15–17 November 1990), rebroadcast by C-SPAN, 24 December 1992.

3. The quote is from Jim Wooten, "The Conciliator," New York Times Magazine, 29 January 1995, p. 28. Emphasis in original. Other insights in this and

4. Quandt, Peace Process, p. 259.

5. Reich, The United States and Israel, p. 45; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 91; and interview with William Quandt, 12 May 1991.

6. Wooten, "The Conciliator."

7. Interview with Harold Saunders, 13 October 1997.

8. Interview with William Quandt, 13 June 1997.

9. Asked during an interview with the Jerusalem Post in September 1977 to define what he meant by "homeland," Carter called it a "place for people to live." See Shadid, The United States and the Palestinians, p. 134.

10. Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 277.

11. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 21–22.

12. Samuel W. Lewis, "The United States and Israel: Constancy and Change," in The Middle East: Ten Years after Camp David, ed. William B. Quandt (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1988), pp. 226–227.

13. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israel Conflict, p. 316, made a similar observation, noting that Carter and his aides had difficulty understanding the "yearnings and fears" of the U.S. Jewish community. Spiegel apparently did not consider it necessary for Carter to understand Palestinian "yearnings and fears."

14. Saunders, Hofstra University talk.

15. Jimmy Carter, The Blood of Abraham: Insights into the Middle East (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985), pp. 115–129.

16. See, for instance, Shadid, The United States and the Palestinians, pp. 138–139, 141.

17. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 65–68, 74; Vance, Hard Choices, p. 35; and Lewis, "The United States and Israel," p. 228.

18. Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. 51–52, and Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 18, 22, 64–65.

19. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 84.

20. Interview with Quandt, 13 June 1997.

21. Zbigniew Brzezinski, François Duchêne, and Kiichi Saeki, "Peace in an International Framework," Foreign Policy, summer 1975, 3–17.

22. Toward Peace in the Middle East, Report of a Study Group (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1975). Highlights of the Brookings report conclusion are cited in Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 85–86, and in Quandt, Decade of Decisions, pp. 290–292.

23. Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 560–561, note 1, and Saunders, Hofstra University talk.

24. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 77, and interview with Quandt, 12 May 1991.

25. The information on Vance in this and the following paragraph is taken from Quandt, Camp David, pp. 34–35; Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 27–29, 163–167; and interviews with Quandt, 13 June 1997, and Saunders.

26. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 34–35.

27. Janice J. Terry, "The Carter Administration and the Palestinians," in U.S. Policyon Palestinefrom Wilsonto Clinton, ed. Michael W. Suleiman(Normal, Ill.: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1995), pp. 172–173, note 8.

28. Ibid., pp. 164–165, 169–170; Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 327; and Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 438. Some pro-Israeli historians and commentators have characterized Carter's administration as lacking any senior official who advocated Israel's position or regarded Israel as a valuable ally. See particularly Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, pp. 326–327. The view that no pro-Israeli official had any impact on policy seriously underestimates the effectiveness of the several pro-Israeli officials described.

29. Quandt, Camp David, p. 5. See pp. 6–29 for Quandt's analysis of the political constraints under which Carter operated in making Middle East policy.

30. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 51, 88, and Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 169–170.

31. Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 169–170, and Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. 280–281.

32. Terry, "The Carter Administration," p. 164.

33. Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 282; Brzezinski, Powerand Principle, p. 24; and Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 174–176.

34. Vance, Hard Choices, p. 184.

35. Ibid., pp. 180–182, and Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 291.

36. Carter, Saunders, and Quandt all acknowledge being misled by Begin. Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 300; Eric Silver, Begin: The Haunted Prophet (New York: Random House, 1984), p. 181; and Quandt, Camp David, pp. 82–84.

37. Silver, Begin, p. 168.

38. Tivnan, The Lobby, pp. 107–110.

39. Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. 289, 292, and Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 96–97.

40. Tivnan, The Lobby, pp. 110–112.

41. Ibid., p. 113.

42. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 98.

43. Tivnan, The Lobby, pp. 118–119, 124.

44. Ibid., p. 109. Ironically, when the National Security Council staff asked the Israeli embassy for information on Begin in preparation for his first visit, the embassy sent to the White House a newly published, favorable portrait of the new prime minister entitled Terror out of Zion. See ibid., p. 115. In the late

45. Tillman, The United States in the Middle East, pp. 192–193.

46. Ibid., p. 194.

47. See The Jerusalem Post International Edition, 7 and 14 November 1987. A decade and a half after it had begun to acknowledge that Israel used "extreme physical and psychological pressures," the State Department was still, into the 1990s, shying away from using the word torture. Even Amnesty International did not use the word with regard to Israel until its 1990 report. Stanley Cohen, "Talking about Torture in Israel," Tikkun, November/December 1991, 24.

48. Suleiman, "American Public Support," p. 18.

49. Melman and Raviv, Friends in Deed, p. 215.

50. Quandt, Camp David, p. 81, and interview with Quandt, 12 May 1991.

51. Secretary of Defense Brown began a secret strategic dialogue in 1978 with his Israeli counterpart Ezer Weizman and as part of this exercise asked for assessments of the changing balance of power around the world. One official who worked on Middle East aspects was Dennis Ross, then a junior State Department official who would later become a key Middle East policymaker in the Bush and Clinton administrations. A proponent of Israel's strategic importance, Ross urged strengthened contacts between Tel Aviv and Washington but got nowhere during Carter's administration. See Melman and Raviv, Friends in Deed, p. 229.

52. Quandt, Camp David, pp. 85–87.

53. Tillman, The United States in the Middle East, pp. 212–213.

54. Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p. 498.

55. Kissinger himself testified before Congress immediately after concluding the Sinai II agreement, to which this and other promises to Israel were addenda, that the addenda were not binding commitments of the United States but could be altered if circumstances changed. In addition, in a report on the Panama Canal Treaty issued in 1978, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee concluded that because the president has exclusive constitutional authority to negotiate with foreign entities, he may voluntarily commit himself not to negotiate but may not circumscribe the right of a successor to enter negotiations. See Tillman, The United States in the Middle East, p. 224.

56. Interview with Quandt, 13 June 1997.

57. Interview with Nicholas Veliotes, 17 March 1998. Harold Saunders, who was involved in negotiating the Sinai II agreement and its codicils, has said that U.S. negotiators deliberately diluted this pledge in order to leave a door open to "an exchange of views in case it became necessary—for example, in moving backtoa Geneva Conference—to work out understandings with the PLOabout its participation and about its negotiating position." Saunders and Albin, Sinai II, p. 84.

58. Tillman, The United States in the Middle East, p. 211.

59. Quandt, Camp David, pp. 87–91, and Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 187–

60. Quandt, Camp David, p. 101, and Vance, Hard Choices, p. 187.

61. Quandt, Camp David, p. 94, note 34.

62. Ibid., pp. 101–102.

63. Ibid.

64. Quandt has said that when Arafat responded to the compromise proposal carried by Bolling with demands the United States could not possibly meet, including a demand for a guarantee that a PLO-led independent state would result from negotiations, Brzezinski finally lost patience with the PLO. He concluded that Arafat was not being serious, and the incident caused many in the administration to view the PLO as untrustworthy. Interview with Quandt, 13 June 1997.

65. See Quandt, Camp David, pp. 104–134, for a complete review of the negotiations and preparations for Geneva in September and October 1977, including the ill-fated U.S.-Soviet joint communiqué of October 1. The joint communiqué expressed the U.S. and Soviet interest in achieving a comprehensive peace settlement, via a Geneva conference, that would resolve all issues, including assuring the "legitimate rights" of the Palestinian people, and that would incorporate all parties to the conflict, including representatives of the Palestinians. Opposition to the communiqué from Israel and Israeli supporters in the United States was so strong that the United States backed away from it within days of its issuance.

