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3. Effects of the Blanket Primary

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8. Crossing Over When It Counts

How the Motives of Voters in Blanket Primaries Are Revealed by Their Actions in General Elections

Thad Kousser

The way a voter behaves in a general election reveals much about the motivation behind that voter's choice in a blanket primary. A Californian who crossed party lines in the une 1998 blanket primary could have done so for two reasons. She might have been sincere, crossing over out of a true preference for another party's candidate over any that her own camp had to offer. Or perhaps she was being strategic, backing someone who was not her top choice in the primary in order to help secure a favorable general election match-up (the two possible forms of strategic voting, hedging and raiding, are described in the introductory chapter of this volume). One way to discover whether a voter acted sincerely or strategically in the primary is to see if she continued to cross over in November or swung back to support her own party's nominee.

In this chapter, I analyze the general election voting behavior of primary crossover voters to gain insight into their primary election motivations. Exploring this link yields lessons that may interest three different categories of political observers. First, anyone concerned with the normative implications of the blanket primary wants to know why voters cross over. If they do so because they sincerely prefer a candidate from the other party, they are more likely stick with that candidate (and remain a crossover voter) if they have the chance to do so in November. However, if they are being strategic when they cross over in the spring, they may not continue to cross over. So tracking crossover voters' general election choices reveals whether the blanket primary frees voters to voice their sincere preferences, or opens up primary elections to strategic manipulation.

Second, political scientists who study American elections have long been concerned that strategic voting in open and blanket primaries can erode party responsibility. If crossover voters are able to swing nomination battles,

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party labels in the general election may become muddled and meaningless, with elected leaders tied to no coherent party platform or grass-roots organization. Scholars have explored the links between crossover voting and party responsibility (Hall 1923; Berdahl 1942; Ranney 1951; Key 1964; Cohen and Sides 1998), prescribed changes in the laws governing primaries to increase responsibility (Harris 1951; American Political Science Association 1950), and even provided expert testimony about the effects of blanket primaries on responsibility (Cain 1997; Alvarez and Nagler 1997).

Third, candidates, political consultants, and party leaders want to know how vigorously they should court the other party's voters in the primary and, if they are successful, how much continued support they can count on in November. Many conjectures have been offered on this topic. The architect of California's Republican Assembly campaigns in 1998, Minority Leader Bill Leonard, predicted that "if you can convince someone to vote for you in the primary, they will stick with you in November" (Ingram and Vanzi 1998).^[1] Was he right? If not, do primary crossover rates and the extent to which voters continue to cross party lines vary with the characteristics of the primary race in which a candidate is involved? Identifying any systematic patterns here can provide political strategists with useful information for deciphering California's latest, and short-lived, experiment with electoral reform.

This investigation tests the hypothesis—suggested by evidence from surveys and from statistical studies^[2]—that some portion of those who cross over in blanket primaries are voting strategically. Strategic voters may be hedging their bets by voting for the most palatable candidate from the other major party, just in case their party's nominee loses in the general election.^[3] The incentives for this type of behavior are greatest in two situations. First, voters might hedge if they think that their party's prospects in November are dim. For instance, Republicans might cross over to help a somewhat moderate Democratic candidate win that party's nomination in an East Los Angeles Democratic stronghold, but then return to the Republican fold in the general election. Consequently, strategic voters have an incentive to cross over into the primary of the dominant party, but not to stick with that party in November. Second, hedgers might cross into the more competitive primary (with more candidates in it), following the electoral action. If their party's race is uncontested, for example, Democratic voters may be tempted to make their vote count by crossing into the Republican party's more competitive primary, even when they intend to remain loyal Democrats in the general election. Strategic crossover voters, then, will abandon the winner of a highly competitive primary. By examining patterns in primary and general election crossover, this chapter investigates whether a significant number of California voters strategically hedge their bets in blanket primaries.

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RESEARCH DESIGN

To know with complete certainty whether crossover voters stick with their primary picks in the general election, I would need reliable information—perhaps in the form of longitudinal survey data—that tracks the same individuals through an election cycle. This ideal dataset does not exist. However, in the 1998 California gubernatorial and senatorial races, something approximating this information is available. An October, 1998 Los Angeles Times poll asked voters which candidate they remembered voting for in the primary and whom they expected to back in the November election. In the Governor's race, 63 percent of the Republican voters who had supported one of the three Democratic primary contenders indicated their intent to support Democratic nominee Gray Davis in the general election. It seems, then, that most of these voters crossed over sincerely, although a sizable minority showed signs of strategic behavior. The U.S. Senate contest revealed a similar pattern, with 65 percent of the Democrats who crossed into the Republican primary sticking with nominee Matt Fong in November.

Although the poll provides a useful starting point, this chapter looks beyond these limited survey data. One problem with relying on the poll's findings is that it was taken only once, in October. Respondents had to recall whom they supported on une 2. It appears that some made mistakes, since their reported vote totals do not match up with actual election results (or perhaps the poll's sample was not representative of the electorate, which would cause additional problems). Also, respondents were forced to predict what their vote choice in November would be at a time when impeachment hearings made the Senate race especially volatile.

More important, focusing only on crossover behavior in California's two marquee contests does not tell the full story of the state's elections under the blanket primary. While some voters may know enough to vote strategically in the statewide races that receive heavy media attention, are any sufficiently informed to be strategic in state legislative contests? Do some types of primaries attract more crossover voters than others? Are voters who cross into another party's primary more likely to be sincere, and thus likely to stick with that party, when the primary has certain characteristics? To answer these questions, scholars need to know something about crossover voting in a large number of contests.

In the California Senate and Assembly combined, there were one hundred legislative races in 1998, ninety of which were contested by both major parties. These ninety cases provide a good comparison group. While each took place under the same rules, the races exhibit a large degree of variation in many potentially important aspects such as the degree of competitiveness and the seat's partisan slant. Unfortunately, reliable survey data does not exist for all ninety of these districts (see Alvarez and Nagler's 1998

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analysis of five of them). However, in the appendix, I describe how an ecological inference procedure devised by King (1997) can be used to calculate crossover rates for both the primaries and general elections in all ninety contested seats.

In this case, King's method requires that I first measure the percentage of voters who participate in each district's Democratic primary. By definition, this percentage equals the proportion of voters who are registered Republicans multiplied by the Republican crossover rate, plus the proportion of registered Democrats multiplied by (100 percent minus the Democratic crossover rate). This is the equation for a line, and there is one line for every district. To estimate the point on each line where the district actually falls (and thus to discover the crossover rates for both party's voters), King's method employs two steps. First, realizing the crossover rates must fall between 0 percent and 100 percent, it places bounds on each district's location along its line. Second, the method plots every district's line on a single graph. It then assumes that each district's location falls somewhere on a bivariate normal distribution—geometrically speaking, a mountain—centered at the point where the lines most densely intersect. After finding the pinnacle of this mountain, the method estimates both crossover rates and confidence intervals around them.

I repeated this process to estimate general election crossover, replacing the percentage of voters who participated in the Democratic primary with the percentage supporting the Democratic nominee. While these applications of King's method require some questionable assumptions, they produce figures that are consistent with Alvarez and Nagler's survey estimates of primary crossover rates in five districts. The correlation between Alvarez and Nagler's survey findings and my ecologically inferred estimates measures 0.98 for Democratic crossover and 0.94 for Republican crossover rates. Though the estimates produced by the ecological inference are higher than the survey estimates by an average of 7.7 percent of voters, half of the estimates differed by 2.5 percent or less. With fairly reliable estimates for all ninety races, I can begin to compare crossover rates in primary elections with those from general elections. Admittedly, analyzing these district-level figures allows only limited inferences about individual behavior. Still, because the actions of sincere voters will produce different aggregate patterns than the choices of strategic individuals, some important cross-level inferences can be made here.

For instance, if all crossover voters in a race are voicing their sincere preferences, then those who crossed party lines in the primary will stick with the other party in the general election, provided that their favored candidate wins the nomination. November crossover rates will therefore be as high as primary crossover rates. There may be some drop-off in the rates

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if voters broke party ranks to back a candidate who eventually lost in the primary, but a nominee would be able to expect that close to 100 percent of his party's sincere crossover supporters would stick with him in November.

However, if voters are strategic, crossover support will be less "sticky." When voters hedge their bets by participating in the other primary while they actually prefer the nominee of their own party, they will reveal their sincere preferences by returning to their party's fold in the general election. If much of a candidate's crossover support comes from strategic voters, he can expect relatively few of these voters to stay with him when it counts.

Therefore, one way to find out whether voters are strategic or sincere is to see how much crossover support a candidate can expect to attract in November for every additional percentage point of the other party's members he captures in the primary. I call this measure—the projected percentage of continued crossover support—a "stickiness factor." A high stickiness factor indicates that a large proportion of the voters who crossed into a party's primary support that party's nominee in the general election. Stickiness is low when voters switch back to their own party in November. This factor should change with the characteristics of a primary race. I expect that certain types of primary races attract relatively high numbers of strategic crossover voters. An analysis of legislative races in both Washington and California suggests that many of the voters who cross into the primary of the party that has the most candidates or an overwhelming registration edge in the district are likely to be strategic. These "hedgers" are drawn toward the more competitive race or the one that is likely to produce the district's eventual representative (Cohen, Kousser, and Sides 1999). To confirm these findings, I will compute different stickiness factors for different types of races. If I find that the factor changes significantly in the predicted directions, this can provide further evidence for the hypothesis that strategic crossover voters (who show their true colors in the general election) are where one expects to find them.^[4]

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

This section begins with some basic statistics describing the ecologically inferred crossover rates (which are fully reported in table 8.7 in appendix A), and then estimates multivariate models of crossover stickiness. On average in California's 1998 legislative primaries, 21.7 percent of registered Democratic voters crossed into Republican races while 24.0 percent of Republicans participated in Democratic primaries. These rates are slightly higher than those observed recently in Washington State,^[5] perhaps because

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California voters were eager to try out the new blanket primary. In California's general election, the estimated mean crossover rates drop to 11.5 percent for Democrats and 16.9 percent for Republicans.

Two things could account for this decrease. One explanation is that nearly all of the new crop of voters who only participated in the general election (see note 4) remained strictly loyal to their parties. Were this the case, the November crossover rate would drop even if every voter who crossed party lines in the primary remained a crossover voter: the denominator of the rate would grow while its numerator stayed the same. But since survey evidence shows that the November-only voters in this election were comparable ideologically to those who took part in the primary as well,^[6] it is unlikely that they all remained loyal partisans. A more plausible interpretation of the drop is that it shows a sizable minority of crossover voters returning to support their parties in the general election. In other words, it seems that they acted strategically in the primary. In a pattern similar to the one revealed by survey evidence from the Governor's and Senate races, only about 53 to 70 percent of primary crossover voters demonstrated their sincere intentions by sticking with the other party's nominee in legislative contests.

Neither crossover rates nor the level of stickiness appear to be constant across legislative districts. Close races with many candidates and contests within the dominant party, when there is one, draw in huge portions of the other party's membership. For instance, consider Senate District 20, an open seat in Los Angeles's San Fernando Valley with a strong Democratic registration advantage. While an estimated 60.1 percent of registered Republicans crossed over to take part in the hotly contested Democratic primary, only 3.9 percent of Democrats participated in the Republican race. Other races of this type show a similar pattern. Yet the crossover voters attracted to these races, while numerous, are also more likely to be strategic than voters who cross over away from the action or into a minority party's primary. In SD 20, only an estimated 19.0 percent of Republicans crossed party lines again in the general election. Democratic crossover, though low to begin with, actually increased to 5.3 percent. Table 8.1 illustrates these points more generally by examining the relationship between the competitiveness of primaries and crossover rates in both the primary and the general election.

Looking first at the primaries, the table shows that crossover rates fluctuate dramatically, with voters following the action into competitive primaries.^[7] For example, although only about one in ten Democrats will cross over away from their party's contest when it is the closer race, well over a third of Democrats will vote in the Republican primary if it is more competitive. The same pattern holds true for Republican voters. The way that crossover rates are clearly tied to the closeness of primaries indicates that

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TABLE 8.1 Mean Crossover Rates under Different Primary Conditions

	Democratic Primary Is Closer	Percentage of Popular Vote in Absentee Sample Both Primaries Are Equally Close	Republican Primary Is Closer
Rate of Democratic crossover into Republican primary	10.4%	19.9%	35.6%
Democratic crossover rate in general election	8.2	11.7	14.1
Rate of Republican crossover into Democratic primary	37.5	22.5	13.8
Republican crossover rate in general election	18.6	17.7	13.7

many voters are being strategic. Why would a sincere crossover voter, interested in voicing her true preference rather than figuring out where her vote counts the most, care which race was tighter?

Patterns in general election crossover appear to support this conclusion. While a smaller percentage of partisans break party ranks in November in every type of election, the drop in crossover rates is especially large when a competitive primary has attracted many crossover voters. When the race for the Republican nomination is closer, Republican crossover measures 13.8 percent in the primary and remains steady at 13.7 percent in the general election. Yet in cases with a more competitive Democratic primary, Republican crossover plummets from 37.5 percent in the spring to 18.6 percent in November. These crossover voters seem to demonstrate their insincerity by returning to the Republican fold in the general election.

Examining the relationship between crossover rates and the edge in registration that one party has in a district reveals a similar pattern. Figure 8.1 shows a fairly tight correspondence between registration and Republi-can crossover in the primary: Republican voters are much more likely to cross party lines in solidly Democratic districts. The temptation to cross over (i.e., hedge) is strongest when the other side's dominance in the dis-trict is so great that capturing its nomination is tantamount to a victory in November. Consequently, hedgers in such cases should cross over in large numbers in the primary but then vote sincerely with their party in the general election. Figure 8.2 provides evidence that there are many hedgers who do indeed return to their party in November. This figure shows a much looser link between registration and general election crossover. Nominees from the dominant party can expect to attract many crossover voters in the primary, but they cannot plan to keep them.

Descriptive statistics alone cannot give a complete picture of how party strength and the competitiveness of primaries work together to shape

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trends in crossover voting. For this, I turn to multivariate regression analysis. I construct models that use the level of crossover support received by each party in the primary, along with other potentially relevant electoral conditions, to predict how much cross-party backing that party's nominee will attract in the general election. This allows me to compute the "sticki-ness factor," the boost in November crossover that a nominee can expect for each additional percentage point of the other party's voters captured in the primary. In these regressions, the coefficient of the independent variable "Primary Crossover" represents the stickiness factor.

Since I am most interested in discovering how this factor changes depending on which party holds a registration edge and which primary is more competitive, I include interaction terms to see if the effect of Primary Crossover shifts with the characteristics of the races. To do this, I first built dichotomous variables that recorded whether or not the district was safely controlled by the Democratic or the Republican Party,^[8] and whether there were more candidates in the Democratic or the Republican primary. I then include interaction terms, created by multiplying each of these four dummies by Primary Crossover, as explanatory variables in my models. Conse-quently, the coefficient for Primary Crossover alone gives the stickiness factor in districts with relatively even registration where each party fielded the same number of candidates in the spring.

I expect the models displayed in tables 8.2 and 8.3 to show that stickiness is highest in competitive contests for a weak party's nomination. These races are expected to draw mostly sincere crossover voters who stick with their primary choices in the general election. Close races in the dominant party's primary are expected to attract many strategic voters who return home in November, thus resulting in a small stickiness factor. Since I have no a priori theory about which type of district characteristic—party strength or primary competitiveness—should have the largest effect, I hypothesize that all interaction terms will be significant. This may not be the case, how-ever. To avoid drawing distinctions between the stickiness of crossover vot-ing where none exist, I begin by including all four interactions in an expanded model for each party and then eliminate those with coefficients smaller than their standard errors in a reduced model.

Both models include as independent variables the presence of incumbents and differences in campaign spending, which previous research has shown to be significant factors in explaining crossover voting.^[9] Tables 8.2 and 8.3 present the results of ordinary least square regressions explaining general election crossover. I present results from models of Democratic and Republican crossover separately even though the rates in each district are generated by the same political conditions. These regressions, then, are best thought of as "seemingly unrelated regressions." Yet because the exogenous factors used in each model are functionally identical, they constitute

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TABLE 8.2 Explaining November Crossover Rates of Republican Voters

	Expanded Model	Reduced Model
NOTE: Entries are OLS regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the percentage of Republican voters crossing party lines in the general election (N & = 90).
Presence of a Democratic incumbent	3.55**	3.55**
	(1.70)	(1.70)
Presence of a Republican incumbent	0.16	0.16
	(1.40)	(1.50)
Difference in total primary spending	0.000005**	0.000005**
(Republican ? Democrat)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Estimated Democratic crossover into	−0.15**	−0.15**
Republican primary	(0.07)	(0.07)
Estimated Republican crossover into	0.72***	0.72***
Democratic primary	(0.11)	(0.11)
Republican primary crossover x	0.18***	0.18***
more competitive Republican primary	(0.07)	(0.07)
Republican primary crossover x	−0.18***	−0.18***
more competitive Democratic primary	(0.06)	(0.06)
Republican primary crossover x	−0.10**	−0.10**
safe Democratic seat	(0.04)	(0.04)
Republican primary crossover x	0.002	−
safe Republican seat	(0.16)	−
Constant	3.90	3.90
	(3.40)	(3.40)
Adjusted R2 .82 .83 **p < .05 ***p <.01

a special case of seemingly unrelated regressions in which ordinary least squares regression yields efficient estimators. Because patterns for each party's voters appear to differ, I estimate models of Democratic and Republican crossover separately.

INTERPRETATION OF QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS

These results indicate that the stickiness factor changes with the relative closeness of primary races and the advantage in registration that one party holds. Indeed, the expected effect of primary election crossover rates on November crossover varies in exactly the ways that hypotheses about strategic behavior led me to expect. In table 8.2, for instance, the coefficient on the "Safe Democratic Seat" interaction term is negative. This suggests that when a nominee's party holds a strong registration advantage in a

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TABLE 8.3 Explaining November Crossover Rates of Democratic Voters

	Expanded Model	Reduced Model
NOTE: Entries are OLS regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the percentage of Democratic voters crossing party lines in the general election (N = 90). **p < .05 ***p <.01
Presence of a Democratic incumbent	−0.76	−0.84
	(1.11)	(1.06)
Presence of a Republican incumbent	1.44	1.28
	(1.55)	(1.53)
Difference in total primary spending	−0.000002	−0.000002
(Republican & Democrat)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Estimated Republican crossover into	0.07	0.06
Democratic primary	(0.08)	(0.08)
Estimated Democratic crossover into	0.72***	0.70***
Republican primary	(0.09)	(0.09)
Democratic primary crossover x	−0.21***	−0.21***
more competitive Republican primary	(0.04)	(0.04)
Democratic primary crossover x	−0.002
more competitive Democratic primary	(0.06)
Democratic primary crossover x	0.12	0.12
safe Democratic seat	(0.11)	(0.11)
Democratic primary crossover x	−0.03
safe Republican seat	(0.03)
Constant	−4.00	−3.50
	(3.40)	(3.30)
Adjusted R2	.84	.84

district, that nominee should not expect to retain much support from the other party's voters who crossed over in the primary. Similarly, the negative coefficient on the interaction with "More Competitive Democratic Primary" indicates that most voters who crossed over to take part in a highly competitive primary when their party's contest was not close will return to their party's fold in the general election. These patterns are clearest in the behavior of Republican voters, but they also appear to be present in Democratic voting trends.^[10]

The regression results from tables 8.2 and 8.3 are given substantive interpretation in tables 8.4 and 8.5. The coefficients of the interaction terms show how the stickiness factor shifts when different electoral conditions are met. By adding together the appropriate coefficients, I have created tables that display the stickiness factor for each party's voters in each type of election. For instance, the first row of table 8.4 can be used to predict the

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TABLE 8.4 Behavior of Republican Crossover Voters

Type of District		Average Primary Crossover	"Stickiness Factor"	Total November Gain
NOTE: Results from model explaining 83 percent of variation in general election cross-over rates; all differences significant at the .01 level. The "stickiness factor" represents the boost in November crossover that a nominee can expect for each additional percentage point of the other party's voters captured in the primary.
If the seat is marginal or a safe Republican seat …	• and Republican race has more candidates	11.8% x 0.90% = 10.6%
	• and primaries have same number of candidates	18.4 x 0.72 = 13.2
	• and Democratic race has more candidates	23.0 x 0.54 = 12.4
If the seat is a safe Democratic seat …	• and Republican race has more candidates	27.5 x 0.80 = 22.0
	• and primaries have same number of candidates	31.1 x 0.62 = 19.3
	• and Democratic race has more candidates	43.8 x 0.44 = 19.3

TABLE 8.5 Behavior of Democratic Crossover Voters

Type of Primary Election		Average Primary Crossover	"Stickiness Factor"	Total November Gain
NOTE: Results from model explaining 84 percent of variation in general election cross-over rates. The "stickiness factor" represents the boost in November crossover that a nominee can expect for each additional percentage point of the other party's voters captured in the primary.
If the seat is marginal or a safe Republican seat …	• and Republican race has more candidates	39.2% × 0.51% = 20.0%
	• and primaries have same number of candidates	26.0 × 0.72 = 18.7
	• and Democratic race has more candidates	20.3 × 0.72 = 14.6
If the seat is a safe Democratic seat …	• and Republican race has more candidates	10.7 × 0.63 = 6.7
	• and primaries have same number of candidates	7.1 × 0.84 = 6.0
	• and Democratic race has more candidates	6.7 × 0.84 = 5.6

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fortunes of a Democrat who won the nomination in a primary with relatively few candidates in a district that is not safely controlled by the Democratic Party. While this type of primary attracts on average only 11.8 percent of Republican voters, the Democratic nominee is expected to hold onto 0.90 percent of these Republican voters for every percentage point of crossover support captured in the blanket primary. This leaves the nominee supported by an expected 10.6 percent of Republican voters in November. By contrast, the bottom row of this table reports that the victor in a close Democratic primary in a solidly Democratic seat will attract 43.8 percent of Republicans but retain only 43.8 percent x 0.44 percent=19.3 percent of them in the general election. The difference between these stickiness factors can be explained by voter motivations. I hypothesized that nearly all of the Republicans who crossed over in the type of race described in the first row did so sincerely. They continued to cross over, while the strategic voters who crossed over in races such as those described by the bottom row returned to back the Democratic nominee in November.

The message from these data is that California's new blanket primary enticed many voters to cross party lines strategically, and that strategic vot-ing was most prevalent where one might expect it to be. But there is more to the story than this. Nominees care not just about how many crossover voters they keep in November, but about how many they can attract to boost their chances in the primary. To give some sense of this, tables 8.4 and 8.5 also report the mean percentage of crossover support attracted to each type of primary, and the percentage expected to stick around in November.^[11] Again, the pattern observed here matches up with hypotheses about strategic voting. Since sincere voters cross over only when they prefer one of the other party's candidates, the level of sincere crossover voting should not fluctuate with district characteristics that do not systematically affect voter preferences. Any significant fluctuations in the crossover rate can likely be attributed to strategic behavior. Indeed, these tables show that crossover rates are especially high when a close competition or one party's overwhelming strength tempts strategic voters to cross party lines in the primary. But the lower stickiness factors for these races reveal that many crossover voters return to support their own party's nominee in the general election, when crossing over really counts.

CONCLUSION

Taken together, these findings point out a striking irony: in the situations that allow a party to attract the most crossover voters, few of these voters will stick around in November. This leaves candidates, party strategists, and political consultants faced with a difficult dilemma. Should candidates in the party with the closest primary expend resources to capture the tantalizing

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prize of crossover voters when half of their cross-party support might evaporate in the general election? My analysis provides no hard and fast rules for practitioners about how to balance this trade-off. It does, however, highlight two practical lessons for blanket primary participants. First, no one can afford to ignore crossover voting when planning a primary strategy, because, especially in certain kinds of races, there will be much of it. Second, once a candidate has gained the nomination, she can look back at the type of primary in which she was victorious as a guide to how many crossover supporters she can expect to stick around in November.

These findings also contain lessons for academics studying voter behavior and those concerned with the normative aspects of political reform. Most important, both the clear patterns in primary crossover rates and the relationship of these rates to general election crossover show that a considerable number of voters are being strategic. This supports Abramowitz, McGlennon, and Rapoport (1981) and Wekkin's (1991) findings that crossover voters can help determine the outcome of a primary, and Cohen, Kousser, and Sides's (1999) conclusion that this behavior often has strategic motivations. Alvarez and Nagler's (1998) analysis of a 1998 California poll found that only 10 percent or so of crossover voters in legislative races voted strategically. The large differences in crossover rates and stickiness factors between types of primaries seen in this analysis suggest that in some races, at least, strategic voting is much more common than that.

What are the normative implications of this strategic behavior? By definition, strategic voters are not casting a ballot for their top choice. Other research indicates that they are hedging their bets, supporting the candidate from the other party who provides the most palatable alternative to their own party's nominee. Those evaluating the blanket primary might not find anything insidious in hedging. They should note, though, that the frequency of this strategic behavior allows voters to help choose the other party's nominee when their sincere allegiances still lie with their own party. Survey evidence from San Diego's Assembly District 75 shows that Democratic crossover voters provided more votes for the eventual Republican nominee than Republicans did (Alvarez and Nagler 1998). The findings of this chapter indicate that more than half of these voters switched back to the Democratic nominee in November, revealing that they had crossed over strategically.

APPENDIX A: MEASURING CROSSOVER RATES THROUGH ECOLOGICAL INFERENCE

To estimate the percentage of Democrats and Republicans who cross over in legislative primaries and general elections, this chapter relies on a method of ecological inference (King 1997). While valuable, it is important

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to recognize that this method is not without its critics (Rivers and Tam 1997; Tam 1997a, 1997b). Here I briefly discuss the application of King's method to the question of crossover voting, first undertaken by Alvarez and Nagler (1997) and Cohen and Sides (1998), and present crossover estimates.

Knowing only the number of Republican and Democratic voters in each district and the vote totals for each party, a researcher needs to make inferences about the number of Republicans who vote for a Democratic candidate (and vice versa). The first step of King's procedure, the method of bounds, uses logic quite similar to the reasoning employed by Hall's (1923) analysis of Wisconsin primaries. Hall reports that in 1918, while 192,145 primary voters cast their ballots in favor of Republicans, general election results suggest that there were only 155,799 Republicans in the active electorate that year. Democrats must have provided some of the Republican primary votes. The fact that only 112,576 Democrats turned up in the general election sets an upper bound on how many Democrats voted in the Republican primary. These bounds imply that Democratic crossover in this race fell between 36,346 and 112,576.

King's method constructs a "tomography plot," with lines in this case representing each California district. The x-axis gives the proportion of Democrats voting for a Democratic candidate and the y-axis gives the proportion of Republicans voting for a Democratic candidate. King assumes that the crossover values are most likely to lie at the pinnacle of a "mountain" (taking the shape of a truncated bivariate normal distribution) that is located where the lines are most densely bunched. His ecological inference procedure yields point estimates of voting rates across all districts derived from the mountain's pinnacle and a confidence interval mapped by the mountain's contour lines. King's method then uses a simulation procedure to calculate district-level estimates of crossover rates.

Using EzI, a program designed to compute King's model, I computed crossover rates in the ninety contested California Assembly and Senate races in 1998.^[12] I conducted separate runs of the program to estimate cross-over in the primaries and in the general election. Some of the assumptions made in both cases to provide input for EzI introduce substantive concerns in addition to the statistical criticisms of ecological inference. To calculate crossover rates, EzI needs to be fed the number of Republicans and Democrats who show up at the polls as well as the number of ballots cast for candidates from each party. While election returns give exact measures of the latter figures, researchers need to find a proxy for the partisan break-down of the electorate that actually turns out. The proxy that I employ here—Democratic and Republican registration as a percentage of major-party registration—is imperfect. In many elections, Republicans go to the polls at a rate higher than that of registered Democrats.

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TABLE 8.6 Estimates of Crossover Vote, with 95 Percent Confidence Interval

	Democratic Crossover			Republican Crossover
	Lower	Estimate	Upper	Lower	Estimate	Upper
Primary election	13.0%	21.7%	35.1%	11.2%	24.0%	41.6%
General election	6.0	11.5	19.9	8.8	16.8	27.9

The assumption that there is no turnout differential in this case, though, seems tenable. In part because of a large mobilization by organized labor to defeat a major anti-labor initiative, Proposition 226, Democratic participation in the primary did not lag behind Republican turnout, as it often has. General election turnout rates were also nearly equal.^[13] Another flaw of this proxy is that it assumes that every voter is a member of one of the major parties. Since 9.5 percent of those who cast a ballot for a major-party candidate in the 1998 primary belonged to a minor party or had no declared party affiliation, the EzI procedure slightly overestimates primary crossover rates. In the general election, this figure was 8 percent (Los Angeles Times exit poll). The nonaffiliates in each district are functionally assigned a party identification based on the major-party breakdown, and some are counted as crossover voters if election returns diverge from party composition patterns.

Tam (1997a) warns of another potential problem with this application of ecological inference. King's ecological inference model assumes both that the parameters (crossover rates, here) are uncorrelated with the regressors (registration figures) and that the lines in the tomography plot are all "related to one common mode" (Tam 1997a). Since I found that crossover does vary with the partisan leanings of a district, and since the tomography plot for this application does appear to be bimodal, I recomputed the estimates using the model extensions described in chapter 9 of King (1997). Specifically, I provided information about the relative competitiveness of primary races expressed in two different ways to the EzI program.^[14] The estimates were fairly robust to these changes. Estimates from each run of EzI correlated with analogous estimates at .95 or higher, and none of the means differed by more than 4 percent. Because the original crossover rates most closely match the survey data from five districts collected by Alvarez and Nagler (1998), I use these figures in my analysis.

Aware of the statistical and substantive challenges to the ecologically inferred crossover rates, one should not place great credence in the precise point estimates that EzI provides. Yet just as a weatherman will predict temperatures in a five-day forecast, this chapter reports and analyzes these figures because they represent a "best guess" about the direction and magnitude

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of voting trends. Table 8.6 provides an average over all legislative districts of the percentage of Democrats and Republicans who crossed over to vote in the opposing party's primary and those who supported the other party in the general election. It also reports the mean lower and upper edges of the 95 percent confidence interval surrounding each estimate in order to quantify the level of uncertainty that this application of King's method entails.^[15] Table 8.7 (pages 160 & 63) reports estimated crossover rates in each contested Senate and Assembly district in 1998, with districts grouped by party registration advantages and the competitiveness of the primaries.

APPENDIX B: CROSSOVER BEHAVIOR IN THE MARCH 2000 PRIMARY

Thad Kousser and ohn Sides

Using the same techniques employed earlier in this chapter, this addendum (and its tables, beginning on page 164) analyzes California's March 2000 primary elections to answer two basic questions. First, how many voters crossed over into the other major party's primary? Second, how many could be expected to continue to cross over in the general election?

Table 8.10 reports primary crossover rate estimates for both Republican and Democratic voters in each of the ninety-seven Senate and Assembly contests that both parties contested in 2000. Tables 8.8 and 8.9 group these races into the same categories used in tables 8.4 and 8.5. Average crossover rates into districts from each category in 2000 are quite similar to the 1998 averages. To estimate expected general election crossover, we used the "stickiness factors" computed for each type of race in 1998. If the relationship between primary crossover, the dynamics of each race, and general election crossover remains stable from one electoral cycle to the next, these predictions will be useful. Estimated November crossover rates in each dis-trict are reported in table 8.10.

