THE MOTIVATION BEHIND CROSSOVER VOTING
We now analyze the motivational basis of crossover voting, using the tripartite typology introduced in chapter 1. One motivation is sincerity, which means that voters select the candidate they like best. A second motivation is hedging. In this case, voters actually prefer a candidate in their own party, but cross over to select their favorite candidate in the other party, thereby hedging their bets in the general election. If their preferred candidate in each party wins the nomination, then no matter who wins the general election, hedgers will find the outcome acceptable. A third motivation is raiding. Raiders vote for the putatively weakest candidate in the opposing party in hopes of helping their own party's candidate win the general election. The incentive for organized raiding—by which outsiders could determine the nominee—is what political party organizations fear most about the blanket primary.
Previous studies have found little evidence of hedging and raiding in American primary elections (Hedlund, Watts, and Hedge 1982; Hedlund and Watts 1986; Abramowitz, McGlennon, and Rapoport 1981; Southwell 1991; Wekkin 1991). One hypothesized reason is that most voters lack the political sophistication to vote strategically, particularly in a state like California, where the length and complexity of the ballot challenges the interest and capacity of most citizens. Knowing how to hedge or raid is thus not always obvious, and organized efforts to mobilize voters to act in these ways are likely to be difficult and costly. If so, then crossover voting should be mostly sincere.
A Los Angeles Times Poll conducted in October 1997 provides initial support for this conclusion. Among the respondents, 90 percent of registered Democrats and 82 percent of registered Republicans said the most likely reason that they might vote for a candidate of another party was simply that they favored that person. Only 7 percent of Democrats and 5 percent of Republicans said they would be likely to raid. Eighty-seven percent of the decline-to-state respondents also said they would choose their most preferred candidate.
Theoretical Expectations
The analysis undertaken here assumes that most crossover voting is sincere or possibly hedging. Essentially, we propose that crossover voting will be more likely among respondents with attitudinal or demographic attributes that deviate from the core constituencies of their party—for example, a conservative Democrat or a female Republican. However, it is important to point out that crossover voting under these circumstances could reflect either sincere voting or hedging. A conservative Democrat could cross over because he or she genuinely prefers the views of the Republican candidate. Likewise, because this conservative Democrat sits somewhere "in between" the two parties, he or she could also hedge to ensure that if the Democrat lost the general election, the Republican victor would be entirely palatable. Given these preliminaries, we can then ask, What are the likely characteristics of crossover voters?
One obvious hypothesis is that the strength of party identification should influence the likelihood of crossover voting. Strong partisans should be less likely to cross over than weak partisans. Similarly, crossover voting should be more likely among those whose ideology is out-of-step with the dominant outlook of their party. Thus, conservative Democrats should cross over to the Republican party at a higher rate than do liberal Democrats. In the same vein, crossover voting might also have some specific issue content. For example, pro-choice Republicans might have an incentive to vote for a Democratic candidate if the Republican candidates are explicitly pro-life (as Dan Lungren was in the gubernatorial primary).[15]
It is quite likely that ideology, partisanship, and policy preferences do not exhaust the reasons for crossover voting. Because demographic variables may function as proxies for political values and interests, they may affect crossover voting as well. In the 1998 California elections, gender may have played a role, as numerous pundits speculated about the attractiveness of Democrats like Jane Harman and Barbara Boxer to female Republicans. The presence of female candidates thus may cue gender considerations otherwise absent in an all-male race.[16] However, the effects of gender might vary across party, "pushing" Republican women to cross over more than
Race and ethnicity could also have impacts on crossover voting. Blacks and, to a lesser extent, Latinos are predominantly Democratic constituencies. Black or Latino Democrats should be less likely to cross over than their white counterparts, especially because the California Republican party is often identified with conservative stances on affirmative action and immigration that tend to alienate racial minorities. The ethnic background of candidates themselves might make voters' ethnic ties even more salient. However, in June 1998, only one nonwhite, Matt Fong, was a major candidate. It is nevertheless possible that Asian voters in particular were attracted to Fong.
Similarly, given that high income is generally associated with a Republican vote, rich Democrats may be more likely to cross over to the Republican party, and rich Republicans less likely to cross over to the Democratic party. In the current electoral climate, religiosity may also benefit Republican candidates. Union membership could function the same way for Democrats, especially in an election featuring the anti-union Proposition 26.
