POWERFUL INCUMBENTS AND SCARCE OPPONENTS
The difficulty of successful electoral rejection stems not just from illdeflned interests and crude candidate evaluations, but also from the limited pool of candidates requiring evaluation. Imagine that a relatively liberal Republican voter learns from liberal ideological elites that people with liberal values should support Medicare, cuts in defense spending, and a progressive tax system. Having clarifled some of her basic policy concerns, this earnest citizen might exercise her voice and ask for these policies from a conservative incumbent who represents her in Congress. Rebuffed by the incumbent, the citizen then prepares to become a voter exercising her right to attempt electoral rejection by studying the candidates opposing her Republican incumbent. This story might end any number of ways, but it is likely that this citizen-voter will end up frustrated by the range of alternative candidates available. In some stories, she is shocked to discover that there is no opponent in the primary or general. Or perhaps the incumbent has only a more conservative opponent in the Republican primary, or the Democratic nominee opposing the incumbent has views resembling those of the incumbent. Or, most likely of all, the Democratic primary election results in an opponent who is neither politically viable nor capable. Even if the voter had, in theory, all of the skills necessary to recognize her (and the larger public's) genuine interests and to evaluate competing candidates, she may flnd herself with no real choice.
Recall that in chapter 2, a necessary precondition of successful collective rejection of unrepresentative incumbents was the existence of alternatives. In the case of elections, this means that (a) one or more electoral opponents must have a chance of winning the election, (b) opponents' policy positions must differ from those of the incumbent, and (c) opponents must have at least minimal competence to pursue those policies in office. America has a long-standing tradition of debate and conflict, and its democratic political philosophy and institutions are primarily adversarial in nature.[70] Nonetheless, many factors
One reason that potential candidates often decline to oppose an elected official is that they dislike the personal criteria by which candidates are judged. For the highest offices, media coverage of campaigns devotes considerable attention to uncovering the "character" of candidates by scrutinizing their personal lives. Tempting targets, such as Gary Hart and Bill Clinton, have habituated the media to looking for personal weaknesses while covering the candidates in presidential primaries. Both the Democratic and Republican parties have been frustrated by the unwillingness of possible candidates to step into the political arena for this reason. Though the media pay scant attention to the personalities and family lives of lower-level candidates, there remains a widespread perception that campaigning for any political office exposes one to inappropriate scrutiny.
For similar reasons, flerce negative campaigning also has turned away potential candidates. Citizens contemplating a career in public service cannot help but notice the harsh television ads and mudslinging mailers exchanged by candidates in other races. Though a low-intensity campaign against an incumbent might never prompt such an attack on the challenger, prospective candidates must still weigh the odds that they will be unfairly attacked, or that their past missteps will be broadcast for all to see. Whether running for federal, state, or local office, the fear of becoming the target of a negative campaign makes qualifled citizens wary of seeking election.[71]
But even angelic candidates and thick-skinned sinners avoid running for office because of the long odds of defeating an incumbent. By virtue of their position, elected officials have numerous advantages over challengers. Members of Congress, for instance, can send mail to constituents without charge. They have travel and communication allowances, constant invitations to public events, regular media exposure, a district office, and paid staff.[72] Even before a campaign begins, the electorate is normally quite familiar with the incumbent's name, while unable to recognize that of the challenger. An aggressive campaign can reduce but not remove that advantage. After the 1990 and 1994 House elections, for instance, an average of 91 percent of voters reported having had some contact (from a piece of mail to a handshake) with incumbents, but only 40 percent reported contact with a challenger. Eighteen percent said they had met the incumbent, compared to only 3 percent who had met the challenger.[73] Given the frequency with which
The greatest advantage of incumbency, however, is fund-raising ability. The rising price of seeking the presidency has received considerable attention, but costs are climbing for other offices, as well. A tremendous amount of money has been spent on House and Senate races nationwide for decades, and the cost of election has continued to grow. Candidates for the House and Senate spent $740 million dollars in the 1997–98 two-year election cycle. To make matters worse, Gary Jacobson explains, "a vastly disproportionate share of the growing pot of campaign money has gone to incumbents and candidates for open seats."[74]