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TABLE 8.7 Estimates of Crossover Rates in Each California 1998 Election

		Estimated Crossover in Primary Races		Estimated Crossover in General Election Races
Seat	Major-Party Nominees in General Election (Democratic Nominee vs. Republican Nominee)	Democrats to Republican Race	Republicans to Democratic Race	Democrats for Republican Nominee	Republicans for Democratic Nominee
Democratic Primary Had More Candidates, Safe Democratic Seat
SD 8	Speier vs. Tomlin	4.4%	49.3%	2.6%	34.1%
SD 10	Figueroa vs. Gough	5.5	46.7	5.7	22.8
SD 20	Alarcon vs. McCaulley	3.9	60.1	5.3	19.0
SD 26	Murray vs. Key	1.4	49.7	1.1	31.0
AD 7	Wiggins vs. Sanchez	8.6	38.4	6.8	16.8
AD 9	Steinberg vs. Dismukes	5.6	40.1	6.7	16.5
AD 18	Corbett vs. Nowicki	6.1	39.1	11.3	13.4
AD 23	Honda vs. Du Long	5.9	42.3	3.6	25.5
AD 31	Reyes vs. Jackson	22.7	19.4	14.3	11.7
AD 47	Wesson vs. Leonard	2.6	43.7	2.5	22.2
AD 49	Romero vs. Imperial	2.5	71.8	5.2	17.1
AD 50	Firebaugh vs. Miller	2.8	51.3	2.3	30.9
AD 55	Floyd vs. Eslinger	5.0	33.0	10.9	13.9
AD 57	Gallegos vs. Gonzales	8.1	38.2	4.7	23.7
AD 58	Calderon vs. Nunez	7.2	29.7	6.4	15.4
AD 62	Longville vs. Escobar	5.6	48.7	7.9	14.5
Democratic Primary Had More Candidates, Not a Safe Democratic Seat
SD 4	Desio vs. Johannessen	36.8%	12.8%	24.6%	6.5%
SD 28	Bowen vs. Knott	10.1	33.1	5.4	23.1
― 161 ―
SD 32	Baca vs. Ulloa	9.3	30.9	7.7	16.2
AD 15	Brydon vs. Leach	29.5	11.9	22.0	6.8
AD 20	Dutra vs. Zager	15.1	20.8	10.8	11.2
AD 30	Florez vs. Prenter	33.3	12.1	16.0	10.3
AD 53	Nakano vs. Eggers	8.2	39.2	5.0	25.3
Primaries Had Equal Number of Candidates, Not a Safe Democratic Seat
SD 16	Costa vs. Palmer	9.7%	30.8%	3.2%	32.2%
SD 24	Solis vs. Taylor	6.1	32.8	3.9	26.0
SD 30	Escutia vs. Robertson	7.8	27.3	4.8	20.7
AD 12	Shelley vs. Fitzgerald	7.1	30.2	2.9	26.1
AD 13	Migden vs. Bernard	6.2	29.8	2.5	25.2
AD 14	Aroner vs. Udinsky	6.3	30.6	2.7	23.1
AD 16	Perata vs. Marshall	8.5	28.2	6.8	17.6
AD 19	Papan vs. Ferguson	8.3	36.6	3.4	30.4
AD 42	Knox vs. Davis	7.5	30.9	3.3	30.3
AD 45	Villaraigosa vs. Hedrick	5.8	33.7	2.7	29.4
AD 46	Cedillo vs. Kim	6.0	29.8	3.7	22.7
AD 48	Wright vs. Woodes	3.5	32.9	0.7	25.2
AD 51	Vincent vs. Acherman	9.7	26.5	4.9	15.8
AD 79	Ducheny vs. Kinz	7.2	35.7	3.1	29.0
Primaries Had Equal Number of Candidates, Safe Democratic Seat
SD 2	Chesbro vs. Jordan	29.5%	15.1%	16.3%	9.3%
SD 12	Canella vs. Monteith	33.5	13.6	23.2	7.5
SD 18	O'Connell vs. Klemm	8.8	42.5	4.0	38.6
SD 34	Dunn vs. Hurtt	25.6	15.5	13.2	11.6
SD 36	Swift vs. Haynes	31.1	12.0	16.4	8.0
SD 38	Arkelian vs. Morrow	33.8	9.4	15.3	5.8
SD 40	Peace vs. Divine	9.1	37.1	3.9	34.2
― 162 ―
AD 1	Strom-Martin vs. Crump	12.6%	22.7%	6.2%	18.5%
AD 8	Thomson vs. Thompson	11.8	28.1	6.8	19.7
AD 17	Machado vs. Smart	10.3	29.	4.1	33.6
AD 21	Lempert vs. Atherly	7.1	41.3	3.6	37.5
AD 22	Alquist vs. Kawczynski	10.6	29.4	5.3	25.5
AD 25	Firch vs. House	41.1	9.6	32.6	4.6
AD 26	Cardoza vs. Hollingsworth	11.2	30.7	5.0	22.5
AD 28	Styles vs. Frusetta	39.8	11.6	28.7	5.7
AD 32	Tucker vs. Ashburn	46.1	7.7	38.7	4.0
AD 34	Figueroa vs. Olberg	42.1	8.8	28.5	5.3
AD 36	Calderon vs. Runner	38.1	8.9	24.0	5.7
AD 41	Kuehl vs. Jhin	12.1	29.1	5.7	20.3
AD 44	Scott vs. LaCorte	15.0	24.6	7.2	18.9
AD 56	Havice vs. Hawkins	4.1	16.5	14.4	10.1
AD 59	Christiansen vs. Margett	7.4	12.1	14.1	8.7
AD 66	Hockersmith vs. Thompson	29.0	13.0	14.7	8.0
AD 69	Correa vs. Morrissey	34.3	14.3	15.3	10.8
AD 71	Badger vs. Campbell	36.9	7.8	20.5	5.1
AD 72	Legas vs. Ackerman	35.6	7.7	3.6	4.9
AD 74	Fitzgerald vs. Kaloogian	5.3	1.4	11.9	9.6
AD 77	Carlson vs. Baldwin	35.0	11.3	23.8	6.4
AD 80	Acuna vs. Battin	38.0	10.	26.8	6.1
― 163 ―
Republican Primary Had More Candidates, Not a Safe Democratic Seat
AD 6	Mazzoni vs. Weiner	9.3%	27.8%	4.8%	22.1%
AD 27	Keeley vs. Chavez	13.3	23.3	5.4	22.2
AD 40	Hertzberg vs. Hammans	9.5	31.3	4.5	28.8
Republican Primary Had More Candidates, Safe Democratic Seat
SD 6	Ortiz vs. Quackenbush	18.1%	19.6%	7.9%	17.7%
AD 2	Sullivan vs. Dickerson	48.8	8.8	20.0	7.2
AD 3	Gruendl vs. Aanestad	47.6	7.4	11.1	11.8
AD 4	Norberg vs. Oller	47.5	6.9	23.5	4.8
AD 5	Davis vs. Cox	38.9	9.1	22.1	7.4
AD 10	Gravert vs. Pescetti	29.2	11.5	10.4	10.4
AD 24	Stokes vs. Cuneen	50.3	9.4	33.8	5.6
AD 33	Sanders vs. Maldonado	52.8	7.8	25.8	5.9
AD 35	Jackson vs. Mitchum	28.3	17.1	11.2	11.5
AD 37	McGrath vs. Strickland	35.6	11.4	10.9	10.8
AD 43	Wildman vs. Repovich	16.1	22.0	3.9	32.6
AD 54	Lowenthal vs. Alban	42.3	10.8	14.6	11.3
AD 60	Wong vs. Pacheco	47.4	8.0	18.6	7.9
AD 61	Soto vs. Demallie	25.0	17.3	8.7	15.3
AD 65	Quinto vs. Granlund	40.1	8.5	19.1	7.1
AD 67	Fennell vs. Baugh	58.5	6.8	12.6	9.3
AD 68	Matsuda vs. Maddox	46.1	9.6	12.3	9.1
AD 73	Wilberg vs. Bates	55.1	5.5	24.4	4.6
AD 75	Debus vs. Zettel	56.2	5.6	26.0	4.1
AD 76	Davis vs. Admire	11.7	27.3	3.2	34.8
AD 78	Wayne vs. Roesch	17.0	17.7	4.8	26.5

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TABLE 8.8 Behavior of Republican Crossover Voters (March 2000)

Type of District		Average Primary Crossover		"Stickiness Factor"		Total November Gain
If the seat is marginal or a safe Republican seat …	• and Republican race has more candidates	11.6%	×	0.90%	=	10.5%
	• and primaries have same number of candidates	16.5	×	0.72	=	11.9
	• and Democratic race has more candidates	19.8	×	0.54	=	10.7
If the seat is a safe Democratic seat …	• and Republican race has more candidates	32.3	×	0.80	=	25.8
	• and primaries have same number of candidates	29.4	×	0.62	=	18.2
	• and Democratic race has more candidates	43.6	×	0.44	=	19.2

TABLE 8.9 Behavior of Democratic Crossover Voters (March 2000)

Type of Primary Election		Average Primary Crossover		"Stickiness Factor"		Total November Gain
If the seat is marginal or a safe Republican seat …	• and Republican race has more candidates	37.6%	×	0.51%	=	19.2%
	• and primaries have same number of candidates	26.8	×	0.72	=	19.3
	• and Democratic race has more candidates	19.8	×	0.72	=	14.3
If the seat is a safe Democratic seat …	• and Republican race has more candidates	5.5	×	0.63	=	3.5
	• and primaries have same number of candidates	5.6	×	0.84	=	4.7
	• and Democratic race has more candidates	3.8	×	0.84	=	3.2

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TABLE 8.10 Estimates of Crossover Rates in 2000 California Elections

		Estimated Crossover in Primary Races		Predicted Crossover in General Election Races
House	Seat	Democrats to Republican Race	Republicans to Democratic Race	Democrats for Republican Nominee	Republicans for Democratic Nominee
Senate	1	40.2%	10.2%	16.8%	7.0%
Senate	3	6.3	28.1	2.5	23.9
Senate	5	15.6	20.3	5.4	19.8
Senate	7	22.2	15.2	9.6	14.4
Senate	9	3.1	31.1	0.1	26.2
Senate	11	13.6	24.1	6.6	22.8
Senate	13	6.5	32.1	2.9	26.4
Senate	15	40.8	11.2	27.0	4.0
Senate	17	41.5	8.5	27.4	4.0
Senate	19	46.9	8.6	20.0	4.6
Senate	21	9.7	34.0	5.3	27.0
Senate	23	3.1	54.3	2.3	27.3
Senate	25	3.6	31.3	1.3	17.1
Senate	27	15.2	20.2	7.5	19.7
Senate	29	21.2	15.2	12.2	8.9
Senate	31	35.5	9.9	23.3	5.9
Senate	33	40.2	7.8	25.1	3.5
Senate	35	32.0	10.8	20.8	7.1
Senate	37	50.1	9.0	21.6	4.5
Senate	39	13.9	20.6	6.6	20.2
Assembly	1	8.2	30.8	3.3	28.4
Assembly	2	51.4	8.6	34.3	2.5
Assembly	3	40.0	8.2	26.3	3.9
Assembly	4	39.9	9.0	25.0	4.4
Assembly	6	3.8	45.6	2.3	23.4
Assembly	7	8.6	26.4	4.3	22.5
Assembly	8	9.7	24.6	4.0	23.7
Assembly	9	7.7	24.6	3.5	21.6
Assembly	10	30.7	12.7	20.1	8.6
Assembly	11	6.5	36.5	4.0	19.0
Assembly	12	5.0	27.0	1.4	23.4
Assembly	13	3.8	28.4	−0.3	29.6
Assembly	14	4.3	28.6	0.9	24.6
Assembly	15	35.3	9.7	23.0	5.7
Assembly	16	3.3	31.7	1.1	23.1
Assembly	17	15.8	17.2	8.6	13.9
Assembly	18	5.6	31.9	2.2	26.4
Assembly	19	5.2	37.8	2.2	30.1
― 166 ―
Assembly	20	9.0%	26.9%	3.6%	25.5%
Assembly	21	11.3	18.8	5.6	15.7
Assembly	22	10.5	26.6	4.6	25.1
Assembly	23	3.1	51.0	2.1	25.9
Assembly	24	20.8	16.3	7.7	15.4
Assembly	25	41.9	9.8	17.6	6.5
Assembly	26	8.4	30.0	3.3	27.8
Assembly	27	8.0	27.2	2.9	25.8
Assembly	28	21.7	16.0	12.7	12.2
Assembly	29	50.5	6.8	33.5	1.4
Assembly	30	8.9	28.9	3.6	27.0
Assembly	31	9.9	27.6	5.4	23.1
Assembly	32	55.9	7.3	37.3	1.0
Assembly	33	51.1	7.3	34.0	1.6
Assembly	34	52.3	7.9	22.6	3.2
Assembly	35	9.9	27.7	4.2	20.9
Assembly	36	38.1	9.5	25.0	5.2
Assembly	37	27.4	15.7	17.9	8.4
Assembly	38	34.2	10.4	13.9	8.2
Assembly	39	4.1	36.2	1.2	29.3
Assembly	40	6.0	30.3	1.1	30.8
Assembly	41	9.6	24.5	4.7	15.7
Assembly	42	2.5	54.4	1.8	27.5
Assembly	43	14.1	21.0	7.6	16.9
Assembly	44	9.9	24.7	4.9	15.7
Assembly	46	4.0	32.9	0.9	27.3
Assembly	47	4.2	24.0	0.6	21.7
Assembly	48	3.1	26.4	−0.2	23.3
Assembly	50	7.3	25.6	3.2	22.3
Assembly	51	3.5	36.2	1.6	19.3
Assembly	52	8.0	25.6	2.1	26.7
Assembly	53	9.8	31.5	4.4	28.6
Assembly	54	17.6	18.5	5.4	21.5
Assembly	55	2.0	50.2	1.1	25.7
Assembly	56	22.4	18.5	7.7	20.8
Assembly	57	3.6	46.8	2.3	23.9
Assembly	58	7.3	27.2	3.3	23.2
Assembly	59	52.5	7.2	22.6	2.6
― 167 ―
Assembly	60	47.8	9.3	31.8	3.6
Assembly	61	27.1	15.3	10.7	13.6
Assembly	62	6.7	29.9	2.9	19.6
Assembly	63	40.5	9.5	18.2	6.5
Assembly	64	34.3	9.9	22.4	6.0
Assembly	65	48.5	7.6	20.7	3.5
Assembly	66	58.2	5.6	25.4	0.2
Assembly	67	52.6	5.8	22.6	1.2
Assembly	68	38.8	10.8	25.6	6.0
Assembly	69	16.3	21.4	8.4	20.4
Assembly	70	29.7	10.5	17.9	7.0
Assembly	71	41.1	6.8	18.3	4.0
Assembly	72	64.1	5.9	28.2	−0.4
Assembly	73	39.9	7.6	26.2	3.5
Assembly	74	55.3	5.8	23.9	0.9
Assembly	75	41.4	6.9	18.5	4.0
Assembly	76	11.5	24.9	3.6	24.6
Assembly	77	35.0	9.2	14.2	6.9
Assembly	78	11.0	24.3	2.5	27.6
Assembly	79	4.2	44.8	1.8	39.1
Assembly	80	29.0	11.4	17.5	7.8

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NOTES

REFERENCES

Abramowitz, Alan; ohn McGlennon; and Ronald Rapoport. 1981. “A Note on Strategic Voting in a Primary Election.” Journal of Politics 43: 899–904.

Alvarez, R. Michael, and onathan Nagler. 1997. “Analysis of Crossover and Strategic Voting.” Expert testimony in California Democratic Party et al. v. ones (1997).

Alvarez, R. Michael, and onathan Nagler. 1998. Preliminary Report on une 2, 1998, Exit Poll. Riverside, CA: Alvarez and Nagler Political Research Group.

American Political Science Association, Committee on Political Parties. 1950. “Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System.” American Political Science Review 44 (supp.).

Berdahl, Clarence A.1942. “Party Membership in the United States.” American Political Science Review 36: 16–50, 241–62.

Bernstein, Dan. 1998. “Blanket Primary Erases Party Lines.” Sacramento Bee, une 7, A1.

Cain, Bruce E.1997. “Report on Blanket and Open Primaries.” Expert testimony in California Democratic Party et al. v. ones, 984 F. Supp. 1288 (1997).

“California Journal's District-by-District Analysis: Assembly.” 1998. California Journal 29 (May): 39–54.

Cohen, Jonathan; Thad Kousser; and ohn Sides. 1999. “Sincere Voting, Hedging, and Raiding: Testing a Formal Model of Crossover Voting in Blanket Primaries.”

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Paper presented at the 1999 American Political Science Association meetings, Atlanta, Georgia.

Cohen, Jonathan, and John Sides. 1998. “The Incidence and Importance of Cross-over Voting in a Blanket Primary: Washington State Senate Elections,” 1986–1996." Institute for Governmental Studies: Working paper 98–6.

DiCamillo, Mark. 1998. “Californians Vote in the State's First Blanket Primary.” IGS Public Affairs Report 39 (September): 1, 4–5.

Freedman, D. A., et al.1998. “On 'Solutions' to the Ecological Inference Problem.” Technical Report No. 515, Statistics Department, University of California, Berkeley (April).

Hall, Arnold Bennet. 1923. “The Direct Primary and Party Responsibility in Wisconsin.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (March): 40–54.

Harris, oseph P.1951. A Model Direct Primary Election System: Report of the Committee on the Direct Primary. New York: National Municipal League.

Ingram, Carl, and Max Vanzi. 1998. “Campaign Expenses Soar for First 'Blanket' Primary.” Los Angeles Times, May 8, 1998: 3.

Jones, Bill. 1998a. 1998 California Primary Election: Campaign Receipts, Expenditures, Cash-On-Hand, and Debts for State Candidates and Officeholders. Sacramento.

Jones, Bill. 1998b. Report of Registration: September1998. Sacramento.

Jones, Bill. 1998c. Statement of Vote: Primary Election, une 2,1998. Sacramento.

Jones, Bill. 1998d. Preliminary Returns from General Election1998. Sacramento.

Key, V. O.1964. Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups. 5th ed. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell.

King, Gary. 1997. A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem: Reconstructing Individual Behavior from Aggregate Data. Princeton, N: Princeton University Press.

Kousser, Morgan. 1996. “Estimating the Partisan Consequences of Redistricting—Simply.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 21 (November): 521–41.

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Rivers, Douglas, and Wendy Tam. 1997. “Yet Another Solution to the Ecological Regression Problem.” Unpublished ms. Available on the Political Methodology server: http://wizard.ucr.edu/polmeth.

Rocca, Helen M.1927. Nominating Methods, with Special Reference to the Direct Primary. Washington, D.C.: National League of Women Voters.

Tam, Wendy. 1997a. “Iff the Assumptions Fit … ” Unpublished ms. Available on the Political Methodology server: http://wizard.ucr.edu/polmeth.

Tam, Wendy. 1997b. “Structural Shifts and Deterministic Regime Switching in Aggregate Data Analysis.” Unpublished ms. Available on the Political Methodology server: http://wizard.ucr.edu/polmeth.

Trounstine, Phillip. 1998. “Political Labels Don't Stick in Open-Primary Season.” San Jose Mercury News, February 22, 1998: C1.

Wekkin, Gary D.1991. “Why Crossover Voters Are Not ‘Mischievous Voters': The Segmented Partisanship Hypothesis.” American Politics Quarterly 19 (April): 229–47.

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9. Candidates, Donors, and Voters in California's Blanket Primary Elections

Wendy K. Tam Cho and Brian J. Gaines

In March of 1996, by a 59.5 percent to 40.5 percent vote, California voters approved Proposition 198, thereby changing the state's primary election law from closed to open. A large majority of citizens undoubtedly consider electoral law to be exceptionally esoteric, even less worthy of attention than normal party politics. By contrast, professional politicians quite sensibly take great interest in electoral mechanisms, as is evident from the heated arguments at the elite level that preceded and, especially, followed Proposition 198's passage. In this chapter, we do not directly take sides on the merits and demerits of the "blanket" primary. Nor do we thoroughly dissect the logic of arguments advanced by Proposition 198's friends and foes. Instead, we proceed by addressing their claims empirically: did opening the primaries have any of its anticipated consequences? We compare California's 1998 elections with those of 1992, 1994, and 1996 in search of significant, systematic changes in the behavior of candidates, voters, and campaign contributors. Our main conclusion is that these actors were slow to react to new strategic opportunities. Changes in political behavior may have manifested themselves had the Supreme Court not overturned California's Proposition 198 in June of 2000; people require time and practice to understand a new electoral system.

The chapter proceeds as follows. We begin by reviewing the debate that surrounded Proposition 198. Our goal is to extract hypotheses about the anticipated effects of a blanket primary law from arguments made by proponents and opponents in the Proposition198 campaign. We then examine data from recent elections (both primary and general) to assess how accurate these hypotheses were. Specifically, we compare the 1998 election to its immediate predecessors. In examining the hypotheses, we focus on issues related to participation and campaign contributions. Finally, we conclude

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with some general discussion about when changes in electoral law should or should not be expected to affect outcomes.

In trying to identify what effects the change in California's primary rules (or, indeed, any change in electoral law) ought to have had, a natural way to start is by reviewing who promoted the change and who opposed it. In the next section, then, we consider what effects the pro–and anti–Proposition 198 forces highlighted in the spring 1996 campaign. We then turn attention to 1998's legislative races, especially the contests for the U.S. House, to evaluate these hypotheses against the first run of the blanket primary system in California.

HYPOTHESES ABOUT BLANKET PRIMARIES

Prior to its debut in June of 1998, the blanket primary was regarded as something of a wild card by disinterested observers. In a preview of the election, CQ Weekly Report summarized, "Most pollsters and political consultants have been unable to predict how the new system will affect election results" (Birtel 1998, 1373). In the absence of expert consensus, a natural place to find hypotheses about the likely effects of Proposition 198 is the "official" debate provided to voters by the Secretary of State in the voters' handbook. In this official state publication, opponents and proponents of each initiative present short statements in support of their positions. The state then circulates these pamphlets with ballots.^[1] Each side can also rebut the other side's claims, so this exchange provides the interested voter with a four-part debate on the merits of the policy at hand. The debate on Proposition 198 was not atypical, in that the arguments made on both sides were a blend of specific claims with a somewhat clear logic, vague and probably untestable points, and plentiful rhetoric. Again, in this chapter we will not dwell on the task of elucidating the logic behind the various positive and negative claims made about blanket primaries. Instead, we will regard these propositions as worthy of investigation and proceed directly to evaluating their empirical veracity.

Supporters of Proposition 198 broached three direct and two indirect arguments. Their direct arguments were that the switch to a blanket primary would "give voters a choice," "increase voter participation," and "restore healthy competition." One of their indirect arguments was that the blanket primary was not an untried experiment: other states had already adopted such laws (and, implicitly, had thereby succeeded in improving something about their politics). California's "closed" primary system was said to be broadly incompatible with Californians' tastes for independence. Further, Proposition 198's opponents were described as "hard liners" in both major political parties who opposed the blanket primary because it

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would weaken their own powers and the powers of the "special interests" that support them.

In the rebuttal to the anti–Proposition 198 claims, the proponents stressed the value of having a choice. The ability to choose from all candidates was said to have a number of beneficial results: it makes elected officials more responsive to voters and not to party chairmen; it encourages candidates to address the issues rather than simply to make partisan appeals; it gives control to the voters and takes it away from special interest groups; and it strengthens the parties by increasing participation and by allowing candidates from both parties to be elected with broader bases of voter support.

The opponents of Proposition 198 adopted a not atypical style of rhetoric and repetition in their argument. The word "No" occurs seven times in the initial one-page brief, four times in capital letters and three times with exclamation points. They stressed that only voters who are registered with a political party should be able to take part in picking that party's flag bearers, but were light on justifications for this position. Their most explicit argument was that "self-serving politicians," "special interests and political consultants" would abuse the blanket system. Mention of "massive checkbooks" implied that the blanket primary might ultimately prove to be far more expensive than its closed counterpart. And, somewhat prophetically, they raised the specter of the "badly drafted" initiative "clogging up" the courts.

In their rebuttal to supporting arguments, the opponents raised one other issue, that the blanket primary would exacerbate convergence of the parties. In this claim, they seem to have been agreeing with those proponents who contended that the blanket primary offers advantages to moderate candidates, while, of course, disagreeing on the normative status of this feature.

In all, we extracted the following testable hypotheses about the blanket primary from the voter's handbook.

• Turnout could be higher, both because of direct expansion of voting opportunities for a significant portion of the eligible electorate and because (as asserted next) races could be more competitive.
• Races—both primary and general—could, on average, be more competitive.
• Nonpartisan registration could soar, as voters were freed from artificial attractions to party registration.
• Moderate candidates could enjoy better results, leading to (more) convergence of parties.
• Primary campaigns could become more substantive and issue-based.

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― 174 ―
• Spending could increase, and special-interest spending could increase dramatically.

We will not examine all of these hypotheses in this chapter. Some are examined in other chapters of this volume (see, e.g., Gerber's chapter 10 on candidate moderation). Others, such as those concerning the amount of substance in campaigns, would require extremely time-consuming content analysis of speeches, TV advertisements, newspaper coverage, and so forth.

Instead, we focus on the hypotheses related to voter participation and campaign finance. First, did voter turnout increase in 1998? Second, were the races in the primary or the general systematically more competitive? Third, is there evidence that financial contributions and campaign spending were different under the new regime? Did candidates spend more, on average? Did their expenditures become more front-loaded? Did contributors give more to campaigns? Did the timing of contributions shift to the primary election?

These are not, of course, unrelated questions. High turnout, high spending, and close races are frequent companions (e.g., Cox and Munger 1989). It is generally true that close elections are marked by higher turnout and by higher spending than are landslides. What is not obvious is what is cause and what effect. The closeness of the final election is undoubtedly affected by candidates' campaign choices, donors' decisions, and citizens' selections, in a complicated, interactive, multistage process. Fortunately, to answer our central query—Did the introduction of the blanket primary change political behavior?—we need not grapple with the many facets of strategy in elections all at once. Instead, we will examine various electoral issues in sequence, without attempting to delineate a precise causal logic.

Voter Participation

Figure 9.1 shows rates of registration and turnout trends for California for all election years since 1944, when the legislative and presidential primaries were first synchronized.^[2] For all four series, the denominator is voting-age population. Figures for registration include nonpartisan registrants, and turnout is measured by the total number of ballots cast. Not surprisingly, citizens are more likely to register and to vote in general elections than in primaries, year in and year out. The gap is especially pronounced in voting. The general election turnout figure displays a familiar saw-tooth pattern also evident in national data: presidential-election years always draw larger shares of the electorate to the polls than do midterms. That effect is much less obvious or regular in primary elections. Finally, both turnout series exhibit (familiar) negative trends over the postwar era, while the registration

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series are fairly flat since about 1960, and even display a small upturn in the 1990s.

What is of immediate interest is whether the blanket primary delivered on the promise of increasing voter participation. Primary turnout in 1998 was 29.8 percent, just slightly lower than the 31.1 percent in 1996. If one compares prior midterms, though, 1998 represents a positive swing. The years 1986, 1990, and 1994 saw primary election turnout rates of 28.1 percent, 28.0 percent, and 26.2 percent, for an average of 27.4 percent. Hence, one can interpret 1998 as having shown a roughly 2.4 percent surge in primary turnout. Note, however, that this surge did not carry over to the general. Also note that the blanket primary almost automatically guaranteed some rise in turnout, since it expanded voting opportunities for about 1.8 million voters who were registered, but not affiliated with any party. These voters could have made the trip to the polls under a closed system, but they were not permitted to participate in partisan primary races, so only ballot initiatives and local elections beckoned. Without a breakdown of participation by registration status, we cannot say definitively if the new primary law increased participation rates in any partisan subgroup, or simply expanded the reasons to show up for a new bloc of voters, who then participated in about the same numbers as did others. Quick calculations show that the numbers are, at least, consistent with this latter interpretation. If about 27.4 percent of registered partisans turned out to vote in the

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1998 primaries, that would account for roughly 5.7 million votes, leaving about five hundred thousand votes unaccounted for. If those were the votes of nonpartisan registrants, that would imply a 27.2 percent nonpartisan turnout at the primary. It is possible, of course, that the effects of the new openness in the primary were more complicated. But the aggregate data are consistent with a simple account, that turnout increased only in a mechanical sense, by fully admitting another set of citizens into the primary electorate. There is no obvious sign in the aggregate data that the blanket primary energized party registrants.

Did the change in primary law increase registration? Figure 9.1 shows that primary registration rose dramatically in 1994, and then slipped downwards in 1996 and 1998. But the main effect of letting independents participate more fully in primaries could be a rise in nonpartisan registration. Voters with fairly weak attachments to parties might, in the past, have opted to register with parties all the same, in order to maintain access to primary ballots for partisan offices. At 1.86 million, nonpartisan registration was at its highest ever total in 1998. As a share of the voting age population, this is about 9 percent. But while the trend is upwards, 1998 does not exhibit a sharp or dramatic rise. Nonpartisan registration has been increasing slowly since 1988, and the 1998 value is consistent with a mildly positive slope over these six elections, suggesting that it did not increase by an unexpectedly large amount.

Survey data, comparisons with other states, and investigation of turnout and registration values at the county and congressional-district level with controls for such factors as closeness of the races, might flesh out this picture. However, without this more elaborate analysis, it does not appear that Proposition 198's immediate impact on participation rates was very dramatic, and so we will turn our attention to other forms of (possibly strategic) behavior. The next section turns to another of the previously delineated claims about the impact of the blanket primary by discussing candidate entry and competitiveness.

Candidates and Competitiveness in the Spring and Fall

Evaluating the competitiveness of a race is a deceptively complicated task. After the fact, one can easily observe how close a given election turned out to be. Under plurality rule, the margin of victory is an adequate measure of competitiveness in two-candidate races, and multicandidate contests are only a little more difficult to characterize. But a larger issue is that all afterthe-fact measures ignore campaign dynamics completely. Implicitly or explicitly, one invokes some variety of rational expectations assumption when taking the final observed closeness as an indicator of how competitive was a race at the outset and over the course of the campaign.^[3] If one's interest

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lies in, say, voter expectations, subjective ex ante closeness is much more important than objective, ex post closeness. The obvious difficulty in developing a more nuanced measure of closeness is that it requires very fine data: multiple opinion polls, preelection surveys, real-time expert surveys, and so on. Fortunately, our concern here is with the election outcome per se. Claims about competition made in the Proposition 198 debate were advanced about outcomes. So one can simply compare the final tallies in 1998 with those from closed primary elections to see whether or not the expected increase in competition transpired.

Tables 9.1 and 9.2 show descriptive statistics on California's primary and general elections in the 1990s. The tables contain a large amount of information, and do not instantly convey a simple story. But the trends apparent on inspection run counter to the suggestion that 1998 might have been a year of close races. The ultimate in noncompetitive elections is the uncontested race. In all four 1990s elections, some seats have been completely abandoned by one of the major parties, and others have seen one or both major party nominations won without any challenge. Considering the two major parties' contingents separately, 1998 saw more, rather than fewer, uncontested races than its predecessors. More than half the districts had no more than one Republican candidate, and nearly three-fourths saw no competition for the Democratic nomination. In a blanket primary, there is a clear incentive for voters to participate in a race in which there is actual competition, since, despite the appearance of competition in a multicandidate ballot, any candidate unchallenged within her party is guaranteed to advance to the general election (provided she secures at least one vote). Strategic-minded Californians, though, were thwarted by a paucity of genuine races. In only one district did more than one candidate seek any of the minor parties' nominations: there were two Libertarians running in the First District. In twenty-nine of the fifty-two districts, at least one of the major parties' nominations was contested, but only eight seats saw races on both sides.^[4]

Were those races that did involve competition closer than usual? On the Republican side, the election that stands out as most competitive in this set is 1992. The average number of candidates, the average "effective" number of candidates, and the victors' margins over second-place finishers are generally similar for 1994, 1996, and 1998.^[5] By contrast, 1992 is an unusually close election in all these respects. The Democratic picture is more striking still: 1998 is the odd election out, but it is less, not more, competitive than the others. Fewer total candidates competed in open and Republican-held seats, the vote was more concentrated in those seats, and margins of victory were abnormally high (in open and in Republican-held seats), or else unchanged (in Democratic-held seats). In short, by a variety of measures, to the extent that the 1998 primaries stand out, it is for their reduced

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TABLE 9.1 Competitiveness of Primary Elections to U.S. House in California, 1992–98

Year	Status	n	Republican Primary					Democratic Primary
			Uncontested Races		Contested Races			Uncontested Races		Contested Races
			No Candidates	One Candidates	N	Ne	Average Margin	No Candidates	One Candidates	N	Ne	Average Margin
NOTE: For 1998, the columns headed Republican Primary and Democratic Primary show the Republican field of candidates and the Democratic field of candidates, in open primary.
1992	Republican incumbent	16	0	2	2.7	2.1	38%	1	7	3.6	2.9	21%
	Democratic incumbent	21	3	9	3.2	2.6	16	0	14	2.4	1.6	60
	Open	15	1	3	6.1	4.1	11	0	2	5.7	3.6	20
1994	Republican incumbent	20	0	9	2.5	1.8	49	0	8	2.5	2.2	26
	Democratic incumbent	29	2	9	2.8	2.2	27	0	15	2.3	1.5	60
	Open	3	0	1	4.5	2.5	22	0	0	4.0	2.5	12
1996	Republican incumbent	25	0	16	2.1	1.6	54	0	17	2.8	2.2	28
	Democratic incumbent	24	0	9	2.7	2.3	28	0	18	2.2	1.5	57
	Open	3	1	0	2.0	1.5	58	0	0	6.0	3.8	15
1998	Republican incumbent	22	0	13	2.8	1.6	64	5	13	2.0	1.6	46
	Democratic incumbent	26	4	11	2.6	2.1	28	0	20	2.2	1.5	61
	Open	4	0	1	3.9	2.7	20	0	0	2.6	1.7	50

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TABLE 9.2 Competitiveness of General Elections to U.S. House in California, 1992–98

Year	Status	n	Uncontested Races		Contested Races
			No Republican	No Democrat	N	Ne	Average Margin
1992	Republican incumbent	15	0	0	3.5	2.2	19%
	Democratic incumbent	21	2	0	3.4	1.9	38
	Open	16	0	0	3.9	2.2	20
1994	Republican incumbent	20	0	0	3.4	1.9	32
	Democratic incumbent	29	2	0	1.9	1.9	28
	Open	3	0	0	2.7	2.0	16
1996	Republican incumbent	25	0	0	4.3	2.1	24
	Democratic incumbent	25	0	0	3.3	1.8	41
	Open	2	0	0	5.0	2.3	6
1998	Republican incumbent	21	0	5	3.3	1.9	30
	Democratic incumbent	26	4	0	3.2	1.7	50
	Open	5	0	0	4.2	2.1	18

competition. Neither friends nor foes of Proposition 198 predicted that the blanket primary would make the primaries less close, but where they seem to have changed at all, this was the nature of the change.

The general election results are not as clear. Again, 1998 saw unparalleled numbers of uncontested races, which runs directly contrary to the prediction of closer competition. Where there were contested races, on the other hand, there is no general trend in either the number of candidates or the victors' vote margins. These data, in short, do not suggest that 1998 was an unusually competitive year in California's general election races for the U.S. House.

Of course, the change in primary election law is not the only feature that sets 1998 apart from prior election years. The national environment has varied over the four 1990s elections, and such factors as the number of incumbents retiring, how parties qua parties were faring in popularity, and so on may be important explanations of the results described in tables 9.1 and 9.2. We separated seats according to their incumbency status for that very reason, but it might also be useful to set California into national context to evaluate whether or not its U.S. House races were, in any sense, more competitive in 1998. Accordingly, we reconsidered the general election data for the U.S. House using a fixed-effects panel data model designed to decompose election returns into normal district vote, incumbency advantage, candidate quality effects, and national partisan swings.^[6] The virtue of this model is that it separates all of the major forces that shape election returns, allowing one to distinguish between such phenomena as rising

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incumbency advantage, gerrymandering, secular change in normal vote, and so forth. We estimated the model shown below for 1992 through 1996, and then again for 1992 through 1998, and compared the estimated detrended district normal vote parameters for California. Did the 1998 returns, once purged of candidate effects and national trends, render California's district normal votes more or less competitive, on average? Our basic model is: where y_it is the Democratic share of the two-party vote in congressional district i and election t, x_it is a matrix of incumbency and candidate-quality indicator variables, with the corresponding βcoefficients estimating various forms of incumbency and quality-challenger advantage, and _t and μ_i are parameters to be estimated, capturing national swings and district normal votes, respectively.^[7]

Consider California's First District, a marginal seat that has twice changed party hands in the 1990s. When applied to the 1992–96 returns, our model estimates a (detrended) normal Democratic vote of 50.4 percent there, implying that the seat is almost exactly a toss-up in expectation. Adding the 1998 returns revises this estimate upward to 54.4 percent, suggesting substantially less competitiveness. By contrast, the same figures for the Second District (a Republican stronghold continuously held by Wally Herger in the 1990s) are 38.0 percent and 40.0 percent, respectively. Hence, incorporating 1998 returns increases our measure of expected competitiveness for that district, which is, by either value, a fairly safe Republican seat. Both of these changes were exceptional in their magnitudes: no district saw a larger gap in the two normal vote estimates than did the First, and the median change in California was just under 1 percent. Our interest here is in whether the normal votes shifted to being more or less competitive across the state. Averaging over all fifty-two California districts, the net change brought about by characterizing the present California electoral map on the basis of 1992–98 general election returns rather than 1992–96 general election returns is a small increase in competition. The mean absolute value of (50 percent—estimated-normal-vote) using 1992–96 is 10.0 percent. Adding 1998 lowers this value to 9.7 percent. The medians are, respectively, 9.5 percent and 9.1 percent.