66. Shadid, The United States and the Palestinians, p. 144, and Tillman, The United States in the Middle East, p. 225.

67. Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 302.

68. Quandt, Camp David, pp. 160–161.

69. Tillman, The United States in the Middle East, pp. 59–60, 221.

70. Quandt, Camp David, pp. 95, 322.

71. Former Israeli Prime Minister Rabin told political scientist Steven Spiegel in an interview that he believed Carter would have involved the PLO in the negotiating process had it not been for the Sinai II commitment. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 474, note 342.

72. Quandt, Camp David, pp. 155–156, 168.

73. Ibid., pp. 168–169, and Vance, Hard Choices, p. 199.

74. Quandt, Camp David, pp. 193–194.

75. Ibid., pp. 162, 204.

76. Ibid., p. 183, and Vance, Hard Choices, p. 209.

77. Quandt, Camp David, p. 204.

78. See ibid., chs. 10–12 and Appendixes D—I, for a summation of Camp David and its aftermath, as well as texts of the various preliminary and final agreements and of the treaty.

79. Ibid., pp. 261, 322–323.

80. Ibid., p. 265.

81. Tillman, The United States in the Middle East, pp. 216–218.

82. Ibid., p. 197, and Harold H. Saunders, "An Israeli-Palestinian Peace," Foreign Affairs, fall 1982, 117.

83. Ann Mosely Lesch, Political Perceptions of the Palestinians on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1980), pp. 6–16

84. Interview with Veliotes.

85. Quandt, Camp David, p. 323.

86. This is the conclusion of Quandt in ibid., p. 323.

87. Ibid., p. 321.

88. Saunders, The Other Walls, pp. 60–62.

89. Ibid.

90. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 279–280.

91. Ibid., pp. 438–440.

92. Vance believed, as he stated in a speech to the UN shortly after the Camp David accords, that no peace agreement would be "just or secure" if it did not resolve the Palestinian issue in such a way as to assure the Palestinians "that they and their descendants can live with dignity and freedom and have the opportunity for economic fulfillment and for political expression." Cited in Quandt, Camp David, p. 289. In January 1979 Vance proposed to Carter that the United States initiate contacts with the PLO in the hope of generating momentum, but the suggestion was treated with near derision by Carter's political aides. Later in the year, Vance, who had always been one of the administration's strongest opponents of Israeli settlement construction, repeatedly urged Carter to show firmness by publicly condemning the settlements and approving reductions in economic aid each time the Israelis built a new settlement. Carter, already disengaged, would not go along and ultimately became irritated with what he characterized as Vance's "dogged" pursuit of the settlements issue. Vance had noticeably lost influence with Carter in Middle East matters when Strauss and later Linowitz assumed the negotiating portfolio. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 278, 440–441.

93. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 442–443.

94. Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 328–329, and Reich, The United States and Israel, pp. 78–79.

95. Melman and Raviv, Friends in Deed, pp. 179–180.

96. Cited in Steve Bell, "American Journalism: Practices, Constraints, and Middle East Reportage," in The American Media and the Arabs, ed. Michael C. Hudson and Ronald G. Wolfe (Washington, D.C.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1980), p. 99.

97. John Weisman, "Blind Spot in the Middle East," TV Guide, 24 October 1981, 8.

98. Time, 14 April 1980.

99. Ibid.

100. Ibid., and Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, pp. 521, 523, 531.

1. Lewis, "The United States and Israel," p. 227.

2. Quoted in Quandt, Peace Process, p. 338.

3. Quoted in William Safire, "Reagan on Israel," New York Times, 24 March 1980.

4. Wolf Blitzer, Between Washington and Jerusalem: A Reporter's Note book (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 238–239, 244.

5. Lewis, "The United States and Israel," p. 227.

6. Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), pp. 407, 463.

7. Strobe Talbott, "What to Do about Israel," Time, 7 September 1981, 18–20.

8. See Leon T. Hadar, "The ‘Neocons’: From the Cold War to the ‘Global Intifada,’" Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, April 1991, 27–28, and Michael Lind, Up from Conservatism: Why the Right Is Wrong for America (New York: Free Press, 1996), pp. 55–56, 61, for a description of the rise of and the beliefs espoused by neoconservatism. See Leon T. Hadar, "Reforming Israel—before It's Too Late," Foreign Policy, winter 1990–1991, 109, for a further description of neoconservative views on Israel.

9. Hadar, "The ‘Neocons.’"

10. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1984), pp. 26, 170–171, and Juliana S. Peck, The Rea gan Administration and the Palestinian Question: The First Thousand Days (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984), p. 15.

11. Quoted in Peck, The Reagan Administration, p. 15, and Reich, The United States and Israel, p. 93.

12. Melman and Raviv, Friends in Deed, pp. 197, 200–205.

13. Gates, From the Shadows, pp. 201, 250, 286.

14. Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981–1987 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), pp. 160–161, 216–217.

15. Tivnan, The Lobby, p. 142.

16. Churba, who died in 1996, was a long-time friend of Rabbi Meir Kahane, founder of the militantly pro-Israeli and anti-Palestinian Jewish Defense League in the United States and of its Israeli counterpart, Kach. While working as an intelligence analyst for the Air Force, Churba propounded a strongly pro-Israeli position. In 1976, while still an Air Force employee, he released to the New York Times an unpublished research paper he had written arguing that Israel was a strategic asset. As a result of his unauthorized release of a classified paper, his highest security clearances were revoked, and he left the Air Force.

17. Peck, The Reagan Administration, p. 14. Reagan himself apparently took some of his cues from Churba. In 1977, after leaving the Air Force, Churba had written another book, The Politics of Defeat: America's Decline in the Middle East, in which he spoke of "the conflict and tension endemic to the region. This condition is traceable largely to the sectarian and fragmented nature of Middle East society." In August 1979, Reagan published an op-ed article in the Washington Post so similarly worded as to suggest is was ghost-written by Churba. Reagan wrote, "The Carter administration has yet to grasp that in this region conflict and tension are endemic, a condition traceable largely to the fragmented sectarian nature of Middle Eastern society." Quandt discovered this near identity of wording; Peace Process, p. 565, note 1.

18. Milstein, "Strategic Ties or Tentacles?" Stephen Bryen was investigated by the FBI in 1978, when an official of an Arab American organization alleged that he had overheard Bryen, then a Senate staffer, offering classified military information to a visiting Israeli official at a coffee shop in Washington. Bryen denied the charge, and when he was appointed to the Defense Department in 1981, Secretary of Defense Weinberger personally directed an investigation that cleared him. See ibid., and Melman and Raviv, Friends in Deed, pp. 286–287.

19. Safire, "Reagan on Israel," and Haig, Caveat, p. 334.

20. See Peck, The Reagan Administration, pp. 32–35, and Safire, "Reagan on Israel," for Rostow's legal justification of Israel's occupation and settlement construction and for Reagan's early statements on Israeli settlements. For the State Department's position, see David A. Korn, Letter to the Editor, New York Times, 1 October 1991.

21. New York Times, 3 February 1981.

22. Peck, The Reagan Administration, pp. 16–17.

23. Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Dishonoring Sadat," New Republic, 11 November 1981, 14–16. Kirkpatrick has remained extremely hostile to the PLO and supportive of Israel's Likud governments since leaving office. Rejecting the PLO's conciliatory moves since 1988, she has charged that the organization still seeks Israel's destruction; she has encouraged Israeli settlement construction in the West Bank and Gaza and has not seen the settlements as posing an impediment to peace. See, for instance, Jeane Kirkpatrick, "How the PLO Was Legitimized," Commentary, July 1989, 21–28. See also the dissents she made as one of the drafters of a 1997 report on the U.S. role in the peace process, in Presidential Study Group, Building for Security and Peace in the Middle East: An Ameri can Agenda (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1997), pp. 4 and 35.

