12. Thinner Ranks
Women as Candidates and California's Blanket Primary
Miki Caul and Katherine Tate
Despite recent gains, women remain numerically underrepresented among elected officials in the United States at both the state and national levels. In 1997, women made up only 12 percent of the House of Representatives and 9 percent of the U.S. Senate. Rates of female officeholding across the fifty state governments vary considerably, with Kentucky and Alabama having the fewest women serving in their state legislatures at 5 to 7 percent and Colorado and Washington having the most at 40 percent. In California, women make up 18 percent of the state Senate and one-quarter of the Assembly (Field and Sohner 1999). While the proportion of women serving in California's state government is only slightly higher than the average proportion of women in U.S. state governments, California is currently one of only two states in the union with two female U.S. Senators, Dianne Feinstein and Barbara Boxer. Moreover, with ten women in the state's fifty-two-member U.S. House delegation, women also make up a slightly higher percentage (19 percent) than for the nation as a whole.
Increasing the descriptive representation of women is important because female elected officials raise and promote issues that are distinct from those emphasized by their male counterparts (Thomas 1993; Thomas and Welch 1991; Dodson and Carroll 1991). In addition, in districts where a woman is elected, female voters are more likely to be interested in and participate in politics, and to have a greater sense of political efficacy and competence (High-Pippert and Comer 1998). The under representation of one-half of the population not only limits the diversity of parliaments but also runs counter to one way that representative democracies may be evaluated, on the basis of whether their elected leadership reflects the society from which it is drawn in terms of salient political cleavages such as race, gender, ethnicity, region, and class.
Research on women's political representation in legislatures has established that the method of election has a profound effect on the numbers of women elected to political office. A change in the method of election, therefore, is likely to alter women's election opportunities and the resultant gender composition of the elected body. California's recent and short-lived adoption of the blanket primary, had it survived its test in the Supreme Court, may have had a negative effect on female officeholding in the state. Broadly, we hypothesize that the implementation of a blanket primary system weakens the role of parties in selecting candidates and increases the costs of elections. Raising the cost of statewide races in states such as California, where campaign costs are high, may mean that fewer viable female candidates will emerge and win.
Specifically, the blanket primary may reduce a woman's chances to advance to the general election because with a weaker role for the major political parties, the individual candidate's resources become more important. Candidates in the blanket primary generally need more resources such as personal financial support, PAC contributions, contacts, and ties to businesses and unions. As a group, women are less likely to have these personal resources. The blanket primary raised the financial and personal bar for candidates, and—had its influence persisted—Californian women might have been less well descriptively represented in their state government relative to women in other states.
THE EFFECTS OF ELECTION METHODS ON FEMALE CANDIDATES
A large empirical literature exists that explains why so few women are elected to democratic governments and why so few are found among the political elite. Although no one thus far has examined the impact of political primary systems on rates of female officeholding, this literature can help us anticipate the likely impact of a blanket primary system on female officeholding.
Research demonstrates that for three decades, women have been as likely as men to win seats in the U.S. House of Representatives once candidate status is taken into account. Although a significant minority of the U.S. population considers women to be less "emotionally suited" to run for political office, no evidence indicates that voter hostility toward female candidates impedes their elections. Nor is there empirical evidence to support claims of a conspiracy of the predominantly male political elite or systematic inadequacies in women's campaigns as barriers to their election (Carroll 1985; Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994). Further, in a study of the 1980 congressional candidates, Uhlaner and Schlozman (1986), controlling for the type of race and incumbency, found that female candidates raised as much money as their male competitors. Although female candidates in the
Specifically, women fare as well as men in primary races. In a study of women in open-seat primaries for the House from 1968 to 1990, Burrell (1992) concludes that relative to men, women acquire as many votes, that they are not substantially older candidates, and that they are just as likely to have previous experience in public office. Rather, as established in research on general elections, the small proportion of women who win primaries is largely due to the paucity of women who run in primary elections. In both Democratic and Republican House primaries, voters had the opportunity to cast their vote for a woman in less than a quarter of the races between 1968 and 1989 (Burrell 1992). Yet by 1990, that proportion had risen to one-third of House primaries.
