Using Cigarette Ads to Counter Health Information

In August 1969 J. W. Burgard wrote to R. A. Pittman, B&W's senior marketing supervisor, requesting that he

undertake a special assignment of drawing up a proposed campaign, to be conducted by B&W, which would bring the industry side of the smoking and health controversy to the attention of the general public ...

It will ... be necessary to work closely with the brand managers and the agencies to marry such a campaign with product advertising. It goes

without saying that each step of this must be thoroughly researched and you will need to call upon the Market Research Department for help in this area. {2111.02, p. 1}

This campaign was to be quite different from Project Truth, which involved straight political advertising aimed at opinion leaders. These ads were to be aimed at the general public and would attempt to associate specific cigarette brands with the message that smoking is not dangerous. The first ad, for Kool cigarettes, included a statement on "the other side of the smoking and health controversy" from a white paper {2111.02, p. 5}. Philip Morris used a similar approach in 1994 and 1995 as a way of protesting restrictions on smoking in enclosed workplaces and public places. In an advertising campaign for Benson & Hedges cigarettes, various ads depicted smokers on an airplane wing, smokers at their desks high up on the outside walls of tall office buildings, and smokers in a convertible taxi. The political message was "Smokers have to fight for indoor smoking areas."

In his memo on the proposed campaign, Burgard instructs Pittman:

I think you should approach this the same as if we were introducing a new brand on the market. You must first develop the product and sell the idea to corporate management, and after it is thoroughly researched submit a specific campaign for approval. What we are contemplating is novel, and the management of the company is going to have to be assured that it is the right thing to do. Certainly, the work done with the initial KOOL ad is an important first step, but when the findings of this research are presented you should be prepared with a recommendation as to the next steps that we should take in development and testing.

I would like to emphasize that, in my opinion, we must confine our campaign to the smoking and health issue and not be drawn into any other aspects such as the economic results, the legality, the unfairness, etc. If this campaign is effective, it will immediately draw fire, and we cannot bear to have in our ads or in our literature a single word that cannot be thoroughly documented. {2111.02, pp. 1–2}

Burgard then spells out the objectives for this campaign:

It is interesting to note how these goals, in particular "lift[ing] the cigarette from the cancer identification as quickly as possible," are completely at odds with the quest for a less dangerous cigarette, which had been a major research and development priority for years (see chapter 4). Burgard had direct line authority over research and development at B&W. Meanwhile, the company's parent, BAT (in its laboratories in England and in Germany), was working on technical approaches to reducing the toxicity of cigarettes while at the public level it, too, was pressing forward with disinformation campaigns questioning the health dangers of smoking.

The sequence numbers on the memo from Burgard to Pittman indicate that it was filed in conjunction with another document, titled "Smoking and Health Proposal," which contains the text of a presentation on "a proposal ... for a B&W project to counter the anti-cigarette forces" {2111.01}. The proposal being discussed is the same one suggested in the Burgard memo. Although the document is undated, the context of the discussion places it around 1969, when the Burgard memo was written. The initials "JVB" (most likely those of J. V. Blalock, B&W's director of public relations) and "CM" (probably those of Corny Muije, position unknown, who is referred to in the document) appear in the margin on the first page. Evidently Blalock and Muije made a joint presentation to someone in the company. After summarizing the status of the anti-cigarette activities, the speaker notes that the anti-cigarette forces are better organized and more efficient than the tobacco industry:

I think the anti-cigarette forces can be characterized as dedicated opportunists. They are quick to act and seem to be totally unprincipled in the type of information they use to attack the industry.

The pro [tobacco] forces, on the other hand, and I'm speaking primarily of the Tobacco Institute, seem to be slow to act, mainly defensive, and rather narrow in the area of defense. The Tobacco Institute has probably done a good job for us in the area of politics and as an industry we also seem to have done very well in turning out scientific information to counter the anti-smoking claims. There is no question, though, that we have been inept in getting out side of the story, good though it may be, across to the news media and to the public. {2111.01, p. 2}

Following a discussion of the justification for the project, the speaker indicates that he views the problem as a marketing one. Thus, the project was designed to sell B&W's side of the smoking and health issue just as the company would sell a new brand of cigarettes. And, as the text of the document indicates, the project was clearly designed to confuse the general public about the scientific evidence on smoking and health.

In thinking over what we might do to improve the case for cigarettes, I have looked at the problem somewhat like the marketing of a new brand. Here is a chart where I have defined the basic marketing elements which I see in the smoking and health problem. Our consumer I have defined as the mass public, our product as doubt, our message as truth—well stated, and our competition as the body of anti-cigarette fact that exists in the public mind [emphasis added]. {2111.01, pp. 3, 4}

It seems rather curious that the speaker would suggest selling doubt with a message of truth, but he sheds some light on the rationale in the course of explaining why he has so defined the consumer, the product, and the message:

We have chosen the mass public as our consumer for several reasons:

This is where the misinformation about smoking and health has been focused.

The Congress and federal agencies are already being dealt with—and perhaps as effectively as possible—by the Tobacco Institute.