24. Cited in Ronald J. Young, Missed Opportunities for Peace: U.S. Middle East Policies, 1981–1986 (Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee, 1987), pp. 20–21.

25. Hermann Frederick Eilts, "The United States and Egypt," in The Middle

26. Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, pp. 548–552, 564–568.

27. Peck, The Reagan Administration, p. 29.

28. Bernard Gwertzman, "Reagan Administration Held 9-Month Talks with P.L.O.," New York Times, 19 February 1984, and interview with Nicholas Veliotes, 17 March 1998.

29. Gwertzman, "Reagan Administration."

30. Haig, Caveat, p. 335. Haig says he told General Sharon that "unless there was an internationally recognized provocation, and unless Israeli retaliation was proportionate to any such provocation, an attack by Israel into Lebanon would have a devastating effect in the United States." Sharon responded, according to Haig, that no one had the right to tell Israel how to defend its people. The notion that Haig had given Sharon a "green light" was first raised by Israeli journalist Ze'ev Schiff in "The Green Light," Foreign Policy, spring 1983, and in considerably greater detail by Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari in Is rael's Lebanon War, trans. Ina Friedman (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), pp. 62–77.

31. Interview with Nicholas Veliotes, 2 May 1991. For an analysis of Israel's objectives in Lebanon, including the restoration of Christian Phalangist power there and the destruction of the PLO, see Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, pp. 580–582.

32. Schiff and Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War, pp. 65–69.

33. Inside administration councils at the beginning of the war, Haig, Kirkpatrick, and Casey all maintained that the invasion was a justifiable act of selfdefense by Israel, arguing down suggestions from Vice President George Bush and Defense Secretary Weinberger that the United States should impose sanctions against Israel for using U.S.-supplied weapons in an act of aggression. See Howard Teicher and Gayle Radley Teicher, Twin Pillars to Desert Storm: America's Flawed Vision in the Middle East from Nixon to Bush (New York: Morrow, 1993), p. 204.

34. Melman and Raviv, Friends in Deed, pp. 216, 487.

35. Rashid Khalidi, Under Siege: P.L.O. Decisionmaking during the 1982 War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 172

36. Kathleen Christison, "The Arab-Israeli Policy of George Shultz," Journal of Palestine Studies 70 (winter 1989): 38.

37. Interview with Veliotes, 17 March 1998.

38. Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 344–345. The texts of Reagan's speech and of talking points sent to Prime Minister Begin appear in Appendix H, pp. 476–485.

39. Letter from Walid Khalidi, 12 December 1989.

40. Schiff and Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War, p. 294.

41. George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Scribner, 1993), p. 65.

42. Thomas A. Dine, "Achievements and Advances in the United States-Israel Relationship,"addresstothe AIPAC Conference, May 17, 1987, reprinted in Journal of Palestine Studies 64 (summer 1987): 99–100.

43. Peck, The Reagan Administration, pp. 89–90.

44. William B. Quandt, "Reagan's Lebanon Policy: Trial and Error," Middle East Journal, spring 1984, 241–242. The full article, pp. 237–266, provides an analysis of the background to and the consequences of the U.S. involvement in Lebanon from 1982 to 1984.

45. Peck, The Reagan Administration, pp. 90, 93–94.

46. Ibid., pp. 94–99; William B. Quandt, "U.S. Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict," in The Middle East: Ten Years after Camp David, ed. William B. Quandt (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1988), p. 366; and Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, pp. 621–622.

47. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 423.

48. Peck, The Reagan Administration, pp. 91–92. The Fez Plan grew out of an initiative proposed more than a year earlier by Saudi Crown Prince Fahd. In August 1981, Fahd enunciated eight principles as guidelines for a comprehensive peace settlement, including the major provisions later incorporated into the Fez Plan. The United States failed to encourage the Fahd initiative, claiming it was largely a restatement of previous Saudi positions and emphasizing the points with which it could not agree. Saudi Arabia submitted the plan to an Arab summit meeting in Morocco in November 1981, but the Arab world was badly divided at the time and the meeting broke up almost immediately. Ibid., pp. 39–41, and Reich, The United States and Israel, p. 104.

49. Walid Khalidi, The Middle East Postwar Environment (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991), p. 25 (emphasis in original), and Peck, The Reagan Administration, p. 92.

50. Teicher and Teicher, Twin Pillars, p. 213; Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 100; and New York Times, 23 October 1982.

51. Quoted in Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p. 826, note 5.

52. "When Push Comes to Shove," Time, 16 August 1982, p. 11, and Neff, Fallen Pillars, p. 122.

53. Interview with a former official who asked to remain anonymous.

54. For details on this policy, see testimony before a House subcommittee by Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, 14 December 1987, reprinted in the Journal of Palestine Studies 67 (spring 1988): 198–201.

55. Richard Murphy, "United States Policy in the Middle East," in Proceedings of the Washington Institute Policy Forum, 1988 (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1988), p. 12.

56. Interview with the Palestinian American, 11 April 1989.

57. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, pp. 105–106, 110.

58. Khalidi, Under Siege, p. 171. PLO concern to assure the safety of Palestinian noncombatants was acute in light of the massacre of hundreds of civilians by Lebanese Christian forces at the Palestinian refugee camp of Tal al-Za'atar in Beirut at the height of the Lebanon civil war in 1976. PLO leaders negotiating the PLO withdrawal in 1982 were specifically concerned to avoid a repeat of the earlier massacre. Ibid., p. 169.

59. Fisk, Pity the Nation, pp. 368–370. Emphasis in original.

60. Newsweek, 27 September and 4 October 1982, and Time, 27 September and 4 October 1982. Newsweek's treatment was highlighted in Fisk, Pity the Nation, p. 401. Also "The Horror, and the Shame," New York Times, 21 September 1982; "The Latest Horror," Wall Street Journal, 21 September 1982; and"Dilemmaof Imperfect Freedom," Wall Street Journal, 24 September 1982.

61. Fisk, Pity the Nation, pp. 370–371.

62. Ibid., p. 366.

63. For descriptions of U.S. policy miscalculations in Lebanon between September 1982 and February 1984, when the U.S. Marine contingent withdrew, see Quandt, "Reagan's Lebanon Policy," pp. 241–250, and Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation, pp. 182–211. The United States was first drawn into Lebanon by Israel's invasion. After the assassination of Bashir Gemayel and the Sabra and Shatila massacre, Israel persuaded the administration to put aside its peace initiative in order to focus attention again on Lebanon. When Shultz himself intervened in 1983 to arrange the final details of an accord intended to bring about the withdrawal of both Israeli and Syrian forces in Lebanon, he dealt with the Israelis but failed to negotiate terms with Syria and ignored the warnings of the U.S. ambassador in Damascus that Syrian President Asad would attempt to undermine any agreement concluded between Israel and Lebanon. The result was as predicted; influenced by Syria, Lebanon abrogated the Israeli-Lebanese treaty only months after it was signed in May 1983. The U.S. Marines became deeply embroiled in Lebanon's sectarian violence in September 1983 after Israel, finding itself in the middle of civil strife among Lebanese factions, pulled its forces out of the mountains above Beirut. This retreat left the Marines with no buffer against attack by local militias increasingly opposed to the U.S. presence and to the Israeli-Lebanese accord. In October, a month after the Marines, still technically a peacekeeping force, began exchanging gunfire with Lebanese factions, the Marine barracks was bombed by pro-Iranian elements allied with Syria, with the loss of 241 U.S. military personnel.

