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Entering the Political Process, 1947–1958
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1. Kawthar (July 28, 1947): 3. [BACK]

2. Sarwat Saulat, Maulana Maududi (Karachi, 1979), 29. [BACK]

3. Saulat, Maulana Maududi, 29; and interview with Mian Tufayl Muhammad in Takbir (November 16, 1989): 56. [BACK]

4. Syed Ahmad Nur, From Martial Law to Martial Law: Politics in the Punjab, 1919–1958 (Boulder, 1985). [BACK]

5. Interview with Mian Tufayl Muhammad. [BACK]

6. These talks were delivered between January 6 and February 10, 1948. They were later published as Islam ka Nizam-i Hayat, and published in English in Sayyid Abu’l-A‘la Mawdudi, The Islamic Way of Life (Leicester, 1986). [BACK]

7. U. S. Embassy, Karachi, disp. #189, 4/28/1948, 845F.00/4–2848, NA. [BACK]

8. For more details see Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defence (Cambridge, 1990), 119–24. [BACK]

9. U. S. Embassy Karachi, disp. #1671, 5/29/1951, 790D.00/5–1651, and disp. #1394, 3/28/1950, 790D.00/3–2851, NA. The British envoy in Pakistan took a less drastic view of the Communist threat, and attributed the plot largely to frustrations over Kashmir. He explained Faiz’s part in the affair as conjectural; see U. K. High Commissioner, Karachi, tel. #FL1018/18, 3/10/1951, FO371/92866, PRO. [BACK]

10. See, for instance, Civil and Military Gazette (January 28, 1950): 2 and (June 6, 1951): 1. Similar sentiments were expressed by Liaqat ‘Ali Khan; U. S. Consulate General, Lahore, disp. #33, 9/15/1950, 790D.001/9–650, NA. Also the IJT, for instance, as a bulwark against communism in Pakistan, received financial support from the Muslim League between 1949 and 1952; see interview with Khurram Jah Murad in JVNAT, vol. 1, 70. [BACK]

11. Freeland Abbott, Islam and Pakistan (Ithaca, 1968), 193. [BACK]

12. See Kawthar (November 25, 1947): 7; (December 13, 1947): 2; (December 17, 1947): 1; (December 25, 1947): 4; and (January 25, 1948): 2. [BACK]

13. Ibid. (March 5, 1948): 1. [BACK]

14. See Rana Sabir Nizami, Jama‘at-i IslamiPakistan: Nakamiyun ke Asbab ka ‘Ilmi Tajziyah (Lahore, 1988), 44–45. [BACK]

15. This comment was made in February 1948 and was later printed in Syed Abul ‘Ala Maudoodi, Islamic Law and Constitution (Karachi, 1955), 1. [BACK]

16. Ibid., 53. [BACK]

17. These lectures were subsequently published in Islamic Law and Constitution (Karachi, 1955). [BACK]

18. Interview with Mian Tufayl Muhammad in Takbir (November 16, 1989): 48. [BACK]

19. Ahmad Ra’if, Pakistan Awr Jama‘at-i Islami (Faisalabad, 1986), 26. [BACK]

20. U. S. Embassy, Karachi, disp. #328, 7/26/1948, 845F.00/7–2648, NA. [BACK]

21. Ra’if, Pakistan, 26. [BACK]

22. For an example of such an assertion, see Kawthar (December 25, 1947): 4. [BACK]

23. Interview with Begum Mawdudi. [BACK]

24. Interviews with Mian Tufayl Muhammad, Sultan Ahmad, and ‘Abdu’l-Ghaffar Hasan. [BACK]

25. SAAM, vol. 1, 225. [BACK]

26. Report of the Court of Inquiry Constituted under Punjab Act 11 of 1953 to Enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953 (Lahore, 1954), 226. [BACK]

