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1. Richard Rorty, Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), 28. [BACK]

2. Richard Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 162. [BACK]

3. See, e.g., Tugendhat's review of Gadamer in Ernst Tugendhat, Philosophische Aufsatze (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1992). [BACK]

4. Rorty terms scientism “the doctrine that natural science is privileged over other areas of culture, that something about natural science puts it in closer—or at least more reliable—touch with reality than any other human activity.” Richard Rorty, Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 294. [BACK]

5. John McDowell, Mind, Value, and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), 72. As will become apparent below, this is essentially a formulation of the problem of the “absolute” as it is seen in early German Romantic philosophy. On this see Andrew Bowie, ‘John McDowell's Mind and World and Early Romantic Epistemology,’ in Revue international dephilosophie, 50.197 (1996): 515-54. [BACK]

6. On this see Manfred Frank, “Unendliche Annaherung”: Die Anfdnge der philoso-phischen Fruhromantik (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp), 1997. [BACK]

7. For a much more detailed account, see Andrew Bowie, From Romanticism to Critical Theory: The Philosophy of German Literary Theory (London: Routledge, 1997). [BACK]

8. See Dahlhaus, Die Idee der absoluten Musik (Munich: DTV, 1978); and Andrew Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From Kant to Nietzsche (Manchester: Manchester University Press, new ed. 2003). [BACK]


9. One of Gadamer's aims is to establish a nonrepresentational concept of “mimesis” as the “essence of all constitutive activity in art and literature,” in which “Mimesis is … not so much that something points to something else that is its original image [Urbild], but that something in itself [in sich selbst] is there as something meaningful” (GW8:85). There is nothing incompatible in this with the idea that music can be world-disclosive: neither position assumes that music is essentially the representation of interiority. [BACK]

10. Quoted in Paul Moos, Die Philosophic der Musik von Kant bis Eduard von Hart-mann (New York: Georg Olms, 1975), 27. [BACK]

11. It is questionable, in the light of the hermeneutically influenced postem-piricist history of science, whether this is an adequate view of the practice of science, but it does correspond to a widely held view in the traditions Gadamer refers to. [BACK]

12. See my From Romanticism to Critical Theory for a more differentiated account of Dilthey. [BACK]

13. Friedrich Schlegel, Kritische Schriften und Fragmente 1-6 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh, 1988), 38. [BACK]

14. Ibid., 48. [BACK]

15. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Sammtliche Werke, ed. K. F. A. Schelling, I Abtheilung vols. 1-10, II Abtheilung vols. 1-4 (Stuttgart, 1856-61), 1/3.627. On this, see Andrew Bowie, Schelling and Modern European Philosophy (London: Rout-ledge, 1993); and Bowie, Aesthetics. [BACK]

16. Novalis, Band 2: Das philosophische-theoretische Werh, ed. Hans-Joachim Mahl (Munich: Hanser, 1978), 769. [BACK]

17. Ibid., 322. [BACK]

18. Ibid., 840. [BACK]

19. In F. D. E. Schleiermacher, “Hermeneutics and Criticism” and Other Texts, ed. and trans. Andrew Bowie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). [BACK]

20. Ibid., 94. [BACK]

21. See Wolfgang Virmond, Schleiermacher-Archiv, Band I (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1985), 575-90; Schleiermacher, “Hermeneutics.” [BACK]

22. Schleiermacher, “Hermeneutics,” 94. In the General Hermeneutics of 1809-10 Schleiermacher sees the two sides as follows: “The grammatical side puts the utterer in the background and regards him just as an organ of the language, but regards language as what really generates the utterance. The technical side, on the other hand, regards the utterer as the real-ground of the utterance and the language merely as the negative limiting principle” (ibid., 230). [BACK]

23. Ibid., 257. [BACK]

24. See Bowie, Romanticism, and my Introduction to Schleiermacher, “Hermeneutics. “As Frank shows in “Unendliche Anndherung,” the insight into the regress of rules, which Kant already describes (see Bowie, Romanticism,chapter 2), was a commonplace of the post-Kantian thinkers who prepared the way for Romantic thought. [BACK]

25. Schleiermacher, “Hermeneutics,” 229. [BACK]

26. Ernest Lepore, ed., Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 446. [BACK]

27. On this see, e.g., Manfred Frank, Das Individuelle-Allgemeine: Textstruhtur-ierungund interpretation nach Schleiermacher (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1977); Christian Berner, La philosophie de Schleiermacher (Paris: Cerf, 1995); and Bowie, Romanticism. [BACK]

