Resisting Government Regulation: Advertising Campaigns

The documents describe several advertising campaigns planned by B&W and other tobacco companies in 1969 and 1970 to counter the increasing threat of government regulation. The first of these campaigns, developed by B&W, was Project Truth, which contained purely political material. Although it was aimed at the public generally, it was intended primarily to influence opinion leaders. Another campaign developed by B&W included political and health messages along with brand advertising. A third campaign, proposed by R. J. Reynolds, and intended to include the participation of all the major cigarette companies, involved the production of a series of spots to be used on prime-time network television. Still another television campaign, intended as an alternative to the R. J. Reynolds idea, was proposed by B&W's advertising agency. Although these campaigns were diverse in design, they had in common the industry's desire to go directly to the public in order to defend itself against the growing body of scientific evidence demonstrating the dangers of smoking.

Project Truth

In late 1969, at the same time that Brown and Williamson's internal scientific staff was working to reduce the toxicity of cigarettes, its advertising agency, Post-Keyes-Gardner, was developing copy for Project Truth, highlighting themes designed to undercut the scientific evidence

that smoking is dangerous. In contrast to the original "Frank Statement" advertisement in 1954, which announced the creation of TIRC and asserted a commitment to a scientific investigation of smoking, the Project Truth advertisements shifted from science to the "rights" arguments.

This advertising campaign was designed to equate any attack on the tobacco industry with an attack on freedom itself. The intent was to create a public backlash against criticism of the tobacco industry by instilling the fear that regulation of the industry would deprive smokers of their individual rights and deprive the industry of its right to operate freely in the marketplace. Rather than focusing on the reality of a powerful industry fending off the feeble attempts of an overmatched government to put some restraints on its sale of a dangerous and addictive product, the ads portrayed the industry as beleaguered and struggling to protect everyone's freedom against an overbearing government. Themes similar to the ones used in this advertising campaign continue to be used by the industry, most notably in its response to the regulation of smoking in the workplace and public places.

The excerpts quoted below are strikingly similar to much of the industry's advertising in the mid-1990s. For example, the industry continues to use hyperbolic language, such as "malicious" and "lynched," to describe government efforts to regulate tobacco use, and it continues to play on the fear that if these efforts succeed, similar efforts could be directed elsewhere. Also, the industry continues to compare proof of the health dangers of smoking with trivial matters, as a way of detracting from the seriousness of the issue. And many of the "buzzwords"—such as "scare-tactics," "freedom," "legal product," "truth," "free speech," "fair play," and "free and responsible enterprise"—are constantly used today in the industry's public relations efforts.

HEAD : Who's next?

COPY : The cigarette industry is being maliciously, systematically lynched. Who is to say it won't happen elsewhere?

As an advertising agency, we view the problem subjectively because we're proud to represent the Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation. Yet we view the problem objectively, because we're alarmed to witness the lynching of free speech in the marketplace and the American system of free enterprise.

Ten years ago, there was a cancer scare over the wax in milk cartons. And over using iodine to get a suntan. These theories were about as valid as the one that says toads cause warts.

And they're about as valid as today's scare-tactics surrounding cigarettes. Because no one has been able to produce conclusive proof that cigarette smoking causes cancer . Scientific, biological, clinical, or any other kind.

It's more than cigarettes being challenged here. It's freedom.

We will continue to bring to the American people the story of the cigarette and any other legal product based upon truth and taste.

We believe that free speech and fair play are both the heritage and promise in our society of free and responsible enterprise [emphasis in original]. {2110.01}