These numbers suggest a very small aggregate movement towards greater competition. However, two final points merit mention. The comparable values for the remainder of the country are similarly signed, but higher: the average change across all other states was from 9.5 percent to 9.1 percent (means) or 8.3 percent to 7.8 percent (medians). Second, differences in estimated incumbency-and experience-advantage parameters were far more striking. The specification that fits the data best resulted

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in incumbency advantages of 6.5 percent (1992–96) or 7.5 percent (1992–98) and experience bonuses of 1.7 percent (1992–96) or 2.1 percent (1992–98) for challengers and open-seat candidates. These estimates are based on national data, and so they resist any interpretation as being induced by primary law changes. They do, however, begin to explain how descriptive data in table 9.1 can be reconciled with the apparent increase in closeness as measured in normal vote. The 1998 election was a good one for incumbents, and so some of the decline in competition detectable in the 1998 results reflects an increase in estimated incumbency advantage once the 1998 returns are added to the 1990s data set (see also chapters 4 and 7 in this volume by Baldassare and by Salvanto and Wattenberg, respectively). Beneath the incumbency effects, normal party competition tightened just slightly in California, but not by quite as much as it did in the rest of the country. On balance, it seems fair to conclude that the blanket primary probably did not itself immediately cause closer or more competitive contests in either the primary or the following general election. This nonresult seems to hold even when one controls for candidate effects and the national political climate in 1998.

Campaign Finance

In examining competitiveness, we focused on the ultimate result of the electoral process. It is possible, of course, for various aspects of electoral behavior to change without substantially altering the outcome. A change in electoral law might, for example, induce various alterations in strategy or behavior that offset one another. We have already examined mass participation, candidate entry, and vote dispersion, and 1998 did not distinguish itself from years past on these fronts. However, we have yet to consider a set of actors especially likely to be sensitive to changes in the institutional environment: campaign contributors. These actors are especially likely to react quickly to electoral law change because they are generally elite figures who pay more attention than most to politics and the electoral process. Moreover, the contributors are not the only players in campaign finance. Instead, campaign finance involves three kinds of actors: candidates for offices, individual members of the public who make financial contributions, and elite contributors such as PACs and parties. The distinction between the latter two, at least implicitly, underlies much of the rhetoric about "special interests" so popular in the debate on Proposition 198. When the primary system changes, all of these actors may have incentives to change their behavior in order to capitalize on the new rules. Hence, this political venue seems particularly prone to exhibiting immediate change following the opening of the primary.

For candidates, the blanket primary seems most likely to affect this firststage

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(primary) strategy. Under closed rules, candidates craft appeals to their own partisans, perhaps with one eye to the general election and the potential for primary election pronouncements and stands to recur as issues. Open rules allow candidates to court a larger and presumably more diverse electorate. If nothing else, the change ensures that there are more potential supporters to woo. This form of expanding the electorate is clearly different from enlarging geographic districts. For example, television markets do not grow simply because more voters in a fixed area become potential supporters. But some of the costs of basic campaign communication, such as sending direct mailers, ought to be related to the size of the electorate. In California, most races for U.S. House seats are, in fact, mail-oriented. For this reason alone, opening primaries could increase the amount of money raised and spent.

We might expect the consequences of the larger potential electorate base to vary for candidates in different types of strategic situations. Since the results of the blanket primary remain the same—that is, the leading vote-getters from each party advance to the general—the change in the primary law is not necessarily great. Candidates in marginal seats face virtually the same situation. The more competitive the general election is expected to be, the more alluring the primary is for ambitious candidates. Hence, one expects competitive, expensive races in both major-party nomination battles, ceteris paribus. It is not evident that admitting independents or permitting cross-party voting should alter this situation.

By contrast, in seats in which one party is not usually competitive in the general election, there are incentives for voters to increase their influence by voting in the other party's more consequential election.^[8] Hence, candidates in safe districts could face new uncertainty under the blanket primary system because of the expanded electorate. This uncertainty does not translate to the general election, which remains a foregone conclusion. But the larger and more diverse electorate might come into play in the primary races in a way that sometimes increases the competition. So, while a candidate such as Maxine Waters, a liberal Democrat with a very safe seat, will win any election over a Republican, she must contend with other Democrats for the nomination. To the extent that independent and Republican primary voters are disinclined to vote for her and more inclined to vote for any candidate who is more moderate, her reelection chances (and the chances of candidates like her) should fall under a blanket system. Adding non-Democrats to the potential Democratic nomination electorate should only make relatively extreme, safe-seat Democrats vulnerable, assuming that many will prefer to participate on the Democratic side in the primary when the Republican is basically not electable in the general. And, of course, parallel logic would apply to safe Republican seats.

Our first look at the data on California campaign finance in the 1990s

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is an overall picture of campaign receipts and disbursements. Figure 9.2 displays total receipts and expenditures over the 1992–98 election years. Figure 9.2 is most striking for its lack of strikingness. The year with the blanket primary, 1998, seems to fall well in line with our expectations of a year without any significant changes in electoral law. Though 1992 seems to be a high outlier, the high expenditures that year were due largely to Michael Huffington, who spent $5.4 million in personal funds on his campaign for a House seat. Without that one extreme value, 1992 expenditures fall well within the expected pattern. Candidates, apparently, did not spend much more money in 1998 than they had in previous years. If figure 9.2 suggests any puzzle, it is why spending was abnormally low in 1994.

Figure 9.3 displays total PAC contributions in California's U.S. House races between 1978 and 1998. Much like the receipts and expenditures plot, this graph is not very striking. PAC funding seems to be on the rise, and the 1998 value fits comfortably within the general pattern. If we anchor the dollar at its 1988 valuation and adjust the other years for inflation, the pattern is the same, and the trend is even less spectacular. This time, the only plausible candidate for outlier status is 1992: PAC funding increased by over 50 percent between 1990 and 1992. The 1.2 percent rise from 1992 to 1994 paled in comparison. Even the 10.7 percent rise from 1994 to 1996 was not as striking. Most important for present purposes, the 8.1 percent increase in 1998 is well in line with previous trends. Hence, while PAC funding did increase following the change in primary law, the change was neither unusually large nor outside the expected pattern. The Proposition 198 campaign rhetoric about special interests, then, seems to be

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unfounded. PAC funding has increased slowly over recent elections, and 1998 was not an unusual year in this regard.

Special-interest money is, of course, only one component of campaign finance. Individual contributors also have incentives to change their behavior and contribution patterns. Initially, determining whether individual contributors have changed their behavior may seem to be an easy task, but the rules underlying campaign contributions are surprisingly complicated. It is thus not trivial to determine how individual contributors have reacted to the new primary. At the outset, a simple hypothesis to test is that the new primary system has resulted in contributions being shifted to the earlier part of the election cycle. After all, in order to see one's favored candidate in the general election, one needs to ensure that this candidate emerges from the primary election, now with a potentially larger electoral base. One way to make this more probable is to pile money into a candidate's war chest early.

There are three ways in which one might observe individual contributors shifting their activities toward primary elections. Because of FECA limitations, contributors are limited to giving a total of $2,000 during an election cycle, $1,000 in the primary and $1,000 in the general election, where each contribution is earmarked for a specific election. However, many contributors simply want to contribute the maximum amount to a certain candidate. Hence, while these contributors earmark $1,000 of their total $2,000 donation for the primary election, they do not necessarily want the candidate to spend $1,000 in the primary and $1,000 in the general. If the candidate were Maxine Waters, for instance, she could use her money most

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effectively by spending the maximum amount in the more competitive primary election and none in the less competitive general election. Hence, one way to gauge increased primary contributions is to separate money that is earmarked for the primary from money that is earmarked for the general. This method has obvious problems and will almost certainly result in flawed estimates.

Since each contribution is accompanied by the date of the contribution, a method that bypasses these problems is to separate the data by the primary date. Those contributions given before the primary can be counted as contributions that were intended for use in the primary, while contributions given after the primary obviously were not meant to be primary donations, even if they were thus earmarked. It is, in fact, not unusual for candidates to receive money after the general election that is earmarked for the primary election. This money is clearly not meant to be spent directly in a primary bid, and candidates are free to use this money to pay off campaign debts.

A final option for the researcher is to combine the first two approaches, placing the contributions into four categories: given before the primary and earmarked for the primary; given after the primary but earmarked for the primary; given before the primary but earmarked for the general; and given after the primary and earmarked for the general. This last option, while not flawless, provides a good compromise between the other options.

We present the results of our analysis in table 9.3. The dependent variable in these models is the proportion of all individual contributions that was both earmarked for and given before the primary election.^[9] The only exception is the column labeled "1996 (June)," where the dependent variable is the proportion of funds that were contributed before June 2, 1996. In 1996, the primary date was moved forward to March in what turned out to be a futile bid to increase California's influence in the races for presidential nominations. The primary in all of the other years occurred in June. We used this modified dependent variable for 1996 to simulate an unchanged primary environment for that year. The data in column 1 comprise all contributions from the period 1992–98. For subsequent columns, the data are year-specific.

The independent variables in the models are the number of candidates in the primary, a dummy variable indicating if there was at least one quality opponent in both the primary and general, a dummy variable indicating whether the seat was open in the general, a measure of district partisan advantage, and a dummy variable indicating whether the election involved a blanket primary. Candidate quality is operationalized simply: any individual who has ever held any electoral office is a quality candidate (Jacobson 1987). The variable labeled "District partisan advantage" is a signed difference between our estimate of the district's normal vote and 50 percent.^[10]

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TABLE 9.3 Timing of Individual Campaign Donations, 1992–98, U.S. House, California Delegation

	1992–98	1992	1994	1996	1996 (June)	1998
NOTE: The table reports OLS regression estimates. The dependent variable is the proportion of primary contributions. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Intercept	0.491[**]	0.545[**]	0.463[**]	0.479[**]	0.616[**]	0.550[**]
	(0.025)	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.057)
Number of candidates in primary	−0.008	−0.022	0.018	−0.015	−0.023	−0.034
	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.23)	(0.026)
Quality opponents in primary	0.040	0.002	0.016	0.135	0.114	0.035
	(0.053)	(0.070)	(0.108)	(0.164)	(0.163)	(0.171)
Quality opponents in general	−0.098[**]	−0.080	−0.164[**]	−0.089	−0.070	−0.094
	(0.030)	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.064)
Blanket primary	0.008
	(0.027)
Open seat in general	−0.018	0.056	−0.022	−0.141	−0.144	−0.112
	(0.039)	(0.059)	(0.111)	(0.126)	(0.125)	(0.079)
District partisan advantage	0.88[**]	1.160[**]	0.872[**]	0.413	0.578[*]	0.943[**]
	(0.135)	(0.252)	(0.227)	(0.308)	(0.307)	(0.306)
N	412	91	95	92	92	81
R2	.32	.39	.49	.16	.19	.38

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The sign is positive if the district generally favors the party of the candidate in question and negative if that candidate's party's normal vote falls below 50 percent. Our observations are all major-party candidates who competed in the general elections.

The model that pools the data for 1992 through 1998 indicates that the change to a blanket primary system did not significantly alter what proportion of individual contributions were given for the primary election, since the blanket primary dummy variable is not significant. Contrary to the arguments of both the proponents and the opponents of Proposition 198, the new primary system apparently had little effect on the timing of contributions. This is a striking result that runs counter to initial expectations and preelection rhetoric. It is also striking in that the results indicate that the 1996 election, not the 1998 election, is the outlier. As we can see from table 9.3, the differing proportion of contributions intended for the primary can be explained by the same variables for each year except 1996. For 1996, none of the independent variables explains the variation in contribution timing. Moreover, the R² value is significantly lower for both 1996 models than it is for any of the other years.

As noted previously, the most obvious difference between the 1996 election and the others is that 1996 saw a much earlier primary date. So, while the change in primary type did not have a significant impact, the timing of the primary apparently does. Timing, then, trumps institutional design in its ability to alter the proportion of funds available for use in the primary. This claim is further bolstered when we note that the results in the column labeled "1996" are less similar to the results of other years than the results in the column labeled "1996 (June)." In the latter column, we artificially "moved" the 1996 primary date to June to coincide with the other years. That is, we counted all donations prior to June 2, 1996 as primary donations. Further analysis is warranted, but this preliminary inspection suggests that timing is at least as significant as the details of the electoral formula.

Lastly, one might expect individual contributors to behave differently in different types of races. In other words, the funding dynamic may be dissimilar between races for safe seats and competitive races. Certainly candidates running in safe seats generally receive less funding than candidates running in competitive districts. Their constituents and supporters understand that they simply do not need the money. However, the change to the blanket primary may have altered this strategic situation in the aforementioned manner.

In order to test this hypothesis, we separated the data into two sets: safe seats and competitive seats. We defined a competitive seat as one in which the normal Democratic vote was either above 60 percent or below 40 percent. We then ran regressions with the same independent variables that were reported in table 9.3. Again, the 1998 elections did not distinguish

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themselves from the other years. Hence, safe district or not, 1998 was not a banner year for change in campaign donations.

CONCLUSION

As a general matter, identifying the precise effects of various features of electoral law proves difficult. Neither the formal, deductive nor the empirical, inductive literatures on the effects of election law is particularly rich with consensus findings. Debating the veracity, logic, and applicability of Duverger's law, a fairly simple and high-level claim, has kept scholars occupied for decades. Not coincidentally, politicians do not often introduce self-interested reforms in electoral procedures, even when they unambiguously have the power to do so. They may fear a public backlash from too obviously loading the dice, or they may regard electoral institutions as too unpredictable to be manipulated easily. Certainly, examples of changes in electoral law that either failed to produce the predicted outcomes or even backfired by producing unanticipated consequences are not hard to find. In recent years, Italy, New Zealand, and Israel have all made major changes in their national election rules without achieving their respective goals. New Zealand's politics have become less stable, not more so; Italy managed to accentuate its already exceptional partisan fragmentation; and Israel perversely increased the influence of very small parties.

Compared to those efforts, California's alteration of primary election rules was minor. The laws governing general elections were unchanged, and the primary was still based on plurality rule. Should the introduction of fully open (blanket) primary rules have been expected radically to alter the elections, directly at the primary stage or indirectly at the general stage? We regard this "open" question as an open question. Here, we have not dwelt on the logics of optimal behavior under the old and new rules. Instead, we have shown that the most publicized predictions about how the new rules would play out in terms of voter turnout, competitiveness, and campaign finance do not seem to have been realized in the first (and only) trial. There does not seem to have been much change in turnout, so, conditional on the behavior of elites (that is, decisions to run, and campaign styles), the masses do not seem to have changed behavior in this regard. The primary elections were not especially close—they may even have been a little less close than normal. Neither did they feed into newly competitive general elections.

Campaign finance is a complicated world, and inferences about changed behavior are, again, perilous, given that one can provide supply-or demand-side explanations for any trend. Moreover, the supply side includes sophisticated elite actors like PACs as well as ordinary citizens acting on small scales and in (relative) isolation. Again, though, our preliminary analysis

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revealed little change, rendering moot the question of whose actions should be regarded as most likely to have caused the (nonexistent) change. Campaign expenditure and campaign contributions, in total, do not seem to have been off-trend for the blanket primary year. Nor was there any detectable shift in the timing of the donations. Based on one run, we see no sign that the blanket primary encourages front-loading one's spending, not even in seats dominated by one party. PACs seem to have been important in 1998, but not much more important than they already were in 1996, 1994, or 1992.

Our conclusion from this analysis, then, is that the blanket primary was a barely noticed and largely irrelevant innovation in California. We should close, though, by hedging our bets in two ways. First, there may be some respects in which the opportunities to cross over or otherwise support another party that a blanket primary presents did make a difference. For example, we eschewed analysis of the ideologies of candidates here, and so we cannot rule out that the potential broadening of the primary electorates did encourage moderation by some of the candidates. Second, election law, it is worth reiterating, is arcane. There is good reason to believe that equilibria may not be quickly discovered. It may take several elections for even elite actors to catch on to the subtle features of a change in rules. It has, after all, taken scholars many decades to formalize properties of election rules—two hundred years elapsed between Condorcet's paradox and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem! So it may be premature to declare the rules governing primary type irrelevant. One must observe a series of runs under the blanket primary rules to know how behavior settles. Of course, the Supreme Court has now ensured that there will be no such series. Nonetheless, California's experiment in electoral law change is ongoing, and so will remain of interest to political scientists, journalists, and other political junkies, who can celebrate this variance in election law even while carefully qualifying any conclusions they draw about its consequences.

NOTES

Thanks to Mike Alvarez, Bruce Cain, and Elisabeth Gerber for valuable comments. Gaines began work on this project while visiting the Department of Applied Economics at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, and thanks KUL for its hospitality. Oana Armeanu, Paul Diperna, and Rebecca Harris provided helpful research assistance.

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REFERENCES

Birtel, Marc. 1996. “Ballot: ‘Jungle Primaries' Adopted … Reclassifying Lions Rejected.” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report54,no.13(March 30):902–3.

Birtel, Marc. 1998. “Changing Demographics Keep Orange County in Play.” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report56,no.21(May 23):1371–74.

Block, A.G., and Claudia Buck, eds.1997.California Political Almanac 1997–1998.5th ed. Sacramento, CA: California Journal/State Net.

Cox, Gary W., and Michael C. Munger. 1989. “Closeness, Expenditures, and Turnout in the 1982 U.S. House Elections.” American Political Science Review83,no.1(March):217–31.

Dubin, Michael J.1998.United States Congressional Elections, 1788–1997.Jefferson, NC: McFarland.

Elving, Ronald D.; Inces Pinto Alicea; and Jeffrey L. Katz. 1992. “Boxer and Feinstein Victorious in ‘Year of the Woman.'” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report50,no. 2 3 (June 6):1621–31.

Gaines, Brian J.1998. “The Impersonal Vote? Constituency Service and Incumbency Advantage in British Elections, 1950–92.” Legislative Studies Quarterly23,no.2(May):167–95.

Gaines, Brian J., and Douglas Rivers. 1994. “Incumbency Advantage in the House and Senate.” Working ms. Stanford University.

Gerber, Elisabeth R., and Rebecca B. Morton. 1998. “Primary Election Systems and Representation.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization14,no.2(October):304–24.

Jacobson, Gary C. 1987.The Politics of Congressional Elections.2d ed. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman.

Jones, Bill. 1998a.Statement of the Vote: Primary Election, June 2, 1998.Sacramento, CA: Office of the Secretary of State, Elections Division.

Jones, Bill. 1998b.Statement of the Vote: General Election, November 3, 1998.Sacramento, CA: Office of the Secretary of State, Elections Division.

Laakso, Markku, and Rein Taagepera. 1979. “Effective' Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to Western Europe.” Comparative Political Studies12,no.1(April):3–27.

Levitt, Steven D., and Catherine D. Wolfram. 1997. “Decomposing the Sources of Incumbency Advantage in the U.S. House.” Legislative Studies Quarterly22,no.1(February):45–60.

Levitt, Steven D., and Catherine D. Wolfram. “March 26 California Primary Results.” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report54,no. 13(March 30):908–11.

McGillivray, Alice V.1995.Congressional and Gubernatorial Primaries 1993–1994.Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly.

McGillivray, Alice V. “Primary Results.” 1998.Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report56,no.23(June 6):1547–52.

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10. Strategic Voting and Candidate Policy Positions

Elisabeth R. Gerber

One of the most debated questions about the blanket primary is whether it advantages candidates with ideologically moderate or ideologically extreme policy positions.^[1] This question directly addresses the issue of political representation. If moderate candidates benefit from the blanket primary, in the sense of having a higher probability of being nominated and elected, then we expect the interests of citizens sharing their centrist or moderate views to be better represented in the policy process. If ideologically extreme candidates benefit from the blanket primary, we expect citizens with extreme views to benefit instead.

Two views regarding the effects of the blanket primary on candidate policy positions prevail. One view, which is central to the arguments made by proponents of the blanket primary, is that the blanket primary advantages moderate candidates (see California Secretary of State 1996). By opening participation in the primary to voters outside a candidate's party, the blanket primary system forces candidates to compete for the ideological center of the electorate. Candidates with more moderate positions, or who can move to the center, receive greater support and prevail. A second view, often advanced or implied by opponents of the blanket primary, is that it advantages extremist candidates (California Secretary of State 1996). By allowing participation by members of the other party, the blanket primary invites "raiding" or "sabotage" by ideologically motivated partisans. These voters nominate weak candidates in the other party and their own ideologically polar candidate prevails.

In this chapter, I assess these two alternative views of primary election dynamics in light of the experience of the June 1998 California primary. First, I sketch out the logic of each view. Second, I review existing evidence about the relationship between primary election systems, candidate strategies,

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and candidate policy positions. Third, I test hypotheses about the effects of primaries on candidates' positions with election returns and case study evidence from the 1998 California gubernatorial, congressional, and state legislative races.

TWO VIEWS OF PRIMARY ELECTION DYNAMICS

The two views of primary election dynamics agree on the basic structure of primary elections. Both sides see primary elections as the first phase in a multistage election process. Primary election laws define the rules of participation; that is, they define which voters are permitted to participate in candidate nominations. Both sides agree that under closed primaries, participation in the primary is limited to registered members of that party. Under blanket primaries, participation is extended to all registered voters, including partisans, independents, and members of other parties.^[2]

Where the two views differ is on their interpretation of the consequences of extending participation to all voters. Specifically, they differ in their expectations of how voters will behave in blanket primaries and how candidates will respond. As discussed in the introduction to this volume and the several chapters on voter behavior, voters in blanket primaries can engage in several forms of crossover voting—sincere crossover, hedging, and raiding. All three forms of crossover voting are difficult or impossible under closed primaries, since voters would need to anticipate their desire to cross over long before the election and re-register under a new party label. In some closed primary states, such as New York, voters must re-register a full year before the election. In California prior to 1998, the registration period was twenty-nine days—shorter but still potentially prohibitive for most voters (Bott 1991). Low rates of re-registration in closed primary states suggest that crossover voting in these systems rarely occurs. By contrast, voters in open primary systems (both traditional open and blanket) can decide to cross over at the polls, requiring no precommitment to one or the other party. Voters in blanket primaries are even less constrained by party and can cross over race by race.

The first view of primary election dynamics argues that of the three types of crossover behavior, sincere crossover and hedging will prevail. This is not to say that voters will never engage in raiding; rather, the argument is that most voters are not sufficiently informed to engage in such sophisticated behavior. Raiding requires voters to calculate (1) which candidate would pose the weakest challenge to their favored candidate; (2) whether that candidate can win the primary; and (3) whether that candidate will lose the general. Further, even if they are sufficiently informed to figure out how to raid the other party's primary, voters are likely to be risk-averse and may not vote for a candidate they dislike, even if it means increasing

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the possibility that the candidate they really like wins. Hence, under this first view, most crossover behavior is by centrist independents and moderates voting across party lines for their preferred candidates.

From the candidates' perspective, extending participation in the primary to centrist independent and moderate voters creates advantages for centrist and moderate candidates. Extending participation means shifting the primary electorate median voter toward the ideological center. In other words, the blanket primary median is closer to the ideological center than the closed primary median. Hence, moderate candidates with policy positions close to the median will prevail, resulting in the nomination of more conservative Democrats and more liberal Republicans compared to their closed primary counterparts.^[3] I refer to this prediction as the "moderation hypothesis."

The second view of primary election dynamics argues that of the three types of crossover behavior, the effects of raiding will prevail. This view recognizes the possibility that some voters, especially independents and moderates, may engage in sincere crossover voting and hedging, drawing candidates to the ideological center. However, they also argue that voters will sometimes face strong incentives to engage in raiding. The most favorable situation for raiding is when one party's primary is uncontested. Voters from that party waste their vote by casting it for their party's presumptive nominee. The question then becomes which candidate they should vote for from the other party. Voters ask if they are better off voting for the more preferred candidate in the other party (i.e., hedging), leading their top two candidates from the two parties to face off in the general election, or voting for the less preferred candidate in the other party (i.e., raiding), leading their most preferred candidate to face his or her weakest opponent. In the end, voters' choices will depend on their preferences relative to the candidates, their attitudes toward risk, and the several candidates' electoral prospects. As discussed above, critics of this view argue that voters are simply not well enough informed to behave in such a sophisticated manner. Defenders counter by pointing out the potential for candidates and campaign organizations to help voters coordinate their behavior.

From the candidates' perspective, the possibility of strategic crossover greatly complicates matters. On the one hand, extending participation to independents and members of other parties means shifting the primary electorate median voter toward the ideological center, as noted above. On the other hand, if some voters engage in raiding, it is no longer clear whose preferences become decisive. Hence, the question candidates must ask is: What types of voters are likely to cross over? To the extent that ideologically extreme voters cross over strategically, benefiting extremist candidates, this view results in what I refer to as the "polarization hypothesis."

To illustrate the logic of voter choice in blanket primaries, consider a

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very simple example in which there are two parties, called D and R. Each party has a "front-runner" candidate designated as d₁ and r₁, respectively. For simplicity, I assume that only one party's primary (arbitrarily, the R party) is contested by candidate r₂. I simplify the example by assuming that all voters have single-peaked policy preferences (i.e., that they are riskneutral); that voters' ideal points are uniformly distributed over the unidimensional space [0,1] (hence the general election median voter's ideal point is located at .50); and that all voters with ideal points to the left of .50 are registered with the D party and all voters with ideal points to the right of .50 are registered with the R party. Voters are forward looking, in the sense that they seek to maximize the expected utility of their primary election vote by considering how it will impact their general election choices.^[4] To begin, I set d₁ = .25 and r₁ = .75 and assume that the R party's primary is contested by a moderate candidate whose ideal point is r₂ = .625. I illustrate the configuration of voter and candidate preferences in figure 10.1.^[5]

In figure 10.1, since the D party primary is uncontested, voters whose ideal points are closest to d₁ need not "waste" their votes in the uncontested D party primary, as they would under closed primaries. Rather, they can vote for one of the R party candidates. The question is, which one? Voters know that if r₁ wins the primary, d₁ and r₁ will meet in the general. Since d₁ and r₁ are equidistant from the general election median (at .5), r₁ will win the general election with prob=.50. If r₂ wins the primary, r₂ will beat d₁ with certainty. Therefore, all voters who prefer a lottery between d₁ and r₁ to a win by r₂ will vote for r₁. This will be the case for voters with ideal points from 0.00 up to .375. These voters have ideal points that are closer to d₁ than to r₂ and so prefer a primary outcome that gives d₁ some chance of victory in the general election. Voters to the right of .375 receive higher utility from r₂ than from the lottery, and so they vote for r₂. Since in this example the number of r₂ voters is greater than the number of r₁ voters, r₂ wins the primary and then the general.

This example is constructed to illustrate all three types of crossover voting. Voters with ideal points between .4375 and .5 engage in sincere crossover, voting for their most preferred candidate, r₂. Voters with ideal points between .375 and .4375 engage in hedging—they most prefer d₁, but prefer

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r₂ over the other R party candidate, r₁. Voters with ideal points between 0.00 and .375 engage in strategic crossover voting, voting for a weaker candidate in the other party's primary, r₁.

Note that a number of the example's assumptions, such as the frontrunner candidates' positions being equidistant from the general election median voter's ideal point, are critical to generate the precise predictions about r₂ winning the primary and the general. If we relax some of these highly restrictive assumptions—for example, if we allow candidates to take more extreme or more moderate positions, or for more than one challenger to enter, or for the number of D and R voters to be different, or for voters to be risk-averse, or for turnout to be probabilistic or uncertain—then optimal voter strategies and candidate responses become much more difficult to determine.^[6] The point of the example is not to make specific predictions about winning candidate positions, but rather to illustrate how all of these variables interact.

EVIDENCE OF CROSSOVER VOTING, CANDIDATE ENTRY, AND POLICY POSITIONS

Several recent studies have analyzed the effects of primary election laws on candidate strategies. Gerber and Morton 1998 compare the ADA scores of U.S. Representatives elected under different primary systems.^[7] They show that winning House candidates elected from open, blanket, and nonpartisan primaries are more moderate (that is, Democrats are more conservative and Republicans are more liberal) than otherwise similar candidates elected from closed primaries. They also find that the greatest share of moderates are not elected from the most open systems, but rather from semiclosed systems. They conjecture that in semiclosed systems, where new voters and independents can participate, but not members of other parties, incentives for sincere crossover and hedging clearly dominate. In other words, Gerber and Morton's evidence suggests that while sincere crossover, hedging, and raiding all are important in blanket primaries, the moderating effects of sincere crossover and hedging prevail. In a related study, Grofman and Brunell (2001) show a higher proportion of mixed-party U.S. Senate delegations in open primary states, suggesting that voters are trying to moderate the net ideology of the delegation by electing Senators of different parties.

Together, these studies provide evidence that is consistent with the moderation hypothesis and contrary to the polarization hypothesis. They imply that, on average, the moderating effects of sincere crossover voting and hedging dominate the polarizing effects of raiding. As a result, moderate candidates tend to prevail in open primaries. These results are consistent with the findings in the five chapters in this volume on voter behavior

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(Sides, Cohen, and Citrin, chapter 5; Alvarez and Nagler, chapter 6; Salvanto and Wattenberg, chapter 7; Kousser, chapter 8; and Petrocik, chapter 14). All of these analyses find evidence of substantial sincere crossover and hedging, and very little evidence of raiding.

There is, however, some compelling evidence to the contrary. King (1998) shows that party organizations are less cohesive and candidate positions show greater variance in open primary states. He argues that under open primaries, candidates have an incentive to "specialize," focusing on one or a few issues and appealing to ideological subgroups in the electorate. In other words, he finds that candidates may be more moderate or more extreme under open primaries, depending on the issues they promote. Further empirical research is required to assess the generality of this claim.

CANDIDATE MODER ATION IN THE CALIFORNIA BLANKET PRIMARY

I now consider the candidate moderation and polarization hypotheses in light of evidence drawn from the 1998 California primary and general election. Did primary and general election winners hold moderate or extreme policy positions relative to those of their challengers? Did they hold more moderate or more extreme policy positions than their counterparts previously elected under closed primaries? Did the competitive circumstances of the race matter? That is, were more moderate candidates nominated and elected in contested races? Uncontested races? Open seats? Was the moderation effect more important in some races than in others? Was the polarization effect more important in some races?

Governor's Race

The Governor's race represented a prime opportunity for crossover voting. Incumbent Governor Pete Wilson was prohibited from running due to term limits. In the Republican primary, former State Attorney General Dan Lungren ran unopposed,^[8] while in the Democratic primary, three candidates—former Lieutenant Governor Gray Davis, former U.S. Representative Jane Harman, and businessman Al Checchi—competed for the nomination.^[9] With the Republican nomination virtually unchallenged, Republican voters were free to cross over into the highly competitive and uncertain Democratic primary.

When they crossed party lines, however, Republican voters faced a field of three ideologically similar, centrist candidates. Harman's record in the U.S. Congress distinguished her as one of the most pro-business, fiscally conservative Democrats in the House.^[10] Checchi's lack of political experience made his ideological position more difficult to assess, but even after

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he committed to running as a Democrat, he repeatedly emphasized his centrist, pro-business positions and downplayed any ties to Democratic ideals. Davis's campaign promised a bipartisan, pragmatic, non-ideological, problem-solving approach to policy, which he has faithfully executed since his election. Thus, Republicans hoping to raid the Democratic primary to advantage Lungren would have been hard pressed to identify the most liberal candidate. Republicans hoping to hedge with the most moderate Democrat could have chosen any of the above.

Nor did crossover voting into the contested Democratic primary appear to result in the nomination of a weak opponent to Lungren. Davis raised nearly $26 million in campaign contributions (California Secretary of State 1998a) and ultimately beat Lungren by nearly 20 percentage points in November (California Secretary of State 1998b). If raiders targeted Davis as the weakest Democratic candidate, it looks like they seriously miscalculated.

This is not to say that the blanket primary had no effect on campaign dynamics or the relative strength of the several candidates. Some of their centrist positioning may, in fact, have been the result of electoral pressures from the center felt during the blanket primary. Further, the fact that three moderates entered the Democratic primary and emphasized their centrist positions may reflect their beliefs that centrist candidates had a greater chance of winning the blanket primary. In fact, Checchi's campaign manager admitted that they saw the blanket primary as a unique opportunity for a candidate without traditional party ties to appeal to independents and moderate Republican crossovers (Institute of Governmental Studies 1999). However, it is clear that the blanket primary was not, at least in this case, decisive. Other factors, such as Checchi's lack of political experience, Harman's inability to mobilize financial support, and Davis's more convincing appeal as an "incumbent-like" challenger seemed to dominate any moderating effect of the blanket primary (see chapter 4 by Baldassare and chapter 7 by Salvanto and Wattenberg in this volume on the importance of incumbency in the 1998 elections).

U.S. Senate Race

The U.S. Senate race presented similarly favorable circumstances for crossover voting. In the Democratic primary, incumbent Barbara Boxer ran virtually unopposed, while former State Treasurer Matt Fong and businessman Darrell Issa competed for the Republican nomination.^[11] So, in the same way that Republicans were able to cross into the competitive Democratic primary for governor, Democrats could employ their votes in a race where they might actually count—the Republican primary—while their incumbent Senator was assured of the Democratic nomination.

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As in the Governor's race, however, it was less than clear which Republican Senate candidate was the more moderate and hence the more attractive to sincere crossover voters and hedgers. Issa, like Al Checchi in the gubernatorial primary, lacked political experience and spent much of the early part of the campaign staking out his ideological turf. Toward late spring, an image began to emerge of a candidate who was quite conservative on social issues and liberal economically. Fong, by contrast, tried to portray himself as more liberal on social issues and conservative on economic issues, although his endorsement by conservative Christian organizations undermined this image to some extent. Hence, it is safe to say that while the Republican primary candidates took different positions on the issues, neither was obviously more attractive to centrist independents and crossover voters.

Where the candidates did clearly differ is on their political records and ties to the political parties. Issa, like Checchi, had no prior political experience. In previous elections, when voters were in the mood to take out their frustrations about a sagging economy on incumbent politicians, this outsider status might have worked to Issa's advantage. In 1998, however, voters were in quite a different mood: incumbents and experienced politicians won up and down the ballot in both the primary and the general (see Baldassare, chapter 4; Salvanto and Wattenberg, chapter 7). To make matters worse, Issa's lack of ideological discipline and inconsistency of policy positions, no doubt a result of his political inexperience, were interpreted by the media as the mark of an erratic and unpredictable candidate. Thus, the lack of partisan ties and ideological rigidity—which should have helped Issa attract support from sincere crossovers and hedgers—failed to carry the day in 1998.

Where Issa lacked political experience, Fong was viewed as a traditional, mainstream party candidate. He was a long-term member of the Republican party. His mother was the very popular (Democratic) Secretary of State for many years. Fong served as a member of the state Board of Equalization and then as State Treasurer. Over many years of public service, Fong established himself as an expert on taxes and fiscal policy, and promised to make reform of the tax code one of his top legislative priorities as Senator (California Secretary of State 1998d). Hence, while it is impossible to know how voters weighed the relative importance of policy positions and political experience, it is clear that Issa was not able to capitalize on his independent status as a party outsider to defeat Fong in the primary.