27. TQ (June 1948): 121–26. [BACK]

28. Ibid., 357. [BACK]

29. SAAM, vol. 1, 359–60. [BACK]

30. Nawa’-i Waqt (September 2, 1948): 1; (September 3, 1948): 1; and (September 3, 1948): 4. [BACK]

31. In the words of one observer, while Muslim League leaders may have never forgiven the Jama‘at’s opposition to their cause before the partition, many shared the party’s social and moral concerns and were therefore generally more tolerant of the Jama‘at. The high civil servants, such as Iskandar Mirza, Ghulam Ahmad, or ‘Aziz Ahmad, in contrast, were far more secular in outlook than the politicians and by the same token less tolerant of the Jama‘at; U. S. Embassy, Karachi, disp. #61, 7/27/1956, 790D.00/7–2756, NA. [BACK]

32. RJI, vol. 6, 133–34 and 138–39. Between 1948 and 1951 additional Jama‘at leaders were jailed for various periods; ibid., 133–35. [BACK]

33. On October 16, 1948, in the Division Classified Letter No. F.4/8/48 EST.(SE) the Jama‘at was declared a subversive organization, the membership of which was prohibited for Pakistani government employees. Other organizations cited in this code were the Anjuman-i Azad Khiyal Musaniffin (Society of Free-Thinking Writers) and the Punjabi Majlis (Punjabi Council), both of which were Communist bodies. The code is interestingly still in the statutes, and was cited in the latest edition of the Civil Service Code printed during the Zia years; see ESTA CODE: Civil Service Establishment Code (Islamabad, 1983), 317. [BACK]

34. RJI, vol. 6, 136–37. [BACK]

35. Ibid., 136–42. [BACK]

36. SAAM, vol. 1, 360. [BACK]

37. Sayyid Abu’l-A‘la Mawdudi, Shakhsiyat (Lahore, n.d.), 273–80. [BACK]

38. RJI, vol. 6, 101–2, and JIKUS, 57–58. [BACK]

39. For a detailed account of the constitutional debates, see Leonard Binder’s excellent analysis in Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1961). [BACK]

40. As an indication of the importance of the alliance with ‘Uthmani, Mian Mumtaz Daultana observed at the time that the Objectives Resolution was a personal favor to ‘Uthmani by Liaqat ‘Ali Khan, in that the sovereignty of God was acknowledged in the resolution; see Afzal Iqbal, Islamization of Pakistan (Lahore, 1986), 41. In a similar vein ‘Abdu’l-Ghaffar Hasan recollects that ‘Uthmani personally interceded with the authorities on a number of occasions to obtain the release of Mawdudi from prison; interview with ‘Abdu’l-Ghaffar Hasan. [BACK]

41. RJI, vol. 6, 107–8. [BACK]

42. Ibid., 110–11. [BACK]

43. Interview with Mian Tufayl. [BACK]

44. RJI, vol. 6, 115. [BACK]

45. SAAM, vol. 1, 365–66. [BACK]

46. Ibid., 370. [BACK]

47. Ibid., 244. [BACK]

48. MMKT, vol. 2, 82–99, and Sayyid Abu’l-A‘la Mawdudi, Sunnat’u Bid‘at ki Kashmakash (Lahore, 1950). [BACK]

49. SAAM, vol. 1, 373. [BACK]

50. On the Muhajir’s demands for land reform, which were first aired in 1949, see U. K. High Commission, Karachi, disp. #18, 5/3/1949, DO35/8948, and disp. #31, 9/3/1949, DO35/8948, PRO. [BACK]

51. MMKT, vol. 2, 161–65. [BACK]

52. RJI, vol. 6, 138–39. [BACK]

53. TQ (June 1950): 360–65. [BACK]

54. RJI, vol. 6, 115; and Binder, Religion and Politics, 216–17. [BACK]

55. For a full discussion of this issue, see Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, “The Politics of an Islamic Movement: The Jama‘at-i Islami of Pakistan,” Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1991, 410–21, and RJI, vol. 6, 140–42. [BACK]

56. U. S. Consulate General, Lahore, disp. #49, 9/25/1950, 790D.00/9–2950; disp. #72, 11/3/1950, 790D.00/11–350; and disp. #84, 11/30/1950, NA. [BACK]

