previous sub-section
The Bhutto Years, 1971–1977
next chapter


1. Cited in ‘Abdu’l-Ghani Faruqi, “Hayat-i Javidan,” HRZ, 31. [BACK]

2. There was another Attock conspiracy case in 1984. The first coup attempt is therefore often referred to as the first Attock conspiracy case. [BACK]

3. Interview with S. M. Zafar. [BACK]

4. See Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1984), 86–104. [BACK]

5. See Stanley Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times (New York, 1993), 281. [BACK]

6. Interview with ‘Abdu’l-Hafiz Pirzadah. [BACK]

7. Quoted in Khalid B. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change (New York, 1980), 162. Similarly, Stanley Wolpert reports that when in 1977 the director of the Inter-Services Intelligence sent a secret report to Bhutto, informing him of the Jama‘at’s influence in the army’s Multan barracks, the prime minister responded by saying that the Jama‘at was dangerous to the army only because it received General Zia’s “official blessings and respect. ” See Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto, 280–81. [BACK]

8. Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan under Bhutto, 1971–1977 (London, 1980), 53. [BACK]

9. Muhammad Salahu’ddin, Peoples Party: Maqasid Awr Hikmat-i ‘Amali (Karachi, 1982). [BACK]

10. On the importance of this issue in the eventual fall of the Bhutto government, see ‘Abdu’l-Ghafur Ahmad, Pher Martial Law A-Giya (Lahore, 1988), 101. [BACK]

11. ISIT(2), 17. [BACK]

12. Altaf Gauhar, “Pakistan, Ayub Khan Awr Mawlana Mawdudi, Tafhimu’l-Qur’an Awr Main,” HRZ, 42–44. [BACK]

13. Tahir Amin, Ethno-National Movements of Pakistan (Islamabad, 1988), 144–48. [BACK]

14. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, 154. [BACK]

15. Mujibu’l-Rahman Shami, “Jama‘at-i Islami Awr Peoples Party: Fasilah Awr Rabitah, Ik Musalsal Kahani,” Qaumi Digest 11, 2 (July 1988): 13. [BACK]

16. Interview with Kawthar Niyazi. [BACK]

17. ISIT(1), 25; and Rudad-i Jama‘at-i Islami Pakistan, 1972 (Lahore, n.d.), 1–2. [BACK]

18. Interview with Tasnim ‘Alam Manzur, in JVNAT, vol. 2, 297–98. [BACK]

19. Zahid Hussain, “The Campus Mafias,” Herald (October 1988): 56. [BACK]

20. Rudad, 2–3. [BACK]

21. Sarwat Saulat, Maulana Maududi (Karachi, 1979), 85. [BACK]

22. Liaqat Baluch, “Rushaniyun Ka Safar,” TT, vol. 2, 220–21. [BACK]

23. ‘Abdu’l-Shakur, “Jahan-i Tazah ki Takbirin,” TT, vol. 2, 71–72. [BACK]

24. Javid Hashmi, “Ik Jur’at-i Rindanah,” TT, vol. 2, 51–52. [BACK]

25. Rudad, 5. [BACK]

26. Ibid., 6–7. [BACK]

27. Interview with Kawthar Niyazi. [BACK]

28. Interviews with ‘Azizu’ddin Ahmad and Khalid Mahmud. [BACK]

29. Cited in Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto, 206. [BACK]

30. Cited in Saulat, Maulana Maududi, 83–84. [BACK]

31. Rudad, 9–11. [BACK]

32. Chaudhri Ghulam Gilani, “Ik Chatan,” TT, vol. 2, 18–19; and Sajjad Mir, “Wahid-i Shahid,” TT, vol. 2, 60. [BACK]

33. Hashmi, “Ik Jur’at-i Rindanah,” 52–53. [BACK]

34. Rudad, 19–20. [BACK]

35. ISIT(1), 34. [BACK]

36. On Mian Tufayl’s experiences in prison, see Mian Tufayl Muhammad, “General Zia ul-Haq Shaheed,” in Shaheed ul-Islam: Muhammad Zia ul-Haq (London, 1990), 50. [BACK]

37. Ibid. [BACK]

38. ISIT(1), 52, and Kausar Niazi, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan: The Last Days (New Delhi, 1992), 28–32. [BACK]

