1. Included here are expenditures made by the NRC/CRPS and the Committee on Research in Endocrinology, and the private National Committee on Maternal Health. The Carnegie Institution's Department of Embryology is not included, nor is U.S. Department of Agriculture funding for reproductive research. See chapter 7.

2. On what constitutes a case, see Ragin and Becker (1992). See, for example, Becher (1989), Bechtel (1986), Bourdieu (1975), Chubin (1976), Farber (1982a,b), Geison (1978, 1981, 1983), Geison and Holmes (1993), Graham, Lepenies, and Weingart (1983), Hall and Glick (1976), Kohler (1982), Lemaine et al. (1976), Rosenberg (1979b), and Whitley (1976). Many (but not all) of these earlier works have an underlying if not explicit assumption that there is one single explanation that is necessary and sufficient to account for the phenomena of disciplines despite their diversity. Such categorical explanations include economic, sociopolitical, technical/instrumental, or intellectual/theoretical reasons. That is, the need for historical accounts of specific disciplines or areas of study as specific entities goes relatively unquestioned—in some kind of tacit recognition of diversity and the value of case studies. Yet, ironically, some fantasy of generalizability across disciplines simultaneously obtains. The risks, in Pauly's (1993:135) terms, are that "practitioners of systematic comparison are liable either to drown in details or to produce generalizations that are empty." There are, then, limits to the utility of generalization that, however, do not undercut the value of empirical case studies.

3. Clarke (1993) focuses on research on reproduction undertaken at the University of Chicago from about 1910 to 1950. Clarke (1987) discusses the early organization of access to a range of human and nonhuman research materials at the Carnegie Institution of Washington's Department of Embryology at Johns Hopkins Medical School.

4. See, for example, Gossel (1992), Keating, Cambrosio, and Mackenzie (1992), and Fujimura (1996).

5. See Latour and Woolgar (1979/1986), Latour (1983, 1987, 1988), Callon (1985, 1995), and Law (1980, 1991). For critical comment on actor network theory, see Shapin (1988), Amsterdamska (1990), Fujimura (1992), Star (1991), Sturdy (1993), and Collins and Yearley (1992).

6. On "mattering," see Butler (1993) and Rabinow (1992). Attributed meanings and consequentialities make a difference.

7. See Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch (1987), Woolgar (1991), and Bijker and Law (1992).

8. Sturdy (1993:372) has a distinctive view of the British case and the general processes: "From the beginning, medical chemists ignored established boundaries, not just between scientific disciplines, but also between pure and applied science, and above all between laboratory science and the practice of medicine. ... Medical chemistry thus represented, in effect, a new scientific formation which broke with older forms of disciplinary organization ... which begs explanation." Cf. Kohler (1982).

9. On women as reproductive scientists, see Price (1967, 1972, 1975), Hyman (1957), Hyman and Hutchinson (1991), the oral history of ecologist Thomas Park in the Special Collections of the Regenstein Library, University of Chicago, and Hall (1974). After World War II, many more women went into the reproductive sciences. See, for example, Schwartz (1984) and Greep and associates (1976, 1977).

10. See Schiebinger (1987, 1989, 1993), Laqueur (1987, 1990), Oudshoorn (1994), and Long (1997). However, both rhetorics have been simultaneously available for deployment.

11. Thanks again to the late Anselm Strauss, whom I will always picture in our qualitative analysis seminar staring over the tops of his glasses and gently saying, "So, tell me, what is this a story of?" A dozen years later I begin to grasp the subtleties of this intervention.

12. See Kohler (1976, 1978, 1991) on "partnerships." Cf. Abir-Am (1982, 1985, 1993), Arnove (1980), Cueto (1994), Fisher (1990), Kay (1993a,b), and Morawski (1986).

13. Exerpted from the Report of the (Foundation) Committee on Appraisal and Plan, Dec. 11, 1934, pp. 42-43, quoted by Kay (1993b:48).

14. See Pressman (1991:14-15, 20) and Morawski (1986).

15. Much of the work on historical and contemporary eugenics movements centers on control over heredity. See, for example, Allen (1986), Kevles (1985), Ludmerer (1972), Haller (1963), and Reilly (1991). Certainly control over reproduction is implicated in concerns with heredity in evolutionary theory, although it is often rendered invisible (Lloyd 1993; Keller 1987; Griesemer forthcoming).

16. See letter to Frank R. Lillie from Warren Weaver, 6 October 1933. RAC RF RG1.1 S216d B8 F105.

17. See Program in Experimental Biology, 17 April 1935, RAC RF RG1.1 S216 B8 F103.

18. On biomedicalization, see Zola (1976), Conrad and Schneider (1980), Riessman (1983), Estes and Binney (1989), and Clarke and Olesen (1998).

19. See Martin (1987/1992:37), who discusses Frederick T. Gates's metaphors of the body as model of industrial society. Gates was a key adviser on medical philanthropy of John D. Rockefeller. On psychiatry, see Pressman (1991, 1997).

20. Folbre's (1994) recent book addresses problems in economic theory, which does not take reproduction into account. There are multiple possible sites and modes of intervention to control life: educational, environmental, hereditary, biological, psychological, social, and so on. Some are meliorist, and others, such as gene therapy (e.g., Culver 1994), are transformative of life itself.

21. Rabinow (1992:241) argues that eugenics projects were not directly within scientific practices: "They were never dans le vrai to use George Canguilhem's telling phrase." Perhaps not entirely, although I can see them as such. But the reproductive sciences were, and therein lie the concrete practices of eugenics. On the Human Genome Initiative, see Hilgartner (1995).