If the low levels of victorious women are a result of few women stepping forward to run for office, then we might ask, What structures encourage women to run in other countries where levels of women's representation are higher? As noted earlier, the electoral system has an important effect on rates of female officeholding. In general, proportional representation (PR) systems, where parties list their set of candidates, produce more women in parliament than plurality systems do (Duverger 1955; Rule and Zimmerman 1994). PR systems in countries such as Iceland, Sweden, Austria, and Switzerland have legislatures that are, on average, 20 percent female compared to single-member district countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, whose national governments are only 10 percent female (Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994, 142). Rule (1987) concludes that the method of election, when compared with socioeconomic and educational indicators, is the strongest indicator of women's parliamentary representation in advanced industrial democracies. Winner take-all, single-member district systems, researchers believe, are less likely to run a woman because the parties perceive that they may lose the seat to a male competitor (Lakeman 1994). In party-list PR systems, in contrast, parties are more likely to add women to the list in order to broaden their appeal and balance the ticket. The perceived risk with a female candidate decreases when a female is part of a group, rather than the sole candidate.
Although there are several names for each office on the ballot and more than one nominee from that list advances to the general election, the blanket primary system is still essentially a plurality rule, single-member district system. Because the candidate with the most votes from each party advances to the general election, the blanket primary is clearly not a proportional system.
Political parties in other established democracies generally both recruit and nominate their candidates (Norris 1997; Lovenduski and Norris
The weak role that political parties play in the nominating process in the United States puts American women at a distinct disadvantage relative to their European counterparts. After all, as Darcy, Welch, and Clark describe, political parties "have been the key for women's advancement to public office in the proportional representation nations. … in which women hold between 20 and 40 percent of the parliamentary seats. In these countries, the political parties have committed themselves to electing more women"(1994, 186). In fact, even among single-member district electoral systems, countries such as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, where the political parties intend to elect more women, have in fact achieved higher levels of women in their national legislature than have the United States or the United Kingdom (Inter-Parliamentary Union 1997).[1] Darcy, Welch, and Clark (1994) show that greater centralized control over the candidate selection process helps women. The stronger the role that parties play in controlling candidate nominations, the greater the proportion of women elected in government.
Similarly, Matthews (1984) shows that the weakening of political parties and the entrepreneurial style of primary nominations have hampered women's candidacies. Evidence from state and city elections suggests that stronger parties may increase political opportunities for women. Broadly, female city council members are more likely to pursue higher office under certain circumstances. In particular, women are more likely to enter races that are legally partisan (Bledsoe and Herring 1990). Women running from a partisan council have an expected success rate nine times higher than that of women running from a nonpartisan council. Deber's (1982) research on women in congressional races in Pennsylvania reveals that those who won were more likely to have received organizational backing from a major party organization. She concludes that weak political parties "may thus hamper efforts by outgroups such as women to penetrate the political system by denying them access to the one ready-made source of political resources (organizational, financial, and electoral) which could be used to help a marginal candidate win election" (1982, 479).
In his seminal work, V. O. Key (1949) theorized that where parties play little or no role, those who have their own resources are more likely to
In primary systems where candidates generally self-select, personal resources are essential. The competition stimulated in races where parties have less control may discourage the entrance of less advantaged groups who do not possess the "personal political capital" necessary to run for public office. Personal political capital consists of resources accumulated by a candidate that lead to an advantage in the campaign, such as personal wealth, social position, professional career, and ties to strong pressure groups (Guadagnini 1993). Because women as a group are less likely to possess these resources, they are at a disadvantage relative to potential male competitors. The heavy reliance upon large sums of campaign money, especially the use of personal wealth, may preclude many potential female candidates from entering a nomination race.
As a group, women average lower incomes than men, and are less likely to have contacts with other elected officials (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 260–61). In addition, women are not as well represented in the prestigious occupations that are the most common springboards to office in the United States. The most heavily represented occupation in the U.S. Congress is law (Matthews 1984). Although women are increasing their proportion of law school enrollments, it will be another generation or two before women represent an equal share of U.S. lawyers. In 1989, women made up only 20 percent of the legal profession. Verba, Scholzman, and Brady (1995) demonstrate that it is in these professional occupations (where women are far less likely to be) that citizens learn their most basic civic skills. In sum, Darcy, Welch, and Clark (1994) conclude that the concentration of women in "pink-ghetto" occupations that are not traditionally the springboards for political careers severely handicaps women, because these careers do not offer the prestige, business contacts, or wealth that are necessary in a campaign.