57. RJI, vol. 6, 118. [BACK]

58. U. S. Consulate General, Lahore, disp. #136, 1/31/1952, 790D.00/1–3152, NA. [BACK]

59. RJI, vol. 6, 117–29. [BACK]

60. Ibid., 121; and U. S. Embassy, Karachi, disp. #660, 12/11/1951, 790D.00/11–2851, NA. [BACK]

61. For details of these speeches, see MMKT, vol. 2. [BACK]

62. U. S. Consulate General, Lahore, disp. #189, 5/1/1952, 790D.00/5–152, NA. [BACK]

63. TQ (November 1952). [BACK]

64. MMKT, vol. 2, 385–432. [BACK]

65. Yohanan Friedmann, Prophecy Continuous: Aspects of Ahmadi Religious Thought and Its Medieval Background (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1989), 37. [BACK]

66. U. S. Embassy, Karachi, disp. #1882, 6/21/1951, 790D.00/6–2151, NA. [BACK]

67. U. S. Embassy, Karachi, disp. #1103, 1/27/1951, 790D.001/1–2750, 2, NA. [BACK]

68. Nur, From Martial Law, 315–16, and Jalal, State of Martial Rule, 144–51. [BACK]

69. U. S. Consulate General Lahore, disp. #146, 2/27/1952, 790D.00/2–2752, NA. [BACK]

70. Malik Ghulam ‘Ali, “Professor Mawdudi ke Sath Sath Islamiyah College Se Zaildar Park Tak,” in HRZ, 123–24. [BACK]

71. SAAM, vol. 1, 441. [BACK]

72. U. S. Embassy Karachi, disp. #59, 7/17/1952, 790D.00/7–1752, NA. [BACK]

73. U. S. Consulate General, Lahore, disp. #3, 7/14/1952, 790D.00/6–1452; U. S. Embassy, Karachi, disp. #591, 12/11/1952, 790D.00/12/1152, NA. [BACK]

74. Daultana’s financial and logistical support for the Ahrar and his direct role in precipitating the crisis in Punjab are detailed in reports of U. S. and British diplomats; see U. S. Consulate General, Lahore, disp. #41, 10/1/1953, 790D.00/10–153, and disp. #58, 11/19/1953, 790D.00/11–1953, NA; and U. K. Deputy High Commissioner, Lahore, disp. #23/53, 11/17/1953, DO35/5296, PRO. [BACK]

75. U. S. Consulate General, Lahore, disp. #10, 7/28/1952, 790D.00/7–2852, NA. [BACK]

76. Jalal, State of Martial Rule, 153. [BACK]

77. U. S. Consulate General, Lahore, disp. #12, 7/31/1952, 790D.00/7–3152, NA. [BACK]

78. U. S. Consulate General, Lahore, disp. #17, 8/4/1952, 790D.00/8–452, NA. [BACK]

79. Binder, Religion and Politics, 294. [BACK]

80. Mawlana Abu’l-Hasanat, the president of the majlis-i ‘amal, told the Court of Inquiry of Justice Munir that Nazimu’ddin had intimated to the majlis that if Zafaru’llah Khan was dismissed “Pakistan would not get one grain of American wheat”; U. S. Consulate General, Lahore, disp. #41, 10/1/1953, 790D.00/10–153, NA. Similar views were also expressed by the Ahrar leader Taju’ddin Ansari, who said Nazimu’ddin had sympathized with their cause, but argued that Zafaru’llah Khan’s presence in the cabinet was essential to receiving wheat from the United States. See U. K. Deputy High Commissioner, Lahore, disp. #20/53, 10/1953, DO35/5296, PRO. Sayyid Amjad ‘Ali, who negotiated the wheat loan from the United States, recollects no such threat on the part of the United States; interview with Sayyid Amjad ‘Ali. [BACK]

81. Report of Court, 50. [BACK]

82. The Jama‘at’s relations with the majlis-i ‘amal were sufficiently ambivalent to implicate the Jama‘at in later court proceedings; see ibid., 69–71: “While Jama‘at’s criticism[s] of acts of violence by agitators were only indirect and veiled, Mawdudi was throughout emitting fire against the Government in a most harsh language.” [BACK]