To the extent that Fong benefited from having greater political experience than his primary competition, and perhaps from being perceived as more moderate ideologically, he was no match for Boxer in the general election. Exit polls show that most of the Democrats that crossed over for Fong in the primary returned to their party in the general and supported

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Boxer (see Kousser, chapter 8 in this volume). Thus, Fong's marginally greater appeal to moderates in the primary failed to translate into a lasting base of support. And in the end, perhaps the most ideological candidate from either party won the U.S. Senate seat.^[12]

U.S. House Races

It is more difficult to generalize about the effects of the blanket primary on candidate positions in legislative races because (1) electoral circumstances vary greatly from race to race, and (2) much less is known about most candidates, especially those who lose in the primary. Furthermore, since House incumbents are reelected at an extremely high rate, there is very little competition in most House general election races and hence little opportunity for the primary to make much difference in terms of electoral outcomes.^[13] Nevertheless, there are at least three types of races in which we might expect crossover voting to affect winning congressional candidates' policy positions. The first type is the open-seat race. In open seats, there are no incumbents, and so challengers have a real chance of winning. However, open seats often generate competition in both parties, and so voters may be reluctant to cross over if their own party's nomination is contested. The second type of race in which the blanket primary may matter is the contested-challenger primary. In such races, only one party is seriously contested, leaving members of the incumbent's party free to cross over into the challenger's primary. However, since challengers rarely beat incumbents in the general election, any effects on candidate positions in the primary are unlikely to translate into election outcomes in the general. The third type of race in which the blanket primary may matter is when a vulnerable incumbent faces a challenge from within his or her own party. These challenges are rare. When they do occur, they may signal to potential crossover voters that the seat is up for grabs and that their votes could matter.

Table 10.1 reports the primary election candidates, primary nominees (single asterisk), and general election winners (double asterisk) for each open seat, contested-challenger, and contested-incumbent race in 1998. I describe the results of these races in detail below.

Open Seats. There were four open House seats in 1998 due to incumbent retirements: Congressional District (CD) 1, CD 3, CD 34, and CD 36. In addition, three seats were filled in special elections in the spring of 1998 due to incumbent retirements or deaths, and although their occupants were listed on the ballot as incumbents, they were rematched with their primary competitors again in June (CD 9, CD 22, and CD 44). I refer to these races as "quasi-open" seats. I discuss these races in this section because

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TABLE 10.1 Primary and General Election Candidates, U.S. House Elections, California Delegation, 1998

District	Democratic Candidates	Ideology	Republican Candidates	Ideology
C=conservative, I=incumbent, L=liberal, M=moderate.
Open and Quasi-Open Seats
CD 1	Mike Thompson[**]	M	Mark Luce[*]	—
	Jim Hennefer	—
CD 3	Sandy Dunn[*]	M	Barbara Alby	C
	Bob Dean Kent	—	Doug Ose[**]	M
CD 34	Grace Napolitano[**]	L	Ed Perez[*]	—
	James Casso	L
CD 36	Janice Hahn[*]	—	Steve Kuykendall[**]	M
			Rudy Svorinich	—
			Susan Brooks	—
			Robert Pegram	C
CD 9	Barbara Lee[**]	L
CD 22	Lois Capps[**]	M	Tom Bordonaro[*]	C
			James Harrison	M
CD 44	Ralph Waite[*]	—	Mary Bono[**]	C
CD 46	Loretta Sanchez[**]	M	Robert Dornan[*]	C
			Lisa Hughes	—
			James Gray	M
Contested-Challenger Primaries
CD 10	Ellen Tauscher (I)[**]	M	Charles Ball[*]	M
			Donald Amador	C
			Gordon Blake	C
CD 15	Dick Lane[*]	M	Tom Campbell (I)[**]	M
	Connor Vlakancie	—
CD 17	Sam Farr (I)[**]	M	Bill McCampbell[*]	M
			Mark Cares	—
CD 20	Cal Dooley (I)[**]	M	Devin Nunes	M
			Cliff Unruh[*]	C
CD 24	Brad Sherman (I)[**]	M	Randy Hoffman[*]	M
			Joe Gelman	C
			William Westmiller	C
Contested-Incumbent Primaries
CD 41	Eileen Ansari[*]	—	Jay Kim (I)	C
			Gary Miller[**]	C
CD 43	Mike Rayburn[*]	—	Ken Calvert (I)[**]	C
			Joe Khoury	C
CD 45	Patricia Neal[*]	L	Dana Rohrbacker (I)[**]	C
			Charmayne Bohman	M

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I do not expect these "incumbents" to enjoy the same electoral advantages as their colleagues who had been in office since at least 1996. One additional seat matched freshman incumbent Loretta Sanchez and former ten year incumbent Robert Dornan, who was defeated in 1996. I discuss the Sanchez-Dornan race in the "Open Seats" section because I expect each candidates' "incumbency" status to negate the advantage of the other. I also refer to this race as a "quasi-open" seat.

As mentioned above, we expect little crossover voting in open seats when both parties compete for the nomination, since members of both parties will be concerned, first and foremost, with their own party's nomination. However, in 1998, only one of the eight open or quasi-open seats was contested by both parties, so crossover voting is a real possibility.

Of these eight open or quasi-open seats, moderate candidates were elected in five races.^[14] In CD 1, moderate former State Senator Mike Thompson beat Jim Hennefer in the primary and Republican Mark Luce in the general. In CD 3, both parties nominated moderates, and Republican Doug Ose beat Democrat Sandy Dunn in the general. In CD 36, moderate Steve Kuykendall beat a field of three other Republicans for the nomination and defeated Democrat Janice Hahn in the general. In the Twenty-Second District, Democrat Lois Capps faced no primary opposition and defeated conservative Tom Bordonaro in the general. And moderate Democrat Loretta Sanchez beat conservative Republican Bob Dornan in CD 46. Extremist candidates were elected in three districts. In CD 34, liberal Democrats Grace Flores Napolitano and James Casso met in the primary, with Napolitano advancing to the general and easily defeating Republican Ed Perez. In CD 9 and CD 34, liberal Democrat Barbara Lee and conservative Republican Mary Bono, respectively, faced the same opponents they had defeated in special elections just months before and won easily. Hence, these open-seat races provide some preliminary support for the moderation hypothesis.

A closer look at the open-seat races, however, reveals that circumstances were ripe for crossover voting—sincere, hedging, or raiding—in only five races (CD 1, CD 22, CD 34, CD 36, and CD 46). In these five races, only one party held a contested primary. All five produced moderate general election winners, but only two produced moderate winners in the contested primary (Democrat Mike Thompson in CD 1 and Republican Steve Kuykendall in CD 36). The nomination and election of these moderates suggests that in these races there may have been substantial sincere crossover and hedging. Note, however, that other factors besides the blanket primary, including superior political experience, campaign resources, and key endorsements, also played important roles in all of these races.

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Contested-Challenger Races. House incumbents are rarely challenged in the primary (in 1998, three House incumbents from California faced serious primary challenges from their own party—see below). The most common scenario is a contested primary to nominate the challenger. In these races, the outcome of the incumbent's primary is virtually certain and members of the incumbent's party are free to participate in the contested challenger's primary. We therefore expect any effects of crossover voting to manifest predominantly in the contested-challenger primaries. Of course, the outcome of these contested-challenger primaries rarely affects general election outcomes, since congressional incumbents are reelected at extremely high rates. Nevertheless, other less direct effects of crossover voting into the challenger's primary may still be felt in the general election, particularly if such crossover voting results in a challenger who can force the incumbent to address new issues or take new positions on old issues.

In the 1998 California primary, fourteen congressional races witnessed some competition in the challenger's party's primary. In three of these races, there was also significant intraparty competition in the incumbent's own primary. However, since challengers are virtually assured of losing in the general, these contested-challenger races rarely attract strong candidates with well-developed policy positions. Moreover, even if they have welldeveloped positions, challengers can rarely mobilize sufficient resources to run professional campaigns that effectively disseminate information about the candidate's positions to voters. This means that during the election, potential crossover voters have little information on which to base their voting decisions. After the election, analysts have little information with which to classify candidates' positions. Recognizing these information problems, I therefore focus on the contested-challenger primaries with "serious" candidates. I define these as races in which at least one candidate received at least 20 percent of the total primary vote. There were five such races in 1998.

Moderates were nominated in four of the five contested-challenger primaries with serious candidates. In two races, there was one candidate who was clearly moderate and two who were clearly conservative, and the moderate was nominated in both races. In the Republican primary in CD 10, relatively moderate Charles Ball defeated conservative primary challengers Donald Amador and Gordon Blake; in the Republican primary in CD 24, moderate Republican Randy Hoffman defeated conservatives Joe Gelman and William Westmiller. In the other two races, none of the challenger primary candidates were clearly liberal or conservative, and moderate candidates Dick Lane (CD 15 Democratic primary) and Bill McCampbell (CD 17 Republican primary) were nominated. Thus, in all four of these races, conditions were ripe for crossover voting, and moderate candidates were

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nominated, providing evidence that is consistent with the moderation hypothesis. In the fifth race, the CD 20 Republican primary, Cliff Unruh, the more conservative of the two candidates, was nominated. While this outcome is more consistent with the polarization hypothesis, observers note that the moderate candidate's age (twenty-four years old) was probably more of a detriment than his policy positions (Hoffenblum 1998b).

Contested-Incumbent Races. Congressional incumbents rarely face challenges from within their own party. When they do, the challenge usually results from extraordinary circumstances such as the incumbent's involvement in a scandal. The three intraparty incumbent challenges in 1998 (CD 41, CD 43, and CD 45) are cases in point. In all three races, the conservative Republican incumbent was involved in a major personal or political scandal. In CD 41, incumbent Jay Kim was defeated by a conservative opponent Gary Miller. In CD 43, incumbent Ken Calvert prevailed over a conservative opponent, Joe Khoury. In CD 45, incumbent Dana Rohrbacker prevailed over his moderate opponent Charmayne Bohman. Due to the extraordinary circumstances in each of these races, however, I hesitate to generalize from these outcomes about the effects of the blanket primary.

State Assembly Races

The State Assembly races provide even more opportunities to analyze the effects of the blanket primary on candidate positions. Due to term limits, there were many open seats and contested races for State Assembly in 1998. This should translate into ample opportunities for studying all types of crossover voting.

Due to the lack of reliable information on candidate positions in some low-profile races, I again restrict my analysis to the contested Assembly primaries with "serious" candidates who received at least 20 percent of the total vote cast for all primary candidates. I was able to obtain information about the winning candidate in thirty-four of thirty-seven such races. For each race, I obtained information on the winning candidate's ideology (conservative, moderate, liberal); party (Democratic or Republican); type of race (open seat, challenger's party, incumbent's party); and district ideology (safe D, strong D, split, strong R, safe R).^[15] For sixteen races, I was also able to identify the losing candidate's ideology.^[16] I report these raw data for 1998 in table 10.2.

One advantage of analyzing the Assembly primaries is that there were a sufficient number of contested races to conduct statistical analyses to test the moderation and polarization hypotheses directly. To test whether the blanket primary resulted in more moderate or more extreme candidates, I need to compare the results in these races to the results in races with a

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TABLE 10.2 Characteristics of Winning Candidates, California State Assembly Races, 1998

District	Party	Race Type	Winner's Ideology	Second-Place Candidate's Ideology	Third-Place Candidate's Ideology	District Ideology
2	Rep.	Open	M	C		Safe R
3	Rep.	Open	C	C		Safe R
4	Rep.	Inc.'s party	C			Safe R
5	Rep.	Open	M	C		Safe R
7	Dem.	Open	L			Strong D
9	Dem.	Open	L	L		Strong R
10	Rep.	Open	M	C		Strong R
15	Dem.	Chal.'s party				Strong R
20	Dem.	Open	M			Strong D
20	Rep.	Open	M			Strong D
23	Dem.	Inc.'s party	L			Safe D
24	Rep.	Inc.'s party	M	C	C	Strong R
29	Rep.	Open	C		M	Safe R
30	Dem.	Chal.'s party	L			Split
33	Rep.	Open	M			Safe R
35	Rep.	Open	M			Split
35	Rep.	Open	M			Split
37	Rep.	Open	C	M		Safe R
47	Dem.	Open	M			Safe D
49	Dem.	Open	M	L	L	Safe D
50	Dem.	Open	L	L		Safe D
53	Dem.	Open				Split
54	Rep.	Open	M			Split
54	Dem.	Open	M			Split
55	Dem.	Inc.'s party	M			Safe D
57	Dem.	Inc.'s party	L			Safe D
60	Rep.	Open	M			Split
61	Rep.	Open	C			Split
62	Dem.	Open				Strong D
65	Rep.	Inc.'s party	C			Safe R
67	Rep.	Inc.'s party	C	M		Strong R
68	Rep.	Open	C	M		Safe R
73	Rep.	Open	C	C		Safe R
75	Rep.	Open	M	C		Safe R
76	Rep.	Chal.'s party	C	M		Strong D
78	Rep.	Chal.'s party	M			Split

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different primary system. The obvious comparison is to the contested Assembly primaries under the closed primary in 1996. The 1996 and 1998 primaries were quite similar in many ways. There were about the same number of contested primaries in both years, and all of the pre-term-limits members were termed out of the Assembly by 1996.^[17] There were also some important differences, however. Most important, 1996 was a presidential election year, while 1998 was a mid-term election. However, the hotly contested open-seat Governor's race in 1998 may have reduced some of these differences by increasing salience and turnout in 1998. Table 10.3 reports Assembly candidate characteristics for 1996.

Table 10.4 compares the percentage of contested Assembly primaries won by moderate candidates in 1996 (under the closed primary) and in 1998 (under the blanket primary). The first row shows that moderates won half of all contested primaries in 1998, compared to 37 percent in 1996. A one-tailed difference of proportions test produces a p-value of .12, indicating that we can reject the null hypothesis that the proportions of moderate winners in the two elections are the same (or that the 1996 proportion is higher) with 88 percent confidence. A two-tailed difference of proportions test produces a p-value of .24. While these tests fail to achieve the standard 95 percent level of confidence, due largely to the small number of races in both election years (forty-one in 1996, thirty-four in 1998), they do indicate some support for the moderation hypothesis.

To test the robustness of the moderation effect, subsequent rows in table 10.4 break down the races in a number of ways. We see that the percentage of open-seat and challenger party primaries won by moderates is higher in 1998. Both moderate (i.e., less liberal) Democrats and moderate (i.e., less conservative) Republicans were more likely to win in 1998. These results are starker when the winner faced an extreme challenger and when voters in the district were moderate.

These comparisons indicate that, while the moderation effect holds across the various subsamples of races, there are also important differences in the overall level of candidate moderation in the different races. In other words, factors such as race type, party, presence of an extreme challenger, and district ideology appear to affect the probability that moderates will be nominated, independent of the effect of the blanket primary. To test this more complete model of candidate policy positions, I ran a multivariate logistic regression analysis. Table 10.5 reports the results of this analysis. The dependent variable is whether or not a moderate was elected in each race. The logit coefficients report the effect of each independent variable on the log of the odds ratio, that is, on the log of the ratio of the probabilities that a moderate candidate is and is not nominated.

The logit coefficients in column 2 (Model 1) show that once we control for the other factors that affect the probability of nominating a moderate

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TABLE 10.3 Characteristics of Winning Candidates, California State Assembly Races, 1998

District	Party	Race Type	Winner's Ideology	Second-Place Candidate's Ideology	Third-Place Candidate's Ideology	District Ideology
1	Dem.	Open	L	M	L	Split
1	Rep.	Open	M	M		Split
4	Rep.	Open	C			Safe R
8	Dem.	Open	M			Split
8	Rep.	Open	M			Split
9	Dem.	Open	L	M		Safe D
11	Dem.	Open	L			Safe D
14	Dem.	Open	L	L	L	Safe D
15	Rep.	Open	C	M		Strong R
16	Dem.	Open	M	L		Safe D
19	Dem.	Open	L		M	Safe D
22	Dem.	Open	M			Strong D
22	Rep.	Open	M		C	Strong D
23	Dem.	Open	L	M	L	Safe D
26	Dem.	Open	M			Split
27	Dem.	Open	L			Strong D
27	Rep.	Open	M	C		Strong D
28	Rep.	Chal Open	C	M		Safe R
47	Dem.	Open	M			Safe D
49	Dem.	Open	M	L		Safe D
50	Dem.	Open	L			Safe D
53	Dem.	Open				Split
54	Rep.	Open	M			Split
54	Dem.	Open	M			Split
55	Dem.	Inc.'s party	M			Safe D
57	Dem.	Inc.'s party	L			Safe D
60	Rep.	Open	M			Split
61	Rep.	Open	C			Split
62	Dem.	Open				Strong D
65	Rep.	Inc.'s party	C			Safe R
67	Rep.	Inc.'s party	C	M		Strong R
68	Rep.	Open	C			Safe R
73	Rep.	Open	C			Safe R
75	Rep.	Open	M	C		Safe R
76	Rep.	Chal.'s party	C	M		Strong D
78	Rep.	Chal.'s party	M			Split

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>

Table 10.4 Percentage of Contested California Assembly Primaries Won by Moderates

	1996	1998	p<z (1-tailed)	p<|z| (2-tailed)
All	37%	50%	.12	.24
Open	41	58	.10	.20
Challenger's party	25	33	.40	.81
Democrats	32	46	.20	.40
Republicans	41	52	.23	.45
Extreme challenger	42	60	.18	.36
Moderate district	48	63	.18	.36
Vote margin (VM)	18.66	21.03	.26	.52
VM—Open seats[a]	18.65	16.31	.28	.56
VM—Challenger's party [a]	21.25	16.25	.29	.59
No. of candidates[a]	3.61	3.51	.40	.80
No. of candidates—Open seats[a]	3.88	3.88	.50	1.00
No. of candidates—Challenger's party[a]	2.25	2.00	.31	.62

TABLE 10.5 Moderates Nominated in Contested Assembly Primaries, Logit Estimates

Independent Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
NOTE: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.
[*]
Blanket	1.02[**]	0.99[**]	0.45
	(0.54)	(0.54)	(0.83)
Open seat	1.67[**]	1.74[**]	1.20
	(0.69)	(0.70)	(1.24)
Moderate district	1.49[**]	1.46[**]	1.53
	(0.55)	(0.56)	(0.89)
Democrats		−0.39	−1.73[**]
		(0.54)	(0.89)
Extreme challenger			2.23[**]
			(0.98)
Constant	−2.92[**]	−2.78[**]	−3.59[**]
	(0.86)	(0.88)	(1.47)
Pseudo-R2	.13	.14	.26
N	75	75	46

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candidate, our confidence in the effect of the blanket primary increases substantially. The coefficient on the blanket primary variable (scored 1 for 1998 and 0 for 1996) is positive with a t-ratio of 1.88. This translates into a p-value of .03 for a one-tailed t-test with 71 degrees of freedom and a p-value of .06 for a two-tailed t-test. The coefficients on the open-seat dummy (scored 1 for open seats, 0 otherwise) and the moderate district dummy (scored 0 for safe Democratic and safe Republican districts, 1 otherwise) are both positive and significant. Thus, the blanket primary, open seats, and moderate districts all result in a higher probability of moderates being elected.

Model 2 adds a dummy variable scored 1 if the race is a Democratic primary and scored 0 otherwise. The negative coefficient is small relative to the other estimated effects and not significant. Thus, once we control for primary type, race type, and district ideology, Democrats are no more likely to elect moderates than Republicans. Finally, Model 3 adds a dummy variable indicating whether the winner faced an extreme challenger. The coefficient on the extreme challenger variable is positive and significant, indicating that moderates are more successful when they face extreme challengers.^[18] Inclusion of the extreme challenger variable increases the size and significance of the Democratic primary dummy. However, it also decreases the size and significance of the blanket primary variable. Further research, perhaps analysis of elections in other blanket primary states, is necessary to determine whether these effects are due to limited observations or some other considerations.^[19]

Since logit coefficients express the estimated effect of each explanatory variable on the log of the odds ratio, they are difficult to interpret on their own. Therefore, it is common to report how the independent variables of interest affect the predicted probabilities of the event (in this case, of nominating a moderate candidate), holding constant the values of the other independent variables. I therefore convert the coefficients from column 2 into predicted probabilities. Table 10.6 reports the predicted probabilities of nominating moderates associated with closed and blanket primaries, under various combinations of race type and district ideology.

The main finding from table 10.6 is that for all combinations of race type and district ideology, the probability of nominating a moderate candidate is higher under the blanket primary. In the least favorable setting—when there is an incumbent running and the district is safe Democratic or safe Republican—the probability of nominating a moderate increases from .05 under a closed primary to .13 under a blanket primary. In the most favorable setting—where the race is an open seat and the district ideology is moderate—the probability of nominating a moderate increases from .56 under a closed primary to .78 under a blanket primary.

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TABLE 10.6 Predicted Probabilities of Nominating Moderates, Based on Model 1 Logit Estimates

Blanket	Open Seat	Moderate District	Z	P
0	0	0	−2.92	.05
0	0	1	−1.43	.19
0	1	0	−1.25	.22
0	1	1	0.24	.56
1	0	0	−1.90	.13
1	0	1	−0.41	.40
1	1	0	−0.23	.44
1	1	1	1.26	.78

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

One of the most debated questions about the blanket primary is whether it would result in the nomination and ultimate election of moderate or extreme candidates. The potential advantages enjoyed by such candidates result from strategic voter behavior. Under the blanket primary, the costs of engaging in three types of voter behavior—sincere crossover, hedging, and raiding—are all substantially lowered. If voters engage primarily in sincere crossover and hedging, the blanket primary advantages moderate candidates. If voters engage primarily in raiding, the blanket primary advantages extreme candidates.

Analyzing the results of the 1998 California races for Governor, U.S. Senate, U.S. Congress, and State Assembly, I find some evidence for the moderation hypothesis and little evidence for the polarization hypothesis. At the top of the ballot, the blanket primary did not seem to have a major effect on election outcomes. Other factors, such as incumbency (or an incumbency-like appeal), seem to have been more important. If anything, the U.S. Senate race provides some evidence for the polarization hypothesis, since the least moderate Senate candidate was elected. The blanket primary seemed to make some difference in the competitive U.S. Congressional primaries, with moderates prevailing more often than extremists. And it clearly made a difference in the State Assembly races, leading to the nomination of a significantly greater number of moderates in 1998 compared to 1996. This is not to say that raiding never occurred or that extreme candidates never benefited from crossover voting made possible by the blanket primary. Rather, the evidence strongly suggests that the overall net effect of the blanket primary was to produce more moderate candidates.

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NOTES

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REFERENCES

Block, A. G., and Claudia Buck. 1997. California Political Almanac. Sacramento, CA: State Net.

Bott, Alexander. 1991. Handbook of United States Election Laws and Practices.New York: Greenwood Press.

California Secretary of State. 1996. Ballot Pamphlet. Sacramento.

California Secretary of State. 1998a. California General Election Campaign Receipts, Expenditures, Cash on Hand, and Debts for State Candidates and Officeholders (July 1, 1998 through December 31, 1998). Sacramento.

California Secretary of State. 1998b. Statement of the Vote: Primary Election, June 2, 1998. Sacramento.

California Secretary of State. 1998c. Statement of the Vote: General Election, November 3, 1998. Sacramento.

California Secretary of State. 1998d. Ballot Pamphlet. Sacramento.

Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.

Gerber, Elisabeth R., and Rebecca B. Morton. 1998. “Primary Election Systems and Representation.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization14,no. 2: 304–24.

Gerber, Elisabeth R., and Rebecca B. Morton. 2001. “Electoral Institutions and Party Competition: The Effects of Nomination Procedures on Electoral Coalition Formation.” Unpublished working paper. University of California, San Diego.

Grofman, Bernard, and Thomas L. Brunell. 2001. “Explaining the Ideological Differences Between Two U.S. Senators Elected from the Same State: An Institutional Effects Model.” In Peter F. Galderisi, Marni Ezra, and Michael Lyons, eds.,

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Congressional Primaries and the Politics of Representation. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Little field.

Hoffenblum, Allan, ed. 1996a. California Target Book, March 1996. Los Angeles: Allan Hoffenblum and Associates.

Hoffenblum, Allan, ed. 1996b. California Target Book, May 1996. Los Angeles: Allan Hoffenblum and Associates.

Hoffenblum, Allan, ed. 1998a. California Target Book, Final Primary Edition. Los Angeles: Allan Hoffenblum and Associates.

Hoffenblum, Allan, ed. 1998b. California Target Book, General Election Edition. Los Angeles: Allan Hoffenblum and Associates.

Institute of Governmental Studies. 1999. Transcript, 1998 Governor's Race Conference. Berkeley, CA: n.p.

Kiewiet, D. Roderick, and Lanche Zeng. 1993. “An Analysis of Congressional Career Decisions.” American Political Science Review87:928–41.

King, David C. 1998. “Party Competition and Polarization in American Politics.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago.

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11. Openness Begets Opportunity

Minor Parties and California's Blanket Primary

Christian Collet

The blanket primary will maim, if not destroy, third parties.

FROM PLAINTIFF'S OPENING BRIEF FILED IN CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY ETAL. V. JONES (1997)

Relatively speaking, the 1990s were prosperous times for minor parties in California. Since the decade began, the number of minor parties qualified for the state ballot doubled, from three to six; the number of alternative candidates mounting campaigns for Congress grew from 33 in the 1990 elections to 77 in 1998 (from 0.7 to roughly 1.5 candidates per district); and the proportion of statewide voters not registering with the Republicans or Democrats grew from 11 to 18 percent. Minor-party candidates won nonpartisan races in Berkeley, Davis, Santa Monica, Simi Valley, and Santa Cruz; and in 1996 the Green party won a majority on the council of the northern coastal city of Arcata. The coup de grace occurred on April Fools' Day 1999, when voters in the East Bay Area's Sixteenth Assembly district elected Audie Bock, a Green, over heavily favored and financed former Oakland Democratic Mayor Elihu Harris. Bock, a first-time candidate and political novice, became the first minor-party candidate to win a State Legislative seat since 1917.^[1]

In spite of these successes, the passage of Proposition 198 cast some uncertainty on this otherwise bullish epoch for alternative politics. After the measure passed in March 1996, the following questions emerged: How would the blanket primary affect minor parties? Would they be helped, or hurt, by the reform? While most of the attention focused on Proposition 198's impact on major parties and the new emancipation given to voters, minor parties were left wondering how the initiative would alter, if at all, their quest for political legitimacy. Some joined Republicans and Democrats in fervent philosophical opposition to the blanket primary. But others remained conspicuously quiet, preferring to take no outright position on

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a reform whose impact could conceivably be beneficial to their strategic electoral goals.

This chapter addresses the impact of the state's blanket primary on California's minor parties—and the question of whether minor parties might have benefited from the reform. In order to shed light on this, I examine the electoral performance of minor-party candidates in 1998 relative to the last gubernatorial election in 1994. As well, I consider the attitudes of candidates and party leaders themselves toward the reform as revealed in a survey and personal interviews. Lastly, I compare the experience of minor parties in California with those in Washington and Alaska, the two states that currently have blanket primary systems.

Historical evidence suggests that while the reform provides the potential for outsider mischief, as opponents contend, such instances are rare. Rather, I conclude that the answer to the question of whether the blanket primary helps or harms minor parties depends on the goals of the parties themselves. If minor parties in California merely aspire to persist as insular "ideological entities," then the blanket primary may be considered harmful, since the "openness" of the format allowed for infiltration of outside voters in the nomination process and may have produced less ideologically pure candidates. However, if the goal of minor parties is to gain more visibility for their candidates and issues, the primary's openness could have offered a significant opportunity for them to advance their electoral position in California.

THE PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT AGAINST THE BLANKET PRIMARY

The minor parties that joined the Republican and Democratic plaintiffs in California Democratic Party et al. v. Jones—namely the Libertarian party (LP) and the established wing of the Peace and Freedom party (PFP)^[2]—focused on how the blanket primary would violate their First Amendment right to association. Simplified, the plaintiffs' argument went as follows: minor parties are "explicitly ideological entities" that are distinctive in their distance from the political mainstream occupied by the Republicans and Democrats; as such, they are small, have relatively few supporters, and are particularly sensitive to the influence of outsiders. If the blanket primary were to be imposed, minor parties would likely receive scores of votes from other party and decline-to-state registrants. This would mean that the act of nomination—one of the primary functions of a political party—would be decided almost completely by non–party members.

The plaintiffs focused on the fact that since minor-party primaries usually involve fewer voters (in the case of legislative races, often in the hundreds) a small number of votes are usually enough to decide the party's nomination. A closely contested primary run under a blanket format would

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therefore almost certainly be decided by "outsiders"—a clear infringement, they argued, of associational rights. Since minor parties rarely have the resources to educate non–party members about their candidates or their platforms, they would suffer from having nominations determined by voters who, in their contention, are completely ignorant of the choices they had made.

The implication of this argument is that minor parties could have their nominations stolen by so-called outsiders who are completely unfaithful to party principles or who, because of personal circumstances, might embarrass the party. Imagine, for example, what could happen if O. J. Simpson were to run on an LP ticket in an overwhelmingly African-American district, or if David Duke were to run for the American Independent party nomination in a northern Central Valley district. In both cases, the dubious celebrity nominees would likely win with factional support from voters outside the parties; in both cases, the parties, lacking the resources to advertise on behalf of the preferred nominee, would be helpless to prevent the ignominy from occurring. The taint of nominating such a candidate could be devastating to a party that is not otherwise known or well established in the electorate.

Since such instances of embarrassment are relatively rare and anecdotal (I shall discuss this below), the plaintiffs' empirical evidence focused on (1) demonstrating the small number of votes that have decided contested minor-party primaries in the past and (2) how the vote for minor-party candidates would dramatically increase under the blanket system. Though there was no way of knowing just how much, and under what conditions, crossover voting would likely occur for minor-party candidates, Richard Winger, the publisher of Ballot Access News, offered the following speculation for the plaintiffs:

In my opinion, if the new California primary law goes into effect, the vote for minor-party candidates in primary elections will be much higher than it has been in the past. The new voters will not be party members. As a general proposition, I believe that minor-party members voting in their own primary will be outnumbered by non–party members. Even where they are not outnumbered, the proportion of non–party voters will be very high—much, much higher than in major-party primaries. ("Appellant's Opening Brief," filed in CA Dems. v. Jones, 36–39)

Such a dramatic increase implies that the votes of party registrants would be swamped by the votes of independents and registrants of other parties—and would overwhelm the preferences of supposed "party members."

The defendant, namely the office of Secretary of State Bill Jones, claimed that Winger's contention was "without foundation." "Nothing suggests that crossover voting in minor-party primaries will be widespread, much less

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negatively impact the parties or their candidates" (Appellee's and Intervenor's Brief, CA Dems v. Jones, "No Harm to Minor Parties," 42–43). As a result, the defendant argued that concerns raised by plaintiffs—the potential stealing of party nominations and weakened and / or embarrassed parties—are not significant enough to "rise to the level of protected associational interests." Minor parties are not competitive, claimed the defendant, but expressive; as the Supreme Court has determined in previous cases, elections are about the process of casting ballots, not the advertisement of alternative political ideas.

THE HISTORY OF MINOR PARTIES IN CALIFORNIA PRIMARIES

There were a number of ironies in the plaintiffs' argument. One was that they portrayed themselves and other minor parties as small, impotent, ideological entities while simultaneously arguing that they were significant enough for court protection. They also put themselves in the awkward position of contending that getting more votes in a primary election is somehow a bad thing, an idea that runs counter to most conceptions of party formation and electoral competition. Indeed, it seems safe to assume, most would expect any political party (particularly a small one) to rejoice at the opportunity to win additional supporters—any time, any place.

Perhaps the hardest point the plaintiffs had to sell was the fact that minor parties were somehow affected significantly by primary elections when, historically, such intraparty challenges have been rare. Indeed, between 1960, when the practice of party cross-filing ended in California, and 1996, there were just ninety cases where more than one minor-party candidate contested for the same statewide, Board of Equalization, congressional, or state legislative seat (see figure 11.1).^[3] In 1998, there were just seven such contests, compared to eighty-six for the major parties.

Of the ninety-seven, more than a third (thirty-three) occurred in 1970 as a result of a factional split in the conservative American Independent party (AIP). The party with the highest number of competitive primaries in this period, however, has been the socialist PFP (forty-three since 1970). The other minor parties in the state—the LP (eleven since 1980), the Greens (two occurring in 1994), the Natural Law party (one in 1996), and the Reform party (also one in 1996)—have scarcely seen challenges from within.

Most intraparty challenges in California's minor parties have occurred at the congressional (seventeen) or state legislative level (forty-seven). Taking these races together, this constitutes 61 percent of all intraparty primaries. But it is worth noting that there has been a contested race in every gubernatorial election since 1970 and in five out of the last six U.S. senatorial elections. For whatever reason—greater exposure driving candidate

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ambition or perhaps greater stakes revealing party divisions^[4]—high-profile offices have more consistently seen contests for minor-party nominations.

When minor parties do have "competitive" primaries, they generally do not live up to their name. The average margin of victory in eight minorparty gubernatorial primaries between 1968 and 1996 was 17.8 percent; for Lieutenant Governor, the margin was 22.9 percent. Races have been equally lopsided at lower levels. In congressional races, the victor has, on average, won by 16 percentage points; in races for the Assembly, the margin has been an average of 20 percentage points.

When looking at the raw vote totals, things appear to be much more competitive. Minor-party primaries under the closed system were decided by a relative handful of votes, as the Proposition 198 plaintiffs demonstrated. This was due to two factors: the generally low level of minor-party registration (which can fall to the low hundreds in some Assembly districts) and the low level of turnout among most minor-party registrants.^[5] Of the ninety contested minor-party primaries between 1968 and 1996, thirty were decided by fewer than fifty votes, and nine were decided by ten votes or less. Two primaries at the legislative level in 1970 were decided by a single vote. Overall, the average number of votes that separated intraparty contestants in statewide primaries was 2,112; for congressional and legislative races, it was a mere 72 votes.

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WHAT HAPPENED IN 1998?

In 1998, as the plaintiffs expected, things changed dramatically for minorparty candidates—especially those running in down-ballot races. In table 11.1, I juxtapose the average primary vote totals for selected offices in the 1968–96 period to the totals for the seven intraparty contests that occurred (five in the PFP, two in the LP) in 1998. The comparisons are staggering. In some races, such as those for Secretary of State and Insurance Commissioner, the vote was twenty to thirty times higher than the twenty-eight-year average. But races for Lieutenant Governor, Congress and the Assembly nonetheless saw increases in the vote that ranged from eight to eleven times greater than what had been seen under the closed primary system.

It is worth noting, however, that the increases in voting were smallest at the top of the ticket. In the gubernatorial PFP primary in 1998 between Marsha Feinland and Gloria de La Riva, just 37,077 votes were cast—about three times more than the average in eight previous gubernatorial races in the 1968–96 period (11,695). But the total number of votes cast for the two candidates was only about half of the party's statewide registration (71,620).