Twelve years before this statement was written, and five years before the Royal College of Physicians issued its first report, the eminent British statistician Sir Ronald A. Fisher, writing as a consultant to the Tobacco Manufacturers' Standing Committee in the United Kingdom, declared that the association between smoking and lung cancer was unequivocally proven (11). Fisher made a sharp distinction between association and causation. All that remained to be worked out, in his view, was the nature of the relationship. Do cigarettes cause lung cancer? Does lung cancer cause smoking? (Sir Ronald did not think this possible and dismissed it.) Does some third factor lead to both smoking and to lung cancer? Sir Ronald asserted that the obvious conclusion could not be reached until this last possibility had been thoroughly studied and either affirmed or negated. He proposed that genetics, one's constitution, might explain a predilection to smoking and to lung cancer. For the next thirty years, the tobacco industry contrived to fashion this wisp of a hypothesis, the "constitutional hypothesis," into the whole cloth of a scientific controversy (12). The effort never had much credibility, but it permitted the industry and its allies to make loud protestations about the lack of "conclusive proof." Of course, since one cannot conclusively prove a negative, there is always a way to argue in favor of the constitutional hypothesis, regardless of how much evidence piles up in favor of the conventional way of thinking. Those who want to believe that smoking does not cause cancer then have something to believe in.

This campaign was also to include a challenge to the scientific community to "prove" that scientific evidence supports the link between smoking and disease. The back cover of a proposed ten-page booklet, The Truth , would read:

ONE MILLION DOLLAR OFFER

For 20 years, the cigarette industry has remained silent while its product has been viciously, maliciously, unjustifiably attacked.

Despite the claims of anti-cigarette forces, no one has produced conclusive proof that cigarettes cause cancer. Biologically, scientifically, clinically or otherwise.

We will pay one million dollars in cash to any individual, group, organization, or government source who can prove scientifically, beyond all doubt, that cigarettes cause cancer during the next 12 months.

A panel of eminent physicians and scientists will be appointed by Johns Hopkins Medical School to determine the conclusiveness of any claims submitted. {2110.03}

Since it is impossible to prove anything "beyond all doubt," there was little risk that the million dollars would actually be awarded.

Two years later, in 1971, B&W put together a twenty-eight-page briefing paper for its hometown newspapers, the Louisville Courier-Journal and the Louisville Times , title "The Smoking/Health Controversy: A View from the Other Side" {2110.06}. The arguments are demonstrably false (11, 13–15), yet they were presented as "Project Truth" to the local newspapers. The contrast between the public posture and the private policies of the company is most vividly illustrated by the statement made in Project Truth about the validity of mouse skin–painting experiments.

Much of the experimental work involves mouse-painting or animal smoke inhalation experiments. In mouse-painting, smoke condensates are painted or dropped on the backs of mice, and cancerous skin tumors have been produced in this manner.

However, these condensates are artificially produced under laboratory conditions and, as such, have little, if any, relation to cigarette smoke as it reaches the smoker . Further, the results obtained on the skin of mice should not be extrapolated to the lung tissue of the mouse, or to any other animal species. Certainly such skin results should not be extrapolated to the human lung [emphasis in original]. {2110.06, pp. 6–7}

As discussed in chapter 4, B&W had made cigarette product design decisions based on precisely this animal model since the mid-1960s. At the time, mouse skin painting was the standard the industry used for testing tobacco smoke condensate for carcinogenicity.

Using Cigarette Ads to Counter Health Information

In August 1969 J. W. Burgard wrote to R. A. Pittman, B&W's senior marketing supervisor, requesting that he

undertake a special assignment of drawing up a proposed campaign, to be conducted by B&W, which would bring the industry side of the smoking and health controversy to the attention of the general public ...

It will ... be necessary to work closely with the brand managers and the agencies to marry such a campaign with product advertising. It goes

without saying that each step of this must be thoroughly researched and you will need to call upon the Market Research Department for help in this area. {2111.02, p. 1}

This campaign was to be quite different from Project Truth, which involved straight political advertising aimed at opinion leaders. These ads were to be aimed at the general public and would attempt to associate specific cigarette brands with the message that smoking is not dangerous. The first ad, for Kool cigarettes, included a statement on "the other side of the smoking and health controversy" from a white paper {2111.02, p. 5}. Philip Morris used a similar approach in 1994 and 1995 as a way of protesting restrictions on smoking in enclosed workplaces and public places. In an advertising campaign for Benson & Hedges cigarettes, various ads depicted smokers on an airplane wing, smokers at their desks high up on the outside walls of tall office buildings, and smokers in a convertible taxi. The political message was "Smokers have to fight for indoor smoking areas."

