CROSSOVER VOTING IN THE PRIMARY CAMPAIGN
How did crossover voters cast their ballots in the 1998 California primary? Tables 5.1 and 5.2 present the distribution of votes for Governor and U.S. Senator, broken down by a three-point party identification scale.[12] To portray the dynamics of voter preferences as the campaign unfolded, we present a separate distribution for each of the four pre-primary Field polls, beginning in February and ending in May.
The Gubernatorial Nomination Campaign
One dynamic of the campaign, as in most campaigns, was the winnowing of potential candidates. The earlier Field polls presented respondents with a broader array of candidates than did the later polls, when the candidate pool had narrowed. A second dynamic is the electoral fortunes of the candidates over time, as presented in the "Total within Party" column of table 5.1. Here, the major story was the come-from-behind victory of Lieutenant Governor Gray Davis in the Democratic primary. In the March poll, he lagged significantly behind both airline millionaire Al Checchi and Congresswoman Jane Harman, but by May he garnered more than half (51.3 percent) of the votes for Democratic candidates.
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 also track crossover intentions over time and by party identification. Though the large majority of partisan voters did not cross over, a notable fraction did, even in the earliest Field poll. In February 1998, 19.8 percent of Republicans and 7.6 percent of Democrats preferred a gubernatorial candidate in the other party. In the Governor's race, crossover voting was primarily a Republican phenomenon. This is not unexpected, since one might anticipate more crossover voters where there is electoral "action," that is, in races with several serious candidates. In the gubernatorial election, the Democratic race was contested, while the Republican, State Attorney General Dan Lungren, ran essentially unopposed.
This arguably created an incentive for Republicans to cross over, since the outcome of the Republican primary was predetermined. Whether this incentive stimulated raiding, hedging, or sincere voting is explored below.
The magnitude of intended crossover voting in the gubernatorial race was quite stable during the four months before the primary, hovering around 20 percent among Republicans and 5 percent among Democrats. This stability suggests that crossover voting was not much affected by campaign events, by the shifting electoral fortunes of various candidates, or by the reduction in undecided voters over time. There seemed to be some fraction of voters in each party who were ready and willing to cross over, even as the likely winner in each race changed.
In comparing the vote choice of crossover voters and noncrossover voters, two findings emerge. First, and most important, similar trends affected vote intention within each group. In the Democratic race, Davis gained support over time among Democrats, independents, and Republicans alike. By May 1998, he won pluralities of all three groups. While both Republican crossovers and independents demonstrated a greater and more durable preference for Checchi than did Democrats, the similarity of the trends across parties suggests that most crossover voting was a genuine response to the perceived qualities of the competing candidates.
The Senatorial Nomination Campaign
As table 5.2 shows, the U.S. Senate race mirrored the Governor's race in that it featured one competitive and one uncompetitive primary. In this case, the Democratic nomination was a foregone conclusion: the incumbent Barbara Boxer was the only serious candidate. All of the action was on the Republican side, where the race became a duel between State Treasurer Matt Fong and car alarm magnate Darrel Issa, which Fong ultimately won.[13]
Just as in the gubernatorial race, this disparity in competition resulted in asymmetric levels of crossover voting. As expected, there were fewer Republicans than Democrats crossing over. By May the fraction of crossover voters had shrunk to 8.6 percent among Republicans but had grown to 15.8 percent among Democrats. As in the Governor's race, trends in candidate preference appeared in all partisan groups. At first, the vote choice of Republicans, independents, and Democrats was somewhat different, but as the campaign unfolded Fong gradually became the preferred Republican among each group.