We continue to see evidence of increased minor-party voting in table 11.2. The mean candidate percentage of the total vote more than tripled in major statewide races and increased anywhere from sevenfold up to twelvefold for down-ballot races. Looking at the minor parties individually, the only potential "loser" (in terms of vote share) from the blanket primary may have been the AIP, which actually received a lower percentage of the vote in the 1998 gubernatorial race than when the primary was closed in 1994. The drop may reflect some of the softness in the AIP's registration, since it is widely thought that many California voters inadvertently register with the "American Independent Party" under the belief that they are registering as independents (i.e., decline-to-state). Still, the party's vote percentage more than quadrupled in U.S. House races and doubled in Assembly races.

The biggest "winner" (in terms of increased vote share) from the blanket primary would appear to be the Green party, whose percentages increased from 0.5 to 3.4 percent in congressional races and from 0.7 to 4.1 percent for Assembly races. LP and PFP candidate percentages also rose dramatically with the expansion of the primary electorate. But not as much as the Greens, who, conceivably, have a broad appeal to progressive crossover voters and others concerned with environmentalism and social justice.

While tables 11.1 and 11.2 unequivocally show an increase in voting for minor parties in 1998, questions remain about its impact. Who benefited the most and under what conditions? Generally speaking, excluding races where a major-party contestant was lacking, the minor-party vote in a given

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TABLE 11.1 Average Number of Votes in Contested Minor-Party Primaries, 1968–96 versus 1998

	1998	1968–96 Average	Increase
source: California Secretary of State, Statement of the Vote (Sacramento, 1968–96 and 1998).
Governor	37,077	11,695	3:1
N =	1	8
Lieutenant Governor	141,128	12,865	11:1
N =	1	5
Secretary of State	127,609	6,357	20:1
N =	1	2
Attorney General	137,946	—	—
N =	1	0
Insurance Commissioner	159,307	5,400	30:1
N =	1	1
U.S. Congress	4,343	536	8:1
N =	1	16
State Assembly	3,469	314	11:1
N =	1	33

TABLE 11.2 Mean Minor-Party Candidate Percentages of the Total Vote in California Primaries, by Party, 1994 and 1998

	Governor		U.S. Senate		U.S. House		California Senate		California Assembly
	1994	1998	1994	1998	1994	1998	1994	1998	1994	1998
source: California Secretary of State, Statement of the Vote (Sacramento, 1994 and 1998).
Note: Means are controlled for percentages garnered in races without a major-party contestant. Intraparty primary candidate percentages were averaged. Neither the Reform party nor the Natural Law party was qualified for the ballot in 1994.
AIP	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	2.2	—	—	0.6	1.2
Green	0.1	1.5	0.2	—	0.5	3.4	—	—	0.7	4.1
LP	0.3	0.8	0.3	1.2	0.3	2.4	0.4	3.4	0.4	3.3
NLP	—	0.2	—	0.4	—	1.8	—	3.0	—	2.4
PFP	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.9	0.2	2.0	0.2	3.4	0.2	3.5
Reform	—	—	—	0.8	—	1.1	—	—	—	2.0
total	0.2	0.7	0.2	0.8	0.3	2.2	0.3	3.4	0.4	3.0

congressional or legislative race tended to be higher for candidates who had an ethnic surname or were female. It was also higher in districts where a competitive primary was lacking in one of the major parties. As table 11.3 shows, the few female and ethnic minor candidates who ran in 1998 did noticeably better than their white male counterparts—suggesting the activity

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TABLE 11.3 Mean Minor-Party Candidate Vote in 1998 U.S. House, State Senate, and State Assembly Primaries

	U.S. House	California Senate	California Assembly
NOTE: Means are controlled for percentages garnered in races without a major-party contestant.
Candidate was …
Female	2.6%	3.5%	3.1%
Male	2.1	3.4	2.9
Candidate had …
A Latino or Asian surname	4.6	—	3.4
No ethnic surname	2.7	—	3.0
Major-party competition
Seat had one uncontested Republican or Democratic primary	3.1	3.4	2.4
Seat had two contested Republican and Democratic primaries	1.7	3.1	1.6
Minor-party candidates in race
1	3.5	3.5	3.1
2	2.4	2.9	1.9
3	2.0	—	1.8
Total minor-party registration in district was …
Above average (> 5.1%)	3.1	3.3	2.0
Below average (< 5.1%)	2.9	3.5	2.3
Total decline-to-state registration in district was …
Above average (> 12.6%)	2.4	3.3	3.1
Below average (< 12.6%)	2.1	3.4	2.8

of crossover voters. Candidates who ran in seats where there was no competition for either the Republican or Democratic nominations also did better, and those who did not face any competition from other minor-party candidates also got a higher percentage of the vote. However, a minorparty candidate's success in the 1998 primaries appears to have had little to do with either the total minor-party registration in the district or the independent, decline-to-state registration. This would suggest that a good portion of crossover votes for minor-party candidates came from those registered with the major parties.

The minor-party vote exploded under the blanket primary, as the Proposition 198 plaintiffs, and many other observers, expected. But did the vote exceed what minor-party candidates normally receive in a general election? According to figure 11.2, no. In the gubernatorial and U.S. senatorial race,

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the mean vote share per candidate was exactly the same in both the primary and general election (0.7 and 0.8 percent, respectively). Candidates for U.S. House and California Assembly races saw higher percentages, on average, in the primary, but the difference was negligible. In the instance of State Senate races, the mean percentage actually increased slightly in the general.

Given the congruity in the vote in the spring and fall elections, it seems as if the increase in minor-party voting under the blanket primary may have been a function of general election supporters being able to cast an earlier ballot for their preferred minor-party candidate. In other words, a minorparty candidate's primary election constituency under the blanket primary may, in fact, have reflected his or her general election constituency and hence his or her "normal" share of the vote. If this was the case, it undercuts, to some degree, the assertion that candidate selection under a blanket system is made by outsiders with no familiarity with the party or its candidates.

THE PEACE AND FREEDOM PARTY'S EXPERIENCE WITH CALIFORNIA'S BLANKET PRIMARY

Along with the influence of nonregistrants in the nomination process, minor-party plaintiffs raised concerns about the blanket primary being used for mischievous purposes. Though it remained unknown to many, such an instance occurred in 1998 in the PFP, the minor party known for having the most primaries and the one that had the most in 1998. The story of their experience with the blanket primary in California is instructive, giving observers insight into how the change in primary rules can particularly affect minor parties—for better and for worse.

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As the only explicitly socialist party active in California politics, the PFP has traditionally had difficulties with envious parties attempting to "raid" its nomination procedures. This, along with a reputation for passionate political infighting, has fueled many primary battles over the years. Tom Condit, a longtime Bay Area activist in the PFP who lost a bid to be the party's candidate for Insurance Commissioner in 1998, explained that the PFP has had more contested primaries for two reasons: (1) because "a small party is a natural target for ‘takeover bids' " and (2) "a lot of people in PFP take their politics very seriously and are willing to fight over them." He explained that, prior to 1980, "candidates were mostly picked by consensus within the ranks of party activists." But in 1980, the Communist Party "asked if we would be upset if they ran Gus Hall in our presidential primary. People who thought that the excitement of contested primaries might attract more interest to the party opened the Pandora's Box and it hasn't been closed since."^[6]

Marsha Feinland, a gubernatorial candidate who, like Condit, lost in a contested PFP primary in 1998, agreed:

As a small party, we are particularly vulnerable to challenges by other groups that want to use our ballot line. … Specifically, the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, the Internationalist Workers Party, the New Alliance Party, and the Workers World Party have all sought to run people for office as Peace and Freedom Party. Some of these groups have worked as active PFP members, while others have just tried to "raid" PFP.

Thus the PFP has seen its secured position on the ballot serve as a lure for nonqualified left parties who want to run candidates. According to Jan B. Tucker, a "second-generation member" of the PFP who has been with the party since its inception in 1968, many groups over the years—communists, socialists, and even libertarians in the early 1970s—have used the PFP's "ballot access as battle ground." This, he contends, is because the PFP has not been organizationally strong and active in campaigns, but has served only as an insular and ideological "ballot status party." This has given "leftist invasions," in Tucker's terms, the incentive and opportunity to continually attempt to influence the PFP's nomination procedures.

In 1998, however, the party's battles did not come from external invasion, but from insurrection—led by Tucker himself. Dissatisfied with the established wing of the PFP led by Condit and Feinland, and with the party's perceived electoral weakness—"our party's structure resembles the organizational principles of the Marx Brothers more closely than those of Karl Marx," he once wrote—Tucker formed an alternative slate of candidates to challenge the officially endorsed party slate. Support for the blanket primary and more democratic reforms was at the heart of Tucker's dissention. But his biggest gripe was that the PFP too often "ran nothing but

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white males" (from the Bay Area) and that the party needed to offer a more diverse slate of candidates in order to make inroads with the state's voters.

Conscious of the strategic possibilities available in the blanket primary, Tucker assembled a slate of two Latinos and two women (whom Condit contends were "a group of [Tucker's] friends and acquaintances, none of whom had previously been active in the [PFP]") to appeal to potential crossover voters. Along with gubernatorial candidate Gloria La Riva (who was endorsed by, but not an official part of, the slate), two of Tucker's candidates won PFP nominations. But most significantly, especially in light of the data in table 11.3, all of the three candidates on the PFP ballot with purely Latino surnames—including one not on the Tucker slate—were victorious.

Though the division between the Tucker slate and the established wing of the party did not result in the type of embarrassing scandal that opponents of Proposition 198 feared, the PFP has suffered since the election. Failing to gain 2 percent of the vote in any of the statewide offices for which it ran in 1998, the PFP was subsequently disqualified from the state ballot. As of this writing, it is mounting a drive to register roughly fourteen thousand more voters to get back on the ballot for 2002.^[7] Ironically, the party that had staked out an official position against Proposition 198—and had seen itself torn asunder by the new primary—turned to using the reform as part of its sales pitch to gain more registrants. "Your party registration," read the Party's official website in late July 1999, "will not affect your right to vote for whichever candidate you prefer in either the primary or general election" (www.peaceandfreedom.org, July 26, 1999). Tucker and other PFP members have since joined the Green party.

THE BLANKET PRIMARY AS A STRATEGIC RESOURCE

The experience of the PFP would seem to justify the fears that some minor parties had regarding the blanket primary. But, during the March 1996 campaign of Proposition 198 and the subsequent lawsuit, one party—the Reform party—remained optimistic. It did not offer an official position, nor did it join the plaintiffs in the suit. Tacitly, however, it gave lukewarm backing to the blanket primary. The roots of the party's support were consistent with its own populist philosophy; following the Ross Perot mantra, the party believed that empowering independent voters and bringing more people into the political process took precedence over the self-interest of parties. Michael Farris, who was chairman of the fledgling California Reform party at the time, argued, like Tucker, within his party to take a more "pro-active position" in supporting the "broader public interests" involved in Proposition 198. In the end, however, "certain administrative internal party stuff" kept them from doing so.

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Populist arguments aside, the Reform party's position regarding the blanket primary reflected more pragmatism than the positions taken by the other minor parties involved in the lawsuit. A new party, less rooted in ideology and more familiar with mainstream politics, the Reform party sensed the strategic opportunities offered by the blanket primary and felt as if it could advance its position in California politics.

How? First of all, a blanket primary system may encourage minor parties and their candidates to actually "run" for office—and to do so earlier in the election season. The typical campaign of a minor-party candidate is low-budget and casual. A 1994 survey of minor-party candidates found that most of the respondents performed few of the basic electioneering activities associated with running for office, like walking precincts or posting signs (Collet 1997). With the closed competitive primary consisting, in many instances, of competition for just hundreds of party voters, there is hardly inspiration for candidates to go beyond committee meetings and run an active campaign.

The "openness" offered by a blanket primary, however, gives minor-party candidates incentive to run "early and often" in order to be heard. Farris himself was an interesting example. Running in Assembly District 37, he told me that, as the lone alternative party candidate in the race, he gained some leverage by garnering early endorsements and by being able to compete earlier in the year with his opponents. Something worked; he received 3.5 percent in the fall after getting 2.8 percent in the primary. Overall, a total of fifteen statewide, thirty U.S. House, and twenty-eight state legislative candidates increased their vote share, like Farris, in the general. A fourth gained more than 1 percent—a significant gain for a small-party candidate.

A related benefit is that a blanket primary may encourage minor parties and their candidates to campaign to the general electorate. Tucker, complaining about the alleged insularity of the PFP, believed the blanket primary would have been instrumental in forcing the party to get its message out to voters statewide. "Those who actually campaign will do well." He continued to explain his belief that the blanket primary would have compelled minor parties to be more than "ballot status" parties: "It forces them to get out and do things that they have never had to do, revolutionary things like campaigning around the state, contacting voters … walking precincts." Condit, Tucker's adversary, tended to agree. When asked about how the blanket primary would change campaigning for the PFP, he replied by saying that "if I run for statewide office again, I will begin my campaign outreach to the general electorate much earlier. That isn't easy to do, of course, given the limited resources of our party, but I think it is necessary."

An ancillary benefit for the minor parties is that broader competition under a blanket primary can inspire moderation on issues and positions.

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Certainly, minor-party candidates will thrive, as they have throughout history, on the votes of the dissatisfied and the marginal—and many future candidates and parties will concentrate on that infinitesimal segment of the electorate. However, a candidate or party that is ambitious and wants to make inroads with independents or major-party voters may wish to moderate some positions. As the blanket primary took the power of nomination out of the hands of a few insiders, candidates were encouraged to abandon the narrow and sometimes insular world of minor-party politics and engage the mainstream electorate. This was a step toward shaking the "fringe" label, and enhancing the credibility of their candidacies and their ideas.

A fourth potential benefit for minor parties is that a good showing in the primary can put the major parties on the defensive before the general election—and thus increase the minor parties' role as "spoilers" during the election. Under a closed system, it is generally not until after the election that anyone even notices the performance of the minor-party candidates. Media and private polling tend to ignore minor-party candidates; even if they are included in polls, their minuscule vote percentages are subject to large sampling errors that render the data almost meaningless.

Under a blanket system, the primary election is a straw poll of sorts. It reveals the strengths and weaknesses of all serious contenders for office—particularly those who do not have an intraparty opponent—months before the general election campaign. If a major-party candidate is in trouble, or a minor-party candidate does surprisingly well, the latter are in a position to directly influence the tone and dynamics of the campaign. A strong primary showing for one or more minor-party candidates will likely attract media attention that can result in more funds and volunteer support. Such strength then forces the major-party candidates to engage the minor-party candidates (when, under normal circumstances, they probably would not), include them in candidate debates, and otherwise treat them as legitimate opponents. Not only does this result in much-needed resources that aid long-term party building, but it gives the minor parties a direct line of communication with the voters for the purpose of selling themselves and their ideas.^[8]

Along this line, a blanket primary can give minor parties the opportunity to influence the policy debate. Unless there are some extraordinary factors at work, as there were in the 1998 election of Audie Bock, minor-party candidates will probably not be able to defeat major-party candidates. The resource disparities are too great. However, with earlier visibility and the opportunity to participate actively in the general election, there remains a possibility for minor-party candidates to score another kind of victory: the acceptance of their ideas.

Throughout history, minor parties have served as the incubators of new policy initiatives, while the major parties, sensing the potential electoral

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power of these ideas, have been all too quick to absorb them. Republicans, for example, seized on the slavery issue brought to the fore by Free-Soilers, and many New Deal programs adopted by the Democratic Party found their roots in progressive and socialist minor-party movements (Mazmanian 1974, 81–82). In more recent times, Ross Perot and the Reform party forced both major parties to pursue a balanced national budget and reforms in entitlement spending and campaign finance.

Similarly, a major-party candidate who runs weakly in a blanket primary may be forced to adopt a minor party's issues as a strategic measure to prevent defeat in the general election. Consider a moderate Democrat running in a marginal coastal district who saw a Green candidate receive 7 percent of the vote in a blanket primary. The Democrat, in order to prevent heavy vote siphoning and a Republican upset, may adopt more Green positions during the campaign in order to preserve victory. Likewise, a moderate Republican might adopt more antitax or reduced government positions if he or she saw a strong Libertarian performance.

A final strategic benefit for minor parties is that the potential for greater support and competition may give them greater opportunity to attract highquality candidates. Insofar as a blanket primary diminishes the importance of party labels and fosters a free-for-all battle for votes, ambitious, independent-minded candidates may be more likely to run on a minor-party ticket. Major parties, because of their mainstream legitimacy and embedded organizational apparatus, will almost always be the first choice for an aspiring politician looking for a vehicle. Running as an independent, because of heavy access restrictions and the inability to compete in the primary, will almost always be the last choice. Hence, minor parties can serve as a plausible alternative—by offering a ballot position and the ability to circumvent a tough contest for a major-party nomination. Minor parties may thus become a more attractive option to visible outsider politicians and those who simply want the opportunity to compete with the establishment candidates.^[9]

CANDIDATES SENSE THE OPPORTUNITIES

Minor-party candidates seemed to sense the potential benefits of the primary and, as a result, supported it. A statewide survey distributed to all candidates who ran in partisan offices in the 1998 primary reveals that the blanket primary received its strongest support from minor-party candidates—with the exception of those running for LP nominations—as well as centrist candidates in the major parties (see table 11.4).^[10] Overall, 83 percent of all non-LP minor-party candidates in the sample said the blanket primary was "a good reform," while 10 percent said it was a failure. More than four of every five respondents who said the primary was a failure were Libertarians. Worth noting is the fact that majorities of candidates from

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TABLE 11.4 Candidate Attitudes toward the Blanket Primary, by Party

	Republicans			Democrats			LP	Other Minor Parties
	Lib./Mod.	Cons.	Total	Lib.	Mod./Cons.	Total
NOTE: Columns may not equal 100 percent due to rounding.
Percentage who believe the blanket primary …
Is a good reform	62%	44%	47%	24%	57%	43%	27%	83%
Is a failure	31	48	45	53	17	33	50	10
Doesn't make much difference either way	8	9	8	24	26	25	23	7
Position on the blanket primary (10-point scale)[a]
Percentage giving scores of …
6–10 (support)	62%	44%	47%	17%	54%	47%	27%	77%
0–4 (opposed)	31	52	48	61	29	43	58	19
5 (neutral)	8	4	5	22	17	19	16	3
Mean	5.9	4.8	5.0	3.2	6.4	5.1	3.6	7.3
(S.D.)	(4.2)	(4.1)	(4.1)	(3.1)	(4.2)	(4.0)	(3.4)	(3.2)

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minor parties like the Greens and the PFP, who officially opposed Proposition 198, nonetheless felt that it was a "good reform."^[11] When asked to rate their position on the blanket primary on a 10-point scale, 77 percent of non-LP minor-party candidates gave it a ranking above 5, resulting in a mean of 7.3. On this measure, moderate Republicans (62 percent) and Democrats (54 percent) were also supportive. LP candidates remained the most opposed, with 58 percent giving a score below 5.

The survey also reveals strong beliefs among all minor-party candidates about the electoral benefits of the blanket primary. While 41 percent of Republicans and 39 percent of Democrats believed the primary "helped [them] win more votes," 74 percent of LP and 68 percent of other minorparty candidates believed the same. Just 2 percent of LP and 7 percent of other minor-party candidates believed the primary "hurt them and cost [them] votes." Roughly two in five major-party candidates, along with one in every four minor-party candidates, said the blanket primary "didn't make much difference either way."

Overall, 74 percent of non-LP minor-party candidates agreed that the blanket primary "[helped] the alternative (or minor) parties." LP candidates, however, were divided (46 percent). Just 29 percent of major-party candidates agreed, and many expressed uncertainty regarding the impact of the blanket primary system on the minor parties.

EXPERIENCE IN WASHINGTON AND ALASKA

How has the imposition of the blanket primary in other states, namely Washington and Alaska, affected minor parties and their candidates? In the former, the blanket primary plays a unique role and has a greater immediate impact. In order to qualify for the general election in Washington, minor-party candidates must receive at least 1 percent of the vote in the primary, a requirement that would likely prevent most from ever advancing to the fall campaign under a closed primary. But with the blanket primary, minor-party candidates are able to draw votes from the entire electorate. In many ways, minor parties in Washington get the best of both worlds. Unlike nominations in major parties, minor-party nominations, under state law, are closed and determined by convention (preventing any minor-party contested primaries). But minor-party candidates are able to receive votes from the entire electorate in the election itself—which greatly enhances their odds of meeting the 1 percent threshold needed to advance to the fall election. "I doubt that we would have ever achieved major-party status with a closed primary," said Paul Telford, Washington chair of the Reform party. Before losing their access in 1998, the Reform party was legally recognized in Washington as a major party—akin to the Republicans and Democrats.

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Given the access and advancement requirements, Washington has not had any notable experiences where minor-party nominations have been raided. Telford explains that even if such a thing were to occur in Washington, it "would take a concerted effort to have a big impact—and the word would get out. How could party manipulators get a lot of people to do this without everybody hearing about it?"

Alaska is a different story. With 58 percent of voters registered as something other than a Republican or Democrat, the state has been a hotbed of minor-party activity. Currently, there are three minor parties active on the ballot, and Alaska is one of four states to have elected an independent governor since 1990 (Walter Hickel).

Libertarians in Alaska have had a poisonous experience with the blanket primary. In 1986, the party had two contestants for its gubernatorial nomination, Mary O'Bannon and Ed Hoch. Hoch received the support from party insiders because O'Bannon was wanted by state authorities for selling fraudulent advertisements. But O'Bannon won the nomination in the blanket primary, presumably because her female name was attractive to crossover voters. With a wanted fugitive as their nominee, the LP failed to get the 3 percent of the general election vote needed to retain its status as a "recognized political party" along with the Democrats and Republicans. Since then, the LP has had to file petitions every election year in order to run candidates for office (personal correspondence, Richard Winger, July 23, 1998; see www.gov.state.ak.us/ltgov/elections/partysta.htm, August 3, 1999).

Since the decline of the LP in Alaska, other minor parties have emerged. Among the most significant is the Alaska Independence Party (AKIP), a libertarian-conservative party predicated on "Alaska First" issues and the right to vote on secession from the United States. Like the LP, the AKIP has had problems because of the blanket primary. Yet their official position has been one of tolerant support of the system. This, says AKIP Chairman Mark Chryson, is due to some deference to the widespread independence of Alaskan voters and the fact that the AKIP really has not been hurt by the process. Chryson, who as a candidate was himself once stung by an uninvited intraparty primary challenge, said, "We don't really have enough candidates to where [the blanket primary] is an issue. We can deal with it. But myself, I would like to see us go to a convention to select candidates. But we don't have the money, organization or resources to do so."

On the one hand, says Chryson, "it does create havoc," but on the other, it gives many AKIP party registrants (who are dispersed throughout remote areas of Alaska) an opportunity to vote in elections from which they would normally be excluded. The lack of a widespread slate of AKIP candidates would mean that they would not have a chance to vote until the November election. In 1998, the AKIP officially remained tolerant of the blanket primary,

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but passed an official party resolution against candidates who have "attempted to use the Party in order to further their self-serving ends."

WEIGHING PRACTICAL BENEFITS AGAINST PRINCIPLED OPPOSITION

One of the classic divisions within a political party is the conflict between pragmatism and purity—or, in other words, the extent to which a party is willing to compromise its ideological principles in order to make electoral gains. In the case of major parties, the result is self-evident: pragmatists almost always prevail because the imminent goal is to win offices. But in the case of minor parties, the goals are not always as clear-cut.

On the one hand, many within California's minor parties are conscientious about the need to win votes (at least enough to maintain ballot access); on the other, the parties are "explicitly ideological entities" that serve primarily to express discontent and articulate alternatives to the establishment. While it may fly in the face of most conventional thinking, some members of minor parties do not aspire to major-party status. And some, particularly the LP and the PFP, pride themselves on being "parties of principle," by maintaining their philosophical purity and ideological consistency on a variety of issues—regardless of the repercussions at the polls.

This means that the purity versus pragmatism conflict lies at the heart of most internal decisions made by minor parties. As such, it colors our response to the central question: Does a blanket primary system help or hurt minor parties? When one takes the purist view—as do most Libertarians and the established wing of the Peace and Freedom party—one is indeed inclined to opposition. The system clearly offers the potential for mischief by inclined outsiders or dissatisfied insiders. The number of votes deciding minor-party nominations increased dramatically in 1998, and it appears as if there is some potential for candidates with female or ethnic names to draw nonregistrant support—regardless of whether the candidate has the endorsement of the party. Insofar as party organizations are weakened by the fact that their nomination decisions can be influenced by others, minor parties may suffer under a blanket primary system.

When one focuses on the electoral imperative, the practical benefits offered by the blanket primary for minor parties are manifest. Earlier involvement in the campaign and wider exposure to the voters can bring much-needed attention to a candidate and his or her party's issues. And gaining the exposure in June, rather than November, of an election year means that minor parties can actually become pre facto rather than post facto spoilers. With the June election serving as a straw poll for the strength of the major-party candidates before the fall election, the blanket primary gives minor parties an opportunity to reveal citizen dissent before the campaign

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begins—and a real opportunity to be heard once it does. With more voice comes more attention and, potentially, more incorporation of minorparty ideas into the political agenda. And with the incorporation of more ideas comes legitimacy. Candidates and other party pragmatists seem to sense this and offer the blanket primary support.

Regardless of who is right, purists or pragmatists, minor parties can agree on one thing: in order to survive, they must adapt to the electoral system. Under a closed primary, minor parties can maintain a quiet existence as fringe ideological entities—as long as they have enough votes or registered members. But, as we saw under California's short-lived experience with a blanket system, strategic opportunities grow as elections become more open. Rather than "maiming" or "destroying" them, a blanket system can entice a minor party toward the mainstream, heighten its visibility, and raise its electoral stakes. Following Plunkitt of Tammany Hall, those parties who are able to see their opportunities under a new system—and take 'em—are likely to be rewarded.

NOTES

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REFERENCES

Appellee's and Intervenor's Brief. 1997. California Democratic Party et al. v. Jones. “No Harm to Minor Parties.”

Collet, Christian. 1997. “Taking the ‘Abnormal' Route: Backgrounds, Beliefs, and Political Activities of Minor Party Candidates.” In Paul S. Herrnson and John C. Green, eds.,Multiparty Politics in America. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

Mazmanian, Daniel. 1974. Third Parties in Presidential Elections. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.

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12. Thinner Ranks

Women as Candidates and California's Blanket Primary

Miki Caul and Katherine Tate

Despite recent gains, women remain numerically underrepresented among elected officials in the United States at both the state and national levels. In 1997, women made up only 12 percent of the House of Representatives and 9 percent of the U.S. Senate. Rates of female officeholding across the fifty state governments vary considerably, with Kentucky and Alabama having the fewest women serving in their state legislatures at 5 to 7 percent and Colorado and Washington having the most at 40 percent. In California, women make up 18 percent of the state Senate and one-quarter of the Assembly (Field and Sohner 1999). While the proportion of women serving in California's state government is only slightly higher than the average proportion of women in U.S. state governments, California is currently one of only two states in the union with two female U.S. Senators, Dianne Feinstein and Barbara Boxer. Moreover, with ten women in the state's fifty-two-member U.S. House delegation, women also make up a slightly higher percentage (19 percent) than for the nation as a whole.

Increasing the descriptive representation of women is important because female elected officials raise and promote issues that are distinct from those emphasized by their male counterparts (Thomas 1993; Thomas and Welch 1991; Dodson and Carroll 1991). In addition, in districts where a woman is elected, female voters are more likely to be interested in and participate in politics, and to have a greater sense of political efficacy and competence (High-Pippert and Comer 1998). The under representation of one-half of the population not only limits the diversity of parliaments but also runs counter to one way that representative democracies may be evaluated, on the basis of whether their elected leadership reflects the society from which it is drawn in terms of salient political cleavages such as race, gender, ethnicity, region, and class.

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Research on women's political representation in legislatures has established that the method of election has a profound effect on the numbers of women elected to political office. A change in the method of election, therefore, is likely to alter women's election opportunities and the resultant gender composition of the elected body. California's recent and short-lived adoption of the blanket primary, had it survived its test in the Supreme Court, may have had a negative effect on female officeholding in the state. Broadly, we hypothesize that the implementation of a blanket primary system weakens the role of parties in selecting candidates and increases the costs of elections. Raising the cost of statewide races in states such as California, where campaign costs are high, may mean that fewer viable female candidates will emerge and win.

Specifically, the blanket primary may reduce a woman's chances to advance to the general election because with a weaker role for the major political parties, the individual candidate's resources become more important. Candidates in the blanket primary generally need more resources such as personal financial support, PAC contributions, contacts, and ties to businesses and unions. As a group, women are less likely to have these personal resources. The blanket primary raised the financial and personal bar for candidates, and—had its influence persisted—Californian women might have been less well descriptively represented in their state government relative to women in other states.

THE EFFECTS OF ELECTION METHODS ON FEMALE CANDIDATES

A large empirical literature exists that explains why so few women are elected to democratic governments and why so few are found among the political elite. Although no one thus far has examined the impact of political primary systems on rates of female officeholding, this literature can help us anticipate the likely impact of a blanket primary system on female officeholding.

Research demonstrates that for three decades, women have been as likely as men to win seats in the U.S. House of Representatives once candidate status is taken into account. Although a significant minority of the U.S. population considers women to be less "emotionally suited" to run for political office, no evidence indicates that voter hostility toward female candidates impedes their elections. Nor is there empirical evidence to support claims of a conspiracy of the predominantly male political elite or systematic inadequacies in women's campaigns as barriers to their election (Carroll 1985; Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994). Further, in a study of the 1980 congressional candidates, Uhlaner and Schlozman (1986), controlling for the type of race and incumbency, found that female candidates raised as much money as their male competitors. Although female candidates in the

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1980s received fewer votes per dollar spent, by the 1990s, female candidates in open-seat House elections reaped the same electoral returns for their campaign resources (Green 1998).

Specifically, women fare as well as men in primary races. In a study of women in open-seat primaries for the House from 1968 to 1990, Burrell (1992) concludes that relative to men, women acquire as many votes, that they are not substantially older candidates, and that they are just as likely to have previous experience in public office. Rather, as established in research on general elections, the small proportion of women who win primaries is largely due to the paucity of women who run in primary elections. In both Democratic and Republican House primaries, voters had the opportunity to cast their vote for a woman in less than a quarter of the races between 1968 and 1989 (Burrell 1992). Yet by 1990, that proportion had risen to one-third of House primaries.

If the low levels of victorious women are a result of few women stepping forward to run for office, then we might ask, What structures encourage women to run in other countries where levels of women's representation are higher? As noted earlier, the electoral system has an important effect on rates of female officeholding. In general, proportional representation (PR) systems, where parties list their set of candidates, produce more women in parliament than plurality systems do (Duverger 1955; Rule and Zimmerman 1994). PR systems in countries such as Iceland, Sweden, Austria, and Switzerland have legislatures that are, on average, 20 percent female compared to single-member district countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, whose national governments are only 10 percent female (Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994, 142). Rule (1987) concludes that the method of election, when compared with socioeconomic and educational indicators, is the strongest indicator of women's parliamentary representation in advanced industrial democracies. Winner take-all, single-member district systems, researchers believe, are less likely to run a woman because the parties perceive that they may lose the seat to a male competitor (Lakeman 1994). In party-list PR systems, in contrast, parties are more likely to add women to the list in order to broaden their appeal and balance the ticket. The perceived risk with a female candidate decreases when a female is part of a group, rather than the sole candidate.

Although there are several names for each office on the ballot and more than one nominee from that list advances to the general election, the blanket primary system is still essentially a plurality rule, single-member district system. Because the candidate with the most votes from each party advances to the general election, the blanket primary is clearly not a proportional system.

Political parties in other established democracies generally both recruit and nominate their candidates (Norris 1997; Lovenduski and Norris

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1993). Often candidates are selected from the ranks of internal party officials and activists. As such, candidates are required only to have worked loyally for the party for some years, rather than being required to have their own personal resources. In contrast to most other party-based political systems, however, candidates in the United States must take the initiative to step forward themselves, raise their own money, and manage their own campaigns. It is not uncommon for U.S. candidates running for top national and state seats to be unknown to their state and national party chapters.

The weak role that political parties play in the nominating process in the United States puts American women at a distinct disadvantage relative to their European counterparts. After all, as Darcy, Welch, and Clark describe, political parties "have been the key for women's advancement to public office in the proportional representation nations. … in which women hold between 20 and 40 percent of the parliamentary seats. In these countries, the political parties have committed themselves to electing more women"(1994, 186). In fact, even among single-member district electoral systems, countries such as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, where the political parties intend to elect more women, have in fact achieved higher levels of women in their national legislature than have the United States or the United Kingdom (Inter-Parliamentary Union 1997).^[1] Darcy, Welch, and Clark (1994) show that greater centralized control over the candidate selection process helps women. The stronger the role that parties play in controlling candidate nominations, the greater the proportion of women elected in government.

Similarly, Matthews (1984) shows that the weakening of political parties and the entrepreneurial style of primary nominations have hampered women's candidacies. Evidence from state and city elections suggests that stronger parties may increase political opportunities for women. Broadly, female city council members are more likely to pursue higher office under certain circumstances. In particular, women are more likely to enter races that are legally partisan (Bledsoe and Herring 1990). Women running from a partisan council have an expected success rate nine times higher than that of women running from a nonpartisan council. Deber's (1982) research on women in congressional races in Pennsylvania reveals that those who won were more likely to have received organizational backing from a major party organization. She concludes that weak political parties "may thus hamper efforts by outgroups such as women to penetrate the political system by denying them access to the one ready-made source of political resources (organizational, financial, and electoral) which could be used to help a marginal candidate win election" (1982, 479).

In his seminal work, V. O. Key (1949) theorized that where parties play little or no role, those who have their own resources are more likely to

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pursue and win office. According to Matthews, "Private wealth can be a distinct asset to a legislative career, particularly in entrepreneurial political systems, where candidates must raise their own campaign resources" (1984, 549).

In primary systems where candidates generally self-select, personal resources are essential. The competition stimulated in races where parties have less control may discourage the entrance of less advantaged groups who do not possess the "personal political capital" necessary to run for public office. Personal political capital consists of resources accumulated by a candidate that lead to an advantage in the campaign, such as personal wealth, social position, professional career, and ties to strong pressure groups (Guadagnini 1993). Because women as a group are less likely to possess these resources, they are at a disadvantage relative to potential male competitors. The heavy reliance upon large sums of campaign money, especially the use of personal wealth, may preclude many potential female candidates from entering a nomination race.

As a group, women average lower incomes than men, and are less likely to have contacts with other elected officials (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 260–61). In addition, women are not as well represented in the prestigious occupations that are the most common springboards to office in the United States. The most heavily represented occupation in the U.S. Congress is law (Matthews 1984). Although women are increasing their proportion of law school enrollments, it will be another generation or two before women represent an equal share of U.S. lawyers. In 1989, women made up only 20 percent of the legal profession. Verba, Scholzman, and Brady (1995) demonstrate that it is in these professional occupations (where women are far less likely to be) that citizens learn their most basic civic skills. In sum, Darcy, Welch, and Clark (1994) conclude that the concentration of women in "pink-ghetto" occupations that are not traditionally the springboards for political careers severely handicaps women, because these careers do not offer the prestige, business contacts, or wealth that are necessary in a campaign.

