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Chapter 7 Legal Concerns Facing the Industry
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Strategies To Defeat Government Regulation

As the threat of government regulation of tobacco increased on several fronts, the tobacco industry developed several strategies for counteracting government action. The principal strategy was simply to create as much controversy as possible over the link between smoking and disease (see chapter 8). Beyond this, the industry also developed specific meth-


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ods for minimizing the impact of legislation aimed at smoking itself (such as the requirements for warning labels and the disclosure of the tar and nicotine content of cigarettes) and legislation aimed at limiting smoking in public places and the workplace.

In 1976 Ernest Pepples, B&W's vice president and general counsel, composed a long, thoughtful analysis of the smoking and health controversy, entitled "Industry Response to the Cigarette/Health Controversy." Pepples begins by noting the means by which the industry has coped with the smoking and health controversy:

The tobacco industry has reacted to the challenge of the smoking and health controversy in the following ways:

 

(1)

Produce more filter brands with lower tar delivery.

(2)

Support scientific research to refute unfavorable findings or at a minimum to keep the scientific question open.

(3)

Conduct information campaigns against claims by the anti-smoking lobby.

(4)

Voluntarily meet some of the demands of the anti-smoking lobby, such as agreeing to publish the FTC ratings on tar and nicotine in cigarette advertising.

(5)

Corporate diversification to minimize the potential adverse financial consequences of the controversy on cigarette sales [emphasis added]. {2205.01, p. 1}

The fact that Pepples regarded filters and low tar as responses to the "smoking and health controversy" (item 1) contrasts with the industry's public stance that these innovations were made in response to "consumer demand" and had nothing to do with health. This memo is an explicit acknowledgment that these things did have everything to do with health. Tying the two together leads to the conclusion that filters and low tar have to do with health concerns of consumers, and to the extent that the innovations allayed concern without providing protection, they are public relations devices for a public health problem.

Pepples then spells out the role of the Tobacco Institute, the industry's trade organization, and the Council for Tobacco Research (CTR), the entity established by the industry purportedly to do independent scientific research on the health effects of smoking (see chapter 2):

The Tobacco Institute, founded in 1958, has been the focal point for criticism of research that indicates a connection between smoking and health. The Institute has attempted to keep the opposition honest. It has carefully scrutinized the sampling difficulties and statistical deficiencies in the studies which allegedly indicate correlations between smoking and disease. The Institute


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also has vigorously opposed governmental control of the marketing of cigarettes. This rearguard action has bought time in which the companies could adapt to the challenge, i.e. change themselves (through diversification) and change their products.

The Council for Tobacco Research (CTR) has dispersed over $26 million through 1973. During the past 20 years the industry has committed more than $50 million to scientific research related to tobacco and health. In December 1972, five cigarette companies including Brown & Williamson gave a $2.8 million grant to the Harvard Medical School for a 5-year investigation of any specific effects cigarette smoke may have in the development of lung and heart diseases. In 1967, over $12 million was spent in the United States on smoking and health research. In 1968, the figure increased to over $15 million.

The significant expenditures on the question of smoking and health have allowed the industry to take a respectable stand along the following lines—

"After millions of dollars and over twenty years of research, the question about smoking and health is still open " [emphasis added]. {2205.01, pp. 1–2}

Pepples viewed CTR as a means of keeping the "controversy" alive, although the industry maintained publicly that CTR was an independent organization whose purpose was to determine whether smoking is causally linked to disease. In essence, therefore, the industry was spending millions of dollars on research so that it could make the single statement that "the question about smoking and health is still open."

The Tobacco Institute also was used for the purpose of prolonging the "controversy." The instructions for B&W's document review project show that the lawyers were sensitive to this issue:

Documents discussing or containing public statements made by TI [the Tobacco Institute] in its role as spokesman for the tobacco industry. Pay special attention to documents suggesting that TI was used as a vehicle for the industry's alleged conspiracy to promote cigarettes through the "open controversy" PR program; that industry-sponsored smoking and health research was used for PR; or that the industry monitored governmental expenditures on research to make certain the industry outspent the government on research [emphasis added]. (1001.01, p. 32}

In "Industry Response to the Cigarette/Health Controversy," Pepples also discusses the strategy of preemption.

The tobacco industry wanted to prevent the chaos of nonuniform state and local regulation such as affects the alcohol industry. To gain one crucial costsaving objective, uniform regulation, the industry compromised by adding a health warning to the cigarette package. Another critic noted that "the label might even be a boon of sorts, providing a new defense for the industry" when


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new health suits were brought by persons claiming to have been injured by cigarette smoking.