In his memo on the proposed campaign, Burgard instructs Pittman:

I think you should approach this the same as if we were introducing a new brand on the market. You must first develop the product and sell the idea to corporate management, and after it is thoroughly researched submit a specific campaign for approval. What we are contemplating is novel, and the management of the company is going to have to be assured that it is the right thing to do. Certainly, the work done with the initial KOOL ad is an important first step, but when the findings of this research are presented you should be prepared with a recommendation as to the next steps that we should take in development and testing.

I would like to emphasize that, in my opinion, we must confine our campaign to the smoking and health issue and not be drawn into any other aspects such as the economic results, the legality, the unfairness, etc. If this campaign is effective, it will immediately draw fire, and we cannot bear to have in our ads or in our literature a single word that cannot be thoroughly documented. {2111.02, pp. 1–2}

Burgard then spells out the objectives for this campaign:

It is interesting to note how these goals, in particular "lift[ing] the cigarette from the cancer identification as quickly as possible," are completely at odds with the quest for a less dangerous cigarette, which had been a major research and development priority for years (see chapter 4). Burgard had direct line authority over research and development at B&W. Meanwhile, the company's parent, BAT (in its laboratories in England and in Germany), was working on technical approaches to reducing the toxicity of cigarettes while at the public level it, too, was pressing forward with disinformation campaigns questioning the health dangers of smoking.

The sequence numbers on the memo from Burgard to Pittman indicate that it was filed in conjunction with another document, titled "Smoking and Health Proposal," which contains the text of a presentation on "a proposal ... for a B&W project to counter the anti-cigarette forces" {2111.01}. The proposal being discussed is the same one suggested in the Burgard memo. Although the document is undated, the context of the discussion places it around 1969, when the Burgard memo was written. The initials "JVB" (most likely those of J. V. Blalock, B&W's director of public relations) and "CM" (probably those of Corny Muije, position unknown, who is referred to in the document) appear in the margin on the first page. Evidently Blalock and Muije made a joint presentation to someone in the company. After summarizing the status of the anti-cigarette activities, the speaker notes that the anti-cigarette forces are better organized and more efficient than the tobacco industry:

I think the anti-cigarette forces can be characterized as dedicated opportunists. They are quick to act and seem to be totally unprincipled in the type of information they use to attack the industry.

The pro [tobacco] forces, on the other hand, and I'm speaking primarily of the Tobacco Institute, seem to be slow to act, mainly defensive, and rather narrow in the area of defense. The Tobacco Institute has probably done a good job for us in the area of politics and as an industry we also seem to have done very well in turning out scientific information to counter the anti-smoking claims. There is no question, though, that we have been inept in getting out side of the story, good though it may be, across to the news media and to the public. {2111.01, p. 2}

Following a discussion of the justification for the project, the speaker indicates that he views the problem as a marketing one. Thus, the project was designed to sell B&W's side of the smoking and health issue just as the company would sell a new brand of cigarettes. And, as the text of the document indicates, the project was clearly designed to confuse the general public about the scientific evidence on smoking and health.

In thinking over what we might do to improve the case for cigarettes, I have looked at the problem somewhat like the marketing of a new brand. Here is a chart where I have defined the basic marketing elements which I see in the smoking and health problem. Our consumer I have defined as the mass public, our product as doubt, our message as truth—well stated, and our competition as the body of anti-cigarette fact that exists in the public mind [emphasis added]. {2111.01, pp. 3, 4}

It seems rather curious that the speaker would suggest selling doubt with a message of truth, but he sheds some light on the rationale in the course of explaining why he has so defined the consumer, the product, and the message:

We have chosen the mass public as our consumer for several reasons:

This is where the misinformation about smoking and health has been focused.

The Congress and federal agencies are already being dealt with—and perhaps as effectively as possible—by the Tobacco Institute.

It is a group with little exposure to the positive side of smoking and health.

It is the prime force in influencing Congress and federal agencies—without public support little effort would be given to a crusade against cigarettes.

...