Taken together, the bulk of the empirical research suggests that political parties play an integral role in increasing women's numerical representation (Lovenduski and Norris 1993; Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994; Caul 1999). While a strong empirical case has yet to be made for the claim that strong political parties lead to higher levels of women's representation, most scholars agree that weakening the control of parties will impede the growth of female representation in legislative office. Even political parties themselves have recognized their link to women's representation. In numerous democracies, many parties have adopted measures directly intended to increase the proportion of women in office. By 1995, eighty-four parties in thirty-six nations worldwide had enacted candidate gender

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quotas. Further, one-quarter of those parties had implemented special training programs for female candidates (Inter-Parliamentary Union 1997).

Because the literature clearly indicates that parties were key in increasing women's representation in most of the nations where representation is high, we are led to expect that the weakening of parties through the implementation of blanket primaries will only further offset any trends favoring women's candidacies. Switching to a blanket primary may not necessarily place women at a greater disadvantage for winning primaries, but it might discourage more women from stepping forward to run.

The weakening of party control over the nomination process may deter potential female candidates in two ways. First, if female candidates do not receive the support of state party officials, they must pay for the resources on their own that the party organization usually provides, such as party workers, candidate research, and get-out-the-vote drives. Since as a group women lack the wealth and social status that men as a group possess, women are at a critical disadvantage in initially financing their own campaigns. Second, it is easier for parties to encourage and recruit female candidates for nomination if party committees and conventions have more control in the nomination process. Strong parties can prepare and train potential candidates, compensating, therefore, for women's relative disadvantage to men in terms of the personal resources that they are able to bring to the campaign.

THE NUMBER OF FEMALE CANDIDATES IN RECENT STATE PRIMARY ELECTIONS

As many had predicted, the 1998 inauguration of California's blanket primary was the most expensive in California state history: a record $50 million was spent. In the gubernatorial primary the only woman in the race, Democrat Jane Harman, lost in a three-way race to her male competitors. Harman received only 12.3 percent of the vote to Al Checchi's 12.7 percent, while Gray Davis won with 34.9 percent. Harman had enough preexisting "personal political capital" to enter the race and offer a strong challenge to her contenders. Harman, as well as Checchi, both millionaires, contributed heavily to their own campaigns. Davis, who had close ties to the teachers' union and other large unions, received greater interest group support.

In the same election year in the Senate primary, San Diego Mayor Susan Golding originally entered the race. As a moderate supporter of abortion rights who received "high marks overall," Golding, many analysts believed, was the Republicans' best chance at defeating Barbara Boxer in the general election. However, Golding dropped out of the race citing fund-raising problems. Thus, the top contenders in the Republican primary—Darrell

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Issa, a multimillionaire car alarm manufacturer, who used his personal wealth to flood the media with advertisements, and Matt Fong, who as State Treasurer, entered the race with statewide name recognition—were both male.

Because the backing of the party appears to be important to increasing the number of women in primary elections, a comparison of the percentages of female candidates running under similar primary election methods may shed light on the impact of the blanket primary on women in California. In most established democracies elections are partisan, and parties, not voters, nominate the candidates. However, in the United States three other states utilize primary systems that are similar to the blanket primary system that was adopted in California: Washington, Alaska, and Louisiana (Cook and McGillivray 1997).

The blanket primary in Washington is nearly identical to the system that California adopted. However, the systems in Alaska and Louisiana vary in potentially important ways. In Alaska, the Republican candidates are not listed on the blanket ballot. The Republican primary is only open to registered Republicans and those who are undeclared. All other parties' candidates are listed on the same ballot, and all voters except registered Republicans can vote for these candidates. In Louisiana, all candidates are listed together on the ballot, and there is an added runoff component. If one candidate receives 50 percent of the total vote, she is automatically elected to office. If no candidate receives 50 percent, the two top finishers, regardless of party, advance to a runoff election. Because there are few cases of these distinct blanket-like primaries, for this analysis we will lump together races in these four states despite important differences, and refer to them as "blanket/nonpartisan." We then compare these to races in all other states, referring to them as "partisan."

We compare statewide races in 1994, 1996, and 1998. The results are shown in the appendix (table 12.2).^[2] Of the one hundred Senate primaries, forty-two of the races included at least one woman candidate.^[3] Of the eighty gubernatorial primaries, thirty-seven, or 46 percent, included at least one woman candidate. Similarly, in those three election years, of the ten primary elections that were blanket/nonpartisan, six races included at least one woman, of which female candidates won four.

These initial results do not support our hypothesis. On the basis of data from these three election years, blanket/nonpartisan primaries do not negatively affect the numbers of female candidates running relative to partisan primaries. Although there are very few cases of blanket/nonpartisan primaries, it does not appear that fewer women run in these primaries, nor are those women who run more likely to lose their races. Thus, contrary to our original hypothesis, it appears that the blanket/nonpartisan primary system does not directly impede the numerical representation of women.

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DOES THE BLANKET PRIMARY AFFECT THE TYPE OF FEMALE CANDIDATES WHO RUN?

The type of primary system utilized by states may be of little consequence for candidacies of women because even partisan primaries are not vehicles through which parties can exert much control over the recruitment of candidates. In other words, all primary types, whether partisan or nonpartisan, reduce the power of the party elites to select their own candidates. Even if the party perceives the need to promote and recruit female candidates behind the scenes, there may be few means by which to do so (Burrell 1993). Thus, relative to most established democracies, political parties in the United States have so little power to help recruit female candidates that the further weakening of parties in the nomination process is infinitesimal. The effects of a switch to a blanket/nonpartisan primary may be undetectable, considering the great degree to which a primary system disadvantages women in the first place.

It still may be that blanket/nonpartisan primaries attract female candidates with different characteristics from those who run in partisan primaries. The number of blanket/nonpartisan cases is too small to put this hypothesis to a rigorous test. However, it appears that in the statewide blanket/nonpartisan races, the women who run are likely to have the personal political capital that most female candidates lack. For example, Jane Harman in California was a member of Congress and entered the gubernatorial primary with a great deal of personal wealth. Likewise, Mary Landrieu, who advanced to the runoff election in the 1996 Louisiana Senate race, is the daughter of a prominent Louisiana politician.

In order to discern whether primary candidates in blanket/nonpartisan races have different backgrounds from candidates in partisan primaries, we collected data on the background of all candidates in Senate and gubernatorial elections in 1994, 1996, and 1998. The occupational background or the type of elected office previously held by each candidate was that listed in Congressional Quarterly Weekly. In addition, in order to determine whether the candidate brought substantial amounts of personal wealth to the primary race, we reviewed articles detailing the campaigns in the same magazine. If a candidate had previously held elected office, brought personal wealth or widespread name recognition to the campaign, or had special connections for fund-raising as a former state party chair, we considered that candidate to have accumulated substantial personal political capital before entering the primary race.

Table 12.1 presents the difference in the percentage of candidates in blanket/nonpartisan and partisan primaries who either brought personal wealth, enjoyed statewide recognition, or had previously held elected office. Excluding incumbents, in partisan primaries 61 percent of women

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TABLE 12.1 Difference in Percentage of Candidates Who Brought "Personal Political Capital" to Nonpartisan and Partisan Primaries

	Percentage-Point Difference between Nonpartisan and Partisan Primaries
NOTE: Entries represent the gender difference between the percentage of nonpartisan and partisan races in which candidates brought personal wealth to the primary or had previously held elected office. We report the percentage-point difference for Senate and gubernatorial primaries for 1994, 1996, and 1998.
Both races
Women	+27
Men	+1
Senate
Women	+15
Men	+7
Gubernatorial
Women	+36
Men	+5

and 44 percent of men held at least one of these qualifications, while in nonpartisan primaries 88 percent of women and 45 percent of men brought at least one. The difference between women in blanket/nonpartisan and partisan primaries is twenty-seven percentage points. For male candidates, the difference is only one percentage point.

Although the number of blanket/nonpartisan cases is quite small when categorized by type of race, among Senate races more women in blanket/ nonpartisan races brought personal political capital than women in partisan races, by fifteen percentage points. For men the difference is only seven percentage points. Among Gubernatorial races, more women in blanket/ nonpartisan primaries had at least one of the above qualifications, by thirtysix percentage points, while the same difference for men is only five percentage points.^[4]

When the same analysis is conducted, but the list of qualifications is limited to holding statewide office or substantial amounts of personal wealth, the results are similar. Excluding the incumbents, the difference between blanket/nonpartisan and partisan primaries for women is forty-seven percentage points. In contrast, among male candidates the relationship is reversed—only 21percent of men in blanket/nonpartisan primaries, compared to 39 percent of men in partisan primaries, brought personal political capital.

Overall, it appears that women who run in blanket/nonpartisan primaries

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are different from women who enter partisan primaries. Women who step forward to run in blanket/nonpartisan primaries are significantly more likely to bring personal wealth or resources or to have held statewide or other elected office. The same relationship does not hold for men. Men in blanket/nonpartisan primaries do not bring as many of these qualifications to their races. Men with no other outstanding qualifications beyond a professional occupation step forward to run in partisan and blanket/ nonpartisan primaries. In contrast, fewer women without some type of personal political capital step forward. When women do step forward to run in blanket/nonpartisan primaries, they have usually previously held elected office, many at the statewide level, or bring personal wealth or some other statewide fame to their races.

CONCLUSION

Although the existing research suggests that the blanket primary may reduce the numbers of women running for office, we found that the absolute numbers of women running in statewide races in recent years were the same in both partisan and blanket/nonpartisan primary systems. Because it generally functions as a self-nominating system, the American primary system, whether partisan, blanket, or nonpartisan, limits the number of female office seekers. Parties, in other words, cannot aggressively or effectively ensure that equal numbers of women and men are nominated for public office in either a partisan or blanket/nonpartisan system. Secondly, other reforms and trends may work to offset the negative consequence of blanket primaries on the number of women seeking office. In California, there are term limits for state office. Term limits have increased the proportion of open-seat contests, which improves the odds that a woman will be elected. Term limits are one reason women are entering state legislatures faster than they are entering the U.S. Congress.

Even offset by past reforms, the blanket primary may still have an impact on female officeholding because it increases the personal cost of running for public office. Fewer women will have the qualifications necessary to make a credible bid for public office under a blanket primary system like the one adopted in California. We found some evidence for this in our examination of statewide primaries held over the last three election cycles. The types of women running in the partisan and blanket/nonpartisan nominating contests were very different. Female candidates in the blanket/ nonpartisan systems were better qualified than their counterparts running in partisan contests. They were generally wealthier, or established political officeholders, or had name recognition because of family ties. Moreover, the fact remains that gender-role expectations regarding family life discourage many women from pursuing public office and leadership positions.

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These beliefs are changing, but remain quite powerful as ceilings on the career ambitions of women. Thus, unless directly invited and supported by a political organization to run for office, fewer women than men, because of how they are socialized, will take the initiative and declare their own candidacy for public office. Gender-role expectations may also explain why we found no systematic differences in the qualifications of the men running in both the partisan and blanket/nonpartisan systems. Women may feel that they need to establish superior qualifications or political connections to justify their candidacies when running in a blanket/nonpartisan system. Men, in contrast, may not feel the need to be extremely well qualified or positioned to run for public office.

Although women have made great strides in achieving greater equality in the labor force, they are still vastly underrepresented in the pool of business and economic elites from which political leaders are drawn. Campaign finance reform and, specifically, strict spending limits on campaigns and the public financing of campaigns, would open the candidate pool to individuals lacking personal wealth or the social connections that have almost become prerequisites for holding public office in the United States. In the end, our research and other studies reaffirm the central role that political parties play in increasing the numerical representation of women in democratic governments. The single most effective reform would strengthen the political party's role in the nominating process. Parties would be in a better position to ensure that our pool of candidates for public office resembled more closely the general population. California's Proposition 198 and similar measures weaken the role of the political party in the nominating process and make it harder for women, as a political minority, to compete for public office.

APPENDIX

TABLE 12.2 Women in Partisan and Nonpartisan Primaries: Senate and Gubernatorial Races, 1994–98

1994 Senate
Total races	34
Races with at least one woman	18
Women who win	8
Nonpartisan races	1—Washington
Women in nonpartisan races	0
Women who win nonpartisan races	0
1994 Governor (plus 1993 New Jersey)
Total races	37
Races with at least one woman	19
― 245 ―
Women who win	9
Nonpartisan races	1—Alaska
Women in nonpartisan races	0
Women who win nonpartisan races	0
1996 Senate
Total races	33
Races with at least one woman	12
Women who win	7
Nonpartisan races	2—Alaska and Louisiana
Women in nonpartisan races	2
Women who win nonpartisan races	1
1996 Governor (plus 1995 Louisiana)
Total races	10
Races with at least one woman	5
Women who win	5
Nonpartisan races	2
Women in nonpartisan races	2—Washington and Louisiana
Women who win nonpartisan races	1
1998 Senate
Total races	33
Races with at least one woman	12
Nonpartisan races	4
Women in nonpartisan races	2
Women who win nonpartisan races	2—both incumbents—California and Washington
1998 Governor (plus 1997 New Jersey)
Total races	36
Races with at least one woman	15
Nonpartisan races	3
Women in nonpartisan races	1
Women who win nonpartisan races	0

NOTES

REFERENCES

Bledsoe, Timothy, and Mary Herring. 1990. “Victims of Circumstances: Women in Pursuit of Political Office.” American Political Science Review84(March): 212–23.

Burrell, Barbara. 1992. “Women Candidates in Open-Seat Primaries for the U.S. House: 1968–1990.” Legislative Studies Quarterly4(November): 493–510.

Burrell, Barbara. 1993. “Party Decline, Party Transformation, and Gender Politics in the USA.” In Lovenduski and Norris 1993.

Carroll, Susan J. 1985. Women as Candidates in American Politics.Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Caul, Miki L. 1999. “Women's Representation in Parliament: the Role of Political Parties.” Party Politics(January): 79–98.

Cook, Rhodes, and Alice V. McGillivray. 1997. U.S. Primary Elections.Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly.

Darcy, R.; Susan Welch; and Janet Clark. 1994. Women, Elections, and Representation.2nd ed. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Deber, Raisa. 1982. “The Fault Dear Brutus: Women as Congressional Candidates in Pennsylvania.” Journal of Politics44 (May): 463–79.

Dodson, Debra, and Susan J. Carroll. 1991. Reshaping the Agenda: Women in State Legislatures.New Brunswick, NJ: Center for American Women in Politics.

Duverger, Maurice. 1955. The Political Role of Women.Paris: United Nations Economic and Social Council.

Field, Mona, and Charles P. Sohner. 1999. California Government and Politics Today.New York: Addison Wesley Educational Publishers.

Green, Joanne Connor. 1998. “The Role of Gender in Open-Seat Elections for the U.S. House of Representatives: A District Level Test for a Differential Value for Campaign Resources.” Women & Politics19, no. 2: 33–53.

Guadagnini, Marila. 1993. “A ‘Partitocrazia' Without Women: The Case of the Italian Party System.” In Lovenduski and Norris 1993.

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High-Pippert, Angela, and John Comer. 1998. “Female Empowerment: The Influence of Women Representing Women.” Women & Politics19, no. 4: 51–66.

Inter-Parliamentary Union. 1997. Democracy Still in the Making: A World Comparative Study.Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union.

Key, V. O., Jr. 1949. Southern Politics in State and Nation.New York: Knopf.

Lakeman, Enid. 1994. “Comparing Political Opportunities in Great Britain and Ireland.” In Rule and Zimmerman 1994.

Lovenduski, Joni, and Pippa Norris. 1993. Gender and Party Politics.London: Sage.

Matthews, Donald. 1984. “Legislative Recruitment and Legislative Careers.” Legislative Studies Quarterly (November): 547–85.

Norris, Pippa. 1997. Passages to Power: Legislative Recruitment in Advanced Democracies.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Norris, Pippa, and Joni Lovenduski. 1995.Political Recruitment: Gender, Race, and Class in the British Parliament.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rule, Wilma. 1981. “Why Women Don't Run: The Critical Factors in Women's Legislative Recruitment.” Western Political Quarterly34: 60–77.

Rule, Wilma. 1987. “Electoral Systems, Contextual Factors, and Women's Opportunity for Election to Parliament in Twenty-Three Democracies.” Western Political Quarterly (September): 477–98.

Rule, Wilma, and Joseph Zimmerman. 1994. Electoral Systems in Comparative Perspective: Their Impact on Women and Minorities.Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Thomas, Sue. 1993. How Women Legislate.Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Thomas, Sue, and Susan Welch. 1991. “The Impact of Gender on Activities and Priorities of State Legislators.” Western Political Quarterly44, no. 2: 445–56.

Uhlaner, Carole Jean, and Kay Lehman Schlozman. 1986. “Candidate Gender and Congressional Campaign Receipts.” Journal of Politics (February) 1986: 30–50.

Verba, Sidney; Kay Lehman Schlozman; and Henry E. Brady. 1995. Voice and Equality.Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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13. Targets of Opportunity

California's Blanket Primary and the Political Representation of Latinos

Gary M. Segura and Nathan D. Woods

What effect, if any, did the adoption of the blanket primary have on the political fortunes of California's Latino voters? Most Latino voters register and vote as Democrats, and the attachment of Latinos to the Democratic party has become stronger in recent years (Segura, Falcoán, and Pachon 1997). Given their strong partisan attachments, it is conceivable that, because these voters are especially unlikely to cross over, the blanket primary meant nothing to the political future of California Latinos, and Latino politicians had little to gain or lose by the switch to this more open system.

While our evidence is extremely limited, since California's experience under the blanket primary was so brief, we argue the contrary. The adoption of the blanket primary served simultaneously to help solve the Republicans' "Latino problem" and the Latinos' "Republican problem" by providing a structural mechanism that would have allowed for the diversification and moderation of the Republican party, particularly on issues of interest to Latinos. Latinos could and did use the blanket primary in 1998 to help nominate Republican Latinos in competitive districts for the California Assembly, often against more conservative opponents.

In this chapter, we first briefly trace the background of Latino political power in California politics. We then outline the parameters of the "Latino problem" facing Republican strategists and suggest why Latinos should be interested in engaging the GOP, that is, in solving their "Republican problem," despite the existing differences. Finally, using data from the 1998 primary and focusing specifically on contested primaries in which Latinos sought the GOP nomination, we suggest that the blanket primary system had already begun to bear fruit for Latino political interests before it was overturned. We conclude with some thoughts about the potential for the Latino-GOP relationship under a blanket primary system.

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CALIFORNIA'S LATINOS AND POLITICAL POWER

In addition to the passage of Proposition 198, the 1996 elections highlighted a number of other important political developments. California's Democratic party retook control of the State Assembly. The surge in Democratic electoral fortunes was, in part, a result of surging Latino political participation. Latinos, indeed all minorities, turned out at higher rates in 1996, at least in part driven to the polls by their opposition to Proposition 209, which ended affirmative action practices in public employment, contracting, and education in California. Though Prop 209 passed decisively, the swollen Latino electorate helped send fourteen Latinos to the Assembly, and this new Democratic majority ultimately elected Cruz Bustamante—a political moderate from California's Central Valley—to the Speakership, the first Latino Speaker in California history.

At the time of this writing, Latinos hold six seats in California's House delegation (11.5 percent), seven seats in the forty-member California State Senate (17.5 percent), and twenty seats in the Assembly (25 percent). Bustamante is now the Lieutenant Governor, and was replaced at the time as Speaker by another Latino, Antonio Villaraigosa.

Latinos' share of the California population (currently around 31 percent) has always exceeded their share of the electorate, with large numbers of noncitizens living in California. Nevertheless, the Latino share of the electorate climbed to 13 percent in the November 1998 election, up from only 9 percent just four years prior. And Latino political power has grown as a result. A telling example was the passage of Measure BB in the 1997 Los Angeles municipal election, a school bond initiative that many felt was badly needed, and the largest school bond passed in U.S. history. Latinos' support for Measure BB was higher than that of any other racial or ethnic group, which is perhaps not surprising, since more than 60 percent of all children in the Los Angeles Unified School District (and 44 percent of Los Angeles County residents) are Latinos.

CALIFORNIA'S REPUBLICANS AND THEIR "LATINO PROBLEM"

How exactly has this newfound electoral power affected party politics in California? The behavioral evidence is clear—Republicans face a growing electoral problem, one rooted in party policy and long-term demographic trends among California's Latinos, and perhaps nationwide. While much was made of George W. Bush's efforts and success at wooing Latino support and votes when he was governor of Texas, the national trends are less promising. Voter Research and Surveys (VRS) estimated that only 21 percent of Latinos voted Republican in the 1996 national election, down from a paltry 24 percent in the 1992 election. Estimates vary considerably across

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different polling organizations, but Ronald Reagan and George Bush regularly attracted between 30 and 40 percent of the Latino vote in the three presidential elections during the 1980s. Not since 1976 have Republicans fared so badly among Latinos.^[1]

Republicans have long felt that they had a significant opportunity to make inroads into this population (Kosnin and Keysar 1995; Chavez 1996; de la Torre 1996; Rodriguez 1996). Latinos are a socially conservative and churchgoing population. The chief connection between Latinos (at least non-Cubans) and the Democratic party has been over economic issues. But growth in the Latino middle class has diversified economic views. Should economic progress continue, not only would the economic connection to Democratic policies wane, but the salience of economic issues vis-á-vis the more GOP-friendly social issues should also wane.

But the publicity and perceptions generated by the introduction and passage of Propositions 187, 209 and 227^[2] have served to alienate Latinos from the GOP (Segura, Falcoán, and Pachon 1997). Many Latinos in California felt that they were directly targeted by these measures, widely heralded and embraced by the GOP and, particularly, by former Republican Governor Pete Wilson.

How much trouble is the GOP in with California Latinos, and are the ballot propositions really to blame? In a 1996 preelection poll conducted by the Tomaás Rivera Policy Institute (TRPI), only 14.5 percent of likely Latino voters indicated a preference for the GOP presidential candidate. More troubling to GOP electoral prospects is that among those recently enfranchised through the naturalization process or just entering the votingage population, only 5.4 percent expressed a preference for Dole. In terms of party registration, 16.2 percent of likely voters and only 9.4 percent of newly enfranchised voters self-identified as Republicans.

Respondents to the TRPI study were asked how their sentiment might have shifted towards the political parties in recent times. Specifically, respondents were asked to evaluate that sentiment in the wake of significant public discourse on immigration, affirmative action, and welfare reform.^[3] Fully 43 percent of all respondents reported feeling closer to the Democratic party, while only 6 percent reported feeling closer to the Republicans; the remainder reported either no shift (35 percent) or movement away from both parties (11 percent). Perhaps more important, in multivariate analyses predicting the magnitude and direction of change in partisan sentiment, concern over these issues was a powerful predictor of anti-GOP shifts, while income and religiosity, the supposed avenues of access for the GOP to Latino voters, remained insignificant (Segura, Falcoán, and Pachon 1997).

Republicans are increasingly aware of and alarmed by this shift in sentiment and what it means for their electoral future. Reports recently generated

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by the GOP's own caucus staff in the Assembly show that only 11 percent of new voter registrants in the 1990s declared a Republican affiliation. The reports go on to cite "the GOP's inability to come to grips with the state's changing demographics, economics, and political trends" (Jeffe 1997).

The party has made some efforts at redressing this distance. Gubernatorial nominee Dan Lungren made considerable efforts in the 1998 election to attract Latino votes and devoted significant resources to Spanishlanguage advertising. He received about 27 percent of the Latino vote—not huge, but certainly an improvement over recent fortunes.

But a political party is not a single hierarchical structure, so changing strategy and rhetoric is not as simple as it is for a single decision-maker who chooses to do so. Even while the Assembly caucus staff was reporting its concerns, convention delegates to the statewide GOP convention were adopting resolutions supporting Proposition 227 (the anti–bilingual education initiative) despite what, to that point, had been a uniform reluctance on the part of many GOP officeholders and candidates to endorse the proposition. Former Congressman Bob Dornan's widely publicized fight to overturn his 1996 defeat by Loretta Sanchez (D–CA), and his decision to seek renomination for the seat, were additional sources of discomfort for party leaders hoping to reverse the party's slide among Latinos.

For the GOP to solve its "Latino problem" will require the party to put forward policy positions more friendly to Latino interests, disengage from wedge issue politics, and offer candidates more appealing to these new voters. Accomplishing this in a loosely structured party system where primaries, not party strategists, select nominees and drive the policy positions of candidates is a tough task, particularly if, as some suggest, ideologues dominate primary electorates.

Why should Latinos be concerned about the degree to which the GOP and its candidates seek their support? A clearly identified social group might be attracted in very high numbers to a single party by the parties' contrasting positions on the issues of high salience to the group. Once the pattern is established, however, the capture of that group by the party in question creates the likelihood that their support is taken for granted and their interests less primary. African-Americans and gays and lesbians are quite familiar with the political dynamics of having one party feel sure of the group's support, while the other party, adopting policy positions deemed to be contrary to the interests of the group, if not openly hostile, fails to represent a credible threat. To the extent that policy differences between the two parties on issues of salience to the group in question diverge, the threat of abstention is not credible either. It is in the long-term political interests of California Latinos and other political minorities to have both major political parties actively and aggressively courting their

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votes. This is not to say that party competition for a group's votes necessarily breeds responsiveness—only that the absence of competition dramatically reduces the incentives to cater to a constituency group's interests.

CALIFORNIA'S LATINOS AND THE BLANKET PRIMARY

How would a blanket primary make the GOP more attractive to Latino voters? First, the blanket primary changes the composition of party primary electorates. Efforts by the GOP leadership to present a more appealing image to Latino voters are undermined when the actual nominees continue to distance the GOP from Latino voters through their policy preferences and rhetoric. The nature of the pool of nominees, however, can be changed, at least in part, if the blanket primary system is used to good effect. Substantial crossover voting would, in theory, moderate primary electorates, thereby reducing the number of general election candidates or elected officials who feel comfortable openly expressing hostility to the interests of this significant voter bloc. Thus, while the GOP leadership takes steps to present a more appealing image to Latino voters, the blanket primary can serve to secure more appealing candidates less likely to engage in wedge issue politics or to adopt policies perceived to be as economically harmful to Latino interests.

Second, and more to the point of this chapter, Latinos could themselves cross over and thus ensure the nomination of a GOP candidate they find acceptable. Latinos lack influence in GOP position-taking precisely because they are a largely Democratic subgroup. Outside of ethnic-majority districts, no reasonable GOP primary candidate would devote significant resources or tailor issue positions to attract Latino votes since, as we have argued and the literature suggests, there are so few Latino GOP primary voters to be had under the closed primary. A blanket primary at least creates the possibility that this reality may change.

Under what conditions would we expect to see Latinos influence the outcome of GOP primaries? There are four specific hypotheses that arise from the logic we have just put forward. Two arise from what we see as necessary conditions for Democratic Latinos to vote in the GOP primary, and two pertain to factors that would affect the magnitude of such a trend. First, the district must be at least competitive for the GOP. Latinos will have little motive to engage in crossover voting in the primary if the general election is a sure win for Latino-friendly Democratic candidates. In districts with a very large majority of Latinos in the population or in which the outcome is securely Democratic, participation in the Republican primary—selecting a candidate sure to lose to one more amenable to the policy preferences of the relevant voters—is less valuable, ex ante. We should expect

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to observe lower levels of crossover voting by Latinos in these contexts. We would expect more crossover voting from Democrats in places where the parties are competitive or where the seat is considered safe for the GOP.

Second, the GOP primary must be contested. That is, ceteris paribus, we would expect little crossover voting by any Democratic group, including Latinos, when a potentially attractive GOP candidate faces no primary opposition.

Third, the absence of a contested Democratic primary, while not absolutely necessary, would certainly make crossing over more attractive to Latino voters because the Democratic nominee is secure, and Latino votes in the Democratic contest are unnecessary. By contrast, in elections in which the Democratic primary offers a meaningful contest, Latino voters may still perceive that there is more to be gained by voting in their own party's primary.

And finally, we expect Latinos to be most likely to engage in crossover voting when there is at least one Latino candidate seeking the GOP nomination. The literature on ethnic voting is well-developed, though the bulk of the work has been done on African-Americans. That work suggests that voters are partial towards candidates of their own subgroup (Karnig and Welch 1981; Sheffield and Hadley 1984; Grofman and Handley 1989) and are more likely to turn out if one is present on the ballot (Atkins, DeZee, and Eckert 1985; Tate 1991). It seems reasonable that, when controlling for other factors, Latinos are more likely to turn out and to vote across party lines for candidates with Hispanic surnames. Certainly, their candidacy must be viable. Stealth Latino candidates, with no money or name recognition, are far less likely to attract sufficient attention to garner much cross-party support.

DID LATINO CROSSOVER VOTING SHAPE OUTCOMES IN 1998?

With the very small number of cases to draw upon, it is difficult with aggregate data to show definitively that Latino crossover voting shaped outcomes in the 1998 primary. Using individual-level polling data would require valid samples of sufficient size in each of the districts affected, which are unfortunately not available. Aggregate data, however, do suggest that Latino engagement and overall voter interest in the GOP primaries increased when competitive Latino candidates appeared upon the primary ballot.

When Rod Pacheco was elected to the California Assembly from the Sixty-Fourth District in 1996, he became the only self-identified Latino Republican to serve in the Assembly since 1881, and only the third ever (Mendel 1998). In the 1996 elections, Pacheco was one of four Latino

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candidates in the GOP Assembly primaries, and one of three Latino nominees from the Republican party, two of which ran in districts so heavily Democratic that they stood no chance of winning the seat.^[4]

By contrast, 1998 witnessed the election of four Latino Republican Assembly members, Pacheco and three freshmen colleagues. A total of nine Latino nominees carried the GOP banner into the general election (out of thirteen who sought GOP nominations).^[5] Table 13.1 lists the Latino Republican candidates for the Assembly, along with some relevant district information regarding party registration and total vote in the 1998 primary.

A quick glance at the data reveals some interesting patterns. The most obvious is the substantial increase in voters going to the polls in nearly all of these districts. With the exclusion of Pacheco's district—where he ran unopposed by candidates of either party—the total number of primary votes cast increased between 7.5 percent and almost 68 percent, compared with total votes cast two years before. Statewide total votes cast increased only 2.1 percent across the state, an indication that these districts experienced unusually high increases in participation when compared to the rest of the state.^[6] Certainly, some of this effect is due to other factors, including the absence of incumbents in a number of districts (where total vote increased an average of 34.3 percent) and the level of primary competition in either party.^[7] But incumbent retirements due to term limits were as substantial in other districts as well, and the growth in total votes in the cases highlighted here dramatically exceeds the statewide mean. Finally, in Districts 27, 57, and 67, total votes increased an average of 30.5 percent in the primary despite the presence of incumbents.

Further, when we examine the data on GOP votes, it becomes clear that the level of participation in the GOP primary also increased substantially in the 1998 elections, even where there was no competition in the GOP primary to attract interest. In eleven of thirteen races fielding Republican Latino candidates, total GOP votes increased. The mean increase in contested seats was 43.8 percent from the comparable figures in the 1996 primary. More surprising, GOP votes increased by a mean of 17.3 percent in the uncontested races as well. In eight of the thirteen districts, including the four districts in which Latino nominees eventually won the seat for the Republicans, GOP vote grew at a rate higher than total vote.

But was this GOP turnout in districts with Republican Latino candidates higher than we might have expected? Across all thirteen districts with Latino GOP candidates, Republican vote share in the primary exceeded Republican registration by 16.7 percent. The comparable figure for the other sixty-seven districts without Latino primary candidates was 11.7 percent. This 16.7 percent also compares favorably with the 1996 primary, in which GOP vote exceeded registration by 12.2 percent in these same districts, and with the 1996 general election, in which the comparable figure was

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TABLE 13.1 Turnout and Registration in Assembly Districts with Latino GOP Primary Candidates, June 1998

Candidate	AD	Share of GOP Vote	GOP % of Total Vote	GOP Registration	Democratic Registration	Latino % in 1997	Increase in Vote from 1996 Primary	Increase in Gop Vote from 1996
Paredes	5th	30.82%	64.80%	44.25%	40.13%	9.5%	+28.6%	+55.5%
Sanchez	7th	100.00	27.00	30.72	52.90	14.3	+11.6	−12.6
Vargas-Widmar	20th	40.26	40.73	31.37	47.68	17.0	+47.0	+51.5
Chavez	27th	51.60	34.80	29.94	49.46	15.2	+7.5	−0.6
Maldonado	33rd	44.33	72.60	43.80	39.98	25.7	+21.5	+44.2
Gonzales	57th	100.00	25.60	26.22	56.15	71.1	+67.8	+15.0
Nunñez	58th	100.00	24.60	23.65	62.48	70.0	+61.9	+25.5
Pacheco, Robert	60th	36.47	67.60	39.89	42.92	38.0	+34.8	+59.6
Escobar	62nd	100.00	21.56	27.66	57.98	47.7	+42.4	+5.3
Pacheco, Rod	64th	100.00	100.00	43.07	41.90	33.9	−9.7	+53.3
Rocha	67th	4.09	77.40	50.47	32.56	13.2	+16.2	+38.4
Gonzales	68th	5.56	69.60	43.39	39.10	30.5	+35.7	+58.1
Zettel	75th	45.14	75.70	50.10	29.59	11.8	+25.0	+43.5

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10.4 percent. Though incumbent Rod Pacheco's lack of opposition inflates this figure, if we examined only those primaries with Latino candidates that were contested in 1998, GOP vote exceeded registration by a mean of 18.0 percent. This unusually high turnout in these specific GOP primary races, we suggest, is explained, at least in part, by the volume of crossover voting.

One might raise the objection that the single most important predictor of Democratic to Republican crossover voting would be whether the Democratic primary was contested, since such a contest would be likely to discourage raiding or hedging by Democrats. It is the case that in the seven primaries in which the Democratic race was contested, GOP vote exceeded registration by only 6.8 percent. But four of those seven races had no contest for the GOP primary. In the three cases where both parties' primaries were contested, GOP vote exceeded party registration by 18.9 percent. The comparable figure in the six districts with no Latino candidates where both parties had contested primaries was 14.5 percent.

To summarize, while this aggregate examination is limited in inferential power, a number of patterns emerge which seem to suggest that the presence of Latinos in the race altered the level of interest and participation. The races represented in table 13.1 experienced turnout growth that was considerably larger than the statewide number. The GOP vote exceeded party registration at a rate higher than in other comparable elections, and contested GOP races attracted considerably more voters even when Democrats had a contest of their own. And in seven of eight races where the GOP vote grew at a rate higher than total turnout, the Republican nominee went on to win the seat, and four of these nominees were Latinos.

HERE'S TO THE WINNERS!

Those Latino candidates that went on to become the four Latino Assembly members stand out from the others who ran for and/or received the GOP nomination. Several distinctions among the races are very clear, as presented in table 13.2.