The broadcast ban which was enacted by Congress in 1969 called for the elimination of all TV and radio cigarette advertising after January 1, 1971 as well as strengthening the cautionary statement. The bill extended the preemption of state and/or local health regulation until June 1971. The tobacco industry did not oppose the 1969 or the 1965 enactments [requiring warning labels on cigarettes] which were in some ways victories [emphasis added]. {2205.01, p. 6}

Indeed, the tobacco industry testified in favor of the federal broadcast ban on cigarette advertising in July 1969.

Pepples concludes his 1976 analysis with a discussion of the implications for the tobacco industry of the disjointed nature of the federal government's regulatory authorities:

Some Conclusions and Observations

The foregoing discussion illustrates that the federated nature of the U.S. political system and the fragmentation of governmental authority and administrative responsibility are important in determining the type of governmental response.

The Congress is not staffed adequately nor is it properly structured to deal on a comprehensive basis with the medical aspects of the smoking controversy.

The independent regulatory bodies in the United States have been established to accomplish government regulation in technical areas. The FTC [Federal Trade Commission], FCC [Federal Communications Commission] and FCPSC [Federal Consumer Product Safety Commission] have been on very doubtful statutory ground in treating the smoking/health issue. They have been slowed by the limits in the procedures found in their statutory charter. As a result broad consideration of the smoking/health problem has been made difficult. Compared with public agencies in other countries they have been relatively free, however, to respond to the problem.

The FTC and FCC actions in this area have been unexpected and precedent-setting. They have mainly stemmed from the efforts of individual personalities. While the agencies have taken a high profile attitude, they have not had the power to act on issues of this type which lie outside their expertise and outside their legislative mandates. Congress has not extended their mandates to deal with the smoking/health problem and in fact has expressly prevented proposed agency actions from taking effect. In addition to the FTC, FCC and FCPSC the Departments of Agriculture, Treasury and Health, Education and Welfare have all dealt with portions of the total picture. A disjointed nature of governmental response has been augmented by the multiplicity of possible places where the action could occur [emphasis added]. {2205.01, pp. 6–7}

Pepples is saying, in effect, that Congress should not play a major role in tobacco control but should leave it up to an agency that is properly


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structured. When discussing potential regulatory agencies, he does not mention the FDA.

Pepples continues:

Each agency is affected by interest group pressures that oppose compromise and cooperation with its opponents. For example, U.S. tobacco price supports and export subsidies are two programs (the latter begun after the Surgeon General's Report) that have been criticized as being in direct conflict with the government's smoking and health program. Also in Britain the Exchequer has been notably reluctant to give up tobacco taxes from cigarette smokers.

The oversight by Congress of its departments is not effective in resolving differences between departments. Each pressure group struggles to define the issue in its own terms so that the goals and actions of government will be congruent with its desires. The Treasury has sought to collect revenues, Agriculture has sought to maintain and increase employment, income and productivity of farmers while the health interests have sought to reduce disease. The antismoking forces were able to gain a foothold in the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration], FCC and FTC and in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. The fact that one hand of the government does one thing and another hand does something quite different reflects the division of authority and responsibility which has made each agency vulnerable to the narrow interests of particular pressure groups [emphasis added]. {2205.01, p. 7}

There is a certain irony in Pepples's complaint about the multitude of government agencies involved in regulating tobacco and their disjointed efforts. Had a single federal agency been given the power to regulate tobacco in a comprehensive manner, its coordinated approach might well have resulted in much stricter control of tobacco. Had regulation been consistent, we would not have had federal price supports for tobacco growers, and tobacco exports would not have been subsidized under the Food for Peace program along with programs to discourage smoking.

Pepples continues,

Smoking and health as a political issue has been unpopular with all but a few politicians regardless of political party persuasions or country. Not only have strong economic interest groups opposed government action but a substantial portion of adult population indulge in the habit and derive significant pleasure from the use of the product. While it is reasonable to assume that the public desires good health, it is not reasonable to assume that the public at large and especially the cigarette smoking public is favorable toward antismoking measures that entail giving up the pleasures of smoking. {2205.01, p. 7}

These views were supported by decades of experience. However, not long after this paper was written, some politicians, particularly at the local level, began to take up the cause of nonsmokers' rights and to react favorably to the idea of restrictions on public smoking.