Taken together, the bulk of the empirical research suggests that political parties play an integral role in increasing women's numerical representation (Lovenduski and Norris 1993; Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994; Caul 1999). While a strong empirical case has yet to be made for the claim that strong political parties lead to higher levels of women's representation, most scholars agree that weakening the control of parties will impede the growth of female representation in legislative office. Even political parties themselves have recognized their link to women's representation. In numerous democracies, many parties have adopted measures directly intended to increase the proportion of women in office. By 1995, eighty-four parties in thirty-six nations worldwide had enacted candidate gender
Because the literature clearly indicates that parties were key in increasing women's representation in most of the nations where representation is high, we are led to expect that the weakening of parties through the implementation of blanket primaries will only further offset any trends favoring women's candidacies. Switching to a blanket primary may not necessarily place women at a greater disadvantage for winning primaries, but it might discourage more women from stepping forward to run.
The weakening of party control over the nomination process may deter potential female candidates in two ways. First, if female candidates do not receive the support of state party officials, they must pay for the resources on their own that the party organization usually provides, such as party workers, candidate research, and get-out-the-vote drives. Since as a group women lack the wealth and social status that men as a group possess, women are at a critical disadvantage in initially financing their own campaigns. Second, it is easier for parties to encourage and recruit female candidates for nomination if party committees and conventions have more control in the nomination process. Strong parties can prepare and train potential candidates, compensating, therefore, for women's relative disadvantage to men in terms of the personal resources that they are able to bring to the campaign.
THE NUMBER OF FEMALE CANDIDATES IN RECENT STATE PRIMARY ELECTIONS
As many had predicted, the 1998 inauguration of California's blanket primary was the most expensive in California state history: a record $50 million was spent. In the gubernatorial primary the only woman in the race, Democrat Jane Harman, lost in a three-way race to her male competitors. Harman received only 12.3 percent of the vote to Al Checchi's 12.7 percent, while Gray Davis won with 34.9 percent. Harman had enough preexisting "personal political capital" to enter the race and offer a strong challenge to her contenders. Harman, as well as Checchi, both millionaires, contributed heavily to their own campaigns. Davis, who had close ties to the teachers' union and other large unions, received greater interest group support.
In the same election year in the Senate primary, San Diego Mayor Susan Golding originally entered the race. As a moderate supporter of abortion rights who received "high marks overall," Golding, many analysts believed, was the Republicans' best chance at defeating Barbara Boxer in the general election. However, Golding dropped out of the race citing fund-raising problems. Thus, the top contenders in the Republican primary—Darrell
Because the backing of the party appears to be important to increasing the number of women in primary elections, a comparison of the percentages of female candidates running under similar primary election methods may shed light on the impact of the blanket primary on women in California. In most established democracies elections are partisan, and parties, not voters, nominate the candidates. However, in the United States three other states utilize primary systems that are similar to the blanket primary system that was adopted in California: Washington, Alaska, and Louisiana (Cook and McGillivray 1997).
The blanket primary in Washington is nearly identical to the system that California adopted. However, the systems in Alaska and Louisiana vary in potentially important ways. In Alaska, the Republican candidates are not listed on the blanket ballot. The Republican primary is only open to registered Republicans and those who are undeclared. All other parties' candidates are listed on the same ballot, and all voters except registered Republicans can vote for these candidates. In Louisiana, all candidates are listed together on the ballot, and there is an added runoff component. If one candidate receives 50 percent of the total vote, she is automatically elected to office. If no candidate receives 50 percent, the two top finishers, regardless of party, advance to a runoff election. Because there are few cases of these distinct blanket-like primaries, for this analysis we will lump together races in these four states despite important differences, and refer to them as "blanket/nonpartisan." We then compare these to races in all other states, referring to them as "partisan."
We compare statewide races in 1994, 1996, and 1998. The results are shown in the appendix (table 12.2).[2] Of the one hundred Senate primaries, forty-two of the races included at least one woman candidate.[3] Of the eighty gubernatorial primaries, thirty-seven, or 46 percent, included at least one woman candidate. Similarly, in those three election years, of the ten primary elections that were blanket/nonpartisan, six races included at least one woman, of which female candidates won four.