64. Christison, "The Arab-Israeli Policy of George Shultz," p. 39.

65. Melman and Raviv, Friends in Deed, p. 232.

66. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 441.

67. Teicher and Teicher, Twin Pillars, pp. 221–224.

68. Ibid., pp. 273–274

69. David K. Shipler, "On Middle East Policy, a Major Influence," New York Times, 6 July 1987.

70. See Tivnan, The Lobby, pp. 135–161, for a description of AIPAC strategy and maneuvering during the AWACS fight.

71. Shipler, "On Middle East Policy."

72. Ibid., and Tivnan, The Lobby, pp. 176–177, 180.

73. Melman and Raviv, Friends in Deed, p. 248.

74. Ibid.; Robert Pear and Richard L. Berke, "Pro-Israel Group Exerts Quiet Might as It Rallies Supporters in Congress," New York Times, 7 July 1987; Shipler, "On Middle East Policy"; Mansour, Beyond Alliance, p. 242; and Dine, "Achievements and Advances," pp. 95–106.

75. Blitzer, Between Washington and Jerusalem, p. 117.

76. Shipler, "On Middle East Policy."

77. This lament was recalled by a one-time AIPAC staffer writing in the Washington Post in 1986, who boasted that State Department "Arabists" hardly received a hearing in Washington anymore. Cited in Neff, Fallen Pil lars, p. 123.

78. Shipler, "On Middle East Policy"; quote in Tivnan, The Lobby, p. 256.

79. Saunders, The Other Walls, p. 140.

80. Shimon Shamir, "Israeli Views of Egypt and the Peace Process: The Duality of Vision," in The Middle East: Ten Years after Camp David, ed. William B. Quandt (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1988), pp. 209–210, and Hadar, "Reforming Israel," p. 123.

81. Blitzer, Between Washington and Jerusalem, p. 106, and Young, Missed Opportunities, pp. 105–107.

82. See Friedman, "Selling Israel to America," 23–25, for details on the Hasbara Project.

83. Ibid., p. 24.

84. Ibid.

85. Quoted in Said, The Politics of Dispossession, p. 255.

86. Friedman, "Selling Israel to America," p. 22, and Weisman, "Blind Spot in the Middle East," p. 12.

87. Quoted in Weisman, "Blind Spot," p. 12.

88. One of the principal expositions of this line in the United States can be found in Daniel Pipes, "Is Jordan Palestine?" Commentary, October 1988, 35–42.

89. Peck, The Reagan Administration, pp. 16–17.

90. Joan Peters, From Time Immemorial: The Origins of the Arab-Jewish Conflict over Palestine (New York: Harper & Row, 1984).

91. Said, The Politics of Dispossession, p. 97. Emphasis in original.

92. The book was reviewed by Ronald Sanders in the New Republic (23 April 1984), Bernard Gwertzman in the New York Times (12 May 1984), John C. Campbell in the New York Times Book Review (13 May 1984), Daniel Pipes in Commentary (July 1984), Walter Reich in The Atlantic Monthly (July 1984), and journalist Sidney Zion in the National Review (5 October 1984).

93. Edward Said published an article in the Nation summarizing the few critical reviews published in the United States and some published in Europe. See the Journal of Palestine Studies 58 (winter 1986): 144–150, for a reprint of the review. The first and most thorough critical review, by Norman Finkelstein,

94. Yehoshua Porath, "Mrs. Peters's Palestine," New York Review of Books, 16 January 1986, 36–39. Interestingly, Porath's critical review is not listed— one must assume through inadvertence—anywhere in the 1986 edition of The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature, under either "Peters," "Porath," or "Palestine" or in the list of book reviews.

95. Erich Isaac and Rael Jean Isaac, "Whose Palestine?" Commentary, July 1986, 24–37.

96. Ronald Sanders, "Letting the Record Speak," New York Times Book Review, 4 September 1988, contains a dual review of Morris's 1987 book, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949, and Shlaim's 1988 book Collusion across the Jordan.

97. Kathleen Christison, "The Arab in Recent Popular Fiction," Middle East Journal, summer 1987, 410.

98. Edmund Ghareeb, Split Vision: The Portrayal of Arabs in the American Media (Washington, D.C.: American-Arab Affairs Council, 1983), p. 254.

99. Abuelkeshk, "A Portrayal," pp. 227–232.

100. Evensen, Truman, Palestine, and the Press, pp. 1–2.

101. Leon Wieseltier, "Summoned by Stones," New Republic, 14 March 1988, 24, 26.

102. Quoted in Friedman, "Selling Israel to America," p. 25. Emphasis added.

103. At a conference of Jewish journalists in Jerusalem in January 1985, he said, "The role of Jews who write in both the Jewish and the general press is to defend Israel, and not join in the attacks on Israel." Criticism, he said, "helps Israel's enemies—and they are legion in the U.S.—to say more and more openly that Israel is not a democratic country." Quoted in ibid., p. 21. Podhoretz did, however, become an outspoken critic of Israel when, under a Labor government, it signed a peace agreement with the PLO in September 1993. Dierdre Carmody, "Veteran Critic of the Left Is Ready to Step Aside," New York Times, 19 January 1995.

104. Norman Podhoretz, "J'Accuse," Commentary, September 1982, 21–31.

105. Friedman, "Selling Israel to America," p. 25; Robert Sherrill, "The New Regime at the New Republic," Columbia Journalism Review, March/April 1976, cited in Richard H. Curtiss, A Changing Image: American Perceptions of the Arab-Israeli Dispute (Washington, D.C.: American Educational Trust, 1986), p. 325. Peretz owned the left-wing magazine Ramparts until 1974 but reportedly sold it and bought the New Republic when Ramparts published an editorial critical of Israel.

106. George P. Shultz, "The Challenge to the Democracies," in Terrorism: How the West Can Win, ed. Benjamin Netanyahu (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1986), pp. 18–20. Emphasis in original.

107. Cited in Lord Caradon, "Images and Realities of the Middle East Conflict,"

108. Saunders, The Other Walls, pp. 139–140.

109. Fouad Moughrabi, "American Public Opinion and the Palestine Question," in Public Opinion and the Palestine Question, ed. Elia Zureik and Fouad Moughrabi (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), pp. 13–48.

110. Ibid., pp. 40–41.

111. Ibid., p. 46.

112. The revisionist, or so-called post-Zionist, historians include Benny Morris, Avi Shlaim, Ilan Pappé, Simcha Flapan, and Tom Segev, whose books were published in the United States between 1986 and 1988. For aspects of the historiographic debate and a discussion of the debate and its effects, see Benny Morris, "The New Historiography: Israel Confronts Its Past," Tikkun, November/December 1988, 19ff.; Shabtai Teveth, "Charging Israel with Original Sin," Commentary, September 1989, 24–33; Benny Morris, "The Eel and History: A Reply to Shabtai Teveth," Tikkun, January/February 1990, 19ff.; Norman Finkelstein, Nur Masalha, and Benny Morris, "Debate on the 1948 Exodus," Journal of Palestine Studies 81 (autumn 1991): 66–114; Shlaim, "The Debate about 1948"; and Ilan Pappé, "Critique and Agenda: The Post-Zionist Scholars in Israel," History & Memory: Studies in Representation of the Past (ed. Gulie Ne'eman Arad), spring/summer 1995, 66–90.

