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Haddad's Southern Lebanese Army

Details of Israel's early links to Lebanese Christian irregulars along Israel's northern border come from Beatte Hamizrachi, an Israeli journalist linked to both parties.[95] When the 1975 civil war began, Lebanese army Major Saad Haddad moved to the south, where he soon initiated contacts with Adal, the Israeli army's planning and liaison unit for southern Lebanon.[96] Headquartered in the Israeli border town of Metula, Adal officers hoped to build up the region under Haddad's control to act as a buffer against the PLO and its Lebanese allies. Adal began as a small, unofficial group of intelligence officers, but it eventually became an influential body, due largely to its ability to influence the southern Lebanese militias. Haddad first met with Adal representatives in November 1976, and within months, his men were using Israeli uniforms, weapons, and funds.[97]

With Israeli encouragement, Haddad enlarged his enclave during the late 1970s, taking over both Christian and Shi'ite areas. His methods were occasionally brutal, as in the case of an October 7, 1976, massacre of fifty prisoners in Marjayoun, or the 1978 killing of prisoners in el-Khiam village during Israel's Operation Litani.[98] Looting, Hamizrachi writes, was the "unwritten law" of the land, allowing the victors to "do with the possessions of the vanquished" as they pleased.[99] Although Adal's involvement in the massacres and theft is unclear, Hamizrachi believed the Israelis wielded considerable control over Haddad's men. "Adal orders," Hamizrachi flatly stated, "were always carried out."[100]

A second border enclave was commanded by former Lebanese army major Sami Shidiak, with headquarters in the village of Rumeish D'bil.


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Although Adal officers worked with both Shidiak and Haddad, they reportedly found the former less cooperative. Again, there were reports of atrocities, as in the case of Shidiak's March 1978 attack on Maround a-Ras village, where his forces, bolstered by reinforcements transported into the area by Israeli forces, allegedly perpetrated killings and sexual assaults.[101] Israel helped link Shidiak and Haddad's enclaves during Operation Litani, creating a border strip that would, after 1985, form the basis for Israel's unofficial "security zone" under Haddad's successor force, the Southern Lebanese Army (SLA).

Israel's relations with the border militias grew increasingly close during the 1980s and 1990s. In 1999, a top Israeli official admitted that the army and the SLA "coordinated their military activity," while Yossi Peled, former head of Israel's northern military command, went a step further, stating that Israeli officers "set goals for the SLA … assigned them missions … and supplied training."[102] Israel paid SLA members a salary of $300– $500 per month, transferring a total of $108.2 million to the border militia from 1995 to 1999 alone.[103] Although the Israeli government argued it had no "effective control" over the group and was not responsible for SLA abuses, a report by the Israeli human rights group B'Tselem stated otherwise, arguing that the "responsibility of Israel for SLA acts is clearer than that of Yugoslavia for acts of the Serb militia in Bosnia-Herzegovina."[104] Reported SLA abuses included massacres, indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas, and torture in its Khiam prison, used chiefly for Lebanese suspected of anti-Israeli activities.[105] In 1999, an SLA commander indirectly acknowledged that harsh interrogation methods were used in Khiam, telling an Israeli journalist that one "would be lying" if one were to claim that "there were no beatings going on there."[106] Israel denied responsibility for Khiam goings-on, saying its representatives were not involved in the prison's interrogations.[107] In 1999, however, an Israeli commander acknowledged that his officers made monthly visits to Khiam to disburse some $30,000 in SLA salaries, and that Israeli security agents "collaborate with SLA personnel, and even help them in professional instruction and training." The officer denied, however, that the agents participated in the "frontal interrogation" of Khiam prisoners.[108] Details on the SLA's links to Israel's security services were supplied by a whistle-blower in Israel's Liaison Unit for Lebanon (LUL), the successor to Adal, who said the unit was a "shadow organization that supervises and commands the SLA," providing an Israeli advisor for every SLA officer. In Khiam, he claimed, Israeli agencies had placed "an instructor from the military police to advise


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vise the SLA jailers and administrators."[109] Despite official Israeli denials, in other words, Israel's links to the border militia appear to have been close.


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