Doubt is our product since it is the best means of competing with the "body of fact" that exists in the mind of the general public. It is also the means of

establishing a controversy. Within the business we recognize that a controversy exists. However, with the general public the consensus is that cigarettes are in some way harmful to the health. If we are successful in establishing a controversy at the public level, then there is an opportunity to put across the real facts about smoking and health. Doubt is also the limit of our "product." Unfortunately, we cannot take a position directly opposing the anti-cigarette forces and say that cigarettes are a contributor to good health. No information that we have supports such a claim .

Truth is our message because of its power to withstand a conflict and sustain a controversy. If in our pro-cigarette efforts we stick to well documented fact , we can dominate a controversy and operate with the confidence of justifiable self-interest [italic emphasis added]. {2111.01, pp. 4, 5}

Thus, this project was to be a classic example of the tobacco industry's attempts to instill in the public mind the notion that there is a controversy surrounding the scientific evidence about cigarettes and health so that further government regulation would be prevented. The speaker does not suggest that the industry has sufficient facts on its side to refute the evidence on the other side, nor does he believe that is necessary to accomplish B&W's main purpose. According to the speaker, B&W merely has to sell a sufficient amount of doubt about the scientific evidence to establish a controversy; it can then disseminate a sufficient amount of "truth" to sustain a controversy.

The speaker then discusses the potential for using brand advertisements to convey a political message:

We have seen research this morning which indicates that there is at least a potential for using our own ads to communicate the other side of the cigarette story. Before putting this type effort into practice, however, we would want to be absolutely certain that there is no damage to our advertising or to the consumer acceptance of our brands. So the first step for the immediate future would be research. We are recommending basic research to unearth specific problems in smoking and health that we can deal directly with. {2111.01, p. 5}

This effort was part of an organized campaign that was carefully researched and designed by Corny Muije, who describes the research that was needed:

What was shown today specifically demonstrates what happened when a certain type of information was supplied with the KOOL Adios II ad.

Indications are that the KOOL copy effectiveness was enhanced. We need more evidence that this is true. Furthermore, we need to establish whether this solely hinges on the Adios II ad and the specific body copy used.

Also, is this an effective approach when the information is supplied with ads for VICEROY, RALEIGH , and BELAIR ? {2111.01, p. 6}

After noting that there will be two phases to the research program, Muije continues:

It is essential that we ascertain which type of anti-cigarette information has most affected the smoking public. What claimed health hazards are currently accepted by the general public.

A general survey with detailed questioning shoud establish this. During Phase II we should also investigate consumer reaction to at least three distinct anti-cigarette approaches. In addition, consumer reactions to maybe a dozen specific anti-cigarette claims could be probed.

The purpose of Phase II is to establish which past information and which current anti-cigarette claims are most damaging. From this we should learn which information should be of greatest interest to the public. We could then tailor our efforts more precisely to achieve the greatest effect [emphasis added]. {2111.01, pp. 6–7}

This discussion suggests that B&W was not so much interested in the actual scientific evidence about smoking and health as it was in the public perception of the evidence. Once the company could ascertain what the public believed, it could then tailor its own public relations efforts to help smokers rationalize their behavior.

After estimating the costs of the second phase of the research, Muije introduces Phase III, test marketing:

None of the research, up to this point, will have let us know the effect of sustained repeated exposure of B&W cigarette ads with body copy of different content.

Prior to a nation-wide commitment, one or more test markets would be called for.

At this point it is impossible to say whether one or more test markets would be desirable.

Regardless, in each instance we recommend that a consumer survey be conducted prior to the start of the test market and another one at the end of the test market.

A comparison of the pre and post surveys will enable us to evaluate the effect of the total campaign. {2111.01, pp. 7–8}

At this point another speaker, probably Blalock again, replaces Muije:

We would like to have the Executive Committee's approval to initiate the research program that Corny has just explained and at the same time to start a task force study of the smoking and health question and develop a detailed plan of action for B&W.

Such a plan would cover:

Sources of information about smoking and health.

The selection and clearance of information to be used by B&W.

The development of new information about smoking and health.

Means of anticipating and countering the release of misinformation.

Channels other than our own advertising for getting messages to the public.

Ways to use and perhaps focus industry efforts in support of our own program.