28. F. D. E. Schleiermacher, Dialehtih, ed. L. Jonas (Berlin: Reimer, 1839), 261. [BACK]


29. See my Introduction to Schleiermacher, “Hermeneutics.” [BACK]

30. Martin Heidegger, Zur Sachen des Denkens (Tubingen: Niemeyer, 1988), 70. [BACK]

31. Martin Heidegger, Holzwege (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1980), 107. [BACK]

32. Ibid., 105. [BACK]

33. See Frank, Individuelle-Allgemeine; Bowie, Schilling. [BACK]

34. Karl-Otto Apel, Auseinandersetzungen (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1998), 572-74. [BACK]

35. See Frank, “Unendliche Annaherung,” §*](:>. [BACK]

36. See Dieter Henrich, Der Grand im Bewusstsein: Untersuchungen zu Holderlins Denhen (1794-5) (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1992); Andrew Bowie, “Re-thinking the History of the Subject: Jacobi, Schelling, and Heidegger,” in Deconstructive Subjectivities, ed. Simon Critchely and Peter Dews (New York: SUNYPress, 1996); Frank, “Unendliche Annaherung. “ [BACK]

37. Gadamer sees correspondences between his position and that of Popper (GWa:4). [BACK]

38. See Bowie, “Re-thinking”; Bowie, Romanticism; Frank, “Unendliche Annaherung. “ [BACK]

39. The contemporary counterpart of Fichte in relation to the question of grounding is Karl-Otto Apel, who insists against Albert that a “final foundation” is to be discovered in the fact that if one does not accept an absolute presupposition concerning the possible intersubjective validity of what is being argued about, one would be involved in the “performative self-contradiction” of claiming validity for a position which excludes the possibility of validity. I shall return to some of the less controversial and more productive aspects of Apel's arguments below. [BACK]

40. Fichte's subjectivism has often led him to be regarded as the essential Romantic philosopher. It was Walter Benjamin who first showed why this is an invalid view of Fichte, for reasons similar to those suggested below; on this see Bowie, Romanticism,chapter 8. [BACK]

41. Novalis 162. [BACK]

42. See Manfred Frank, Selbstbewusstsein und Selbsterhenntnis (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1991). [BACK]

43. Dieter Henrich, Fluchtlinien: Philosophische Essays (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1982), 166. [BACK]

44. F. D. E. Schleiermacher, Friedrich Schleiermachers Dialektih, ed. Rudolf Ode-brecht (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1976), 274-75. [BACK]

45. Frank,“UnendlicheAnnaherung,” 717. [BACK]

46. Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 196. [BACK]

47. Rorty, Truth and Progress, vol. 1, 2. [BACK]

48. Ibid., 3. [BACK]

49. Novalis 181. [BACK]

50. Ibid. [BACK]

51. Friedrich Schlegel, Philosophische Vorlesungen (1800-1807), Kritische Fried-rich Schlegel Ausgabe, vol. 12 (Munich: Ferdinand Schoningh), 95. [BACK]

52. Friedrich Schlegel, Transcendentalphilosophie, ed. Michael Elsasser (Hamburg: Meiner, 1991), 95. [BACK]

53. Novalis 8. [BACK]


54. Friedrich Schlegel, Philosophische Lehrjahre II (1798-1828) (Kritische Friedrich Schlegel Ausgabe, vol. 19) (Munich: Ferdinand Schoningh, 1971), 58. [BACK]

55. Schlegel, Kritische Schriften, 240. [BACK]

56. Rorty, Truth, 38. [BACK]

57. Richard Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 126. [BACK]

58. Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 216. [BACK]

59. Schlegel, Transcendentalphilosophie, 74. [BACK]

60. Ibid., 92-93. [BACK]

61. Schlegel, Vorlesungen, 316-17. [BACK]

62. Schlegel, Transcendentalphilosophie, 92. [BACK]

63. Schleiermacher, Dialektik, 18. [BACK]

64. Apel 92. [BACK]

65. The further complicating factor lies in the fact that representations require linguistic articulation if they are to be agreed on, which gives a further reason why the correspondence model is untenable, at least in its traditional form. [BACK]

66. Schleiermacher, “Hermeneutics,” 274. [BACK]

67. Rorty, Truth, 60-61. [BACK]

68. Indeed, it is arguable that for much of this century most English-speaking philosophy at least was, with respect to these specific issues, not even at the level of the Romantic debate. [BACK]

69. Richard Rorty, “Pragmatism as Romantic Polytheism,” in The Revival of Pragmatism: New Essays on Social Thought, Law, and Culture, ed. Morris Dickstein (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998), 37-46. See also Rorty, Contingency. [BACK]

70. Rorty, Truth, 310. [BACK]

71. Ibid., Truth, 288. [BACK]

72. Cited in ibid. [BACK]

73. Rorty, Essays, 125. [BACK]

74. Ibid., 126. [BACK]

75. See Bowie, Romanticism,chapter 9. [BACK]

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