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1. Lewis, "The United States and Israel," p. 227. [BACK]

2. Quoted in Quandt, Peace Process, p. 338. [BACK]

3. Quoted in William Safire, "Reagan on Israel," New York Times, 24 March 1980. [BACK]

5. Lewis, "The United States and Israel," p. 227. [BACK]

7. Strobe Talbott, "What to Do about Israel," Time, 7 September 1981, 18–20. [BACK]

8. See Leon T. Hadar, "The ‘Neocons’: From the Cold War to the ‘Global Intifada,’" Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, April 1991, 27–28, and Michael Lind, Up from Conservatism: Why the Right Is Wrong for America (New York: Free Press, 1996), pp. 55–56, 61, for a description of the rise of and the beliefs espoused by neoconservatism. See Leon T. Hadar, "Reforming Israel—before It's Too Late," Foreign Policy, winter 1990–1991, 109, for a further description of neoconservative views on Israel. [BACK]

9. Hadar, "The ‘Neocons.’" [BACK]

11. Quoted in Peck, The Reagan Administration, p. 15, and Reich, The United States and Israel, p. 93. [BACK]

12. Melman and Raviv, Friends in Deed, pp. 197, 200–205. [BACK]

13. Gates, From the Shadows, pp. 201, 250, 286. [BACK]

14. Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981–1987 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), pp. 160–161, 216–217. [BACK]

15. Tivnan, The Lobby, p. 142. [BACK]

16. Churba, who died in 1996, was a long-time friend of Rabbi Meir Kahane, founder of the militantly pro-Israeli and anti-Palestinian Jewish Defense League in the United States and of its Israeli counterpart, Kach. While working as an intelligence analyst for the Air Force, Churba propounded a strongly pro-Israeli position. In 1976, while still an Air Force employee, he released to the New York Times an unpublished research paper he had written arguing that Israel was a strategic asset. As a result of his unauthorized release of a classified paper, his highest security clearances were revoked, and he left the Air Force.

Robert I. Friedman, The False Prophet: Rabbi Meir Kahane—from FBI Infor mant to Knesset Member (Brooklyn, N.Y.: Hill, 1990), pp. 58–82. [BACK]

17. Peck, The Reagan Administration, p. 14. Reagan himself apparently took some of his cues from Churba. In 1977, after leaving the Air Force, Churba had written another book, The Politics of Defeat: America's Decline in the Middle East, in which he spoke of "the conflict and tension endemic to the region. This condition is traceable largely to the sectarian and fragmented nature of Middle East society." In August 1979, Reagan published an op-ed article in the Washington Post so similarly worded as to suggest is was ghost-written by Churba. Reagan wrote, "The Carter administration has yet to grasp that in this region conflict and tension are endemic, a condition traceable largely to the fragmented sectarian nature of Middle Eastern society." Quandt discovered this near identity of wording; Peace Process, p. 565, note 1. [BACK]

18. Milstein, "Strategic Ties or Tentacles?" Stephen Bryen was investigated by the FBI in 1978, when an official of an Arab American organization alleged that he had overheard Bryen, then a Senate staffer, offering classified military information to a visiting Israeli official at a coffee shop in Washington. Bryen denied the charge, and when he was appointed to the Defense Department in 1981, Secretary of Defense Weinberger personally directed an investigation that cleared him. See ibid., and Melman and Raviv, Friends in Deed, pp. 286–287. [BACK]

19. Safire, "Reagan on Israel," and Haig, Caveat, p. 334. [BACK]

20. See Peck, The Reagan Administration, pp. 32–35, and Safire, "Reagan on Israel," for Rostow's legal justification of Israel's occupation and settlement construction and for Reagan's early statements on Israeli settlements. For the State Department's position, see David A. Korn, Letter to the Editor, New York Times, 1 October 1991. [BACK]