The average cost of contested races is far more than even those flgures would suggest. Some unopposed incumbents initially raise funds to intimidate potential opponents and keep them off the ballot, but once that task has been accomplished, "safe" incumbents raise relatively little money. The bulk of fund-raising and spending occurs in the handful of competitive races across the country. To take an extreme example, in the 1996 race for the lone congressional seat for North Dakota, one of the nation's least-populated states, with a relatively small economy, the Democratic incumbent, Earl Pomeroy, spent $971,000 defeating the $434,000 campaign of his Republican opponent (55 percent to 43 percent). High-proflle competitive races involve much greater sums. When Senator Jesse Helms, the long-time incumbent, fought off the challenge of Harvey Gantt in the 1996 North Carolina Senate election, Helms outspent his opponent by nearly two-to-one, even though Gantt spent $8 million.[75]
The national trend of escalating campaign costs has parallels for most state and local offices as well. In California, for example, it is now common for candidates for the state legislature to spend as much, or even more, than candidates for U.S. Congress in comparable districts. New candidates for the California legislature now need to raise $500,000, or possibly more, to compete against an incumbent. These high stakes for state races led one Los Angeles Times reporter to note that "even back-bench legislators attract $100,000 or more from single sources."[76] In New Mexico, one of the poorest states in the United States, candidates for the state legislature have in the past routinely run for office on budgets under $15,000. In 1996, however, a highly competitive Democratic primary set an ominous precedent, with three candidates
Aside from the daunting fund-raising requirements of an effective challenge, Gary Jacobson notes, the personal flnancial cost of running has escalated: "The investment of time and energy … required to run an all-out campaign is daunting. A serious House candidacy is a fulltime job—with plenty of overtime. Most non-incumbents have to flnance the campaign's start-up costs while forgoing income from their regular work for many months.[78]
The high personal and flnancial cost of campaigning has contributed to the dearth of candidates for public office. Surveying nine congressional districts in Tennessee in 1998, for example, the Associated Press reporter Rachel Zoll identifled only one credible challenger. The 1997–98 Tennessee congressional delegation included five Republicans and four Democrats, reflecting the parity between the two parties statewide, and in the 1996 presidential election, President Clinton defeated Robert Dole in Tennessee by just two percentage points. Nonetheless, no Tennessee incumbent has lost reelection to the House since 1974, and the 1998 elections proved no exception. When Zoll asked local analysts to explain the lack of credible challengers, they gave two explanations: the "intensive and intrusive media attention" candidates receive and "the high cost of running."[79] Tennessee is no exception: the number of experienced challengers choosing to run against congressional incumbents has declined from 1950 to 1990.[80]
What is true for national races is also true in low-proflle races. As James MacGregor Burns and his colleagues explain in their survey of state and local elections: "Getting good people to run for office is … a challenge. The spiraling cost of campaigns and the advantages enjoyed by incumbents have deterred many good potential candidates. Others are repelled by the nasty and negative tone of recent elections. Unless a democracy produces able citizens who are willing to run for office, itloses its ability to hold incumbents accountable.[81]
For these reasons, the opponents that incumbents face in both highand low-proflle races usually have serious liabilities. Some lack basic intellectual and political skills, and many more are political extremists. There is no way of preventing unqualifled candidates from seeking local, state, and federal offices, but it is striking how often such candidates appear as the only opposition on the ballot. This problem of unchallenged incumbency is by no means new. Just one example among
Although voters are asked to choose every year between well-qualified and politically distinct candidates, many of these elections turn out to be meaningless, because the challenger cannot compete against the well-funded incumbent. These challengers choose to run against the odds, but precious few ever manage to beat those odds. In partisan races in strong Democratic or Republican districts, challengers cannot overcome the unpopularity of their own party, and in more evenly matched districts, nonpartisan races, and primary elections, the incumbent derives a decisive advantage from name recognition and a larger advertising budget. The dramatic victories of underdog challengers make for good stories because they are the exception, but their occurrence in no way changes the overall pattern of uncompetitive elections.