83. The book was not rounded up by Martial Law authorities until March 23, and in eighteen days it sold fifty-seven thousand copies; SAAM, vol. 2, 32. [BACK]

84. U. K. High Commissioner, Karachi, disp. #405, 3/6/1953, DO35/5326, PRO. [BACK]

85. In his memoirs, unpublished in full to this date, General Mirza takes full responsibility for martial law in Punjab. See General Iskandar Mirza’s “Memoirs,” 52–54 (unpublished manuscript). General Mirza’s claim is confirmed by reports of U. S. and British diplomats; see U. S. Embassy, Karachi, tel. #5258, 4/16/1953, 790D.00/4–1653, and tel. #1913, 4/7/1953, 790D.00/4–753; U. S. Consulate General, Lahore, disp. #71, 1/5/1954, 790D.00/1/454, NA. Also see U. K. High Commissioner, Karachi, disp. #56, 4/18/1953, DO35/5377, PRO.

Other sources detailing the course of events which led to the imposition of Section 92a in Punjab place greater emphasis on the role of the central government and Nazimu’ddin in the events leading to the declaration of martial law. Aware of Daultana’s dealings with the Ahrar, and eager to prevent him from assuming the image of a martyr once the martial law was imposed, the army prevented his resignation. Daultana was forced to negotiate with Nazimu’ddin, and agreed to hand in a letter which explicitly endorsed and supported the army’s direct action. The army even summoned Daultana’s links with the Ahrar to Karachi, indicating that unless the chief minister cooperated in the termination of his political career a case would be made against him and he could face a trial at a later date. The final deal which led to Daultana’s resignation also explains the fact that Justice Munir in his probe into the agitations glossed over the chief minister’s role in the agitations, and then in camera; U. S. Consulate General, Lahore, disp. #159, 3/17/1953, 790D.00/3–1753, NA. Also see U. K. High Commissioner, Karachi, disp. #442, 3/11/1953, DO35/5326, PRO.

One British source has pointed to General A‘zam Khan as the prime mover behind the coup, reporting that “General Azam, who had for the past two days been pressing for authority from Nazimu’ddin but had not been able to get any orders, had taken over (as I understood it), entirely on his own”; U. K. High Commissioner, Karachi, disp. #417, 3/7/1953, DO35/5326, PRO. In light of the foregoing and evidence to the contrary, it is unlikely that A‘zam Khan acted independently. The period March 4–6, during which A‘zam Khan had demanded action, was likely used by General Mirza and Nazimu’ddin to elicit concessions from Daultana. [BACK]

86. The articles were published in February 28 and March 7, 1953, editions of the magazine; see HRZ, 134. [BACK]

87. Ibid. [BACK]

88. Memoirs of General Mirza, 46–48. [BACK]

89. Binder, Religion and Politics, 305. [BACK]

90. Even the uncompromisingly secularist Iskandar Mirza appealed to Islam to bolster his political standing and promote national unity. For instance, during a tour of Pathan tribal areas in October 1957, he lectured the tribes on the importance of Islamic unity; U. S. Consulate General, Lahore, disp. #58, 10/10/1957, 790D.00/10–1057, NA. [BACK]

91. Jalal, State of Martial Rule, 184. [BACK]

92. Cited in U. K. High Commissioner, Karachi, savingram #199, 11/26/1953, DO35/5284, PRO. [BACK]

93. Civil and Military Gazette (July 22, 1952): 1. [BACK]

94. U. S. Consulate General, Lahore, disp. #169, 4/2/1953, 790D.00/4–253, NA. [BACK]

95. U. S. Consulate General, Lahore, disp. #185, 5/7/1953, 790D.00/5–753, NA. [BACK]

96. U. K. High Commissioner, Karachi, savingram #94, 5/13/1953, DO35/5284, PRO. [BACK]

97. U. K. Deputy High Commissioner, Lahore, disp. #10/53, 5/19/1953, DO35/5296, PRO. [BACK]

98. For instance, the Awami League, hardly a friend of the Jama‘at at this time, announced its intention to hold a Mawdudi Day on May 22, 1953, and was thwarted in its efforts only by government pressure; U. S. Consulate, Dacca, disp. #99, 5/28/1953, 790D.00/5–2853; also see U. S. Consulate General, Lahore, disp. #192, 5/31/1953, 790D.00/5–2153, NA. [BACK]