First, consistent with our hypothesis that crossover voting is likely to be attractive only in contested primaries, turnout growth was stronger in the contested races. For the four cases here where the GOP primary was uncontested (but the Democratic primary was), GOP vote share underperformed GOP registration share by 2.4 percent. In the eight cases where the GOP primary was contested, vote share in the primary exceeded registration share by an average of 21.5 percent.^[8]

Second, if Latino crossover voting was responsible for boosting the GOP's total share of the vote, it was those candidates who benefited the most from this crossing—where GOP vote share most exceeded their share of registration—that then went on to win the seat in the general election.

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TABLE 13.2 Key Characteristics of Districts with Latino GOP Primary Candidates, June 1998

Candidate	AD	GOP Vote% Minus Gop Registration	District Type	Democratic Primary Contest	Latino % in 1997	Primary Election outcome	Primary Margin of Win/(Loss)	General Election Result
L=lost, W=won.
Uncontested GOP
nominees
Sanchez	7th	−3.72%	Safe D	Yes	14.3%	Unopposed	N/A	L
Gonzales	57th	−0.62	Safe D	Yes	71.1	Unopposed	N/A	L
Nunñez	58th	+0.95	Safe D	Yes	70.0	Unopposed	N/A	L
Escobar	62nd	−6.10	Safe D	Yes	47.7	Unopposed	N/A	L
Contested GOP
primary losers
Paredes	5th	+20.55	Leans R	Yes	9.5	Lost	(14,951)	N/A
Vargas-Widmar	20th	+9.36	Safe D	Yes	17.0	Lost	(4,846)	N/A
Rocha	67th	+26.93	Safe R	Yes	13.2	Lost	(23,875)	N/A
Gonzales	68th	+26.21	Leans R	No	30.5	Lost	(11,134)	N/A
Contested GOP
primary winners
Chavez	27th	+5.14	Safe D	No	15.2	Won	978	L
Maldonado	33rd	+28.80	Leans R	No	25.7	Won	4,040	W
Pacheco, Robert	60th	+27.71	Leans D	No	38.0	Won	1,752	W
Zettel	75th	+27.60	Safe R	No	11.8	Won	8,821	W
Candidate unopposed
by either party
Pacheco, Rod	64th	+56.93	Leans R	No	33.9	Won		W

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For the four primary candidates who ultimately lost, GOP vote share exceeded registration share by 20.8 percent. For the four primary candidates who received the nomination, GOP vote share exceeded registration share by 22.3 percent on average. And for the three of these four who went on to win the general election, the comparable figure is 28 percent.

Three types of Latino nominees emerged from the primaries spotlighted in tables 13.1 and 13.2. The first two are "sacrificial lambs," or candidates nominated to run under circumstances of near certain general election defeat. There are two types of sacrificial lambs—those nominated by virtue of running in heavily Latino districts and those nominated in heavily Democratic districts. Henry Gonzales in the Fifty-Seventh District and Albert Nunñez in the Fifty-Eighth fall into the first category. Those two districts' populations are 71.1 and 70 percent Latino, respectively. Latinos ran unopposed in both party primaries, and the Latino Democratic nominees won in nearly identical landslides in the general election with about 72 percent of the vote. Not surprisingly, and consistent with our hypothesis regarding safe districts and uncontested primaries, there is little evidence of crossover voting in the primary, since GOP vote totals in the primary hover just above the level of GOP registration.^[9]

The second type of sacrificial lamb is one led to the purely partisan slaughter (as opposed to the ethnic one). Bob Sanchez (District 7), Phil Chavez (District 27), and Irma Escobar (District 62) each ran in heavily Democratic districts, facing GOP registration disadvantages of 22 percent, 20 percent and 30 percent less than Democratic registration respectively. Each of these candidates faced non-Hispanic Democrats, but the party registration disadvantage doomed all three to lose, each garnering only 30 to 35 percent of the general election vote.

Like Nunñez and Gonzalez, Sanchez and Escobar ran unopposed in the primary. In both instances, however, the Democratic primaries were contested, so there was little incentive for Democrats to cross over in the Republican primary, and, not surprisingly, Republican vote share was actually less than GOP registration.^[10]

Of those nominated to run in the general election in these difficult districts, only Phil Chavez in District 27 faced primary opposition. Chavez faced a close race with Chuck Carter and won the nomination by only 978 votes. It is conceivable that Chavez's nomination was secured by crossover votes, and the district—around Monterey and Santa Cruz—is 15.2 percent Latino. Republican share of the total vote, however, exceeded party registration by just over 5 percent, but was actually lower than GOP vote share in both the 1996 and 1994 general elections and primaries. Given the GOP's overall performance compared to elections in the recent past, it is difficult to make a case that much if any crossover occurred. But

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with such a close vote margin, it is possible that enough Latinos crossed over to make the difference.

The final type of nominee includes those with a legitimate chance to win. The four winners in 1998 have substantially different stories to tell. Only Charlene Gonzales Zettel was nominated to run in a safe Republican district. The other three were nominated in districts where party registration was fairly competitive. Similarly, only Zettel ran in a district with a very small Latino population. The other three candidates ran in districts where the Latino population was large enough to make an electoral impact (ranging from 26 to 38 percent), but not so large as to guarantee a safe Democratic or safe majority-Latino seat. Unfortunately for the purposes of our inquiry—but fortunately for him—Rod Pacheco was lucky enough to face no opposition in either party, so it is impossible for us to speculate what effect the blanket primary might have had on his electoral fortunes. The remaining three faced primary opposition. That leaves us with three cases where the Latino candidate faced primary opposition in seats where the winner had a reasonable chance of being competitive or winning in the general election: Zettel in District 75, Abel Maldonado in District 33, and Robert Pacheco in District 60. Those cases are worthy of a closer examination.

The Thirty-Third Assembly District

Abel Maldonado's election in District 33 was not a simple undertaking. The primary campaign included a number of charges of unethical behavior regarding endorsements and the like, and some press reports suggested that his Republican primary opponents might not support him in the general election (Wilcox 1998a, 1998b).

Maldonado was not the most moderate candidate in the election, but was clearly the more moderate of the two leading candidates—the other being Rick Bravo, whose support came from the more conservative wing of the party. Bravo was also Latino, of Cuban and Ecuadorian ancestry.

This intraparty division is not new in the district, which covers Santa Maria, San Luis Obispo and Pismo Beach. A recent special-election GOP primary for Congress between Tom Bordonaro and Brooks Firestone produced a similar divide. Bordonaro, the more conservative of the two, won the nomination and went on to lose to Democrat Lois Capps in the general election.

Maldonado's campaign was the potential beneficiary of the dynamic we have described. There was no contest on the Democratic side, freeing voters to cross over at little cost. The district is over 25 percent Latino, up from just 20 percent since 1990. Crossover voting is key to any candidate's electoral

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chances since the GOP registration advantage over the Democrats is just under 4 percent.

On primary election day, GOP percent of the total vote exceeded registration by nearly 30 percent, a strong indication that crossover voting made a difference. Maldonado polled 44.3 percent of the GOP vote, while Bravo received 38.6 percent of GOP votes. The difference in real numbers was 4,040 votes out of over 71,000 GOP votes cast. Maldonado went on to beat Democrat Betty Sanders by almost 30,000 votes in the general election, receiving 60.4 percent of the vote.

The Sixtieth Assembly District

Robert Pacheco (who is unrelated to Rod Pacheco) was something of an underdog in this race. His closest competitor, Mike Radlovic, was the anointed party successor ("District by District Analysis" 1998), was well financed through personal wealth, and was the son of a prominent Republican party activist. He was described by the California Journal as a "businessman" and political "outsider" despite these connections. By contrast, Robert Pacheco was a former Walnut city councilman and had far more in the way of local ties and electoral experience.

The district, which includes all or parts of West Covina, Whittier, La Habra Heights, and Walnut, leans Republican, but only slightly; GOP registration exceeds Democratic registration by just over 3 percent. Again, the Democrats had no contest on their side, freeing voters to cross over. Pacheco's presence on the ballot, no doubt, attracted voters in a district that is now 38 percent Latino, up from less than 30 percent in the 1990 census.

GOP vote share in the June primary (67.6 percent) exceeded party registration (39.9 percent) dramatically. In terms of raw numbers, total vote increased almost 35 percent from the 1996 primary, and GOP vote increased almost 60 percent. Pacheco beat Radlovic 36.5 percent to 32.4 percent, a vote margin of only 1,752 votes out of 42,608 GOP votes cast. It seems highly likely that Latino crossover voting made a difference in this primary. Pacheco went on to defeat Democrat Ben Wong in a fairly close race, receiving 52.5 percent of the vote and outpolling Wong by less than 7,000 votes in a race where over 90,000 votes were cast. Having a Latino carry the banner for the GOP in this increasingly Hispanic district may have actually determined the ultimate outcome in a race Democrats thought they had a chance of winning ("District by District Analysis" 1998).

The Seventy-Fifth Assembly District

In contrast to the other two districts presented, Charlene Zettel's district (Poway, El Cajon, and Lakeside) is solidly Republican. The GOP enjoys a registration margin of over 20 points. In such a safe seat, we expect significant

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crossover voting, and the absence of a contest on the Democratic side in this primary only exacerbated that propensity.

Zettel, as a pro-choice Latina and member of the Poway School Board, was clearly the most moderate of the major candidates. Her opponents, Joel Anderson and Mark Price, were both white males from the business community with no political experience to speak of. Both were described by the California Journal as decidedly more conservative, and the race turned largely on these two competing for the conservative vote. The press accounts suggest that the campaign was expensive and nasty on the part of all three candidates, with charges and countercharges exchanged, most of which proved to be false (Braun 1998). Latinos make up only 11.8 percent of this district. Nevertheless, GOP vote share on election day was 75.7 percent, 6 percent higher than the 1996 primary vote share and over 25 percent above party registration. Zettel received 45 percent of the GOP vote, while Anderson and Price split the conservative vote and received 31.4 percent and 23.5 percent, respectively. The division among the conservatives was critical to Zettel, who outpolled Anderson by 8,821 votes. Nevertheless, the lone Democratic candidate polled only 18.6 percent of all votes, suggesting that, along with abstention, a significant number of Democrats crossed over. The lion's share of those votes went to the pro-choice Latina. Zettel went on to win the general election with 64.4 percent of the vote, more than doubling the number of votes received by her Democratic opponent^[11] but substantially underperforming previous GOP vote tallies.^[12]

Latino GOP Candidates Who Didn't Make the Cut

The four cases where Latino primary candidates failed to reach the general election warrant some attention. In two instances, the Latino candidates were never serious contenders. Felix Rocha, running in the crowded Sixty-Seventh District, polled only 3.2 percent of the total vote. Rocha placed last in a six-candidate GOP field that included both an incumbent (Scott Baugh) and a former holder of the seat (Doris Allen). The Democratic nomination was also contested. Republican share of the total vote was high (77.4 percent), an indication that some crossover voting occurred, though it likely benefited Allen. Though the district is 13.2 percent Latino, it is doubtful whether Rocha's candidacy attracted much attention within the community, though they may well be responsible for the 2,593 votes he managed to gather. The seat is safe for the GOP, which enjoys an 18 percentage point advantage in party registration.

A bigger surprise was Paul Gonzales in the Sixty-Eighth district. Gonzales, too, placed last in a crowded field of five GOP candidates. But the district is competitive, with Republican registration only 4.3 percent higher than Democratic. The Democratic half of the primary was uncontested,

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and the Latino population has climbed to 30.5 percent in recent years. Gonzales' 2,152 votes were an indication that his candidacy was never a significant factor in the district.

The more interesting cases come from Districts 5 and 20. In the Fifth, Sam Paredes placed second to Dave Cox. Despite a contest on the Democratic side, GOP total vote share was 10 points higher than in 1996 and 20 points higher than registration percentages. It is unlikely, however, that Paredes was the beneficiary of a significant crossover vote. As executive director of the Gun Owners of California, Paredes was decidedly not a moderate in the race. In addition, the district is only 9.5 percent Latino. Paredes lost the nomination by almost 15,000 votes.

Finally, in the Twentieth District, Linda Vargas-Widmar lost the GOP nomination to Jonelle Zager. Vargas-Widmar did manage to attract over 40 percent of the GOP votes cast, and the district's 17 percent Latino population may well have helped her. But the presence of a Democratic contest and the fact that District 20 is heavily Democratic (47.7 percent Democrat to 31.4 percent GOP) severely limited her chance of attracting enough crossover voters to make the difference.

We learn a number of important caveats from the four primary losses. First, not every Latino candidate is more moderate than his primary opposition, and while the attraction of a Hispanic surname might be significant, it is not alone sufficient to ensure competitiveness. Second, poorly funded campaigns with low name recognition cannot be compensated for merely through crossover balloting. Candidates who are not competitive in the first place can take little comfort in the hope that Latinos in the other party will vault them to victory.

GOP to Democratic Crossover

We have focused our discussion on Democratic to Republican crossover voting. It is reasonable to ask what, if any effect, the blanket primary had on Latinos running in Democratic primaries. Since most politically active Latinos are already voting Democratic, the level of crossover voting from the GOP for the benefit of Latino candidates is likely to be small.

Nevertheless, we looked at all Assembly races in which Latino Democrats sought the party's nomination in a contested primary. A total of eight districts had Latino candidates facing primary opposition. In six of those cases, however, it seems fairly clear that crossover voting was either not significant or had little effect. In Districts 30, 31, and 61, growth in GOP total votes exceeded growth in Democratic votes. In the first two cases, the margin of victory was sizable, making it even less likely that crossover voters had an effect on the outcome. In the third case, a hotly contested GOP primary held Democratic total vote close to Democratic share of two-party registration.

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In the remaining three districts, other factors suggest that crossover voting had no effect. In District 50, all three Democratic candidates were Latino, and the district was strongly Democratic, where Democratic registration exceeded GOP registration by 53 percent. In Districts 57 and 58, there was substantial growth in Democratic votes. But given the nominees' margins of victory—the nominees received nearly 70 percent of the Democratic votes in the Fifty-Seventh and 83 percent in the Fifty-Eighth—and that GOP vote share was close to its share of two-party registration, it is highly unlikely that there was any crossover impact.

In two cases, however, there does appear to be some evidence that crossover voting affected Latino political fortunes. In the Forty-Ninth District, the Democratic vote more than doubled from 1996, while the GOP vote declined substantially. The Democratic primary attracted five candidates—three Latinos—and the Latino victor won by less than 3,000 votes over an Asian-American rival. By contrast, in the Sixty-Second District, which is only 47.7 percent Latino, though safely Democratic, the Democratic vote increased 57.2 percent compared to an increase of only 5.3 percent for Republicans, who underperformed their share of two-party registration. Two Anglos faced three Latino candidates. While apparent crossover benefited one Anglo candidate, who secured the nomination with 30 percent of the Democratic vote, the division in the 60.8 percent of the vote that went to the three Latino candidates likely played a pivotal role in determining the outcome.

As in our discussion of Democratic-to-Republican crossover voting, the number of contested Democratic primary races with Latino candidates from this one election is not sufficient to draw hard and fast conclusions about any long-term effects the blanket primary may have had on Democratic Latino candidates. Further, we do not examine whether the blanket primary had an effect on the Democratic party as a whole. Rather, our focus on Latino candidates suggests that the impact of Republican-to-Democratic crossover was small and mixed. In only two cases did aggregate evidence suggest that crossover might have played a role, and in one of those cases, it was to the detriment of the leading Latino candidate. In that latter case, division of the Latino vote among three candidates was likely more responsible for the loss. In short, the opportunity to cross party lines in the primary election seemed to have more significant effects for Latinos who were running in the Republican primaries than for those seeking Democratic nominations.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

We began this enterprise with the question of whether the adoption of the blanket primary served Latino interests in the 1998 primary. We argued

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that since most Latinos are Democrats, evidence that Latinos made "use" of the blanket primary would be significant crossover voting for GOP candidates. We hypothesized that Latino crossover voting would occur when competitive Latino candidates contested GOP primaries in districts where they had a reasonable chance of winning, and in districts where the Latino population could contribute to that effort.

In the absence of individual-level evidence on the thirteen districts in which Latinos sought GOP Assembly nominations, we relied on aggregate evidence which, while not definitive, is at least suggestive that Latino voters made a difference in several GOP primaries, possibly changing the outcome in a few, and ultimately electing four moderate Latinos to the California Assembly in competitive or safe Republican districts.

Clearly, to the extent that this effect exists, it is not systematic—crossover voting can make a difference only when circumstances are ripe. First, for the blanket primary to present an opportunity to Latino voters requires competitive Latino candidates in the GOP which, itself, is likely endogenous to these processes. In other words, the very factors which have driven Latino voters into the Democratic fold have reduced the available pool of potential Latino GOP candidates. Without credible Latino candidates, the crossover opportunity we identify here is of limited use. Second, the outcome of the GOP primary has to matter. Electing Latino GOP nominees in a Latinomajority district is no trick, and nominating Latinos from the GOP to run in safe Democratic seats serves little purpose. Third, the district needs to have an electorally meaningful Latino population; otherwise even significant crossover voting is unlikely to change the outcome.

Nevertheless, the opportunity to elect competitive Latinos did manifest itself, and the opportunity appears to have been taken. As table 13.2 clearly showed, when the hypothesized circumstances were in place, crossover voting appears to have occurred at significant levels, and the competitive Latino candidates did well. The result is a GOP Assembly caucus that is less conservative and more ethnically diverse than at any point in its modern history. This change may well have served long-term Republican electoral interests, had the blanket primary rules remained in force. The irony, of course, is that this change occurred through a mechanism the party leadership opposed—the blanket primary. Had it survived, the blanket primary may have saved the Republican party from itself.

It is important to make clear what we have not argued here. We do not suggest that Latinos were uniquely more likely to cross over. In fact, if we suspect any intergroup difference, it would be a lesser propensity among Latinos.^[13] The evidence presented elsewhere in this volume suggests substantial crossover voting. What we do mean to suggest is that Latino identity, either communicated in campaign materials or signified by surname, serves as one important avenue for drawing non–party members into a party's

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nominating process. Given the growing importance of the Latino electorate, this avenue might have been particularly important to the future competitiveness of the state's GOP.

The same dynamics might have served to help other minority and female candidates within the GOP as well. To the extent that identity politics trumps partisan preferences in the hierarchy of voter concerns, we could imagine that substantial crossover voting might have occurred among African-American, Asian-American, and especially female voters who identify with GOP primary candidates with like characteristics. This possibility, particularly in the case of female candidates, is certainly worth exploring. The likelihood of such an occurrence for other minority groups, however, is damped by the relatively rare instances of the GOP running candidates of like identity. Unlike Latinos, however, who now make up almost a third of the state's population, Asian-American and African-American voters are less frequently concentrated in sufficient numbers—and in electorally competitive or safe Republican districts—to affect outcomes. As California's demography continues to evolve, however, this possibility might well have grown substantially.

A few other observations are worth noting as well. First, we have confined our examination to the State Assembly for good reason. The dynamic we believe we have identified was clearly not replicated in the 1998 races for the State Senate or the U.S. House. There were no Latino candidates for GOP nominations to the State Senate. For the House, three Latinos ran for GOP nominations, two of them successfully. However, both nominees were unopposed and ended up losing in the general election in heavily Democratic majority-minority districts. The unsuccessful candidate mounted almost no campaign, received less than 2 percent of the total vote, and placed last in a field of four Republicans (including Bob Dornan) seeking the seat currently held by Loretta Sanchez (D–CA), who undoubtedly attracted nearly all Latino attention and votes in that hotly contested district.

Second, Latinos have shown themselves to be moderately successful at running in white districts in a way African-Americans have never been. None of the four Republican Latino Assembly members represents a majority-minority district, and two of the Latino Democrats in the Assembly are also from majority white districts. In the State Senate, three of the seven Latinos represent majority white districts.

Future research into blanket primary systems and their effects among Latinos might want to answer a number of questions for which our data are insufficient. First, can the relationships we hypothesized here be demonstrated both at the level of the individual voter and across a larger number of races? Second, does crossover voting begin to have spillover effects? It would be important if ethnic crossover voting in the primary is associated

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with the same types of increased ticket splitting in the general election, or even a slow drift into the other party, as demonstrated by Sides, Cohen, and Citrin (chapter 5) and Kousser (chapter 8) in this volume. Similarly, crossover voting in one race may well be associated with crossing over in other races. Third, crossover voting is hypothesized here as a function of the voters' identification with Hispanic-surnamed candidates. The propensity to engage in ethnically driven voting might decline vis-a`-vis stronger party identification as the individual is more assimilated into the society. Should this be the case, crossover voting by Latinos may well be more common among the newly enfranchised naturalized citizens than among second-or third-generation Latinos whose partisan attitudes are more fully developed. Or, by contrast, the reverse might be the case if longer-term and second-generation Latino citizens become less uniform in their partisan preferences as they become more socially and economically diverse.

The evidence we presented in the first section of this chapter strongly suggested that the GOP was in very deep trouble among the state's Latinos. It may turn out that 1998 was the high-water mark of efforts to reverse the slide and attract Latinos to the GOP. And any effect we observed here was confined to races for the State Assembly. The party was clearly serious about the effort to attract more Latino votes, appointing a Latino as its political director and, more recently, electing Rod Pacheco as the GOP Assembly leader, though his tenure in that position turned out to be startlingly brief. But the very presence of these four Latinos in the Republican caucus serves to help the GOP's perception among Latinos and may well shape party policy into something less directly confrontational with the fastest growing segment of California's electorate.

The blanket primary could not, alone, make the GOP competitive among Latinos or moderate and diversify its group of elected officials. And it is not clear how the Democratic party might respond to such a challenge. To continue enjoying their advantage among Latino voters, Democrats might become more aggressive in recruiting Latino candidates in mixed and/or competitive districts or more specifically tailor their message to this specific audience. Given the dominance of the Democrats among Latinos and the successes of Latino Democratic politicians to date, it is difficult to imagine that party doing more. Nevertheless, our findings do suggest that the blanket primary may have provided a first step in making Republicans competitive for Latino votes.

NOTES

REFERENCES

Abramowitz, Alan; Ronald Rapoport; and Walter Stone. 1991. “Up Close and Personal: The Iowa Caucuses and Presidential Politics.” In Emmett H. Buel and Lee Sigelman, eds., Nominating the President.Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.

Atkins, Burton; Matthew DeZee; and William Eckert. 1985. “The Effect of a Black Candidate in Stimulating Voter Participation in Statewide Elections.” Journal of Black Studies 16, no. 2: 213–25.

Braun, Gerry. 1998. “Assembly Hopefuls Turning Mean with Last-Minute Mailers.” San Diego Union Tribune, May 31, B1.

Cain, Bruce E. 1997. “Report on Blanket and Open Primaries.” Expert testimony in California Democratic Party v. Jones, 984 F. Supp. 1288 (1997).

California Secretary of State. 1994, 1996, 1998. Statement of the Vote. Sacramento.

California Secretary of State. 1998. Report of Registration. Sacramento.

Chavez, Linda. 1996. “The Hispanic Political Tide.” New York Times, November 18, A17.

Crotty, William, and John Jackson. 1985. Presidential Primaries and Nominations. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press.

de la Garza, Rodolfo O., and Louis DeSipio, eds. 1999. Awash in the Mainstream: Latino Politics in the 1996 Elections. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

de la Torre, Adela. 1996. “Latinos Can't Be Taken for Granted; Republicans Alienate Many on Immigration and Bilingual Issues. Democrats Talk But Don't Always Deliver.” Los Angeles Times, October 16, home edition, 9.

"District by District Analysis." 1998. California Journal 29, no. 7 (July): 43–46

Grofman, Bernard, and Lisa Handley. 1989. “Minority Population and Black and Hispanic Congressional Success in the 1970s and 1980s.” American Politics Quarterly 17: 436–45.

Hedlund, R., and M. Watts. 1986. “The Wisconsin Open Primary 1968–1984.” American Politics Quarterly 14: 55–73.

Hedlund, R.; M. Watts; and D. Hedge. 1982. “Voting in Open Primaries.” American Politics Quarterly 10: 197–218.

Herrington, John, and Bill Press. 1996. “Argument Against Proposition 198.” Secretary of State. Ballot Information. Sacramento.

Jeffe, Sherry Bebitch. 1997. “California Conservatism's Worst Nightmare Revealed.” Los Angeles Times, August 17, home edition, 1.

Jewell, Malcolm. 1984. Parties and Primaries: Nominating State Governors. New York: Praeger.

Karnig, A., and S. Welch. 1981. Black Representation and Urban Public Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kosnin, Barry, and Ariela Keysar. 1995. “Party Political Preferences of U.S. Hispanics:

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The Varying Impact of Demographic Factors.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 18, no. 2: 336–47.

Ladd, Everett. 1978. Where Have All the Voters Gone? New York: W. W. Norton.

Mendel, Ed. 1998. “Pacheco May Be Major GOP Inroad to Latinos.” San Diego Union Tribune, November 6, A1.

Monardi, Fred. 1994. “Primary Voters as Retrospective Voters.” American Politics Quarterly 22: 88–103.

Norrander, Barbara. 1989. “Ideological Representativeness of Presidential Primary Voters.” American Journal of Political Science 33, no. 3: 570–87.

Ranney, A. 1975. “Turnout and Representation in Presidential Primary Elections.” American Political Science Review 66: 21–37.

Rodriguez, Gregory. 1996. “California Latinos Make History, But Is the Democratic Party Home?” Los Angeles Times, November 10, home edition, 1.

Segura, Gary; Dennis Falcoán; and Harry Pachon. 1997. “Dynamics of Latino Partisanship in California: Immigration, Issue Salience, and Their Implications.” Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy 10: 62–80.

Sheffield, James, and Charles Hadley. 1984. “Racial Crossover Voting in a Biracial City: A Reexamination of Some Hypotheses.” American Politics Quarterly 12: 449–64.

Southwell, Priscilla. 1988. “Open versus Closed Primaries and Candidate Fortunes, 1972–1984.” American Politics Quarterly 16, no. 3: 280–95.

Tate, Katherine. 1991. “Black Political Participation in the 1984 and 1988 Presidential Elections.” American Political Science Review 85, no. 4: 1159–76.

Tomaás Rivera Policy Institute. 1996. California Pre-Election Survey. Claremont, CA: Tomaás Rivera Policy Institute.

Walker, Jack. 1988. “The Primary Game.” Wilson Quarterly 12: 64–77.

Wekkin, Gary. 1988. “The Conceptualization and Measurement of Crossover Voting.” Western Political Quarterly 41: 105–14.

Wilcox, Dave. 1998a. “Maldonado Tops Bravo.” San Luis Obispo County Telegram-Tribune, June 3, A1.

Wilcox, Dave. 1998b. “Party Strife Distinguishes Assembly GOP Campaign.” San Luis Obispo County Telegram-Tribune, June 4.

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14. Candidate Strategy, Voter Response,
and Party Cohesion

John R. Petrocik

Primaries, the advocates of party government insist, reduce the authoritativeness of party leaders, encourage unmanageable programmatic heterogeneity among the party's candidates and officeholders, threaten a candidate's general election success when they are divisive, and severely limit the role of party organizations—to name just a few of the harms commonly attributed to them.^[1] The effects are worse with some forms of the primary, and are thought to reach their limit with blanket primaries, which potentially eliminate any party basis to a nomination.^[2] Systematic evidence supporting these outcomes is not extensive. The correlation is mostly demonstrated by the coincidence of the putative weakening of the parties as the primary system was adopted throughout the United States. The coincidence of primaries with other social and political trends and events may never make it possible to develop conclusive evidence for their partyweakening consequences.

However, because primaries create opportunities for insurgent and antiparty forces, it is at least plausible that they have undercut party leaders and party cohesion. Moreover, the argument is not entirely speculative. Haeberle (1985), for example, provides evidence that candidates selected in closed primaries are more cohesive than those selected in open and blanket primaries. He found that members of Congress nominated in closed primaries had a party unity score of almost 73 percent, compared to those selected in open primaries, who averaged about 69 percent. Members selected through a blanket primary had the lowest party unity scores—just under 66 percent. Also, Sorauf's (1963) study of candidate selection in Pennsylvania found candidates to be more loyal to party programs when their selection and nomination involved significant party input.

This chapter reports additional evidence for how primaries, in this case

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the blanket primary, can weaken parties by reducing the influence of a party's core electorate in the selection of party nominees. The analysis uses survey data to illustrate how the blanket primary can be exploited by candidates to overcome the preferences of core party supporters. It focuses on the potential impact of crossover votes (a Democrat voting in a Republican primary, or vice versa) on nominations by examining whether an ambitious candidate can frame the primary choice in a way that will draw enough crossover votes to win a blanket primary.^[3] Specifically, it examines whether a candidate can encourage enough crossover voting to overwhelm the preferences of party loyalists. It goes on to indicate why the strategy may have an impact on the programmatic cohesion of a party's officeholders.

The scenario that is examined argues that the effect of a blanket primary on party cohesion is a byproduct of the incentives it gives candidates to solicit crossover votes. These crossover-seekers present an ideological posture at odds with the majority of their party's supporters in order to create a winning coalition with votes from the other party's supporters. Such candidates present themselves as issue and policy moderates in order to attract a median voter who is well to the left or right (depending upon whether the primary contest is, respectively, Republican or Democrat) of the party's electorate in a closed primary. This outcome creates greater programmatic variability among each party's elected officials, since those elected with a crossover strategy have an incentive to protect their winning primary coalition with an issue position that appeals to the preferences of a significant fraction of independents and identifiers with the other party. The model assumes (on the basis of evidence reviewed below) that "raiding"—crossover voting that is motivated by a desire to nominate someone who will easily be defeated in the general election—will be trivial because most voters are crossing over to support the candidate they want to win the general election.^[4]

The data do not directly test the effect of the type of primary on party cohesion. The assessment is indirect, with evidence of the blanket primary's effect on the party's programmatic orientation found in the ideological posture that candidates elected through crossover voting might need to maintain to assure their electoral security. The data establish only a few of the suggested effects. First, they demonstrate that crossover voting increases when voters are sensitized to the hopeless general election prospects of their party's candidate. Second they show that crossover voters will overwhelmingly support the more moderate candidate. Finally, the data illustrate that the "moderates" who cross over to vote in the other party's primary have dramatically different policy preferences than the "moderates" they join. Republican "moderates" are significantly more conservative than Democratic "moderates," or, viewed from the other side, Democratic "moderates" are significantly more liberal than GOP "moderates."

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The hypothesized decline in party cohesion is a by-product of the (assumed) need for successful crossover-elected candidates to retain the support of programmatically distinct moderates. Whether candidates selected in a blanket primary are more moderate than winners in a partisan primary is not directly demonstrated (but see Gerber, chapter 10 in this volume). However, it is a more than plausible conjecture. Legislators tailor themselves to their districts in ways that improve their electoral security. A Democratic incumbent elected with the support of moderate Republicans cannot usually afford a record as liberal as a Democrat whose nomination and election were achieved with a loyal core of Democratic support. When many incumbents depend upon crossover support, the frequent outcome is a Democratic caucus with many moderates and conservatives and a GOP delegation containing moderates and liberals (see Froman 1963; Mayhew 1974; Fenno 1978). Adams's (1996) study of the consequences of changing the Illinois multimember district system to single-member districts capitalized on what amounts to a natural experiment that demonstrated that creating a more partisan electorate created more programmatically homogeneous party delegations in the Illinois legislature.

Why this might happen is better understood after a brief overview of the relevant features of the primary, particularly why the nomination process helps to decide which individuals and groups have the most influence with officeholders. That is addressed in the next section. The chapter then outlines a process by which crossover votes can be solicited by candidates who raise strategic considerations around the competitiveness of a district and the relative programmatic proximity of the candidates. The data address potential influences associated with voter motivations to cross over and the strategic calculations by candidates that increase or depress crossover voting. Finally, the chapter examines the policy and attitudinal orientation of "moderate" voters. The data demonstrate that moderates are a diverse group, and different in much the same way that leaning Democrats differ from leaning Republicans. These last data are used to speculate on how the blanket primary might affect the programmatic orientations of the parties.

THE POLITICAL INTENTION OF THE PRIMARY SYSTEM

When the direct primary was introduced late in the nineteenth century, the vast majority of elective offices—for Congress, state legislatures, city councils, county supervisors, sheriffs, and so forth—were not competitive (nor, of course, are they today). Electoral manipulation (gerrymandering, for example) and group traditions (the urban Irish were Democrats, while Midwestern Germans were Republicans) had created party bastions almost everywhere, and voters, then as now, loyally supported the candidates of

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their party.^[5] Nomination assured election, and, in most cases, party leaders and political notables used personal loyalties and patronage to control the caucus and convention delegates who did the nominating. The result was officeholders who were more responsive to the party leaders—who could deny them renomination—than they were to an electorate that rarely defeated them in the general election.^[6]

The reinforcing elements of this system of party government were separated by the direct nominating primary because it eliminated the support party leaders received from the electorate's partisanship. The nominating primary never asked voters to cross party lines. It allowed them to select preferred candidates within their party and then support them again in the general election.^[7] It promised to weaken party leaders by increasing the chance of selecting candidates who were not beholden to party leaders for the nomination (Merriam 1908).

The hoped-for effects of the primary were not immediate. Slating, endorsements, control over money and other electoral resources, and the commitment and cohesiveness of party cadres gave party leaders continued influence over nominations. In time, however, the influence of traditional party leaders and notables was significantly reduced.

A Problem with Primaries

The grandest vision of the reformers went unrealized because primaries developed their own nominating elite: the few who bothered to vote in them. In the typical contemporary primary, turnout rarely exceeds 35 percent of the eligible electorate (it was 30.1 percent of the eligible electorate in the June 1998 California primary).^[8] The problem with such low participation is the unrepresentativeness of those who take part. Primary voters are better educated than the median eligible voter, have higher incomes, are older, and are disproportionately white. A more relevant bias of primary voters is their higher-than-average level of political interest and motivation, greater concern with politics and government, and greater-than-average inclination to vote and work for candidates who share their preferences—and to oppose those who do not.