There are situations in which voters have the luxury of choosing among equally qualifled and viable candidates. A few incumbents inhabit volatile districts in which every new election is as stressful as the last: the late George Brown represented his southern California district in the House from 1972 to 1999, but he only managed to do so by flghting off one challenger after another. He won his 1996 reelection campaign with 50.5 percent of the vote, and he won with 51 percent in 1994.[82]
Most competitive races, though, feature no incumbent—either because one lost in the primary or because the incumbent has chosen to retire or run for another office instead. When these "open-seat races" take place in even marginally competitive districts, they often result in aggressive campaigns and even higher levels of candidate spending. For example, after Bill Bradley announced his retirement from the U.S. Senate, two New Jersey congressmen ran against one another in the 1996 general election. The Republican, Dick Zimmer, was pro-choice and moderate on many social issues, but he nonetheless clashed with his Democratic opponent, Robert Torricelli, on many issues. With each of the candidates spending over $8 million, neither had a clear flnancial edge, and after a hard-fought election, Torricelli won with 53 percent of the vote.[83] The central question, however, is whether voters have a realistic
| Percentage Reelected | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Main Presidential Candidates | U.S. House of Representatives (%) | U.S. Senate (%) | |
| SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1997, table 447. 1998 flgures are calculated directly from 1998 election results. The percentages represent the number of incumbents who won both primary and general elections divided by the total number who ran for reelection. | |||
| 1972 | Nixon–McGovern | 94 | 74 |
| 1974 | — | 88 | 85 |
| 1976 | Ford–Carter | 96 | 64 |
| 1978 | — | 94 | 60 |
| 1980 | Carter–Reagan | 91 | 55 |
| 1982 | — | 90 | 93 |
| 1984 | Reagan–Mondale | 96 | 90 |
| 1986 | — | 98 | 75 |
| 1988 | Bush–Dukakis | 98 | 85 |
| 1990 | — | 96 | 97 |
| 1992 | Bush–Clinton–Perot | 88 | 82 |
| 1994 | — | 90 | 92 |
| 1996 | Clinton–Dole–Perot | 94 | 91 |
| 1998 | — | 98 | 90 |
| Average from 1972 to 1998 | 94 | 81 | |
Together, these factors result in a very secure incumbency for most public officials. Periodically, there is a public cry of "Throw the bums out!" Ross Perot tried to ride such a wave of protest into the White House in 1992. The reality is that even such elections result in little turnover. In the case of Congress, for example, 88 percent of U.S. representatives and 82 percent of senators won reelection despite the cry for reform and new candidates from "outside the Beltway" (see table 3).[84] For the House, reelection rates since 1972 have never been below that mark, though the Senate had a period of turnover following
Upon closer inspection, reelection is even more of a certainty than table 3 suggests. A few highly volatile congressional districts across the country account for most of the turnover. Most representatives have even higher probabilities of reelection, with 65–85 percent of House incumbents typically winning with at least 60 percent of the vote—a victory margin of 20 percent or greater. After studying the signiflcance of incumbency in 150 years of congressional races, John Alford and David Brady conclude that "personal incumbency advantage now rivals partisan advantage in its contribution to reelection margins."[86] Beyond the relatively high-proflle U.S. House and Senate races, typical state and local incumbents enjoy at least as powerful an inherent advantage over their challengers. Since these low-visibility races do not receive signiflcant media exposure and seldom attract well-funded opposition, these elected officials are often even more secure in their jobs.[87]