Agency participation in the program.

Internal administration and implementation of the program.

Thorough evaluation of potential advantages and disadvantages of public action on B&W and its brands. {2111.01, pp. 8–9}

It is not clear from the documents whether this program moved beyond the concept, design, and test market stages. However, it is clear B&W was actively researching why people believed that smoking is dangerous and was trying to develop specific counterstrategies to allay the fears of the general public. This activity came at a time when public health officials were calling for stronger warnings and a ban on television and radio advertising for tobacco; when anti-cigarette television ads, ordered by the Federal Communications Commission, were reducing cigarette consumption (16); and when discussions that would lead to modestly strengthened warnings on cigarette packages were under way (4).

Rjr's Projects A And B

In 1970 the tobacco industry was actively discussing various public relations strategies to undermine public awareness of the dangers of smoking. The instructions to the law firm hired to analyze the Brown and Williamson documents (see chapter 1), which describe the relationships among Project Truth (see above) and Projects A and B, provide the context for the following discussion:

PROJECT TRUTH / PROJECT A / PROJECT B: Documents relating to any of these public issue campaigns involving the tobacco companies and TI. "Project A," developed in 1970, consisted of three TV spots on smoking and health that would be substituted for some regular TV commercials for which time had already been contracted. The spots were rejected by the network. Ruder & Finn proposed "Project B," which called for TV and print advertising that might position tobacco beside liquor in terms of public tolerance. In the fall of 1970, TI distributed two public service TV spots, produced by Ted Bates, to counteract the anti-smoking spot announcements. This activity was called "Project Truth." {1001.01, p. 12}

On February 20, 1970, J. W. Burgard sent a memorandum to E. P. Finch, B&W's president and chairman of the board, summarizing and

commenting on the recommendations of the Tobacco Institute's Communications Committee for 1970, which evidently included plans for certain advertising campaigns. After stressing the need to prepare and approve effective copy, Burgard discussed the possibility of using the material B&W had already been preparing for presentation to editors and others in connection with Project Truth. Burgard's comment makes it clear that the lawyers were heavily involved in that project:

I suggest this because we are hopeful that we can have such a presentation approved before too long, and I am painfully aware of the fact that we have been working intensively on this for over six months, with the full and almost daily cooperation of not only our own Law Department but of outside counsel. {2112.01, p. 1}

Although Burgard notes that the committee's recommendations did not cover R. J. Reynolds's "Project A" proposal, he offers his opinion of the project:

I still feel that this is quite worthwhile if, again, the copy submitted by Reynolds is approved. If we attempt to make any major changes in their proposal, I am afraid this also will bog down in the pursuit of effective approved copy. {2112.01, p. 2}

A separate document, which is untitled and is neither signed nor dated, but appears to be a summary of various proposed advertising strategies and B&W's analysis of them, has as its first item a discussion of "Project A"—an R. J. Reynolds television series:

Full agreement of group. Esty [perhaps Gil Esterle, International and External Technical Services Dept.] would produce and supply, through Tobacco Institute, the special spots to the six companies for insertion in network primetime schedules. The B&W-proposed share plan was adopted; i.e., each company would give one minute for every 10 minutes of present schedule. Copies of estimates are attached, showing an approximate dollar value for the series of $275,000 per week, or $14,508,000 on a 12-month basis. Except for production costs (on a market share basis), the companies would not be committed to spend any extra dollars for the series, since they would simply be substituting the spots for already purchased time on an allotted basis. Nor would any extra agency commissions be involved; each company's agencies would receive commissions on already contracted time.

In developing the series, Esty would have the legal advice and counsel of some designated lawyer(s), not a committee of company counsels (it is understood that Dave Hardy would act for B&W and Philip Morris). Before the series is run, heads of the networks would be given a special presentation (of course the entire series has to be approved by the network continuity people). {2112.04, p. 1}

The other ideas discussed in this document include newspaper advertising to introduce the television series; a benchmark opinion survey to determine public attitudes toward the smoking controversy; media briefings; communications with physicians on research efforts and studies that cast doubt on the anti-smoking theory; television network specials; participation on educational television programs; and employment of a public relations agency by the Tobacco Institute {2112.04, pp. 1–3}.