This traditional wisdom about the "bias" of primary electorates (dating, at least, to V. O. Key 1952) expects the most ideological elements of each party to be overrepresented in their primaries (Ranney 1972; for an example for California, see Costantini 1963). Candidates with strong policy views are especially attractive to such voters and the result, in this scenario, is ideologically ardent nominees. Party leaders and candidates tend to share the belief that primary voters are strongly motivated by ideology and opposed to political moderates. As a result, the would-be nominees, even when they are not personally inclined to take strong issue positions, often

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TABLE 14.1 Policy Preferences of Primary and Nonprimary Voters, 1980

	Primary Voter
	Yes	No	Difference
NOTE: The numbers in the first two rows of the table report the percentage who support unrestricted access to abortion services. The values in the remainder of the table are percentage differences calculated by subtracting the percentage offering the liberal response from the percentage offering the conservative response. Negative values indicate a predominantly liberal response among the group. Positive values indicate a conservative response. For example, the "-29" for Democratic identifiers' attitudes on welfare issues means that they are 29 points more liberal than conservative on welfare issues.
Unrestricted access to abortion
Democrats	35%	35%	0%
Republicans	30	32	−2
Welfare attitudes
Democrats	−29	−19	−10
Republicans	57	33	24
Helping minorities
Democrats	0	11	−11
Republicans	59	48	11
General ideological identification
Democrats	−21	−21	0
Republicans	62	54	8

feel that they must, and the preferences of the ideologically motivated get overrepresented as candidates—even moderate ones—make an effort to placate activists by supporting "hot-button" ideological issues.^[9]

The accuracy of this traditional wisdom about primary voters is questionable. Some research found a substantial similarity between primary voters and the general electorate, at least in presidential primaries (Geer 1988). But the overall sense that primaries are largely controlled by ideologically extreme voters and unrepresentative interests remains the conventional wisdom, especially within the parties.^[10] And it may have some merit. The data in table 14.1 provide some support for the belief that primary voters are more ideologically extreme than nonvoters, although the difference is not equally large for all four issues or similar between the parties.^[11] The data show GOP primary voters to be more conservative than primary nonvoters on three issues; Democratic primary voters and nonvoters differ on two of them. A prudent conclusion is that differences probably exist, although they may not be of the magnitude or consistency presumed in the earliest research.

More important for the possible consequences of a blanket primary system is the large interparty difference. Republicans are—abortion opinions

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excepted—more conservative than Democrats, and the difference is greatest among those who turned out in the primaries. This fact is important for candidate strategy in blanket primaries and is what can contribute to lower intraparty cohesion.

Blanket Solution" to the Primary Problem

California's blanket primary was initially sponsored by Republican moderates as a solution to the presumed dominance of GOP nomination politics by ideological conservatives. The blanket primary was expected to draw more moderate voters into the primary and allow moderate Democrats, Republicans, and independents to rally in support of moderate candidates. In the reformer's scenario, the potential for moderate candidates to find substantial support among moderate voters would have cumulative consequences. It would lead moderate Democrats and Republicans to contest primaries that they would otherwise refuse to enter; while moderate voters, rejecting the ideological candidates, would provide the winning margin for them. The expected result was greater opportunity for candidates not committed to the ideological activists in the parties—in approximately the same manner that the original primary created opportunities for candidates not subservient to party leaders.

The blanket primary was a suggested remedy for other often-decried features of modern government. It was promoted as likely to increase turnout in primaries because it would allow those not registered as party supporters to take part (see California Secretary of State 1996). However, its prospect for reigning in the ideological extremists in both parties and the governmental gridlock they cause was its major selling point (see, for example, the Los Angeles Times editorial [1998] endorsing the proposition)—although the evidence that gridlock is unavoidable in divided government might also be questioned (see Mayhew 1991).

VOTERS IN PRIMARY ELECTIONS

In all elections, the records of the candidates' parties, their policy proposals, party association, and personal qualities provide the systematic criteria that determine the vote. Voters consider some or all of these factors, weigh them in various ways, and cast a vote. In a general election each is potentially germane.

The party factor is canceled in closed primaries since the candidates and voters share a party affiliation.^[12] But a new variable, viability in the general election, complicates the utility calculations of any voter who considers it. Since the outcome of the general election can sometimes be estimated, a voter might not vote for the preferred candidate if that candidate

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is likely to lose the general election. In such a circumstance, the preferences of a voter may be best satisfied if the primary nominates a candidate with "imperfect" issue positions but a higher probability of winning the general election. A vote for the less preferred primary candidate invokes a minimax version of Downs's utility voting rule by voting for the most preferred primary candidate with a reasonable chance to win the general election.

Voters in Open and Blanket Primaries

In open and blanket primaries, the calculations of voters can be more complex, depending upon whether the voter is a loyalist supporting a candidate of his party, or a crossover to the other party's primary. Loyalists who support the candidate with the preferred policy proposals, record, and personal qualities are indistinguishable from maximizing voters in a closed primary. Similarly, loyalists who vote for the candidate with a better chance for general election victory than the candidate with the most preferred policies and record are indistinguishable from minimax voters in closed primaries.

The motives of crossover voters can be either sincere or strategic, and they do not fit so easily into a utility-maximizing model of voter choice. Sincere crossover voters are maximizers. Presented with an array of candidates, some representing their party, sincere crossover voters support the candidate they find the most attractive. Their vote supports the candidate they prefer over all others seeking nomination, and the candidate they support in the primary is the one they intend to vote for in the general election. Strategic crossover voters are of two types. Raiders (the term used in the introductory chapter) are the mirror image of minimax voters. While they may be committed to a candidate, they do not vote for that candidate. They vote for the opposition candidate likely to be the easiest to defeat in the general election, hoping to foist a sure loser on the opposition. They do not behave as minimax voters because there is nothing about their vote that can be defined as a strategy to avoid a victory by their least preferred candidate. Raiders are simply attempting to improve the prospects of their preferred candidate in the general election by creating an opponent who will maximize (1) loyalty among partisans of their party and (2) defections among partisans of the other party. Hedgers are crossover voters who have an ideological and motivation profile that is virtually identical to strategically motivated minimax voters in a closed primary. They would prefer to see their party's candidate win the general election; however, recognizing that outcome as unlikely, they vote to achieve the next best result—a victory by the opposition-party candidate who is closest to their ideological ideal.

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The Incidence of Raiding

Raiding is not common. In virtually all previous research, sincerity and hedging were the typical motivations for crossing over, and its effect was largely limited to eroding or magnifying the margin of the victor (Southwell 1991; Geer 1986; Hedlund, Watts, and Hedge 1982; Lengle 1981; Hedlund 1977–78; Adamany 1976; and Ranney 1972). California voters in the two blanket primaries conducted prior to the overturning of Proposition 198 did not express the motivations of raiders. The Los Angeles Times exit poll analyzed by Sides, Cohen, and Citrin (chapter 5 in this volume) found 90 percent of Democrats and 82 percent of Republicans reporting that a sincere preference is the most likely reason one would cross over in a primary. Upwards of 75 percent of crossovers in the 1998 California blanket primary remained with their primary preference in the general election; obvious raiders represented barely 7 percent of the Democrats and 5 percent of the Republicans.

In short, although the crossover voting that we observe sometimes looks suspicious—it is typically at its greatest when only one of the parties experiences a competitive primary—the raiding threat is more apparent than real. Even when their party's nomination is uncontested and crossing over would give the ill-willed an opportunity to harm the general election chances of the opposition by nominating a weak candidate, the candidate supported by crossover voters is usually the one whose programmatic profile matches the voter's ideological and policy preferences.

Survey data from the 1998 Senate primary in Washington State corroborate data from presidential primaries.^[13] The Washington U.S. Senate primary offered an ideal opportunity for raiding. The renomination bid of Patty Murray was unopposed; she was regarded by some as vulnerable to a strong Republican challenge; the GOP nomination was competitive. Yet the Democratic crossovers were not numerous, and their profile was not characteristic of raiders. Sixty-eight percent of those who planned to vote in the GOP Senate primary were Republican identifiers, 23 percent were independents, and only 9 percent were Democrats. More to the point, the overwhelming bulk of the crossovers were self-described moderates or conservatives; only 4 percent of all those who planned to vote in the GOP primary were Democratic or Independent liberals. Finally, and following the pattern observed in presidential primary voting (see, in particular, Southwell 1991; Hedlund and Watts 1986; Hedlund, Watts, and Hedge 1982), the crossovers—whether liberal or moderate, Democratic or independent—supported the candidate preferred by Republican identifiers. In the survey, the ultimate winner received 59 percent of the votes of Republican identifiers in the survey, 64 percent of independent votes, and 71 percent of Democratic votes. Crossover voting moved survey support for

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the winner from 59 percent (the vote of Republican identifiers—all that mattered had there been a closed Republican primary) to 61 percent in the blanket format, which included the preferences of avowed Democrats and independents.

Further, an attempt to raid the opposition party's primary would run into voter resistance to "dirty tricks" and probably produce enough notoriety and contrary behavior that the effort would backfire. The media's appetite for scandal and political maneuver makes it unlikely that eliteorganized raiding could be hidden. The GOP governor of Wisconsin, Tommy Thompson, discovered this when he advised Republicans to vote in the Democratic presidential primary in 1988. At the time, George Bush was largely unopposed, virtually certain to win the Wisconsin primary, and assured of the nomination. The Democrats, by contrast, still had not settled the matter. Jesse Jackson and Michael Dukakis were competing for delegates. Thompson's suggestion that Republicans cross over and vote for Jackson produced a virtual firestorm of negative comment throughout the state.^[14]

The rarity of raiding in high-salience elections does not preclude a significant political effect from crossover voting (which can be up to 40 percent; see Alvarez and Nagler 1997). The 2000 presidential primaries, for example, despite the attention and concern lavished on crossover voting, conformed to the historical pattern.^[15] Democrats were slightly more than 5 percent of the vote in Republican primaries; Republicans identifiers contributed about 4 percent of the Democratic presidential primary electorate.^[16] But while their numbers were not large, their candidate preference differed from that of party voters. The crossover vote in the Democratic primary was too small to yield a reliable estimate of the behavior of crossovers. But in six of the seven GOP primaries, where crossovers were sufficiently numerous to examine, the majority of their votes went to John McCain, while a majority of Republican identifiers voted for George Bush.^[17] More meaningful were the large number of self-described independents (averaging almost 27 percent in the Republican primaries and 21 percent in the Democratic contests). In fifteen out of twenty-three GOP primaries, the independents preferred McCain to Bush. Independents voted for Bradley over Gore in twelve of eighteen Democratic primaries. In each case where McCain won, it was because of support from independents. Bush was the majority choice of Republicans in every contest except New Hampshire (where McCain carried all partisan groups in the GOP primary).

CANDIDATE STR ATEGY IN PRIMARIES

What McCain might have accomplished with independents can be achieved when candidates are prepared to present a political persona that is attractive

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to independents and crossover voters. The generic election strategy requires candidates to persuade a majority of the voters that they best approximate the voter's ideal with regard to party affiliation, issue stance, and personal qualities. They announce policy positions, party affiliation, and record—hoping that a majority of voters will find these attributes close to some ideal point (the "positive" campaign). At other times they attempt to create dissimilarity between the voters and the opposition (the goal of "attack" or "comparative" campaign strategies). The candidate's strategy in a closed primary can exploit a minimax consideration by emphasizing the superiority of her policy prescriptions, record, personal traits, and general election prospects. This strategy attempts to persuade voters that no candidate with similarly satisfying policies has a greater probability of winning the general election.

Candidate Strategy in Open and Blanket Primaries

A candidate with an issue posture that appeals across party lines is exactly the kind of candidate envisioned by the blanket primary and approved by the political culture. Most important, the preconditions for a crossoverbased campaign strategy are present. Like most other Americans, Californian's support for party institutions is weak—and has been for a long time (Field Institute 1983). Half of the respondents in this survey agreed that "parties do more to confuse voters than to provide clear choices in elections," and almost 70 percent agreed with the proposition that politics is too partisan and that the public suffers because the parties are at odds over almost everything. Less than 50 percent regarded the candidate's party to be an important aspect of their vote.^[18] Also, few legislative districts are competitive. Redistricting, whether partisan or bipartisan, typically produces party bastions (Kousser 1996).

In the uncompetitive districts, where nomination virtually guarantees election, an open or blanket primary can present a way for an ambitious individual from the majority party to defeat the party's candidate with a moderation strategy. Announcements that create the moderate persona and endorsements from respectable groups with a reputation for "reasonable" choices must be cultivated in this strategy. The ambitious Democrat must be the moderate alternative to the "typical" liberal always elected in an uncompetitive Democratic district; the ambitious Republican must be the moderate alternative to the "typical" conservative always selected in a solidly GOP district. Campaign tactics for directly appealing to crossovers and independents (direct mail, for example) complete the linkage to voters who want to select the "best candidate."

The moderate-crossover strategy does not require voters to have strong ideological motivations. Indeed, the most issue-motivated voters are the

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least likely to cross over, since they are the most likely to reject the other party's candidates, even the moderate ones (see Petrocik 1979; Wright and Berkman 1986; Petrocik and Doherty 1996). The most likely crossover prospects are mildly interested in politics, motivated to select a "good" candidate, and receptive to the "moderate" posture of the candidate who is challenging an incumbent of the opposite party, who can be portrayed as "immoderate" (see Verba, Nie, and Petrocik 1979; Petrocik 1979; Wright and Berkman 1986; Zaller 1998). The moderate strategy of a challenger in the blanket primary is not vulnerable to accusations of unfair or "immoral" campaigning. The candidate can occupy the positively valued ground of moderation, while appealing to sincere sentiments among voters, who, in their turn, would respond to such appeals with full honesty.

This strategy mixes a global appeal to the median voter with a specific appeal directed at hedgers—those who recognize that their party's candidate might (or will) lose the general election and can be persuaded to seek the next best result in a victory by the opposition-party candidate who is closest to their ideal. In California's (and the nation's) weakly partisan climate, a candidate with a moderate persona might induce enough crossover voting to win. The spotlight of public attention will be directed at the nomination struggle in the majority party rather than to the pointless struggle (if there is a struggle) for the minority party's nomination. Minority-party supporters will be attracted because of the intensity of the battle, and in that exposure the candidate might create crossover appeal. How this would work is illustrated with the example below.

Would it work among voters? Some political observers assert that moderate Republicans benefited from crossover votes in four open-seat Assembly districts in 1998, fulfilling the hopes of the blanket primary's proponents (Quinn 1998). Higher than average crossover rates on behalf of the majority party were reported in uncompetitive State Assembly districts by Alvarez and Nagler (1997). There is also clear evidence of a moderation crossover strategy in the 2000 GOP primary for State Assembly seats. In both cases, Republican-registered voters gave a majority of their votes to the candidate endorsed by the GOP establishment. However, Democratic crossovers and independents voted heavily for the victorious insurgents—who actively courted them (Wisckol 2000).^[19]

Electoral Arithmetic for a Moderation-Crossover Strategy

The necessary arithmetic underlying the moderate candidate strategy is illustrated in table 14.2. In this district, 44 percent are registered Democrats, 30 percent are registered as Republicans, and 26 percent either declined to state a preference or are registered with a minor party. Democratic nominees have won the November election with more than 60

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TABLE 14.2 A Crossover Strategy to Win a Primary

Type of Candidate	Voter Is Registered as:			Total
	Democrat	Independent	Republican
Liberal Democrat	24%	8%	1%	33%
Moderate Democrat	17	8	9	34
Republican	2	8	20	30
Others	1	2	0	3
total	44	26	30	100

percent of the vote in every election since the lines were drawn in 1991.^[20] In a closed primary (which can be approximated by looking at the vote among registered Democrats), the liberal Democrat is the expected nominee with about 57 percent of the primary vote, and the general election winner with, if past is prologue, about 60 percent of the vote.^[21] But the liberal Democratic incumbent can be defeated in a blanket primary if a moderate Democrat can run well among Democratic voters and attract enough Republicans to forge at least a plurality of the votes cast for all Democratic candidates. In this example, the moderate Democrat wins with less than 39 percent of the Democratic votes (17 of 44 percent), a third of the independents, and a 30 percent crossover from Republicans. The margin is narrow (the arithmetic is in the table), but it sends the moderate to the general election, where the Democratic partisanship of the district virtually ensures victory. If the moderate Democrat attracted more of the independents and Republicans, the victory over the Democrat-preferred Democratic candidate would be even larger, or the required fraction of the Democratic vote would be smaller.

The following survey-based "experiment" shows that voters can be attracted to political moderates as the blanket primary proponents hoped they would.

TESTING THE EFFECT OF THE BLANKET PRIMARY

Prior to California's blanket primary in June of 1998, the Center for the Study of Society and Politics of the Institute for Social Science Research at UCLA conducted a blanket primary experiment in its annual Los Angeles County Social Survey.^[22] The experiment included a question series designed to assess how much crossover voting might occur, who was likely to cross over, and whether crossover voters would respond to the appeal of moderate candidates in uncompetitive districts. It assumed that downballot races for the state legislature were likely to be the kind of elections where a moderation-crossover strategy would work because (1) state legislative

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districts are typically uncompetitive; and (2) this lack of competition leads to situations where minority party voters usually cast a wasted vote in their own primary and the general election; and (3) partisanship can be muddied because the charged symbolic issues that mobilize partisanship and ideology simultaneously are less common.

Three questions were asked to determine how many voters would respond to appeals by a moderate of the other party. The first question simulated the opportunities of the blanket primary. It provided no information other than the party and political orientation of the candidates. This "No Cue" question was designed to generate a baseline estimate of the equilibrium level of crossover voting that could occur in a blanket primary when voters where left to choose between the parties in approximately the same way they do in a general election. That question read as follows:

As I said earlier, all the primary candidates for an office—Democrat, Republican, Peace and Freedom, and others—will be on the ballot together. Under this new system, you can vote for a candidate even if you are not registered with that candidate's party. Which of the following candidates would you vote for in the primary for the State Assembly: a liberal Democrat, a moderate Democrat, a moderate Republican, or a conservative Republican?

The results of that question were then compared to answers to a second "Cue" question that stimulated awareness of the competitiveness of the district in the general election and primed the ideological differences between the candidates seeking the nomination of the district's majority party. The second question varied depending upon the party preference of the voter. A respondent registered as a Democrat was asked:

If you lived in a State Assembly district that always elected Republicans no matter who the parties nominated, who would you vote for if the primary election had the following candidates: a conservative Republican, a moderate Republican, or a Democrat who has no opposition for the Democrat nomination?

Republican registrants were asked:

If you lived in a State Assembly district that always elected Democrats no matter who the parties nominated, who would you vote for if the primary election had the following candidates: a liberal Democrat, a moderate Democrat, or a Republican who has no opposition for the Republican nomination?

The Cue question was designed to simulate an appeal that a moderate candidate could make to create crossover voting.^[23] It apprised the voters of the politics of "their" district in a way which sensitized them to two facts: (1) the certainty that the candidate of their party would be nominated and (2) the very low probability that the candidate of their party could win the general election. It implicitly presented them with a third fact. Mentioning,

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as the Cue question did, that the respondent could support a moderate or his ideological opposite also sensitized them (albeit more weakly) to their ability to cast a more effective vote against the candidate who stood for policies and programs they were especially likely to reject. In brief, the cue questions attempted to simulate a campaign that primed the party preference and general ideological orientation of the respondents in a way calculated to encourage crossover voting.^[24]

Candidate Strategy and Voter Response

The Cue question induced a very high rate of crossover voting. As table 14.3 shows, about 10 percent crossed over to vote in the other party's primary in the No Cue situation, a rate that was virtually identical to the crossover rates that have been reported in open presidential primaries and for the recent blanket Senatorial primary in Washington state. Democratic crossovers split equally between a moderate and conservative Republican; Republican crossovers were more uniformly supportive of the moderate Democrat. But the differences between Democratic and Republican registrants are too small to be statistically significant.

However, crossover voting surged dramatically—to 44 percent for the Democrats and 39 percent for Republicans—when the Cue question sensitized respondents to the availability of a moderate candidate in the primary election and made them aware of the certain loss of their party's candidate in the general election. As expected, the ideological moderate was the overwhelming choice of those who crossed over. Overall, 71 percent of the crossover voters supported the moderate: 74 percent of all GOP crossovers (29 of 39 percent) chose the Democratic moderate, and 68 percent of the Democratic crossovers (30 of 43 percent) preferred the Republican moderate.

Only a small minority contradicted expectations and supported the other party'sideological candidate. They are of two types. The first (6 percent of all voters) were crossover voters who voted for the other party's ideological candidate (e.g., Democrats who crossed over and voted for a conservative Republican). These individuals—liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats—hold ideological positions that are at variance with their party preference, and their vote choices seem to reflect their ideological self identification. Liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats appeared to be engaging in odd primary voting because, in the stylized world of the moderate-crossover strategy, crossover voters are expected to be ideological moderates attracted to the moderate candidate. In the real world of imperfect consistency between issue preferences and partisanship, some Democrats will be conservative, and some Republicans will be liberal—and the ideological candidate will be more attractive for at least some of these individuals.

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TABLE 14.3 Crossover Voting as a Function of Ideological Cues

	Blanket Primary
	With No Cues	With Cues
NOTE: The question with no cues allowed the respondent to vote for a liberal or conservative Democrat. That result is collapsed in the table. The question with cues presumed a single candidate of the respondent's party and did not ask about an ideological distinction. See the question wording in the text.
Registered Democrats (N = 300)
Voted for a Democrat	90%	56%
Crossover to moderate Republican	5	30
Crossover to conservative Republican	5	14
TOTAL	100	100
Registered Republicans (N = 147)
Voted for a Republican	91	61
Crossover to moderate Democrat	8	29
Crossover to liberal Democrat	1	10
TOTAL	100	100

A second group—also about 6 percent of all voters—registered a vote intention that is idiosyncratic and impossible to characterize with these data. These were conservative Republicans who voted for the liberal Democrat when they crossed over into the Democratic primary, and liberal Democrats who voted for the conservative Republican when they crossed over into the GOP primary. There is no obvious explanation for these choices. Respondent idiosyncrasies and random error behavior seems to be what is going on here.

The small fraction that cannot be characterized is trivial compared to the essential feature of table 14.3: many primary voters crossed over to support the moderate candidate in response to cues that prime (1) the uncompetitiveness of the district in the general election and (2) the presence of an ideologically tolerable candidate in the other party's primary. Crossovers are a trivial 10 percent without the priming, but over 40 percent with it. Not all of these crossovers support the moderate, but the 71 percent who did may be large enough to elect a moderate candidate in the dominant party's primary (depending, of course, on the distribution of Democrats, Republicans, independents—and liberals, conservatives, and moderates—among voters in the district).

A moderate is not guaranteed success with a strategy of soliciting crossover votes, but this "experiment" suggests that both Democratic and Republican rank-and-file voters, when they are the minority in an uncompetitive district, will respond to a candidate who solicits crossover support on the basis that she is a preferable moderate alternative to the

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TABLE 14.4 Demographic Contours of Moderate Crossover Voting

	Percentage Crossing Over to Vote for:
	Any Candidate	Moderate Candidate	Number of Cases
a Others are those who provide a multiracial identity; they describe themselves as having black and white parents, and so on.
White	37%	31%	207
Hispanic	47	28	150
Black	52	31	52
Asian	36	20	25
Othersa	45	45	11
Male	42	29	118
Female	42	31	229
Less than high school	46	19	74
High school degree	46	30	151
Junior College	45	36	69
BA	35	31	86
MA/LLB/Ph.D./etc.	36	33	67
$20,000 or less	47	22	90
$20,000–$40,000	47	30	118
$40,000–$70,000	42	29	102
More than $70,000	40	34	110
Married	43	30	246
Religiously observant	39	27	162
Fundamentalist	45	31	200
18–24 years of age	58	44	52
25–35 years of age	44	28	124
36–55 years of age	41	28	183
Over 55 years of age	33	26	82
Democrat	44	30	300
Republican	39	29	147
Stronger identifier	36	26	151
Weak identifier	43	27	222
Leaner/Independent	51	42	151

ideological candidate who will otherwise win the primary and general elections.

WHO CROSSES OVER?

Crossover rates varied little with demographic characteristics, and in ways that do not indicate anything systematic (see table 14.4). Blacks and Hispanics, those with lower income, the less educated, and the youngest were

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the most likely to cross over. However, these small differences do not show up as any particular responsiveness to a crossover solicitation by a moderate candidate. As the data show, a moderate's strategy to solicit support does not receive a response that is differentiated by race, gender, social class, or most other social statuses. The only numerically visible differences in responsiveness to the appeal of moderates are found among young voters and higher income voters, but the differences are not statistically significant.

Democratic and Republican identifiers are equally likely (at 30 and 29 percent respectively) to support moderates who solicit their support. Avowed partisans are less likely to cross over (only about 26 percent did so) than leaners and independents (42 percent crossed over).^[25] Neither difference is especially large, and only strength of party preference is statistically significant. There is also no correlation between a willingness to cross over (in general or on behalf of moderates) and generalized support for parties and the party system in the abstract. Those most committed to the notion that parties serve important functions and most likely to believe that party affiliation is a critical criterion for choosing a candidate are no less likely to cross over than those who find parties dispensable.^[26]

The only consistent predictor of willingness to cross over on behalf of a political moderate is the intensity of the ideological commitment of the individual (see figure 14.1). Crossover voting averaged over 40 percent for the most ideologically moderate, with Republican moderates particularly likely to cross over. The willingness to cross over declined more or less consistently to about 21 percent among the most ideologically committed. Generally, as figure 14.1 shows, the effect of ideological commitment was equally strong for Democratic and Republican identifiers.

PROGRAMMATIC EFFECTS OF THE BLANKET PRIMARY: A SPECULATION

In an open primary, especially in a blanket primary, the ability of voters to cross over makes the primary electorate approximate the general election electorate. Therein lies the party-weakening effect of crossover voting in a blanket primary. A blanket Democratic primary might attract enough Republicans so that the median voter could be substantially to the right of the median voter in a closed Democratic primary; while the median voter in a GOP blanket primary could be substantially to the left (see table 14.1).

The blanket primary can increase ideological diversity within the parties and reduce programmatic differences between them because it greatly facilitates a moderate candidate strategy that can increase the number of moderate political elites within both parties. Legislative districts are never homogeneous in political and policy orientation, but most Democratic

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officeholders have a constituency that endorses their essentially liberal orientation, likewise most Republican incumbents have a constituency that supports their conservativeness. However, many districts are ideologically diverse, even when one party's electoral majority is secure. Still other districts have a reputation for being more liberal or conservative than the party of the incumbent. Incumbents manage to "fit" themselves to such districts by adopting a degree of programmatic moderation, and both parties have incumbents with a deserved reputation for being more moderate than their caucus. In the extreme, this produces a fractured party of the sort created by the southern conservative wing of the Democratic majority in Congress from the 1940s through the 1980s. A more modest contemporary manifestation, staying with examples provided by the Democrats, are the moderate factions associated with the Democratic Leadership Council and, more recently, the "Bluedog" Democrats. But whether a moderate or a conservative faction creates the divergence, the essential fact is the existence of officeholders that create intraparty programmatic diversity and conflict as by-products of their attempt to satisfy the preferences of their electoral majority.

The blanket primary can increase their numbers because it creates a structure within which candidates can employ a strategy that creates a more moderate nominating electorate than would be found in a purely partisan Percentage crossing over

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primary. The moderation strategy outlined above will not be universally effective. It is, for example, particularly unlikely to bring success when the partisanship of the district is too lopsided to permit an effective appeal for crossover voting. But where such an appeal is feasible, the moderate appeal seems to be a dominating strategy in both parties (as table 14.3 shows).

The ideological effect of the moderation-crossover strategy on the parties emerges from (1) its potential attractiveness as a campaign strategy and (2) the ease with which it can be employed. An incumbent who won with a crossover strategy has a strong incentive to behave moderately in office in order to avoid defeat by another candidate adopting the strategy in the future. The moderation strategy also becomes a model for the election of more moderates.^[27] Over time, therefore, there are more opportunities for the number of moderates to increase than there are forces causing them to decline, ceteris paribus; and the proportion of moderates within both parties might be expected to increase (although the numbers will have a limit), just as the advocates of California's blanket primary hoped. As the number of moderates increases, the programmatic effect on the parties (hinted at in Haeberle's data) might become large as Democrats and Republicans elected in more secure districts are joined by those who won by appealing to crossovers and must maintain that posture to ensure their reelection.^[28] The electoral pressures toward this outcome are clear in the following data.

The Meaning of Moderation

The programmatic threat raised by this tendency of candidates to adapt to the expectations of their primary constituency occurs because the policy preferences of moderates vary by party: Democratic moderates are measurably more liberal than Republican moderates; GOP moderates are measurably more conservative than Democratic moderates.^[29] Consider the data in table 14.5, which presents the mean preferences of moderate Democrats and Republicans in four issue areas, stratified by the strength of their ideological commitments.

Measures. Ideological commitment is measured by the "strength" of the individual's preferences on two political issues (health care and the proper role of the government in addressing problems in the society) and the intensity with which they identify as liberal or conservative.^[30] This formulation allows respondents to share preferences on policy questions, but vary in the strength or intensity of that preference; and it is the strength of the preference that distinguishes a moderate.^[31] Those who express a strong preference on both issues and also describe themselves as "strongly" liberal or conservative are categorized as having a strong ideological commitment.

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TABLE 14.5 Political Preferences of Moderates

	Moderate		Weak		Strong
Ideological Commitment	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.
NOTE: Table entries are issue-opinion scores. The most liberal score is 0; the most conservative score is 1.0.
Social spending	.32	.19	.26	.19	.29	.15
Policies aiding minorities	.55	.40	.57	.36	.57	.32
Active government	.66	.39	.64	.35	.66	.29
National health care	.63	.44	.71	.40	.55	.31
AVERAGE	.54	.36	.55	.33	.52	.27

A person who did not express a strong preference on either issue and did not identify strongly as a conservative or liberal is regarded as a moderate. All other response patterns are characterized as a weak ideological commitment.

The social spending measure is a summary index which measures the respondent's general preference to have the government spend more money on education, child care, the environment, poor people, and African-Americans. The index of policies to aid minorities is an additive measure based on support for affirmative action, a general feeling about the government's responsibility to assure equal opportunity to minorities, English-language requirements, and bilingualism in general. These indices were evaluated with a factor analysis, and their suitability for a single index was evaluated by Cronbach's alpha. The "active government" measure is a single item that asked the respondent's feeling about how active the government should be in dealing with problems. The national health care measure is a single question that asked whether the respondent felt that the government should be more active in ensuring adequate health care for all.

Results. The consistent result in the table is that differences between partisans of different parties far exceed issue preference differences among partisans. Republicans are more conservative than Democrats at every level of ideological commitment. The interparty differences increase with the strength of ideological commitment, but the change is small. The substantive opinions of Democratic moderates are almost as liberal as those of strongly committed Democrats; self-described Republican moderates have issue positions that are virtually indistinguishable from those of ideologically committed Republicans.^[32]

Table 14.6 displays this fact by calculating the average pairwise difference in two ways. The first column reports the average issue difference

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TABLE 14.6 The Partisan Meaning of Moderation

	Average Issue Distance
	Between Party Identifiers	Within Party Identifiers
NOTE: The between-party differences are significant at or above the .05 level by a onetailed test that expects Republicans to be more conservative than Democrats.
Social spending	.11	.03
Policies aiding minorities	.20	.03
Active government	.31	.04
National health care	.25	.10

between Democratic and Republican identifiers for any given level of ideological commitment. The number in the cell is the average difference, for each issue, of the issue scores of moderate Democrats compared to moderate Republicans, weakly committed Democrats compared to weakly committed Republicans, and strongly committed Democrats compared to strongly committed Republicans. The second column reports the average difference among partisans of the same party for any given intensity of ideological commitment. It reports, for each issue and among those who identify with the same party, the average issue-score difference between moderates, those weakly committed, and those with a strong commitment.

All of the differences within party identifiers hover just above zero. The between-party differences are noticeably larger. On average, for any given level of ideological commitment, Republicans are 11 points more conservative than Democrats on the social spending index, 20 points more conservative on the minority policy index, 31 points more conservative in their attitudes toward the appropriate role of the government, and 25 points more conservative on the question of the government's role in ensuring health care.

The consequences of this pattern are illustrated in figure 14.2. Because they are "moderate" in the intensity of their beliefs, they seem able to support a "moderate" candidate in the other party. But the "moderation" that makes a crossover vote easy for them brings to the winner's coalition a more programmatically heterogeneous constituency than would exist for a candidate selected within a closed primary. Crossover voters who find a moderate candidate more programmatically acceptable will create an incumbent with a nomination and reelection constituency that is significantly less liberal (if the incumbent is Democrat) or conservative (if Republican) than the constituency of a candidate elected in a closed primary. Figure 14.2 indicates what that might look like. Four positions are plotted. Each point is the average of the four issue positions discussed above.^[33] The arrows in the bottom half point to the observed averages for Democratic and Republican

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identifiers. Presumably these scores would represent the issue constituency of a Democrat and Republican, respectively, in a closed primary. The top half of the figure calculates an issue score for a nomination constituency that is one-third partisans of the other party. For example, the nomination constituency of a "moderate strategy" Democrat in a blanket primary is approximately one-third Republican, and the issue preferences of this electorate reflect the size of the GOP vote and the issue positions characteristic of Republican identifiers.

It is pure speculation to assert that candidates elected under a blanket primary would shift as far to the center as the preferences of their voter's shift when a blanket primary produces crossover voting. However, as Adams's (1996) data demonstrates, a system that reduces a need to consider the preferences of opposition voters does create a more programmatically cohesive legislative delegation, and the blanket primary does the opposite. If the policy averages did move as much as the data in figure 14.2, it is easy to understand why crossover-elected legislators might cause policy cohesion within the parties to decline and issue conflict within the parties to increase.

CONCLUSION

In this survey "experiment," upwards of 30 percent of the moderates in both parties were successfully solicited to cross over on behalf of the moderate candidate in a blanket primary. Whether this result could be reproduced

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in an actual election is unknown. Several election cycles would have been required for California voters to become accustomed to the blanket primary and develop norms for crossover voting. If California voters had followed the precedent of Washington voters (who have been voting in a blanket primary for more than sixty years), we would have expected lower rates of crossover voting than those produced by this experiment, but higher than the rate that occurs in the No Cue condition in this experiment. However, the high rates of crossover voting—on the order of 40 percent in some races—reported by various county registrars ("Election Officials Study Impact" 1998) and Alvarez and Nagler (1997) are evidence that crossover voting itself can be extremely common in low-competition elections. It seems likely that a candidate can shape that crossover vote to produce the outcomes reported here.

It is also virtually impossible to predict with any certainty how much more moderate officeholders will become. A blanket primary system seems to offer strategic opportunities for moderates to defeat candidates with a reputation for strong liberal or conservative commitments. When these strongly committed candidates run in districts that are lopsidedly partisan, the kind of targeting and coalition strategy outlined in this chapter will not usually be successful. But when the party registration of the minority party is within 20 to 25 points of that of the dominant party, the blanket primary creates an opportunity for ambitious moderates to defeat their committed liberal or conservative colleagues with the help of crossover voters from the other side. When California's voters established the blanket primary in 1996, there were enough uncompetitive districts with a sufficient minorityparty vote to make a moderation-crossover strategy an attractive option for an insurgent. A vigorous partisan redistricting (generally expected with the election of a Democratic governor in 1998) might have made more districts vulnerable to such a strategy, especially among the Democrats, since a larger number of Democratic districts could be achieved only by creating smaller Democratic majorities in more districts. It might also have produced the intraparty conflicts suggested by figure 14.2. The Supreme Court eliminated this hypothetical future. But the dynamics studied with this "experiment" were not undone by the Court. Blanket primaries can facilitate an antiparty insurgent strategy that in turn erodes party cohesion. It is an institution to avoid if we value programmatic cohesion in our parties.

NOTES

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