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Pepples, moreover, miscalculated the reaction of smokers to restrictions on public smoking. Polls over the past twenty years have consistently shown majority support among smokers for such restrictions. Many smokers view limitations on smoking as a way to help them quit, or at least reduce their consumption, and many also understand the need to control tobacco smoke pollution for the sake of others.

Pepples next discusses the impact of the efforts to regulate cigarette advertising on cigarette consumption:

So far government efforts to regulate cigarette advertising have constituted the main thrust of government concern and the aggressive antismoking lobby is highly dissatisfied with the impact such efforts have had on total consumption. (The following page [not in the documents] shows in chart form the general upward trend in cigarette sales but suggests a significant loss of volume due to political factors.) The reduction in cigarette advertising seems to have made the industry stronger economically. Profits have increased. The ban on television and other broadcast advertising does not seem to have reduced consumption. The concomitant reduction in the number of anti-cigarette commercials is considered to be a severe loss in the effort to keep public concern and awareness of the controversy at a fever pitch [emphasis added]. {2205.01, p. 8}

Pepples then specifies the legitimate government role in regulating tobacco as a public health problem.

Like the meat industry [because of muckrakers who demanded USDA regulation early in the century] and recently the automobile industry [because of Ralph Nader], tobacco products are now coming under close scrutiny and governments are attempting to establish control over the products, as opposed to merely the advertising, to protect the public .

The warnings, the tar and nicotine ratings and the anti-cigarette commercials were all part of the effort to educate children and cigarette consumers not to smoke. Implicit in the policy of education is the idea that the consumers should make the basic decision and will make the "right" decision, provided they are given "more knowledge." In short, inform the public, and rely on an informed public to change the pattern of consumption. The government has not yet intervened directly to change the content of the product or limit its use. The protection of nonsmokers also has become an important and growing focus of the antismoking lobby with the announced purpose of making cigarette smoking an unacceptable social custom which they compare to spitting . At least 26 bills have been added to some 70 antismoking proposals in state legislatures for action in 1976, involving 26 states. Characteristically these measures would restrict the places where smoking may lawfully occur.

It is clear, however, that many anti-cigarette zealots and some public officials believe that the responsibility of the government does not end with merely warning the public of the hazards. They advocate direct intervention. Senators [Edward] Kennedy (D-MA) and [Gary] Hart [D-CO] recently [in


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1976] proposed a health research bill to be financed by a tax related to the tar and nicotine content of cigarettes. At about the same time, the British Minister of Health announced on national television that he intended to lay an order before Parliament bringing additives and substitutes under the Medicines Act, which order must be approved by resolution of each House.

The tobacco industry, of course, would prefer no regulation at all. If there must be regulation, the industry is probably better off to have it at the federal level than be forced to fight off a multitude of nonuniform regulatory efforts at the state, county and town levels. Even expanded regulatory efforts may be shaped by the industry to enhance stability in the market or by individual manufacturers to bolster market positions—for example, by capitalizing on official tar and nicotine ratings in cigarette advertising.

The manufacturers' marketing strategy has been to overcome and even to make marketing use of the smoking/health connection. Individual tobacco companies have benefited from government actions. Thus the "tar derby" in the United States resulted from industry efforts to cater to the public's concern and to attract consumers to the new filtered brands. The heavy use of television in the introduction of WINCHESTER [a cigarette-like little cigar made by R. J. Reynolds] represented a bald exploitation of the little cigar loophole in the broadcast ban law. The current duel between TRUE and VANTAGE and between CARLTON and NOW are other examples of competitive efforts to capitalize on the smoking/health controversy.

Market conditions are important in determining company response. In a rapidly changing cigarette market, it is difficult to obtain industry cooperation because cooperation tends to affect individual firms unevenly [emphasis added]. {2205.01, pp. 8–9}

In effect, preemption allowed the industry to accept certain defeats, while at the same time limiting the damage. Indeed, as Pepples noted, the radio and television advertising ban, which might have appeared at first to be a crippling blow to the industry, actually turned into an unforeseen advantage. As important as preemption was to the industry with respect to the issues discussed by Pepples in 1976, it was to become an even more crucial tactic for the industry in its battle against legislation regulating environmental tobacco smoke. In that battle the industry has focused on passing weak laws at the state level (where the industry has great political clout) that preempt stronger ordinances passed by cities and counties (where industry influence is relatively weak).


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Chapter 7 Legal Concerns Facing the Industry
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