113. Pappé, "Critique and Agenda," p. 79, and Ilan Pappé, "Post-Zionist Critique on Israel and the Palestinians. Part I: The Academic Debate," Journal of Palestine Studies 102 (winter 1997): 33. All discourse on history in Israel, writes Israeli history professor Dan Diner, "is ipso facto discourse on legitimacy." The debate about 1948, he says, is a debate on the legitimacy and selfidentity of the state and is therefore deeply emotional. Dan Diner, "Cumulative Contingency: Historicizing Legitimacy in Israeli Discourse," History & Memory: Studies in Representation of the Past (ed. Gulie Ne'eman Arad), spring/summer 1995, 149.

114. Shlaim, "The Debate about 1948"; Pappé, "Critique and Agenda," p. 71; and Pappé, "Post-Zionist Critique," p. 32.

115. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. xiii.

116. These books, which broke new ground in bringing aspects of Palestinian history to the fore, include Lesch, Arab Politics in Palestine; Ian Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel's Control of a National Minority (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980); Khalidi, Under Siege; Laurie A. Brand, Palestini ans in the Arab World: Institution Building in the Arab World (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988); Mattar, The Mufti of Jerusalem; and Muslih, The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism. A history of Palestinian nationalism published in the early 1970s—William B. Quandt, Fuad Jabber, and Ann Mosely Lesch, The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973)—is virtually the only book of its kind published before 1979.

117. Cited in Young, Missed Opportunities, p. 134.

118. In August 1985, Congress added to the two requirements of the Sinai II commitment the further stipulation that the PLO must renounce the use of terrorism. See Quandt, Peace Process, p. 572, note 24.

119. For a fuller description of the Jordanian-PLO initiative and maneuvering over it, told from differing perspectives, see Young, Missed Opportunities, pp. 141–155; Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 351–356; Ann M. Lesch, "The Reagan Administration's Policy toward the Palestinians," in U.S. Policy on Palestine from Wilson to Clinton, ed. Michael W. Suleiman (Normal, Ill.: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1995), pp. 182–184; Dan Tschirgi, The American Search for Mideast Peace (New York: Praeger, 1989), pp. 203–211; Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, pp. 444–462; Samuel W. Lewis, "Israel: The Peres Era and Its Legacy," Foreign Affairs 65, no. 3 (1987): 582–610; and Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, pp. 654–666.

120. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, pp. 453–454, 461–462, and Young, Missed Opportunities, pp. 143–144.

121. See Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 360–363, for details.

122. Lewis, "Israel," p. 598, and Hadar, "Reforming Israel," pp. 121–122.

123. Lesch, "The Reagan Administration's Policy," p. 184.

124. Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, pp. 706, 712; for a summary of the factors leading to the intifada, see pp. 677–685.

125. See Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 364–367, and Lesch, "The Reagan Administration's Policy," pp. 184–189, for details on Shultz's efforts in 1988.

126. Lesch, "The Reagan Administration's Policy," p. 185; and Peretz Kidron, "Re-run of an Old Movie," and Donald Neff, "Shultz Leaves a Ticking Time Bomb," Middle East International 323 (16 April 1988): 5–6.

127. Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 368–369, 372–375.

128. For descriptions of this mediation effort by both of the principals involved, see Mohamed Rabie, U.S.-P.L.O. Dialogue: Secret Diplomacy and Con flict Resolution (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1995), and Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 369–372.

129. Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p. 720.

130. Full texts of the PNC "Declaration of Independence" and the PNC "Political Communique," both dated November 15, 1988, can be found in the Journal of Palestine Studies 70 (winter 1989): 213–223.

131. During an Arab summit meeting in Algiers in June 1988, Abu Sharif passed out to the press corps a statement in English declaring the PLO's readiness to coexist with Israel. The statement also expressed the PLO's understanding of "the Jewish people's centuries of suffering" and of the desire for statehood that grew out of that suffering. "We believe," the statement said, "that all peoples—the Jews and the Palestinians included—have the right to run their own affairs, expecting from their neighbors not only non-belligerence but the kind of political and economic cooperation without which no state can be truly secure. … The Palestinians want that kind of lasting peace and security for themselves and the Israelis because no one can build his own future on the ruins

132. Rabie, U.S.-P.L.O Dialogue, pp. 58–61, and Shultz, Turmoil and Tri umph, pp. 1035, 1037.

133. Quoted in "A Dance of Many Veils," Time, 26 December 1988, 23.

134. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, pp. 1040–1044, and Quandt, Peace Pro cess, pp. 374–375. Quandt reproduces the wording of Arafat's statements before the UN session on December 13 and at the press conference the following day. At the UN session, after explicitly naming Israel as one of the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Arafat said the PLO respected "everyone's right to exist, to peace and to security, according to Resolutions 242 and 338." He also "rejected" and "condemned" terrorism but did not "renounce" it. Shultz regarded the statement as not adequate because it did not directly enough recognize Israel's right to exist and did not reject terrorism in a way that admitted to having committed it in the past, a connotation the word renounce carries.

135. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 49. Shultz also complained, somewhat disingenuously, that PLO messages were too indirect and were "delivered through a variety of channels." In fact, of course, the principal channel—that is, talking directly to U.S. officials—was blocked by the U.S. insistence that the PLO first pronounce a prescribed formula.

136. Meron Benvenisti, The West Bank Data Base Project 1987 Report: Demographic, Economic, Legal, Social and Political Developments in the West Bank (Jerusalem: West Bank Data Base Project, 1987), pp. 52–55, and Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p. 671.

1. Gates, From the Shadows, pp. 454–455.

2. Michael Duffy and Dan Goodgame, Marching in Place: The Status Quo Presidency of George Bush (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), excerpted in Time, 24 August 1992, 32, 38.

3. Quandt, Peace Process, p. 383.

4. Bush referred to himself in interviews as "cautious," "prudent," and "diplomatic." Baker was dubbed by former Reagan aide Michael Deaver "the most cautious human being I've ever met." John Newhouse, "The Tactician," New Yorker, 7 May 1990, 52.

5. Christopher Ogden, "Vision Problems at State," Time, 25 September 1989, 22, and Maureen Dowd and Thomas L. Friedman, "The Fabulous Bush and Baker Boys," New York Times Magazine, 6 May 1990, 36.

6. On Baker's political skill, see Dowd and Friedman, "The Fabulous Bush and Baker Boys," pp. 34ff., and Newhouse, "The Tactician," pp. 50–82. For the judgment of another administration official on his political abilities, see Gates,

7. Quandt, Peace Process, p. 404, and New York Times, 8 November 1992.

8. James A. Baker, III, with Thomas M. De Frank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989–1992 (New York: Putnam, 1995), p. xiii.

9. Ibid., pp. 115–117.

10. Dowd and Friedman, "The Fabulous Bush and Baker Boys," p. 67.

11. In one rare example, Baker, touring Kurdish refugee camps in the aftermath of the Gulf war in 1991, was so deeply affected that he organized a relief effort for purely humanitarian reasons. It is an indication of how unusual his reactions to this disaster were that the press wrote about it at the time and that he devoted several pages to it in his memoirs, writing with an unusual degree of feeling. Washington Post, 29 April 1991, and Baker, The Politics of Diplo macy, pp. 430–435.

12. Washington Institute's Presidential Study Group, Building for Peace: An American Strategy for the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1988).

13. Indyk did not become a U.S. citizen until he was appointed to the Clinton administration National Security Council staff in early 1993.

14. "The Next Step in the Peace Process: A Roundtable Discussion of Building for Peace," a symposium with Martin Indyk, Samuel Lewis, William Quandt, and Dennis Ross, November 30, 1988, in Proceedings of the Washing ton Institute Policy Forum, 1988 (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1988), pp. 31–44.

15. Downplaying the significance of these PLO concessions, Indyk chastised the PLO for having addressed them to the United States and not solely to Israel, despite the fact that the focus of U.S. demands on the PLO had for years been precisely those concessions that would lead to a U.S.-PLO dialogue. Ibid., p. 40.