These initial results do not support our hypothesis. On the basis of data from these three election years, blanket/nonpartisan primaries do not negatively affect the numbers of female candidates running relative to partisan primaries. Although there are very few cases of blanket/nonpartisan primaries, it does not appear that fewer women run in these primaries, nor are those women who run more likely to lose their races. Thus, contrary to our original hypothesis, it appears that the blanket/nonpartisan primary system does not directly impede the numerical representation of women.
DOES THE BLANKET PRIMARY AFFECT THE TYPE OF FEMALE CANDIDATES WHO RUN?
The type of primary system utilized by states may be of little consequence for candidacies of women because even partisan primaries are not vehicles through which parties can exert much control over the recruitment of candidates. In other words, all primary types, whether partisan or nonpartisan, reduce the power of the party elites to select their own candidates. Even if the party perceives the need to promote and recruit female candidates behind the scenes, there may be few means by which to do so (Burrell 1993). Thus, relative to most established democracies, political parties in the United States have so little power to help recruit female candidates that the further weakening of parties in the nomination process is infinitesimal. The effects of a switch to a blanket/nonpartisan primary may be undetectable, considering the great degree to which a primary system disadvantages women in the first place.
It still may be that blanket/nonpartisan primaries attract female candidates with different characteristics from those who run in partisan primaries. The number of blanket/nonpartisan cases is too small to put this hypothesis to a rigorous test. However, it appears that in the statewide blanket/nonpartisan races, the women who run are likely to have the personal political capital that most female candidates lack. For example, Jane Harman in California was a member of Congress and entered the gubernatorial primary with a great deal of personal wealth. Likewise, Mary Landrieu, who advanced to the runoff election in the 1996 Louisiana Senate race, is the daughter of a prominent Louisiana politician.
In order to discern whether primary candidates in blanket/nonpartisan races have different backgrounds from candidates in partisan primaries, we collected data on the background of all candidates in Senate and gubernatorial elections in 1994, 1996, and 1998. The occupational background or the type of elected office previously held by each candidate was that listed in Congressional Quarterly Weekly. In addition, in order to determine whether the candidate brought substantial amounts of personal wealth to the primary race, we reviewed articles detailing the campaigns in the same magazine. If a candidate had previously held elected office, brought personal wealth or widespread name recognition to the campaign, or had special connections for fund-raising as a former state party chair, we considered that candidate to have accumulated substantial personal political capital before entering the primary race.
Table 12.1 presents the difference in the percentage of candidates in blanket/nonpartisan and partisan primaries who either brought personal wealth, enjoyed statewide recognition, or had previously held elected office. Excluding incumbents, in partisan primaries 61 percent of women
Percentage-Point Difference between Nonpartisan and Partisan Primaries | |
---|---|
NOTE: Entries represent the gender difference between the percentage of nonpartisan and partisan races in which candidates brought personal wealth to the primary or had previously held elected office. We report the percentage-point difference for Senate and gubernatorial primaries for 1994, 1996, and 1998. | |
Both races | |
Women | +27 |
Men | +1 |
Senate | |
Women | +15 |
Men | +7 |
Gubernatorial | |
Women | +36 |
Men | +5 |
Although the number of blanket/nonpartisan cases is quite small when categorized by type of race, among Senate races more women in blanket/ nonpartisan races brought personal political capital than women in partisan races, by fifteen percentage points. For men the difference is only seven percentage points. Among Gubernatorial races, more women in blanket/ nonpartisan primaries had at least one of the above qualifications, by thirtysix percentage points, while the same difference for men is only five percentage points.[4]
When the same analysis is conducted, but the list of qualifications is limited to holding statewide office or substantial amounts of personal wealth, the results are similar. Excluding the incumbents, the difference between blanket/nonpartisan and partisan primaries for women is forty-seven percentage points. In contrast, among male candidates the relationship is reversed—only 21percent of men in blanket/nonpartisan primaries, compared to 39 percent of men in partisan primaries, brought personal political capital.