21. New York Times, 3 February 1981. [BACK]

22. Peck, The Reagan Administration, pp. 16–17. [BACK]

23. Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Dishonoring Sadat," New Republic, 11 November 1981, 14–16. Kirkpatrick has remained extremely hostile to the PLO and supportive of Israel's Likud governments since leaving office. Rejecting the PLO's conciliatory moves since 1988, she has charged that the organization still seeks Israel's destruction; she has encouraged Israeli settlement construction in the West Bank and Gaza and has not seen the settlements as posing an impediment to peace. See, for instance, Jeane Kirkpatrick, "How the PLO Was Legitimized," Commentary, July 1989, 21–28. See also the dissents she made as one of the drafters of a 1997 report on the U.S. role in the peace process, in Presidential Study Group, Building for Security and Peace in the Middle East: An Ameri can Agenda (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1997), pp. 4 and 35. [BACK]

25. Hermann Frederick Eilts, "The United States and Egypt," in The Middle

East: Ten Years after Camp David, ed. William B. Quandt (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1988), pp. 119–120. Ambassador to Israel Lewis has said that Reagan was "often hazy on details" and even in private meetings with Begin had to use index cards to deliver his prepared talking points. Lewis, "The United States and Israel," p. 227. [BACK]

26. Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, pp. 548–552, 564–568. [BACK]

27. Peck, The Reagan Administration, p. 29. [BACK]

28. Bernard Gwertzman, "Reagan Administration Held 9-Month Talks with P.L.O.," New York Times, 19 February 1984, and interview with Nicholas Veliotes, 17 March 1998. [BACK]

29. Gwertzman, "Reagan Administration." [BACK]

30. Haig, Caveat, p. 335. Haig says he told General Sharon that "unless there was an internationally recognized provocation, and unless Israeli retaliation was proportionate to any such provocation, an attack by Israel into Lebanon would have a devastating effect in the United States." Sharon responded, according to Haig, that no one had the right to tell Israel how to defend its people. The notion that Haig had given Sharon a "green light" was first raised by Israeli journalist Ze'ev Schiff in "The Green Light," Foreign Policy, spring 1983, and in considerably greater detail by Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari in Is rael's Lebanon War, trans. Ina Friedman (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), pp. 62–77. [BACK]

31. Interview with Nicholas Veliotes, 2 May 1991. For an analysis of Israel's objectives in Lebanon, including the restoration of Christian Phalangist power there and the destruction of the PLO, see Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, pp. 580–582. [BACK]

32. Schiff and Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War, pp. 65–69. [BACK]

33. Inside administration councils at the beginning of the war, Haig, Kirkpatrick, and Casey all maintained that the invasion was a justifiable act of selfdefense by Israel, arguing down suggestions from Vice President George Bush and Defense Secretary Weinberger that the United States should impose sanctions against Israel for using U.S.-supplied weapons in an act of aggression. See Howard Teicher and Gayle Radley Teicher, Twin Pillars to Desert Storm: America's Flawed Vision in the Middle East from Nixon to Bush (New York: Morrow, 1993), p. 204. [BACK]

34. Melman and Raviv, Friends in Deed, pp. 216, 487. [BACK]

37. Interview with Veliotes, 17 March 1998. [BACK]

38. Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 344–345. The texts of Reagan's speech and of talking points sent to Prime Minister Begin appear in Appendix H, pp. 476–485. [BACK]

39. Letter from Walid Khalidi, 12 December 1989. [BACK]


40. Schiff and Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War, p. 294. [BACK]

42. Thomas A. Dine, "Achievements and Advances in the United States-Israel Relationship,"addresstothe AIPAC Conference, May 17, 1987, reprinted in Journal of Palestine Studies 64 (summer 1987): 99–100. [BACK]

43. Peck, The Reagan Administration, pp. 89–90. [BACK]

44. William B. Quandt, "Reagan's Lebanon Policy: Trial and Error," Middle East Journal, spring 1984, 241–242. The full article, pp. 237–266, provides an analysis of the background to and the consequences of the U.S. involvement in Lebanon from 1982 to 1984. [BACK]

45. Peck, The Reagan Administration, pp. 90, 93–94. [BACK]

47. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 423. [BACK]

48. Peck, The Reagan Administration, pp. 91–92. The Fez Plan grew out of an initiative proposed more than a year earlier by Saudi Crown Prince Fahd. In August 1981, Fahd enunciated eight principles as guidelines for a comprehensive peace settlement, including the major provisions later incorporated into the Fez Plan. The United States failed to encourage the Fahd initiative, claiming it was largely a restatement of previous Saudi positions and emphasizing the points with which it could not agree. Saudi Arabia submitted the plan to an Arab summit meeting in Morocco in November 1981, but the Arab world was badly divided at the time and the meeting broke up almost immediately. Ibid., pp. 39–41, and Reich, The United States and Israel, p. 104. [BACK]