16. Benvenisti, Intimate Enemies, pp. 86–87.

17. Deeming the Middle East a pitfall to be avoided, Baker said in his memoirs, "From day one, the last thing I wanted to do was touch the Middle East peace process." Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, p. 115.

18. In a paper published in 1985, Ross criticized those in the bureaucracy who he claimed "feel guilty about our relationship with Israel and our reluctance to force Israeli concessions." Dennis Ross, Acting with Caution: Middle East Policy Planning for the Second Reagan Administration, Policy Paper 1 (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1985), p. 32.

19. A brief profile of the two men appears in Jonathan Broder, "The Bush League," Jerusalem Report, 22 October 1992, 16–18.

20. The description of these men's Labor Party approach is from ibid. The reference to "impeccable pro-Israeli credentials" and the designation "Israelists" are from Leon Hadar, "High Noon in Washington: The Shootout over the Loan Guarantees," Journal of Palestine Studies 82 (winter 1992): 77.

21. Hanan Ashrawi, This Side of Peace: A Personal Account (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), p. 230

22. Ross, Acting with Caution, pp. iv, 2–5.

23. Broder, "The Bush League," and Laura Blumenfeld, "Three Peace Suits," Washington Post, 24 February 1997.

24. Aaron David Miller's book on the Palestinians, The PLO and the Politics of Survival (New York: Praeger, 1983), is a balanced and nonpolemical exposition of Palestinian and PLO positions; it describes the rise of Palestinian nationalism and the outlook for the Palestinians in the wake of the PLO's dispersal after Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon. His second book, The Arab States and the Palestine Question: Between Ideology and Self-Interest (New York: Praeger, 1986), is also an unbiased description of the Arab states' relation to and interests in the Palestinian issue. In 1987, Miller wrote an article examining the Arab-Israeli conflict twenty years after the 1967 war; the article viewed the conflict from a middle-of-the-road perspective and showed a realism shared by few in the Reagan administration of the time and by few others on Baker's team two years later; "The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967–1987: A Retrospective," Middle East Journal, summer 1987, 349–360.

25. Daniel Charles Kurtzer, "Palestine Guerrilla and Israeli Counter insurgency Warfare: The Radicalization of the Palestine Arab Community to Violence, 1949–1970" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1976). Kurtzer recognized that the Arab-Jewish conflict in Palestine involved two "national liberation movements" struggling for "political sovereignty."

26. Teicher and Teicher, Twin Pillars, p. 146.

27. Richard N. Haass, "Paying Less Attention to the Middle East," Commentary, August 1986, 22–26. Richard N. Haass, Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990).

28. Haass, Conflicts Unending, p. 51.

29. Ross, Acting with Caution, pp. 25, 40.

30. Dennis Ross, "The Peace Process—a Status Report" (a presentation at the Aspen Institute of the Wye Plantation Fourth Annual Policy Conference, "U.S. Policy and the Middle East Peace Process," Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1989), pp. 11–12.

31. Quandt, Peace Process, p. 388.

32. Broder, "The Bush League," p. 18, and Blumenfeld, "Three Peace Suits."

33. Christison, "Splitting the Difference," pp. 42 and 50, note 19.

34. Thomas L. Friedman, "A Window on Deep Israel-U.S. Tensions," New York Times, 19 September 1991.

35. Wolf Blitzer, "How American Pressure Shifted from Israel to the Palestinians," Jerusalem Post International Edition, 29 April 1989; David Makovsky, "Shamir's Defiance Aimed at Setting Limits for U.S.," Jerusalem Post Interna tional Edition, 3 November 1990; and Thomas L. Friedman, "Special Relationship Reaches Its Limits," New York Times, 21 October 1990.

36. Rabie, U.S.-P.L.O Dialogue, pp. 99–107, describes the dialogue on the

37. Some Palestinians, in fact, believe that the official Tunis channel was undermined by Arafat's acquiescence in the U.S. desire to communicate indirectly and unofficially via the Egyptians. Rabie, U.S.-P.L.O Dialogue, pp. 107–156.

38. Quandt, Peace Process, p. 389.

39. Ross, Acting with Caution, p. 43.

40. Interview with a former government official who asked to remain anonymous.

41. Rabie, U.S.-P.L.O Dialogue, p. 145.

42. Baker credits New York Times correspondent Thomas Friedman with the idea of threatening to withdraw from the peace process. Noting that he occasionally asked Friedman "to share his thoughts with me on an off-the-record basis," Baker said in his memoirs that Friedman had offered the view that it made no sense to continue with the peace process if the parties were not genuinely interested and that, to get their attention, the United States should let them know it would not be there to help unless they called. Baker himself was the one who decided to doth is publicly. Baker, The Politicsof Diplomacy, p. 131.

43. Abba Eban, "Vision and Hard Facts," Jerusalem Post International Edition, 13 January 1990, 8.

44. Hadar, "Reforming Israel," pp. 124–126.

45. Frank Collins, "Borrowing Money for Israel: Annual Interest Alone Exceeds $3 Billion," Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, December 1991/January 1992, 33.

46. Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p. 745. A combination of relaxed restrictions on emigration from the Soviet Union, leading to a more than twelve-fold increase in the number of Soviet Jewish emigrants by late 1989, and changes in U.S. immigration laws that increased limits on the entry of those claiming refugee status, together resulted in a huge increase in the numbers of Soviet Jews moving to Israel. In early 1990 the Israeli government was predicting that as many as five hundred thousand Soviet Jews would move to Israel in that year alone. Geoffrey Aronson, "Soviet Jewish Emigration, the United States, and the Occupied Territories," Journal of Palestine Studies 76 (summer 1990): 30–45.

47. Dowd and Friedman, "The Fabulous Bush and Baker Boys," p. 67.

48. Ibid., and Glenn Frankel, "The Widening Gulf of Distrust between the U.S. and Israel," Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 7–13 May 1990, 17.

49. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, pp. 127–128. Baker says that White

50. Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p. 736.

51. Aronson, "Soviet Jewish Emigration," pp. 30, 37. Immigrants to Israel from all countries for the first ten months of 1990 totaled 122, 592; approximately 90 percent were from the Soviet Union. New York Times, 2 November 1990.

52. Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p. 745; Geoffrey Aronson, "Settlement Report" (November 1994), reprinted in Journal of Pal estine Studies 94 (winter 1995): 99; and Rachelle Marshall, "End of the Beginning or Beginning of the End?" Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, March 1995, 7.

53. The Security Council initially met outside New York to avoid the issue of whether the United States would again deny Arafat a visa to address the session, as had occurred in 1988, when Secretary of State Shultz refused to allow Arafat to enter the United States for a General Assembly session.

54. Jules Kagian, "Another American Veto," and Daoud Kuttab, "Hunger Strike Gains," Middle East International, 8 June 1990, 8–10.

55. Salah Khalaf expressed his concern to Quandt in June 1990. He thought Saddam was planning something big and wanted the PLO in his corner. Khalaf was concerned that this development boded ill for the Palestinians, andhehoped to avoid a break with the United States, but he had been unable to get Arafat to listen to any proposals for a compromise on the Abu al-Abbas issue that would satisfy the United States. Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 393–394, and interview with William Quandt, 12 May 1991. (Khalaf was assassinated, most likely by a renegade Palestinian group under orders from Saddam, in January 1991.) Even Baker attributes the Palestinian tilt toward Iraq to the breakdown of the peace process. In his memoirs, Baker observes that "perhaps" because Israel had repudiated its own peace plan, public opinion in the Arab world suddenly began to shift "away from conciliation in the direction of Saddam's truculence," and the Egyptians began to lose influence with the PLO. Baker, The Politics of Dip lomacy, p. 129.

