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The Elections of 1970 and Their Aftermath
Between May and December 1970 the Jama‘at campaigned frantically. Competition with the Awami League and clashes with Bhashani’s supporters escalated tensions in East Pakistan and Punjab, and clashes with the People’s Party tied down the Jama‘at in West Pakistan. These conflicts, combined with the challenge from the party’s religious flank, taxed the Jama‘at’s energies. Despite untiring efforts, it won only four of the 151 National Assembly seats which it contested, all in West Pakistan, and only four of the 331 provincial assembly seats it had aimed for, one in each province except Baluchistan (see tables 8–11). It trailed far behind the Awami League and the People’s Party in the final tally of seats and to its dismay and embarrassment finished behind the Jami‘at-i Ulama-i Islam and Jami‘at-i Ulama-i Pakistan. The Jami‘at-i Ulama-i Islam even gained enough seats to serve as a partner to the National Awami party (National People’s Party) in forming provincial governments in Baluchistan and North-West Frontier Province. To the Jama‘at’s surprise the two ulama parties did better than the Jama‘at, although they had contested fewer seats and received a lower percentage of votes cast. In elections to the National Assembly, the Jama‘at’s share of the total vote was at 6.03 percent, as opposed to the Jami‘at-i Ulama-i Islam’s 3.98 percent and the Jami‘at-i Ulama-i Pakistan’s 3.94 percent. Where the Jama‘at had won only four seats (and none in East Pakistan, where its share of the total votes cast was 6.07 percent) the ulama parties had won seven seats each. In provincial elections the Jama‘at received 3.25 percent of the votes cast, the Jami‘at-i Ulama-i Islam 2.25 percent, and the Jami‘at-i Ulama-i Pakistan 2.11 percent. In contrast with the Jama‘at’s four provincial seats, the Jami‘at-i Ulama-i Islam had won nine and the Jami‘at-i Ulama-i Pakistan eleven. The Jama‘at’s 6.03 percent of the votes cast in National Assembly elections had yielded only 1.3 percent of the seats, and its 3.25 percent share of the vote in provincial elections a mere 0.67 percent of the seats. The results turned the Jama‘at into an ardent advocate of proportional representation for Pakistan. Finally, partly because they had competed with one another, the Islamic parties taken together did poorly in both parts of Pakistan. This limited the political power of Islam and further constricted the Jama‘at.
East Pakistan | Punjab | Sind | NWFP | Baluchistan | Total | |
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Source: Report on the General Elections, Pakistan 1970–71 (Islamabad, n.d.) 2:68–69. | ||||||
Jama‘at-i Islami | 1,044,137 (6.07%) | 515,564 (4.74%) | 321,471 (10.31%) | 103,958 (7.22%) | 4,331 (1.16%) | 1,989,461 (6.03%) |
Jami‘at-i Ulama-i Islam, West Pakistan | 158,058 (0.92%) | 564,601 (5.19%) | 151,284 (4.85%) | 366,477 (25.45%) | 74,651 (20%) | 1,315,071 (3.98%) |
Jami‘at-i Ulama-i Islam / Jami‘at-i Ahl-i Hadith | 485,774 (2.83%) | 28,246 (0.26%) | 0 | 7,744 (0.54%) | 0 | 521,764 (1.58%) |
Jami‘at-i Ulama-i Pakistan | 0 | 1,083,196 (9.96%) | 216,418 (6.94%) | 244 (0.02%) | 0 | 1,299,858 (3.94%) |
East Pakistan | Punjab | Sind | NWFP | Baluchistan | Total | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Source: Report on the General Elections, Pakistan 1970–71 (Islamabad, n.d.) 2:70–99, 100–21. | ||||||
Jama‘at-i Islami | ||||||
Seats contested | 71 | 44 | 19 | 15 | 2 | 151 |
Seats won | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 4 |
Jami‘at-i Ulama-i Islam, West Pakistan | ||||||
Seats contested | 15 | 46 | 21 | 19 | 4 | 105 |
Seats won | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 1 | 7 |
Jami‘at-i Ulama-i Islam/Jami‘at-i Ahl-i Hadith | ||||||
Seats contested | 49 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 54 |
Seats won | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Jami‘at-i Ulama-i Pakistan | ||||||
Seats contested | 0 | 41 | 8 | 1 | 0 | 50 |
Seats won | 0 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 7 |
Total seats contested | 781 | 460 | 170 | 143 | 25 | 1579 |
Total seats won | 162 | 82 | 27 | 25 | 4 | 300 |
East Pakistan | Punjab | Sind | NWFP | Baluchistan | Total | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Source: Report on the General Elections, Pakistan 1970–71 (Islamabad, n.d.) 2:268–69. | ||||||
Jama‘at-i Islami | 678,159 (4.5%) | 161,62 (1.61%) | 89,245 (2.93%) | 37,387 (2.58%) | 8,609 (2.07%) | 975,027 (3.25% |
Jami‘at-i Ulama-i Islam, West Pakistan | 76,735 (0.51%) | 313,684 (3.13%) | 37,418 (1.23%) | 201,030 (13.89%) | 45,609 (10.96%) | 674,416 (2.25%) |
Jami‘at-i Ulama-i Islam/Jami‘at-i Ahl-i Hadith | 223,634 (1.48%) | 2,262 (0.02%) | 14,702 (0.48%) | 691 (0.05%) | 0 | 241,289 (0.8%) |
Jami‘at-i Ulama-i Pakistan | 0 | 448,008 (4.47%) | 184,151 (6.06%) | 0 | 0 | 632,159 (2.11%) |