49. Walid Khalidi, The Middle East Postwar Environment (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991), p. 25 (emphasis in original), and Peck, The Reagan Administration, p. 92. [BACK]

50. Teicher and Teicher, Twin Pillars, p. 213; Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 100; and New York Times, 23 October 1982. [BACK]

51. Quoted in Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p. 826, note 5. [BACK]

52. "When Push Comes to Shove," Time, 16 August 1982, p. 11, and Neff, Fallen Pillars, p. 122. [BACK]

53. Interview with a former official who asked to remain anonymous. [BACK]

54. For details on this policy, see testimony before a House subcommittee by Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, 14 December 1987, reprinted in the Journal of Palestine Studies 67 (spring 1988): 198–201. [BACK]

55. Richard Murphy, "United States Policy in the Middle East," in Proceedings of the Washington Institute Policy Forum, 1988 (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1988), p. 12. [BACK]

56. Interview with the Palestinian American, 11 April 1989. [BACK]

57. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, pp. 105–106, 110. [BACK]


58. Khalidi, Under Siege, p. 171. PLO concern to assure the safety of Palestinian noncombatants was acute in light of the massacre of hundreds of civilians by Lebanese Christian forces at the Palestinian refugee camp of Tal al-Za'atar in Beirut at the height of the Lebanon civil war in 1976. PLO leaders negotiating the PLO withdrawal in 1982 were specifically concerned to avoid a repeat of the earlier massacre. Ibid., p. 169. [BACK]

59. Fisk, Pity the Nation, pp. 368–370. Emphasis in original. [BACK]

60. Newsweek, 27 September and 4 October 1982, and Time, 27 September and 4 October 1982. Newsweek's treatment was highlighted in Fisk, Pity the Nation, p. 401. Also "The Horror, and the Shame," New York Times, 21 September 1982; "The Latest Horror," Wall Street Journal, 21 September 1982; and"Dilemmaof Imperfect Freedom," Wall Street Journal, 24 September 1982. [BACK]

61. Fisk, Pity the Nation, pp. 370–371. [BACK]

62. Ibid., p. 366. [BACK]

63. For descriptions of U.S. policy miscalculations in Lebanon between September 1982 and February 1984, when the U.S. Marine contingent withdrew, see Quandt, "Reagan's Lebanon Policy," pp. 241–250, and Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation, pp. 182–211. The United States was first drawn into Lebanon by Israel's invasion. After the assassination of Bashir Gemayel and the Sabra and Shatila massacre, Israel persuaded the administration to put aside its peace initiative in order to focus attention again on Lebanon. When Shultz himself intervened in 1983 to arrange the final details of an accord intended to bring about the withdrawal of both Israeli and Syrian forces in Lebanon, he dealt with the Israelis but failed to negotiate terms with Syria and ignored the warnings of the U.S. ambassador in Damascus that Syrian President Asad would attempt to undermine any agreement concluded between Israel and Lebanon. The result was as predicted; influenced by Syria, Lebanon abrogated the Israeli-Lebanese treaty only months after it was signed in May 1983. The U.S. Marines became deeply embroiled in Lebanon's sectarian violence in September 1983 after Israel, finding itself in the middle of civil strife among Lebanese factions, pulled its forces out of the mountains above Beirut. This retreat left the Marines with no buffer against attack by local militias increasingly opposed to the U.S. presence and to the Israeli-Lebanese accord. In October, a month after the Marines, still technically a peacekeeping force, began exchanging gunfire with Lebanese factions, the Marine barracks was bombed by pro-Iranian elements allied with Syria, with the loss of 241 U.S. military personnel. [BACK]

64. Christison, "The Arab-Israeli Policy of George Shultz," p. 39. [BACK]

65. Melman and Raviv, Friends in Deed, p. 232. [BACK]

66. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 441. [BACK]