56. William B. Quandt, "The Middle East in 1990," Foreign Affairs 70, no. 1 (1991): 56.

57. Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 398–399.

58. Friedman, "Special Relationship Reaches Its Limits," and Michael Kramer, "The Political Interest: Baker's Real Agenda: 1992," Time, 27 May 1991, 35.

59. Bush diary entry, early 1991, cited in Herbert S. Parmet, George Bush: The Life of a Lone Star Yankee (New York: Scribner, 1997), p. 500.

60. See NBC/ Wall Street Journal poll, September 25, 1991, reprinted in the Journal of Palestine Studies 82 (winter 1992): 163; Gallup poll, December 1992, executive summary reprinted in the Journal of Palestine Studies 86 (winter 1993): 167–168; and Fouad Moughrabi, "Polls Show Dramatic Shifts in US

61. A political cartoon by Oliphant, for instance, depicted Shamir slapping Baker in the face and then extending his hand; it was labeled "Donations accepted." Reprinted in the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, October 1991, 9.

62. Baker believes that AIPAC's failure to block the request for delay was "a powerful psychological weapon" on the administration's side and meant that AIPAC was no longer perceived in Congress as politically invincible. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, pp. 549, 555.

63. Quoted in Melman and Raviv, Friends in Deed, p. 456.

64. Ashrawi, This Side of Peace, pp. 59, 93–94.

65. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, pp. 414–415, 423.

66. Thomas L. Friedman, "Amid Histrionics, Arabs and Israelis Team Up to Lose an Opportunity," New York Times, 3 November 1991.

67. Ashrawi, This Side of Peace, p. 93. Ashrawi paints a picture of Baker's team, particularly Ross and Kurtzer, as imperious and patronizing toward the Palestinians, excessively vigilant about preventing any hint of PLO involvement, and extremely careful to accommodate Israel's sensibilities. She alleges that Ross frequently failed to pass on to Baker Palestinian proposals and information on Israeli occupation practices. See, for example, ibid., pp. 99, 108–117, 160, 199–200.

68. Ibid., pp. 83–84, 87, 128, and Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, pp. 466, 493. Baker used the "dead cat" admonition with the Israelis also, urging them to go far enough so that "we can leave this dead cat on the Arab doorstep." Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, p. 450.

69. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, p. 446.

70. Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, July 1991, 15.

71. Richard H. Curtiss, "It's Lift-Off or Abort as Bush-Baker Initiative Nears Point of No Return," Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, July 1991, 8.

72. George J. Church, "Finally Face to Face," Time, 11 November 1991, 55.

73. CNN broadcast, 5 November 1991.

74. One theme was the "moral-equivalency" argument—the notion that there could be no moral equivalency between Israel and the Arabs and that an evenhanded approach to the peace process was thus unfair to Israel because Israel was the victim of Arab aggression. This theme was enunciated in a fullpage ad in the New York Times on 26 February 1992 by the Committee on U.S. Interests in the Middle East. Signers included, from the Johnson administration, Eugene Rostow; from the Nixon administration, Leonard Garment; from the Carter administration, Stuart Eizenstat; and from the Reagan administration, Elliot Abrams, William Bennett, Stephen Bryen, Linda Chavez, Alan Keyes, John Lehman, and Richard Perle.

75. David R. Bowen, "Analysis of Loan Guarantee Terms," CNI Newsletter,

76. "Settlement Population Growth under Labor," in "Settlement Report," ed. Geoffrey Aronson, reprinted in Journal of Palestine Studies 101 (autumn 1996): 130.

77. Quoted in Ashrawi, This Side of Peace, p. 90.

78. Anton Shammas, "A Lost Voice," New York Times Magazine, 28 April 1991, 48.

79. Ibid.

1. Clinton Rossiter and James Lare, eds., The Essential Lippmann: A Politi cal Philosophy for Liberal Democracy (New York: Random House, 1963), pp. 140–141.

2. Jervis, Perception and Misperception, pp. 146, 156.

3. Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "Political Space for ‘Political Islam,’" Washington Post, 12 September 1997.

4. Reprinted in Journal of Palestine Studies 103 (spring 1997): 162–163.

5. Gore is a former student and a close friend of New Republic publisher Martin Peretz, who is strongly pro-Israeli and is also widely characterized as anti-Arab. Gore is believed to be heavily influenced by Peretz.

6. In addition to Ross and Indyk, Aaron David Miller remained in the Clinton administration, on the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, and works on the peace process. Richard Haass left government service after Bush's electoral defeat, moving across town to the Brookings Institution, where he is still actively involved in foreign-policy matters. Daniel Kurtzer became ambassador to Egypt in 1997.

7. Steven Erlanger, "U.S.-Israeli Relations: Real Crisis or Smoke and Mirrors?"(symposium, Centerfor Policy Analysison Palestine, Washington, D.C., June 5, 1998).

8. The statement was in the form of a U.S. proposal for an "Israeli-Palestinian Joint Declaration of Principles" and was presented on June 30, 1993, to the Israeli and Palestinian delegations to the ongoing bilateral peace talks. Reprinted, along with the official Palestinian response, dated August 5, 1993, in Journal of Palestine Studies 89 (autumn 1993): 111–114.

9. The pertinent sections of the statement of principles asserted that "the inclusion or exclusion of specific … geographic areas … within the jurisdiction of the [Palestinian] interim self-government will not prejudice the positions or claims of either party and will not constitute a basis for asserting, supporting ordeny inganyparty'sclaimto territorial sovereignty in the permanent status negotiations. … Issues related to sovereignty will be negotiated during talks on permanent status." Ibid., p. 112.

10. Ross, Acting with Caution, p. 38.

11. Neff, Fallen Pillars, pp. 127, 165, 186.

12. Cited in ibid., p. 186.

13. Benvenisti, Intimate Enemies, p. 176.

14. William Safire, "Move the Embassy," New York Times, 1 July 1996.

15. In the last four years of the five-year loan-guarantee period, the Clinton administration imposed a penalty for that part of Israel's settlement construction that went beyond the limits of the 1992 loan-guarantee agreement, but in three of those years it offset the penalty in order to compensate Israel for redeployment costs under the Oslo agreement or because the offset was deemed "important to the security interests of the United States." Settlement penalties were set at $437 million (from an annual loan-guarantee total of $2 billion) in 1993, $311.8 million in 1994, $303 million in 1995, and $307 million in 1996. There was no offset in 1993, but offsets totaled $95 million (or 30 percent) in 1994, $243 million (80 percent) in 1995, and $247 (80 percent) in 1996. No penalty was levied in 1992, the first year of the loan guarantees. "Loan Guarantees Update," in "Settlement Report," ed. Geoffrey Aronson, reprinted in Journal of Palestine Studies 102 (winter 1997): 142.

16. In March and April 1997, UN Ambassador Bill Richardson vetoed two moderately worded resolutions in the Security Council, one drafted by European allies, criticizing Israel's construction of the Har Homa settlement in the Jabal Abu Ghunaym section of East Jerusalem. On two other occasions in the same months, the United States voted with Israel against similar resolutions in the General Assembly. The U.S. position is that the UN should not become involved in an issue that the two parties to the conflict have to settle themselves.

17. Two Israeli human-rights organizations—Hamoked, the Center for the Defence of the Individual, and B'Tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories—have published a study on the Israeli practices, The Quiet Deportation: Revocation of Residency of East Jeru salem Palestinians (Jerusalem: Hamoked and B'Tselem, April 1997).

18. Leon T. Hadar, "The Friendsof Bibi(FOBs)vs.‘The New Middle East,’" Journal of Palestine Studies 101 (autumn 1996): 91–92.