39. Salim Mansur Khalid, “Talabah Awr Tahrik-i Khatm-i Nubuwwat,” TT, vol. 2, 159–75. [BACK]

40. Abu Sufyan Muhammad Tufayl Rashidi, Tahaffuz-i Khatm-i Nubuwwat Awr Jama‘at-i Islami (Lahore, n.d.), 81–85. [BACK]

41. ISIT(2), 9–10. [BACK]

42. Ibid., 10. [BACK]

43. Ibid., 14. [BACK]

44. Ibid., 15–16. [BACK]

45. Niazi, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, 36–37. [BACK]

46. The nine parties were the Jama‘at-i Islami, Jami‘at-i Ulama Islam, Jami‘at-i Ulama-i Pakistan, Muslim League, Tahrik-i Istiqlal (Freedom Movement), Pakistan Democratic Party, National Democratic Party, Tahrik-i Khaksar, and the Muslim Conference. [BACK]

47. ISIT(2), 25. [BACK]

48. Ahmad, Pher Martial Law, 92–93; and Nizai, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, 70–71. [BACK]

49. Sharif al-Mujahid, “The 1977 Pakistani Elections: An Analysis,” in Manzooruddin Ahmed, ed., Contemporary Pakistan: Politics, Economy, and Society (Karachi, 1980), 73. The Jama‘at was originally given thirty-two tickets by the PNA, but it contested only thirty-one as Jan Muhammad ‘Abbasi was prevented by the government from running in Larkana, Sind. [BACK]

50. The difference between the share of the popular vote between the two contenders was, however, less staggering. The People’s Party won only 58 percent of the popular vote compared with PNA’s 35 percent. For these figures see, Burki, Pakistan, 196. What was contentious was that given the success of the PNA, the People’s Party was clearly less popular than in 1970, yet both its percentage of national votes and seats won to the National Assembly increased markedly, from 39.9 percent to 58 percent and from 81 to 155, respectively; see Mujahid, “The 1977 Elections,” 83–84. [BACK]

51. Ahmad, Pher Martial Law, 122 and 140–52. [BACK]

52. Saulat, Maulana Maududi, 96. [BACK]

53. SAAM, vol. 2, 460–61. [BACK]

54. For instance, in a speech before the parliament on April 28 Bhutto had referred to “the person inflaming the country in the name of Nizam-e-Mustafa, Maulana Maudoodi,” thus attesting to Mawdudi’s pivotal role in the crisis, at least in the People’s Party’s eyes; cited in Niazi, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, 91. [BACK]

55. Interview with Kawthar Niyazi. [BACK]

56. Interview with Begum ‘Abidah Gurmani. [BACK]

57. Ibid. [BACK]

58. Ahmad, Pher Martial Law, 152. [BACK]

59. Ibid., 182. [BACK]

60. Saulat, Maulana Maududi, 98. [BACK]

61. The government side consisted of Bhutto, ‘Abdu’l-Hafiz Pirzadah (minister of law), and Kawthar Niyazi (minister for religious affairs). The PNA was represented by Mufti Mahmud (Jami‘at-i Ulama-i Islam), ‘Abdu’l-Ghafur Ahmad (Jama‘at-i Islami), and Nawwabzadah Nasru’llah Khan (Pakistan Democratic Party). For accounts of these meetings, see Kawthar Niyazi, Awr Line Kat Ga’i (Lahore, 1987); idem,Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto; and Ahmad, Pher Martial Law. [BACK]

62. Niazi, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, 89. [BACK]

63. Ibid., 89–94; for other examples of this allegation see Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto, 277–302. Pakistan’s decision to embark on a nuclear weapons program had created tensions in the relations between the two countries; see, for instance, the alarmist report in U. S. Ambassador, Islamabad, tel. #4065, 4/26/1978, DFTUSED, no. 45, 19. [BACK]

64. Ahmad, Pher Martial Law, 194. [BACK]

65. Most PNA leaders, along with Niyazi and Pirzadah, believe that an agreement was reached; whether or not it would have been signed by all PNA parties or by Bhutto remains open to speculation. Interviews with ‘Abdu’l-Ghafur Ahmad, Sardar Shairbaz Khan Mazari, ‘Abdu’l-Hafiz Pirzadah, Begum Nasim Wali Khan, and Kawthar Niyazi. Pirzadah argues that he and Mufti Mahmud finalized the agreement in the late hours of July 2 and Bhutto was to sign it on July 5. Niyazi too writes that a final accord was reached, and Bhutto had agreed to sign it; Niazi, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, 239–41. Begum Nasim Wali Khan argues that despite the enthusiasm of the negotiating team other PNA leaders had reservations about the agreement, and most were not likely to sign it. Absence of a formal agreement between the government and the PNA was used as an excuse by the armed forces to stage a coup in order to break the dangerous impasse. Those justifying the coup, therefore, argue that no agreement had been reached between the two sides. See, for instance, Lt. General Faiz Ali Chishti, Betrayals of Another Kind: Islam, Democracy, and the Army in Pakistan (Cincinnati, 1990), 66. [BACK]

previous sub-section
The Bhutto Years, 1971–1977
next chapter