East Pakistan | Punjab | Sind | NWFP | Baluchistan | Total | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Source: Report on the General Elections, Pakistan 1970–71 (Islamabad, n.d.) 2:270–355. | ||||||
Jama‘at-i Islami | ||||||
Seats contested | 174 | 80 | 37 | 28 | 12 | 331 |
Seats won | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 4 |
Jami‘at-i Ulama-i Islam, West Pakistan | ||||||
Seats contested | 23 | 72 | 23 | 35 | 14 | 167 |
Seats won | 0 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 9 |
Jami‘at-i Ulama-i Islam/Jami‘at-i Ahl-i Hadith | ||||||
Seats contested | 63 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 74 |
Seats won | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
Jami‘at-i Ulama-i Pakistan | ||||||
Seats contested | 0 | 73 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 88 |
Seats won | 0 | 4 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 11 |
Total seats contested | 1,850 | 1,323 | 579 | 319 | 164 | 4,235 |
Total seats won | 300 | 180 | 60 | 40 | 20 | 600 |
The election results dealt a severe blow to the morale of Jama‘at members. Mawdudi’s leadership was questioned, as was the party’s time-honored reliance on Islamic symbols and the putative Islamic loyalties of Pakistanis. The election results, moreover, effectively eliminated the Jama‘at as a power broker. The Jama‘at quickly regrouped, however, this time to defend Pakistan against the polarization of the country between the Awami League and the People’s Party. The Jama‘at leaders encouraged Yahya Khan not to discriminate against the Awami League and to allow Mujib to form a government.[71] When Yahya Khan refused, the party broke with him, accusing him of unfair partiality toward the People’s Party, which the Jama‘at was convinced would have disastrous consequences for Pakistan. Meanwhile, the Jama‘at excoriated the People’s Party for lobbying with the generals to deny the Awami League the fruit of its victory.
The Jama‘at’s argument did not endear it to the Awami League; Mawdudi’s attacks on Bhashani and Mujib, the former for his religious views and the latter for his rapacious political ambition, had continued with his criticisms of Yahya Khan and Bhutto. Its pro-Pakistan and anti–Awami League propaganda had increased the violence between IJT supporters and Bengali nationalists following the elections. As the situation in East Pakistan deteriorated throughout 1971, the Jama‘at members became convinced of a Communist-Hindu plot to dismember Pakistan. Driven by its dedication to Pakistan’s unity and unable to counter the challenge of the Awami League, the Jama‘at abandoned its role as intermediary and formed an unholy alliance with the Pakistan army, which had been sent to Dhaka to crush the Bengali nationalists.
After a meeting with General Tikka Khan, the head of the army in East Pakistan, in April 1971, Ghulam A‘zam, the amir of East Pakistan, gave full support to the army’s actions against “enemies of Islam.” Meanwhile, a group of Jama‘at members went to Europe to explain Pakistan’s cause and defend what the army was doing in East Pakistan; another group was sent to the Arab world, where the Jama‘at drew upon its considerable influence to gain support.[72] In September 1971 the alliance between the Jama‘at and the army was made official when four members of the Jama‘at-i Islami of East Pakistan joined the military government of the province.[73] Both sides saw gains to be made from their alliance. The army would receive religious sanction for its increasingly brutal campaign, and the Jama‘at would gain prominence. Its position was, in good measure, the result of decisions made by the Jama‘at-i Islami of East Pakistan, then led by Ghulam A‘zam and Khurram Jah Murad. This branch of the Jama‘at, faced with annihilation, was thoroughly radicalized, and acted with increasing independence in doing the bidding of the military regime in Dhaka. The Lahore secretariat often merely approved the lead taken by the Jama‘at and the IJT in Dhaka. Nowhere was this development more evident than in the IJT’s contribution to the ill-fated al-Badr and al-Shams counterinsurgency operations.
In the civil war, two thousand Jama‘at and IJT members, workers, and sympathizers were killed and upward of twelve thousand held in prison camps.[74] The East Pakistan war also had its bright side insofar as the nationalist credentials of the party, which had repeatedly been accused of being “anti-Pakistan,” could no longer be questioned. As one Jama‘at leader put it, “While the Muslim League youth took refuge in their opulent homes, it was the Jami‘at [IJT] which gave its blood to save Pakistan.”[75] The party, which had been routed at the polls only a year earlier, now found a new measure of confidence that facilitated its return to the political arena.