Overall, it appears that women who run in blanket/nonpartisan primaries
CONCLUSION
Although the existing research suggests that the blanket primary may reduce the numbers of women running for office, we found that the absolute numbers of women running in statewide races in recent years were the same in both partisan and blanket/nonpartisan primary systems. Because it generally functions as a self-nominating system, the American primary system, whether partisan, blanket, or nonpartisan, limits the number of female office seekers. Parties, in other words, cannot aggressively or effectively ensure that equal numbers of women and men are nominated for public office in either a partisan or blanket/nonpartisan system. Secondly, other reforms and trends may work to offset the negative consequence of blanket primaries on the number of women seeking office. In California, there are term limits for state office. Term limits have increased the proportion of open-seat contests, which improves the odds that a woman will be elected. Term limits are one reason women are entering state legislatures faster than they are entering the U.S. Congress.
Even offset by past reforms, the blanket primary may still have an impact on female officeholding because it increases the personal cost of running for public office. Fewer women will have the qualifications necessary to make a credible bid for public office under a blanket primary system like the one adopted in California. We found some evidence for this in our examination of statewide primaries held over the last three election cycles. The types of women running in the partisan and blanket/nonpartisan nominating contests were very different. Female candidates in the blanket/ nonpartisan systems were better qualified than their counterparts running in partisan contests. They were generally wealthier, or established political officeholders, or had name recognition because of family ties. Moreover, the fact remains that gender-role expectations regarding family life discourage many women from pursuing public office and leadership positions.
Although women have made great strides in achieving greater equality in the labor force, they are still vastly underrepresented in the pool of business and economic elites from which political leaders are drawn. Campaign finance reform and, specifically, strict spending limits on campaigns and the public financing of campaigns, would open the candidate pool to individuals lacking personal wealth or the social connections that have almost become prerequisites for holding public office in the United States. In the end, our research and other studies reaffirm the central role that political parties play in increasing the numerical representation of women in democratic governments. The single most effective reform would strengthen the political party's role in the nominating process. Parties would be in a better position to ensure that our pool of candidates for public office resembled more closely the general population. California's Proposition 198 and similar measures weaken the role of the political party in the nominating process and make it harder for women, as a political minority, to compete for public office.
APPENDIX
1994 Senate | |
Total races | 34 |
Races with at least one woman | 18 |
Women who win | 8 |
Nonpartisan races | 1—Washington |
Women in nonpartisan races | 0 |
Women who win nonpartisan races | 0 |
1994 Governor (plus 1993 New Jersey) | |
Total races | 37 |
Races with at least one woman | 19 |
― 245 ― | |
Women who win | 9 |
Nonpartisan races | 1—Alaska |
Women in nonpartisan races | 0 |
Women who win nonpartisan races | 0 |
1996 Senate | |
Total races | 33 |
Races with at least one woman | 12 |
Women who win | 7 |
Nonpartisan races | 2—Alaska and Louisiana |
Women in nonpartisan races | 2 |
Women who win nonpartisan races | 1 |
1996 Governor (plus 1995 Louisiana) | |
Total races | 10 |
Races with at least one woman | 5 |
Women who win | 5 |
Nonpartisan races | 2 |
Women in nonpartisan races | 2—Washington and Louisiana |
Women who win nonpartisan races | 1 |
1998 Senate | |
Total races | 33 |
Races with at least one woman | 12 |
Nonpartisan races | 4 |
Women in nonpartisan races | 2 |
Women who win nonpartisan races | 2—both incumbents—California and Washington |
1998 Governor (plus 1997 New Jersey) | |
Total races | 36 |
Races with at least one woman | 15 |
Nonpartisan races | 3 |
Women in nonpartisan races | 1 |
Women who win nonpartisan races | 0 |
NOTES
1. Although minor-party primaries include women candidates, we limited our study to the Democratic and Republican party primaries. [BACK]
2. We examined only the Democratic and Republican party primaries for these years. [BACK]
3. Because the Republican primary in Alaska is partisan, it has been excluded
4. The same analysis was conducted with the incumbents included, and the results reveal the same relationship: women in nonpartisan races bring more qualifications. For both types of races, with the incumbents included for partisan primaries, 57 percent of women have at least one qualification, and 37 percent of men. In contrast, in nonpartisan primaries, 70 percent of women have at least one, as do only 43 percent of men. Among Senate races for partisan primaries, 52 percent of women and 30 percent of men had at least one qualification, while in nonpartisan primaries, 63 percent of women and 41percent of men had at least one. And among partisan primaries in gubernatorial races, 61percent of women and 44 percent of men had at least one qualification. In contrast, in nonpartisan elections, both of the two women who fell into this category had at least one qualification, while only 44 percent of the men brought the same. [BACK]
REFERENCES
Bledsoe, Timothy, and Mary Herring. 1990.