99. Report of the Court, 92, and Abdur Rahman Abd, Sayyed Maududi Faces the Death Sentence (Lahore, 1978), 14–15. [BACK]

100. See Na‘im Siddiqi and Sa‘id Ahmad Malik, Tahqiqat-i ‘Adalat ki Report Par Tabsarah (Lahore, 1955). [BACK]

101. U. S. Embassy, Karachi, tel. #1711, 5/12/1951, 790D.00/5–1253, NA. In an interesting exchange soon after the anti-Ahmadi agitations came to an end, the U. S. Consul reports that Malik Firuz Khan Noon, chief minister of Punjab, asked the American consulate general not to give any money to the Jama‘at should the party ask for it under the pretext of waging an anti-Communist crusade. The chief minister then explained that the consulate should be aware that the Jama‘at was “very dangerous” and that the anti-Ahmadi alliance could be revived to “kill off the Muslim League.” U. S. Consulate General, Lahore, disp. #103, 1/4/1955, 790D.00/1–455, NA. [BACK]

102. Muhammad Munir, From Jinnah to Zia (Lahore, 1979), 55. [BACK]

103. Abu’l-Khayr Mawdudi, who seems to have always taken pleasure in cutting his younger brother’s ego to size, mentions that such Muslim League stalwarts as Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani, Chaudhri Muhammad ‘Ali, and the ousted premier, Nazimu’ddin, had told Mawdudi that he would not be harmed; cited in Ja‘far Qasmi, “Mujhe Yad Hey Sab Se Zara Zara…” in Nida (April 17, 1990): 28–34. Also see Aziz Ahmad, “Mawdudi and Orthodox Fundamentalism in Pakistan,” Middle East Journal 21, 3 (Summer 1967): 369–70, where the author argues that Nazimu’ddin and Chaudhri Muhammad ‘Ali interceded on Mawdudi’s behalf with the authorities, preventing his execution. King Saud of Saudi Arabia, too, intervened on Mawdudi’s behalf with Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad; cited in Sayyid Asad Gilani, Maududi: Thought and Movement (Lahore, 1984), 103–4. After Mawdudi’s sentence was commuted, the Muslim League of Punjab lobbied for his release from prison; U. K. High Commissioner, Karachi, disp. #INT.29/26/4, 5/1/1954, DO35/5405, PRO. [BACK]

104. ‘Abdu’ssattar Niyazi recollects that a section of the army was unhappy with the decision of the military tribunal in Mawdudi’s and Niyazi’s cases; interview with ‘Abdu’ssattar Niyazi in Herald (January 1990): 272. [BACK]

105. For instance, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, the former grand mufti of Palestine, congratulated Mawdudi, which appeared in the press; cited in U. K. Deputy High Commissioner, Lahore, disp. #16/55, 8/8/1955, DO35/5297, PRO. [BACK]

106. Chaudhri Ghulam Muhammad, “Pakistan Main Jumhuri Iqdar ki Baqa Awr Furugh,” Chiragh-i Rah, Tahrik-i Islami Number (November 1963): 211. [BACK]

107. On the Jama‘at’s efforts to assist the petition, see Nawwabzadah Nasru’llah Khan, “Ham Unke, Vuh Hemarah Sath Rahe”, in HRZ, 37. [BACK]

108. On May 22, 1955, the governor-general amended the Emergency Powers Ordinance of 1955 to validate the Constituent Assembly for Pakistan Act of 1949 (expanding and redistributing the seats of the Constituent Assembly). As a result, all acts passed by the Constituent Assembly after 1949, including the Martial Law Indemnity Act of 1953, could be argued to be valid. Prisoners arrested under the Indemnity Act such as Mawdudi had been released when the law had been declared invalid; U. K. High Commissioner, Karachi, disp. #203, 10/31/1955, DO35/5120, PRO. [BACK]