In sum, the locus of crossover voting varies with the competitiveness of the contest both between parties and within each party. Crossover voting tends to increase in primaries with asymmetric competition, as voters desert their own party's uncompetitive race to participate in a competitive race in the
| SOURCE: Field Institute, Field Polls (San Francisco: The Field Institute, 1998). NOTE: The total crossover rates differ from those presented earlier in the text because here they are expressed as a percentage of all voters, including those without a preference (undecideds). | |||||||||
| February 1998 | March 1998 | ||||||||
| Republican (N = 318) | Indepedent (N = 56) | Democrat (N = 355) | Total within Party | Republican (N =496) | Indepedent (N = 117) | Democrat (N = 565) | Total within Party | ||
| Republican | 57.9 | 19.6 | 7.6 | 100.0 | 47.4 | 7.7 | 4.6 | 100.0 | |
| Lungren | 36.5 | 7.1 | 1.7 | 56.8 | 45.0 | 6.8 | 3.4 | 92.6 | |
| Riodran | 21.4 | 12.5 | 5.9 | 43.2 | |||||
| Peron | 2.4 | 0.9 | 1.2 | 7.4 | |||||
| Democrat | 19.8 | 32.2 | 65.6 | 100.0 | 20.1 | 28.1 | 65.0 | 100.0 | |
| Checchi | 10.4 | 12.5 | 16.3 | 31.2 | 10.9 | 17.9 | 20.0 | 37.6 | |
| Davis | 4.7 | 7.1 | 22.5 | 31.5 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 17.9 | 24.4 | |
| Harman | 0.3 | 1.8 | 4.5 | 5.7 | 5.8 | 6.8 | 27.1 | 38.0 | |
| Panetta | 3.8 | 5.4 | 18.6 | 25.8 | — | — | — | ||
| Vasconcellos | 0.6 | 5.4 | 3.7 | 5.7 | — | — | — | ||
| Other | — | — | — | 3.4 | 6.8 | 3.5 | |||
| Undecided | 22.3 | 48.2 | 26.8 | 29.0 | 57.3 | 26.9 | |||
| TOTAL CROSSOVER:9.0% | TOTAL CROSSOVER: 8.9% | ||||||||
― 83 ― | |||||||||
| April 1998 | May 1998 | ||||||||
| Republican (N = 353) | Indepedent (N = 99) | Democrat (N = 478) | Total within Party | Republican (N = 279) | Indepedent (N = 62) | Democrat (N = 373) | Total within Party | ||
| Republican | 51.6 | 6.1 | 5.0 | 100.0 | 65.9 | 14.5 | 5.1 | 100.0 | |
| Lungren | 51.6 | 6.1 | 5.0 | 100.0 | 65.9 | 14.5 | 5.1 | 100.0 | |
| Riordan | |||||||||
| Peroin | |||||||||
| Democrat | 21.5 | 48.4 | 68.7 | 100.0 | 22.6 | 48.4 | 80.1 | 100.0 | |
| Checchi | 11.9 | 23.2 | 24.7 | 40.5 | 7.5 | 16.1 | 15.0 | 22.2 | |
| Davis | 6.8 | 14.1 | 26.2 | 36.0 | 9.7 | 19.4 | 43.4 | 51.3 | |
| Harman | 2.8 | 11.1 | 17.8 | 23.5 | 5.4 | 12.9 | 21.7 | 26.5 | |
| Panetta | — | — | — | — | — | — | |||
| Vasconcellos | — | — | — | — | — | — | |||
| Other | 3.1 | 7.1 | 2.7 | 3.6 | 11.3 | 4.0 | |||
| Undecided | 23.8 | 38.4 | 23.6 | 7.9 | 25.8 | 10.7 | |||
| TOTAL CROSOVER: 10.8% | TOTAL CROSSOVER: 11.5% | ||||||||
| SOURCE: Field Institute, Field Polls (San Francisco: The Field Institute, 1998). NOTE: The total crossover rates differ from those presented earlier in the text because here they are expressed as a percentage of all voters, including those without a preference (undecideds). | ||||||||
| February 1998 | March 1998 | |||||||
| Republican (N = 318) | Indepedent (N = 56) | Democrat (N = 355) | Total within Party | Republican (N = 496) | Indepedent (N = 117) | Democrat (N = 565) | Total within Party | |
| Democrat | 9.4 | 35.7 | 67.6 | 100.0 | 47.4 | 7.7 | 4.6 | 100.0 |
| Boxer | 9.4 | 35.7 | 67.6 | 100.0 | 47.4 | 7.7 | 4.6 | 100.0 |
| Republican | 73.8 | 32.1 | 17.4 | 100.0 | 51.7 | 14.5 | 8.8 | 100.0 |
| Fong | 11.6 | 7.1 | 3.7 | 17.1 | 19.2 | 3.4 | 4.2 | 38.1 |
| Issa | 13.8 | 7.1 | 2.8 | 18.4 | 25.8 | 9.4 | 3.4 | 48.9 |
| Riggs | 2.5 | 0.0 | 0.8 | 3.5 | 6.7 | 1.7 | 1.2 | 13.0 |
| Wilson | 45.9 | 17.9 | 10.1 | 61.0 | — | — | — | |
| Other | — | — | — | 5.4 | 7.7 | 3.4 | 13.0 | |
| Undecided | 16.7 | 32.1 | 14.9 | 32.7 | 47.0 | 115.6 | ||
| TOTAL CORSSOVER: 9.2% | TOTAL CROSSOVER: 7.2% | |||||||
― 85 ― | ||||||||
| April 1998 | May 1998 | |||||||
| Republican (N = 353) | Indepedent (N = 99) | Democrat (N = 478) | Total within Party | Republican (N = 279) | Indepedent (N = 62) | Democrat (N = 373) | Total within Party | |
| Democrat | 11.6 | 30.3 | 69.7 | 100.0 | 8.6 | 38.7 | 73.7 | 100.0 |
| Boxer | 11.6 | 30.3 | 69.7 | 100.0 | 8.6 | 38.7 | 73.7 | 100.0 |
| Republican | 53.9 | 23.2 | 10.9 | 100.0 | 73.8 | 33.9 | 15.8 | 100.0 |
| Fong | 24.4 | 12.1 | 6.1 | 47.7 | 38.0 | 21.0 | 9.4 | 53.8 |
| Issa | 29.5 | 11.1 | 4.8 | 52.3 | 35.8 | 12.9 | 6.4 | 46.2 |
| Riggs | — | — | — | — | — | — | ||
| Wilson | — | — | — | — | — | — | ||
| Other | 4.2 | 6.1 | 5.0 | 2.9 | 8.1 | 2.9 | ||
| Undecided | 30.3 | 40.4 | 14.4 | 14.7 | 19.4 | 7.5 | ||
| TOTAL CROSSOVER: 10.0% | TOTAL CROSSOVER: 11.6% | |||||||