Two variables, age and education, do not generate clear directional hypotheses. Age could have a consistently negative impact on the propensity to cross over regardless of party, if one assumes that partisan loyalties, whether Democratic or Republican, ossify with age. However, to the extent that age is associated with increasing conservatism, as is the conventional wisdom, it should associate negatively with crossover voting among Republicans, but positively with crossover voting among Democrats. As for the influence of formal education, one hypothesis is that it will have a consistently negative impact on crossover voting, since educated voters could be more dedicated partisans. However, it is probably also true that educated voters more diligently consume political information, and thus are likely to learn about and perhaps support candidates in the opposing party. Furthermore, educated voters' greater cognitive capacities may provide the wherewithal to vote strategically. Education could also have a varying impact on crossover voting among Democrats and Republicans if it is generally associated with a loyalty to one party or another—e.g., if more education leads to a stronger Democratic party identification.
Data and Measures
To test the hypotheses spelled out above, we estimate multivariate models of crossover voting. To ensure an adequate number of cases for analysis, we rely on the pooled Field poll dataset. The choice of dependent variable again depends on whether we define crossover voting as voting against
Ideology is measured by a seven-point self-identification scale, with a score of one representing a strong conservative and seven a strong liberal (thus we refer to the measure as "liberalism"). Strength of partisanship is measured by "folding" the standard seven-point party identification scale at the mid-point to create a four-category measure, where one indicates independents, and four indicates strong partisans.[18] The only consistently available indicators of issue positions in our dataset are questions about two highly contested ballot propositions on the June ballot, Propositions 226 and 227. Proposition 226 would have mandated that unions obtain the permission of all members before spending their dues for political purposes. Proposition 227 radically limited bilingual education programs in California public schools. Proposition 226 failed by a narrow margin, while Proposition 227 passed easily. Although this interpretation is somewhat crude, we construe a vote for either of these propositions as conservative, and thus more congruent with a vote for a Republican candidate.[19]
Multivariate Results: The Governor's Race
The multivariate analysis is comprised of a series of logit models, one for each party-contest combination.[20] Table 5.4 presents the results for the gubernatorial race. The logit model for Republican crossover voting in the first column confirms several of our expectations. For one, the coefficient for liberalism is statistically significant and positive. As Republicans became more liberal, the probability of a crossover vote increased. Furthermore, the coefficient for strength of partisanship is negative and statistically significant, indicating that increased partisanship was associated with a declining probability of crossing over. The coefficient for gender is also significant and positive; other things equal, Republican women were more likely than their male counterparts to cross over in the gubernatorial race. By contrast, income is negatively associated with a crossover vote. The wealthier the Republican voter, the less likely he or she was to vote for a Democrat in the primary. Votes for both Prop 226 and Prop 227 are
| Republicans | Democrats | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Coefficient | Probability | Coefficient | Probability | |
| SOURCE: Field Institute, Field Polls (San Francisco: The Field Institute, 1998). NOTE: Table entries are logit coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is coded 1 for a crossover vote and 0 otherwise. The rate of Republican crossover was 27.8 percent, and the rate of Democratic crossover was 7.1 percent. Change in probability is the change in the probability of crossover voting associated with a shift from the minimum to the maximum value of the independent variable, holding all other variables at their mean values. *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .0001 | ||||
| Liberalism | 0.18* | .27 | −0.27** | −.07 |
| (0.07) | (0.11) | |||
| Strength of partisanship | −0.63*** | −.30 | −0.14 | |
| (0.14) | (0.20) | |||
| Prop 226 vote | −0.32 | 1.03** | .05 | |
| (0.22) | (0.34) | |||
| Prop 227 vote | −0.12 | 0.14 | ||
| (0.25) | (0.34) | |||
| Gender | 0.41* | .10 | −0.34 | |
| (0.20) | (0.31) | |||
| Protestant | −0.19 | −0.44 | ||
| (0.23) | (0.38) | |||
| Catholic | −0.06 | −0.24 | ||
| (0.27) | (0.39) | |||
| Income | −0.22** | −.18 | 0.23* | .04 |
| (0.08) | (0.12) | |||
| Age | −0.005 | 0.008 | ||
| (0.006) | (0.01) | |||
| Education | −0.04 | −0.16* | −.07 | |
| (0.05) | (0.08) | |||
| Black | — | −0.59 | ||
| (0.56) | ||||
| Latino | — | −0.79 | ||
| (0.54) | ||||
| Union member | — | 0.66* | .03 | |
| (0.31) | ||||
| Constant | 1.98** | −1.55 | ||
| (0.73) | (1.11) | |||
| −2 x log-likelihood | 664.3 | 339.6 | ||
| Percentage correctly predicted | 74.6 | 92.9 | ||
| No crossover | 94.9 | 100.0 | ||
| Crossover | 21.8 | 0.0 | ||
| Pseudo-R 2 | .11 | .11 | ||
| N | 627 | 743 | ||
Table 5.4 also presents the change in the predicted probability of crossing over associated with a shift from the minimum to the maximum value of the statistically significant variables. The results for Republican crossover voting demonstrate the power of partisanship and ideology. With all other variables held at their means, the probability that a strong liberal Republican crossed over was .27 greater than that of a strong conservative Republican. A comparable probability obtains for strength of partisanship. Income also had a strong effect: the highest income group is predicted to have a probability of crossing over .18 lower than that of the poorest group. Gender has a weaker effect.[21]
Comparable models of Democratic crossover for Governor, presented in column two of table 5.4, produce generally similar results. While liberalism has the hypothesized effect—the probability of crossing over declines with increasing liberalism—the strength of partisanship variable is insignificant. However, the Prop 226 vote is statistically significant. Support for Prop 226, which is in essence an anti-union vote, is associated with a higher probability of crossover voting among Democrats.