67. Teicher and Teicher, Twin Pillars, pp. 221–224. [BACK]

68. Ibid., pp. 273–274 [BACK]

69. David K. Shipler, "On Middle East Policy, a Major Influence," New York Times, 6 July 1987. [BACK]

70. See Tivnan, The Lobby, pp. 135–161, for a description of AIPAC strategy and maneuvering during the AWACS fight. [BACK]


71. Shipler, "On Middle East Policy." [BACK]

72. Ibid., and Tivnan, The Lobby, pp. 176–177, 180. [BACK]

73. Melman and Raviv, Friends in Deed, p. 248. [BACK]

74. Ibid.; Robert Pear and Richard L. Berke, "Pro-Israel Group Exerts Quiet Might as It Rallies Supporters in Congress," New York Times, 7 July 1987; Shipler, "On Middle East Policy"; Mansour, Beyond Alliance, p. 242; and Dine, "Achievements and Advances," pp. 95–106. [BACK]

75. Blitzer, Between Washington and Jerusalem, p. 117. [BACK]

76. Shipler, "On Middle East Policy." [BACK]

77. This lament was recalled by a one-time AIPAC staffer writing in the Washington Post in 1986, who boasted that State Department "Arabists" hardly received a hearing in Washington anymore. Cited in Neff, Fallen Pil lars, p. 123. [BACK]

78. Shipler, "On Middle East Policy"; quote in Tivnan, The Lobby, p. 256. [BACK]

79. Saunders, The Other Walls, p. 140. [BACK]

81. Blitzer, Between Washington and Jerusalem, p. 106, and Young, Missed Opportunities, pp. 105–107. [BACK]

82. See Friedman, "Selling Israel to America," 23–25, for details on the Hasbara Project. [BACK]

83. Ibid., p. 24. [BACK]

84. Ibid. [BACK]

85. Quoted in Said, The Politics of Dispossession, p. 255. [BACK]

86. Friedman, "Selling Israel to America," p. 22, and Weisman, "Blind Spot in the Middle East," p. 12. [BACK]

87. Quoted in Weisman, "Blind Spot," p. 12. [BACK]

88. One of the principal expositions of this line in the United States can be found in Daniel Pipes, "Is Jordan Palestine?" Commentary, October 1988, 35–42. [BACK]

89. Peck, The Reagan Administration, pp. 16–17. [BACK]

91. Said, The Politics of Dispossession, p. 97. Emphasis in original. [BACK]

92. The book was reviewed by Ronald Sanders in the New Republic (23 April 1984), Bernard Gwertzman in the New York Times (12 May 1984), John C. Campbell in the New York Times Book Review (13 May 1984), Daniel Pipes in Commentary (July 1984), Walter Reich in The Atlantic Monthly (July 1984), and journalist Sidney Zion in the National Review (5 October 1984). [BACK]

93. Edward Said published an article in the Nation summarizing the few critical reviews published in the United States and some published in Europe. See the Journal of Palestine Studies 58 (winter 1986): 144–150, for a reprint of the review. The first and most thorough critical review, by Norman Finkelstein,

appeared in the 11 September 1984 issue of the nonmainstream magazine In These Times. [BACK]

94. Yehoshua Porath, "Mrs. Peters's Palestine," New York Review of Books, 16 January 1986, 36–39. Interestingly, Porath's critical review is not listed— one must assume through inadvertence—anywhere in the 1986 edition of The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature, under either "Peters," "Porath," or "Palestine" or in the list of book reviews. [BACK]

95. Erich Isaac and Rael Jean Isaac, "Whose Palestine?" Commentary, July 1986, 24–37. [BACK]

96. Ronald Sanders, "Letting the Record Speak," New York Times Book Review, 4 September 1988, contains a dual review of Morris's 1987 book, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949, and Shlaim's 1988 book Collusion across the Jordan. [BACK]