109. U. S. Embassy, Karachi, disp. #767, 5/28/1955, 790D.00/5–2855, and disp. #776, 6/2/1955, 790D.00/6–255, NA. [BACK]

110. Faruqi writes that Chaudhri Muhammad ‘Ali maintained close contact with Mawdudi throughout 1956 and frequently consulted him over the constitutional draft; ‘Abdu’l-Ghani Faruqi, “Hayat-i Javidan,” HRZ, 29. [BACK]

111. U. K. High Commissioner, Karachi, disp. #56, 4/18/1953, DO35/5372, P.3, PRO. [BACK]

112. TQ (January–February 1956): 2–8. [BACK]

113. Nur, From Martial Law, 351–55. [BACK]

114. U. S. Consulate General, Lahore, disp. #159, 1/6/1956, 790D.001–656, NA. [BACK]

115. Letter from I. I. Chundrigar to United Kingdom’s high commissioner, Sir Alexander Symon, dated 1/9/1956, DO35/5119, PRO. [BACK]

116. U. K. High Commissioner, Karachi, confidential memo to Commonwealth Relations Office, London, 10/22/1955, DO35/5119; U. K. High Commission, Karachi, internal memo, 11/30/1955, DO35/5119. Interestingly, although a few months earlier the British had turned down Iskandar Mirza’s request for advice on constitutional matters, this time the high commissioner thought otherwise and sent Chundrigar’s draft constitution to Rowlatt for consideration; letter from U. K. High Commission, Karachi, to Commonwealth Relations Office, London, 9/23/1955, DO35/5119, PRO. [BACK]

117. The vote in the East Pakistan provincial assembly had been 159 to 1; U. K. High Commissioner, Karachi, tel. #1585, 10/2/1956, DO35/5107A, PRO. [BACK]

118. Mawdudi went on a tour of East Pakistan to campaign against joint electorates, hoping to influence the East Pakistan provincial assembly’s decision on the matter; MMKT, vol. 4, 31–32, 66–70, 77–80, 166–79, and 182–83. [BACK]

119. U. S. Embassy, Karachi, disp. #61, 7/27/1956, 790D.00/7–2756, NA. [BACK]

120. In fact, it was the Jama‘at’s successful anti–joint electorates campaign that gave Iskandar Mirza a handle in 1958 to keep Suhrawardi’s challenges to him and the Noon government at bay; U. S. Embassy, Karachi, tel. #1890, 1/31/1958, 790D.00/1–3158, NA. [BACK]

121. Suhrawardi left office on October 11, 1957. His successor, Isma‘il Ibrahim Chundrigar, remained in office until December 16, 1957, and was replaced with Malik Firuz Khan Noon, whose tenure of office extended until October 7, 1958. [BACK]

122. See Mawdudi’s criticisms of General Mirza’s policies in MMKT, vol. 4, 125–32. [BACK]

123. Nasru’llah Khan, “Ham Unke,” 37. [BACK]

124. Cited in U. S. Consulate, Dacca, disp. #247, 4/3/1958, 790D.00/4–358, NA. [BACK]

125. U. S. Embassy, Karachi, disp. #678, 4/10/1958, 790D.00/4–1058, NA. [BACK]

126. U. S. Embassy, Karachi, disp. #939, 4/11/1958, 790D.00/4–1158, NA. [BACK]

127. U. S. Embassy, Karachi, tel. #2708, 5/1/1958, 790D.00/5–158, and disp. #1094, 790D.00/5–2958, NA. [BACK]

128. The Jama‘at, moreover, defeated the Awami League and the National Awami party (with one seat each), both of which were deemed far more powerful than the Jama‘at. The U. S. Embassy attributed the Jama‘at’s success to its good rapport with the Muhajir community, owing to its long history of social work among that community, its good choice of candidates, and the efficiency of its campaign. The Jama‘at, it is reported, spent a total of Rs. 40,000 on the campaign, an average of less than Rs. 2,000 per candidate; U. S. Embassy, Karachi, disp. #1094, 790D.00/5–2958, NA. [BACK]

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Entering the Political Process, 1947–1958
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