That gender is not significant in this or any model of Democratic crossover demonstrates that the "pull" effect of gender—its ability to keep Democrats within the party—is not as strong as its "push" effect—its ability to drive Republicans toward Democratic candidates. In other words, Democratic men are less likely to defect than Republican women are. Of the remaining demographic variables in this model, income, education, and union membership have significant effects. As income increases, the propensity to cross over among Democrats increases. Education has the opposite effect. As Democratic respondents become more educated, ceteris paribus, their propensity to cross over in the gubernatorial primary decreases. Curiously, the effect of union membership is in the opposite direction than expected: being a union member (or having one in the family) was associated with a greater likelihood to cross over and vote for Lungren. However, the associated change in predicted probability shows that this unanticipated effect was relatively weak.[22]
Multivariate Results: The U.S. Senate Race
Table 5.5 presents two comparable models of crossover voting for Senator. By and large the results for Republican crossover generally conform to those for the gubernatorial election, despite the differences in the size of
| Republicans | Democrats | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Coefficient | Change in Probability | Coefficient | Change in Probability | ||
| SOURCE: Field Institute, Field Polls (San Francisco: The Field Institute, 1998). NOTE: Table entries are logit coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is coded 1 for a crossover vote and 0 otherwise. The rate of Republican crossover was 13.7 percent, and the rate of Democratic crossover was 17.6 percent. Change in probability is the change in the probability of crossover voting associated with a shift from the minimum to the maximum value of the independent variable, holding all other variables at their mean values. *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 | |||||
| Liberalism | 0.45*** | 0.34 | −0.40*** | −.30 | |
| (0.10) | (0.08) | ||||
| Strength of partisanship | −0.40* | −.06 | −0.76*** | −.16 | |
| (0.18) | (0.14) | ||||
| Prop 226 vote | −0.74** | −.06 | 0.40* | .04 | |
| (0.28) | (0.21) | ||||
| Prop 227 vote | 0.13 | 0.31 | |||
| (0.33) | (0.23) | ||||
| Gender | 0.44* | .03 | −0.33 | ||
| (0.26) | (0.21) | ||||
| Protestant | −0.14 | −0.35 | |||
| (0.30) | (0.25) | ||||
| Catholic | 0.08 | −0.37 | |||
| (0.35) | (0.30) | ||||
| Income | −0.07 | −.04 | |||
| (0.11) | (0.09) | ||||
| Age | −0.002 | 0.005 | |||
| (0.008) | (0.007) | ||||
| Education | 0.02 | −0.16** | −.14 | ||
| (0.06) | (0.05) | ||||
| Asian | 0.55 | — | |||
| (0.52) | — | ||||
| Black | — | −0.18 | |||
| (0.32) | |||||
| Latino | — | 0.07 | |||
| (0.32) | |||||
| Union member | — | 0.11 | |||
| (0.22) | |||||
| Constant | −1.50 | 2.94*** | |||
| (0.98) | (0.77) | ||||
| −2 x log-likelihood | 414.2 | 621.0 | |||
| Percentage correctly predicted | 86.7 | 82.9 | |||
| No crossover | 99.4 | 98.0 | |||
| Crossover | 6.1 | 12.2 | |||
| Pseudo-R 2 | .13 | .16 | |||
| N | 600 | 791 | |||
The results for Democratic crossover voting for Senator, presented in column two of table 5.5, again confirm our theoretical expectations. Liberalism and partisanship have significant negative effects on the probability of a crossover vote. The coefficient for the vote on Prop 226 is again significant and in the hypothesized direction: a vote against unions was associated with a greater likelihood of a Democratic crossover vote to Fong or Issa. The coefficient for education, as in the analysis of Democratic crossover for Governor, is significant and negative. Among Democrats, a higher level of formal education was associated with a declining propensity to cross over and vote for a Republican candidate for Senator. The changes in predicted probability again underscore the power of liberalism and partisanship as predictors of defection.