97. Kathleen Christison, "The Arab in Recent Popular Fiction," Middle East Journal, summer 1987, 410. [BACK]

99. Abuelkeshk, "A Portrayal," pp. 227–232. [BACK]

100. Evensen, Truman, Palestine, and the Press, pp. 1–2. [BACK]

101. Leon Wieseltier, "Summoned by Stones," New Republic, 14 March 1988, 24, 26. [BACK]

102. Quoted in Friedman, "Selling Israel to America," p. 25. Emphasis added. [BACK]

103. At a conference of Jewish journalists in Jerusalem in January 1985, he said, "The role of Jews who write in both the Jewish and the general press is to defend Israel, and not join in the attacks on Israel." Criticism, he said, "helps Israel's enemies—and they are legion in the U.S.—to say more and more openly that Israel is not a democratic country." Quoted in ibid., p. 21. Podhoretz did, however, become an outspoken critic of Israel when, under a Labor government, it signed a peace agreement with the PLO in September 1993. Dierdre Carmody, "Veteran Critic of the Left Is Ready to Step Aside," New York Times, 19 January 1995. [BACK]

105. Friedman, "Selling Israel to America," p. 25; Robert Sherrill, "The New Regime at the New Republic," Columbia Journalism Review, March/April 1976, cited in Richard H. Curtiss, A Changing Image: American Perceptions of the Arab-Israeli Dispute (Washington, D.C.: American Educational Trust, 1986), p. 325. Peretz owned the left-wing magazine Ramparts until 1974 but reportedly sold it and bought the New Republic when Ramparts published an editorial critical of Israel. [BACK]

108. Saunders, The Other Walls, pp. 139–140. [BACK]

110. Ibid., pp. 40–41. [BACK]

111. Ibid., p. 46. [BACK]

112. The revisionist, or so-called post-Zionist, historians include Benny Morris, Avi Shlaim, Ilan Pappé, Simcha Flapan, and Tom Segev, whose books were published in the United States between 1986 and 1988. For aspects of the historiographic debate and a discussion of the debate and its effects, see Benny Morris, "The New Historiography: Israel Confronts Its Past," Tikkun, November/December 1988, 19ff.; Shabtai Teveth, "Charging Israel with Original Sin," Commentary, September 1989, 24–33; Benny Morris, "The Eel and History: A Reply to Shabtai Teveth," Tikkun, January/February 1990, 19ff.; Norman Finkelstein, Nur Masalha, and Benny Morris, "Debate on the 1948 Exodus," Journal of Palestine Studies 81 (autumn 1991): 66–114; Shlaim, "The Debate about 1948"; and Ilan Pappé, "Critique and Agenda: The Post-Zionist Scholars in Israel," History & Memory: Studies in Representation of the Past (ed. Gulie Ne'eman Arad), spring/summer 1995, 66–90. [BACK]

113. Pappé, "Critique and Agenda," p. 79, and Ilan Pappé, "Post-Zionist Critique on Israel and the Palestinians. Part I: The Academic Debate," Journal of Palestine Studies 102 (winter 1997): 33. All discourse on history in Israel, writes Israeli history professor Dan Diner, "is ipso facto discourse on legitimacy." The debate about 1948, he says, is a debate on the legitimacy and selfidentity of the state and is therefore deeply emotional. Dan Diner, "Cumulative Contingency: Historicizing Legitimacy in Israeli Discourse," History & Memory: Studies in Representation of the Past (ed. Gulie Ne'eman Arad), spring/summer 1995, 149. [BACK]

114. Shlaim, "The Debate about 1948"; Pappé, "Critique and Agenda," p. 71; and Pappé, "Post-Zionist Critique," p. 32. [BACK]

115. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. xiii. [BACK]

116. These books, which broke new ground in bringing aspects of Palestinian history to the fore, include Lesch, Arab Politics in Palestine; Ian Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel's Control of a National Minority (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980); Khalidi, Under Siege; Laurie A. Brand, Palestini ans in the Arab World: Institution Building in the Arab World (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988); Mattar, The Mufti of Jerusalem; and Muslih, The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism. A history of Palestinian nationalism published in the early 1970s—William B. Quandt, Fuad Jabber, and Ann Mosely Lesch, The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973)—is virtually the only book of its kind published before 1979. [BACK]


117. Cited in Young, Missed Opportunities, p. 134. [BACK]

118. In August 1985, Congress added to the two requirements of the Sinai II commitment the further stipulation that the PLO must renounce the use of terrorism. See Quandt, Peace Process, p. 572, note 24. [BACK]