“Victims of Circumstances: Women in Pursuit of Political Office.”
American Political Science Review84(March): 212–23.
Burrell, Barbara. 1992.
“Women Candidates in Open-Seat Primaries for the U.S. House: 1968–1990.”
Legislative Studies Quarterly4(November): 493–510.
Burrell, Barbara. 1993.
“Party Decline, Party Transformation, and Gender Politics in the USA.”
In Lovenduski and Norris 1993.
Carroll, Susan J. 1985. Women as Candidates in American Politics.Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Caul, Miki L. 1999.
“Women's Representation in Parliament: the Role of Political Parties.”
Party Politics(January): 79–98.
Cook, Rhodes, and Alice V. McGillivray. 1997. U.S. Primary Elections.Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly.
Darcy, R.; Susan Welch; and Janet Clark. 1994. Women, Elections, and Representation.2nd ed. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
Deber, Raisa. 1982.
“The Fault Dear Brutus: Women as Congressional Candidates in Pennsylvania.”
Journal of Politics44 (May): 463–79.
Dodson, Debra, and Susan J. Carroll. 1991. Reshaping the Agenda: Women in State Legislatures.New Brunswick, NJ: Center for American Women in Politics.
Duverger, Maurice. 1955. The Political Role of Women.Paris: United Nations Economic and Social Council.
Field, Mona, and Charles P. Sohner. 1999. California Government and Politics Today.New York: Addison Wesley Educational Publishers.
Green, Joanne Connor. 1998.
“The Role of Gender in Open-Seat Elections for the U.S. House of Representatives: A District Level Test for a Differential Value for Campaign Resources.”
Women & Politics19, no. 2: 33–53.
Guadagnini, Marila. 1993.
“A ‘Partitocrazia' Without Women: The Case of the Italian Party System.”
In Lovenduski and Norris 1993.
High-Pippert, Angela, and John Comer. 1998.
“Female Empowerment: The Influence of Women Representing Women.”
Women & Politics19, no. 4: 51–66.
Inter-Parliamentary Union. 1997. Democracy Still in the Making: A World Comparative Study.Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union.
Key, V. O., Jr. 1949. Southern Politics in State and Nation.New York: Knopf.
Lakeman, Enid. 1994.
“Comparing Political Opportunities in Great Britain and Ireland.”
In Rule and Zimmerman 1994.
Lovenduski, Joni, and Pippa Norris. 1993. Gender and Party Politics.London: Sage.
Matthews, Donald. 1984.
“Legislative Recruitment and Legislative Careers.”
Legislative Studies Quarterly (November): 547–85.
Norris, Pippa. 1997. Passages to Power: Legislative Recruitment in Advanced Democracies.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Norris, Pippa, and Joni Lovenduski. 1995.Political Recruitment: Gender, Race, and Class in the British Parliament.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rule, Wilma. 1981.
“Why Women Don't Run: The Critical Factors in Women's Legislative Recruitment.”
Western Political Quarterly34: 60–77.
Rule, Wilma. 1987.
“Electoral Systems, Contextual Factors, and Women's Opportunity for Election to Parliament in Twenty-Three Democracies.”
Western Political Quarterly (September): 477–98.
Rule, Wilma, and Joseph Zimmerman. 1994. Electoral Systems in Comparative Perspective: Their Impact on Women and Minorities.Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Thomas, Sue. 1993. How Women Legislate.Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Thomas, Sue, and Susan Welch. 1991.
“The Impact of Gender on Activities and Priorities of State Legislators.”
Western Political Quarterly44, no. 2: 445–56.
Uhlaner, Carole Jean, and Kay Lehman Schlozman. 1986.
“Candidate Gender and Congressional Campaign Receipts.”
Journal of Politics (February) 1986: 30–50.
Verba, Sidney; Kay Lehman Schlozman; and Henry E. Brady. 1995. Voice and Equality.Cambridge: Harvard University Press.