It is a group with little exposure to the positive side of smoking and health.

It is the prime force in influencing Congress and federal agencies—without public support little effort would be given to a crusade against cigarettes.

...

Doubt is our product since it is the best means of competing with the "body of fact" that exists in the mind of the general public. It is also the means of

establishing a controversy. Within the business we recognize that a controversy exists. However, with the general public the consensus is that cigarettes are in some way harmful to the health. If we are successful in establishing a controversy at the public level, then there is an opportunity to put across the real facts about smoking and health. Doubt is also the limit of our "product." Unfortunately, we cannot take a position directly opposing the anti-cigarette forces and say that cigarettes are a contributor to good health. No information that we have supports such a claim .

Truth is our message because of its power to withstand a conflict and sustain a controversy. If in our pro-cigarette efforts we stick to well documented fact , we can dominate a controversy and operate with the confidence of justifiable self-interest [italic emphasis added]. {2111.01, pp. 4, 5}

Thus, this project was to be a classic example of the tobacco industry's attempts to instill in the public mind the notion that there is a controversy surrounding the scientific evidence about cigarettes and health so that further government regulation would be prevented. The speaker does not suggest that the industry has sufficient facts on its side to refute the evidence on the other side, nor does he believe that is necessary to accomplish B&W's main purpose. According to the speaker, B&W merely has to sell a sufficient amount of doubt about the scientific evidence to establish a controversy; it can then disseminate a sufficient amount of "truth" to sustain a controversy.

The speaker then discusses the potential for using brand advertisements to convey a political message:

We have seen research this morning which indicates that there is at least a potential for using our own ads to communicate the other side of the cigarette story. Before putting this type effort into practice, however, we would want to be absolutely certain that there is no damage to our advertising or to the consumer acceptance of our brands. So the first step for the immediate future would be research. We are recommending basic research to unearth specific problems in smoking and health that we can deal directly with. {2111.01, p. 5}

This effort was part of an organized campaign that was carefully researched and designed by Corny Muije, who describes the research that was needed:

What was shown today specifically demonstrates what happened when a certain type of information was supplied with the KOOL Adios II ad.

Indications are that the KOOL copy effectiveness was enhanced. We need more evidence that this is true. Furthermore, we need to establish whether this solely hinges on the Adios II ad and the specific body copy used.

Also, is this an effective approach when the information is supplied with ads for VICEROY, RALEIGH , and BELAIR ? {2111.01, p. 6}

After noting that there will be two phases to the research program, Muije continues:

It is essential that we ascertain which type of anti-cigarette information has most affected the smoking public. What claimed health hazards are currently accepted by the general public.

A general survey with detailed questioning shoud establish this. During Phase II we should also investigate consumer reaction to at least three distinct anti-cigarette approaches. In addition, consumer reactions to maybe a dozen specific anti-cigarette claims could be probed.

The purpose of Phase II is to establish which past information and which current anti-cigarette claims are most damaging. From this we should learn which information should be of greatest interest to the public. We could then tailor our efforts more precisely to achieve the greatest effect [emphasis added]. {2111.01, pp. 6–7}

This discussion suggests that B&W was not so much interested in the actual scientific evidence about smoking and health as it was in the public perception of the evidence. Once the company could ascertain what the public believed, it could then tailor its own public relations efforts to help smokers rationalize their behavior.

After estimating the costs of the second phase of the research, Muije introduces Phase III, test marketing:

None of the research, up to this point, will have let us know the effect of sustained repeated exposure of B&W cigarette ads with body copy of different content.

Prior to a nation-wide commitment, one or more test markets would be called for.

At this point it is impossible to say whether one or more test markets would be desirable.

Regardless, in each instance we recommend that a consumer survey be conducted prior to the start of the test market and another one at the end of the test market.

A comparison of the pre and post surveys will enable us to evaluate the effect of the total campaign. {2111.01, pp. 7–8}

At this point another speaker, probably Blalock again, replaces Muije:

We would like to have the Executive Committee's approval to initiate the research program that Corny has just explained and at the same time to start a task force study of the smoking and health question and develop a detailed plan of action for B&W.

Such a plan would cover:

Sources of information about smoking and health.

The selection and clearance of information to be used by B&W.

The development of new information about smoking and health.

Means of anticipating and countering the release of misinformation.

Channels other than our own advertising for getting messages to the public.

Ways to use and perhaps focus industry efforts in support of our own program.

Agency participation in the program.

Internal administration and implementation of the program.

Thorough evaluation of potential advantages and disadvantages of public action on B&W and its brands. {2111.01, pp. 8–9}

It is not clear from the documents whether this program moved beyond the concept, design, and test market stages. However, it is clear B&W was actively researching why people believed that smoking is dangerous and was trying to develop specific counterstrategies to allay the fears of the general public. This activity came at a time when public health officials were calling for stronger warnings and a ban on television and radio advertising for tobacco; when anti-cigarette television ads, ordered by the Federal Communications Commission, were reducing cigarette consumption (16); and when discussions that would lead to modestly strengthened warnings on cigarette packages were under way (4).