119. For a fuller description of the Jordanian-PLO initiative and maneuvering over it, told from differing perspectives, see Young, Missed Opportunities, pp. 141–155; Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 351–356; Ann M. Lesch, "The Reagan Administration's Policy toward the Palestinians," in U.S. Policy on Palestine from Wilson to Clinton, ed. Michael W. Suleiman (Normal, Ill.: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1995), pp. 182–184; Dan Tschirgi, The American Search for Mideast Peace (New York: Praeger, 1989), pp. 203–211; Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, pp. 444–462; Samuel W. Lewis, "Israel: The Peres Era and Its Legacy," Foreign Affairs 65, no. 3 (1987): 582–610; and Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, pp. 654–666. [BACK]

120. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, pp. 453–454, 461–462, and Young, Missed Opportunities, pp. 143–144. [BACK]

121. See Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 360–363, for details. [BACK]

122. Lewis, "Israel," p. 598, and Hadar, "Reforming Israel," pp. 121–122. [BACK]

123. Lesch, "The Reagan Administration's Policy," p. 184. [BACK]

124. Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, pp. 706, 712; for a summary of the factors leading to the intifada, see pp. 677–685. [BACK]

125. See Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 364–367, and Lesch, "The Reagan Administration's Policy," pp. 184–189, for details on Shultz's efforts in 1988. [BACK]

126. Lesch, "The Reagan Administration's Policy," p. 185; and Peretz Kidron, "Re-run of an Old Movie," and Donald Neff, "Shultz Leaves a Ticking Time Bomb," Middle East International 323 (16 April 1988): 5–6. [BACK]

127. Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 368–369, 372–375. [BACK]

128. For descriptions of this mediation effort by both of the principals involved, see Mohamed Rabie, U.S.-P.L.O. Dialogue: Secret Diplomacy and Con flict Resolution (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1995), and Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 369–372. [BACK]

129. Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p. 720. [BACK]

130. Full texts of the PNC "Declaration of Independence" and the PNC "Political Communique," both dated November 15, 1988, can be found in the Journal of Palestine Studies 70 (winter 1989): 213–223. [BACK]

131. During an Arab summit meeting in Algiers in June 1988, Abu Sharif passed out to the press corps a statement in English declaring the PLO's readiness to coexist with Israel. The statement also expressed the PLO's understanding of "the Jewish people's centuries of suffering" and of the desire for statehood that grew out of that suffering. "We believe," the statement said, "that all peoples—the Jews and the Palestinians included—have the right to run their own affairs, expecting from their neighbors not only non-belligerence but the kind of political and economic cooperation without which no state can be truly secure. … The Palestinians want that kind of lasting peace and security for themselves and the Israelis because no one can build his own future on the ruins

of another's." Agreeing with Israel's desire for direct negotiations, the statement affirmed that the "key to a Palestinian-Israeli settlement lies in talks between the Palestinians and the Israelis." For the full text, see the Journal of Palestine Studies 69 (autumn 1988): 272–275. As previously noted, the U.S. government and press generally ignored the statement. [BACK]

132. Rabie, U.S.-P.L.O Dialogue, pp. 58–61, and Shultz, Turmoil and Tri umph, pp. 1035, 1037. [BACK]

133. Quoted in "A Dance of Many Veils," Time, 26 December 1988, 23. [BACK]

134. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, pp. 1040–1044, and Quandt, Peace Pro cess, pp. 374–375. Quandt reproduces the wording of Arafat's statements before the UN session on December 13 and at the press conference the following day. At the UN session, after explicitly naming Israel as one of the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Arafat said the PLO respected "everyone's right to exist, to peace and to security, according to Resolutions 242 and 338." He also "rejected" and "condemned" terrorism but did not "renounce" it. Shultz regarded the statement as not adequate because it did not directly enough recognize Israel's right to exist and did not reject terrorism in a way that admitted to having committed it in the past, a connotation the word renounce carries. [BACK]

135. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 49. Shultz also complained, somewhat disingenuously, that PLO messages were too indirect and were "delivered through a variety of channels." In fact, of course, the principal channel—that is, talking directly to U.S. officials—was blocked by the U.S. insistence that the PLO first pronounce a prescribed formula. [BACK]

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