Crossover voting thus derives from relatively weak party ties, sympathy with the ideological orientation of the other party, and membership in demographic groups generally linked to support for the opposition. This pattern of associations suggests that most crossover voting is sincere voting or hedging. If raiding were prevalent, crossover voting should be concentrated among strong partisans and others with an interest in sabotaging the other party's nomination process. Instead, just the opposite holds true.
Crossing Over Consistently? Synthesizing Electoral and Individual Motivations
Thus far, two sorts of motivations for crossover voting have emerged. First, the aggregate level of crossover voting tends to increase when voters confront an uncompetitive race in their own party but a competitive race in the other party. Thus, the percentage of Republicans crossing over into the Democratic gubernatorial primary was much higher than the percentage of Democrats crossing over to Lungren. Second, the multivariate analysis of individual behavior shows that the strength of partisanship and ideological self-identification consistently influence the decision to cross over. Taken together, these two sets of findings suggest that crossover voting
Further evidence for the confluence of electoral and individual attributes comes when we analyze the "consistency" of crossover voting—whether respondents crossed over in either the gubernatorial or senate race, or whether they crossed over in both races. We thus cease treating crossover voting in the gubernatorial race and crossover voting in the senatorial race as independent acts.
The incidence of consistent crossover voting—that is, in both the Governor's and U.S. Senate races—is quite small. For example, among Republicans who crossed over in the gubernatorial race, only 30 percent crossed over to vote for Boxer in the Senate race. Among Democrats who crossed over in the Senate race, only 18 percent crossed over to Lungren in the gubernatorial race.[24] Altogether, only 4.3 percent of Republican identifiers and 1.7 percent of Democratic identifiers were consistent crossover voters, demonstrating the important role of factors such as the competitiveness of each party's contest. Confronted with a competitive Democratic gubernatorial primary, a sizable number of Republican voters crossed over to Davis, Checchi, or Harman; by contrast, confronted with an uncompetitive Democratic senatorial primary, very few of these gubernatorial crossover voters preferred Boxer as well.
However, a simple descriptive analysis of the demographic and political attributes of consistent crossover voters demonstrates something more: as one would expect, these voters are even further out of step with their party than are those who crossed over in just one of the races. Table 5.6 shows that consistent crossover voters in both parties tend to be weak partisans and ideological misfits when compared to voters who either did not cross over or who crossed over in only one race. For example, only 11.6 percent of Republicans who crossed over in both races were strong partisans, as compared to 26.7 percent of Republicans who crossed over in one race and 43.6 percent of those who did not cross over at all. Those who crossed over twice were also less conservative and less supportive of Prop 226. Similarly, the Democrats who crossed over in both races were weaker partisans, less liberal, and more supportive of Prop 226.
This suggests that individual attributes and electoral circumstances combine to encourage crossover voting. Within each party, there exists a subset of voters with a predisposition to defect. In a sense, the party identification of consistent crossover voters in particular was an error in judgment. The blanket primary allowed them to find their true homes. Thus, these voters
| Strong Partisan | Prop 226 | Supported Conservative | |
|---|---|---|---|
| SOURCE: Field Institute, Field Polls, February–May 1998 (San Francisco: The Field Institute, 1998). | |||
| Republican crossover | |||
| None | 43.6% | 64.2% | 79.3% |
| One race | 26.7 | 48.1 | 71.2 |
| Both races | 11.6 | 33.3 | 56.6 |
| Democratic crossover | |||
| None | 39.5 | 12.9 | 48.3 |
| One race | 24.6 | 20.2 | 58.3 |
| Both races | 20.6 | 26.5 | 77.4 |