19. Ian S. Lustick, "The Oslo Agreement as an Obstacle to Peace," Journal of Palestine Studies 105 (autumn 1997): 62, 66.

20. Broadcast of the Rush Limbaugh radio show, 9 April 1997.

21. Lustick, "The Oslo Agreement," p. 63.

22. Quoted from a FLAME ad in the New Yorker, 8 September 1997.

23. Peretz Kidron, "Triumph in Washington," Middle East International, 30 January 1998, 6.

24. Israeli left-wing journalist Haim Baram, for instance, has reported that a prominent Labor Party leader complained to him following the September 1997 visit to Israel of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright—her first involvement in the peace process despite being in office for eight months—that the fate of Israel and of the peace process was now left to "nonentities" like Clinton and Albright, who offered a stark contrast to the "relatively effective" Bush and Baker. Baram also reported that Yossi Sarid of the left-wing Meretz party appeared on Israeli television following the Albright visit and declared

25. Palestinian intellectuals in the United States launched a public campaign in the Arabic and the international press in late 1989 taking the PLO to task for leaving the propaganda field, as always, to Israel and its supporters. See reprint of a critical article by Edward Said in Journal of Palestine Studies 74 (winter 1990): 146–151; interview of Ibrahim Abu-Lughod in Foreign Broadcast Information Service FBIS-NES-89-209 (31 October 1989); and Hisham Sharabi, "Two Years of the Intifada: The Impact on the Palestinian Diaspora," Middle East International (15 December 1989): 20–21.

26. Edward W. Said, Peace and Its Discontents: Essays on Palestine in the Middle East Peace Process (New York: Vintage Books, 1996), p. 27. Emphasis in original.

27. Reich, The United States and Israel, p. 179.

28. Mansour, Beyond Alliance, pp. 277–278.

29. Gershon Shafir, "Israeli Decolonization and Critical Sociology," Journal of Palestine Studies 99 (spring 1996): 29.

30. David Makovsky, Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 19, 26–29; and Jane Corbin, Gaza First: The Secret Norway Channel to Peace between Israel and the PLO (London: Bloomsbury, 1994), pp. 66–67, 175–176.

31. Makovsky, Making Peace with the PLO, pp. 13, 25, 38–39.

32. Saunders, "An Israeli-Palestinian Peace," p. 121.

33. Corbin, Gaza First, pp. 89, 138.

1. For texts of the Hebron agreement and of various letters of assurance and statements related to it, see Journal of Palestine Studies 103 (spring 1997): 131–145. The citation from Christopher's letter is on p. 139; the State Department spokesman's statement is on p. 141.

2. In its first three months in office, from July to October 1999, the Barak government authorized 2, 600 new housing units in settlements—a yearly average far above the Netanyahu government's 3,000 new units a year. See Geoffrey Aronson, "Settlement Report" (November/December 1999), reprinted in Journal of Palestine Studies 114 (winter 2000): 138.

3. See Aronson, "Settlement Report" (January/February 2000), reprinted in Journal of Palestine Studies 116 (summer 2000): 142.

4. Aronson, "Settlement Report" (July/August 2000), reprinted in Journal of Palestine Studies 117 (autumn 2000): 141, citing Haaretz (31 March 2000), reports that 3,096 residency permits were revoked in this period, including many after Barak was elected.

5. See interviews with Dennis Ross in Janine Zacharia, "Ross to ‘Post’: Palestinians Missed Historic Opportunity," Jerusalem Post internet edition

6. Perlez, "U.S. Mideast Envoy Recalls."

7. See the series of seven articles in Al-Ayyam newspaper from 29 July 2000 to 10 August 2000, by Akram Hanieh, Al-Ayyam editor-in-chief, adviser to Arafat, and participant in the Camp David summit; translated and reprinted on the web site of the Palestinian Authority Negotiations Affairs Department, www.nad-plo.org.

8. The wording of Barak's later public statements affirming his "insistence" that 80 percent of the Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza remain "in blocs under Israeli sovereignty"—which repeats one of the "parameters" outlined by Clinton—strongly suggests that this particular proposal came originally from Barak himself. See, for instance, New York Times (23 January 2001). Clinton's parameters, outlined during a meeting with Israeli and Palestinian negotiators on 23 December 2000, are described in New York Times (26 December 2000). For a translated set of notes taken by Palestinians attending the meeting with Clinton, see Haaretz, English edition (31 December 2000).

9. Perlez, "Falling Short of Peace After Camp David Deadlock," New York Times (15 October 2000).

10. The Palestinian statements were contained in a memorandum written by the Palestinian negotiating team and circulated via e-mail by the Palestine Media Center on 22 January 2001. See New York Times (23 January 2001) for a description of the memorandum. Although Arafat personally disavowed the statement (see New York Times, 25 January 2001), it nonetheless expresses the views of Palestinian negotiators. For other analyses of the U.S. emphasis on process over substance, see Hanan Ashrawi, "The Failure of Oslo: Charting a New Course," Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine Policy Brief (16 November 2000), and Kathleen Christison, "All Process and No Substance: U.S. Policymaking on Palestine," Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, Informa tion Brief (10 January 2001).

11. These statements are taken from Clinton's address to a Palestinian conference in Gaza on 14 December 1998. See Journal of Palestine Studies 111 (spring 1999): 160–161.

12. Laura Blumenfeld, "Three Peace Suits," Washington Post (24 February 1997).

13. Ibid.

14. Akiva Eldar, "Go in Peace, American Peace Team," Haaretz, English edition (22 January 2001). Eldar, a prominent Israeli commentator, strongly suggests that Ross's ties to Israel influenced his policymaking, even raising the possibility that if Ross and the other members of his peace team had not been Jewish, the United States would not have permitted Israeli settlers to remain in Hebron when that agreement was negotiated in January 1997 or permitted Israel to expand Jerusalem's municipal boundaries.

15. Perlez, "U.S. Mideast Envoy Recalls."

16. Uri Savir, The Process: 1,100 Days That Changed the Middle East (New York: Random House, 1998), p. 207.

17. Savir, "Let Me Warn You," Haaretz, English edition (31 January 2001).

18. "Saying No to Peace," Economist (3 February 2001).

19. For analyses of U.S. press coverage of the Camp David summit breakdown and the intifada, see Christison, "Taking Israel's Side," Middle East In ternational (18 August 2000): 19, and Christison, "The American Media Spin," Middle East International (10 November 2000): 25.

20. The first quote is from Anthony Lewis, "But There Is No Peace," New York Times (14 October 2000); the second is from Richard Cohen, "Joseph's Tomb," Washington Post (10 October 2000); the third is from Stephen Rosenfeld, "Who Leads to Peace?" Washington Post (11 October 2000); the fourth is from Cohen, "Israel's Answer to Arafat," Washington Post (8 February 2001); the fifth is from Lawrence Eagleburger, "A Failure With Many Fathers," New York Times (11 October 2000); the last is from Henry Kissinger, "The Peace Paradox," Washington Post and Los Angeles Times (4 December 2000).

21. The first of these notions is from Thomas L. Friedman, "Sharon, Arafat and Mao," New York Times (8 February 2001); the second is from Cohen, "Israel's Answer to Arafat."

22. See, for instance, "The Fires of Hate," Time (23 October 2000), and Matt Rees, "At the Speed of Hate," Time (13 November 2000), as well as a picture caption accompanying the first article, showing Palestinians throwing Molotov cocktails at Israeli soldiers, titled "Ancient Hatreds Reignited."

23. Marc Ellis, speech to the American Committee on Jerusalem, Washington, D.C. (3 August 2000), rebroadcast on C-SPAN, 8 August 2000.