As the instructions indicate, "Project B" called for television advertising, and the documents include two of the proposed ads, a one-minute spot and a thirty-second spot. They are worth setting out in full:

STAGE I—One-Minute TV Spot:

This is a message from the people who make cigarettes—and are proud of it. It is a plea for common sense. You've seen the anti-smoking commercials. Dramatic and frightening, they do not appeal to your reason, but rather to your emotions. The fact is, a clear and consistent picture does not emerge from research findings concerning smoking and health. Many statistical connections have been cited against smoking—but these figures work both ways. Some figures which are as questionable as any others, for instance, indicate that people who smoke moderately are actually healthier than non smokers. (PAUSE ) Our common sense tells us the emotional charges and counter charges will not resolve this controversy. Such emotionalism may even discourage needed intensive research by dedicated scientists. In the field of tobacco and health research, we in this industry provide more money, without strings, than all the voluntary agencies in this country combined. We have great confidence that this impartial research will lead the way in providing fair and accurate information regarding cigarette smoking. Until the answers are in, we must count on your common sense and sense of fair play. And we do. {2112.02}

and

STAGE I—Thirty-Second TV Spot:

This is a plea for common sense. You've seen the anti-smoking commercials. Dramatic, frightening, they do not appeal to reason, but rather to emotion. The fact is, a clear and consistent picture does not emerge from research findings concerning smoking and health. (PAUSE ) Emotional charges will not resolve this controversy. Intensive research by dedicated scientists will. We provide more money for this research than all the voluntary agencies combined, and more than any agency of the Federal Government. Until the dilemma is resolved, we must count on your common sense. And we do [emphasis in original]. {2112.03}

On March 3, 1970, J. V. Blalock wrote a scathing attack on Project B in a memorandum to Finch, Burgard, and Yeaman {2112.05}. In his memo Blalock notes that the project was presented as an alternative to

Project A, that it was presented in three stages, and that B&W had certain responses to each stage:

Stage I—"Person to person dialogue—reasonable and responsible."

Because words are spoken on television, a dialogue is not necessarily established with the viewers, particularly people who have been bombarded by anti-cigarette propaganda. The public doesn't feel it owes the tobacco industry anything. We must believe that people can be persuaded if presented a realistic argument or viewpoint; that is our task—what to say and how to say it. Certainly, we would be foolhearty indeed to put our trust in Ruder & Finn's reasoning by saying on television: "Until the dilemma is resolved, we must count on your common sense and sense of fair play ." We have to do a great deal more than that, or go down with a faint smile of misguided trust!

Stage II—"Reassurance."

Ruder & Finn charges that Reynolds' "Project A" is "an angry attack" and "seems argumentative and accusative." Their suggested print ad (Page 14) calls the anti-cigarette propaganda "widely-distorted, semi-hysterical campaign of fear ..." Nowhere in "Project A" is there such an extreme statement (we may believe the propaganda is just that, but to say so in those terms would immediately destroy credibility). Reynolds' "Project A" takes a position that appeals to reason: "You've been told (about lung cancer, heart disease, etc. as related to smoking) but why haven't the anti-smoking people told you (about the substantial number of scientists who doubt those statement?)" Of course, we should tell smokers about industry research efforts, but we can hardly give them any comfort by telling them that "Being alive today is a risky business" (Page 21). The whole argument made in these print ads smacks of fumbling and sweet dodging.

Stage III—"Risk-benefit."

At this point, we would be ill-advised to equate the amount of risk with the degree of benefit derived from smoking. Ruder & Finn are victims of a misconception when they say: "The broad intention envisioned ... is to achieve for the Tobacco Industry a position similar to that currently held by the liquor and beer industries." Neither industry has ever unitedly spoken of moderation or used a "risk-benefit" argument. These are elements which Reynolds' "Project A" have left out, and I believe Ruder & Finn's "Project B" fails completely to advance a convincing argument for this or other phases of its alternative to "Project A."

There seems little advantage to go further into this proposal, because the basic premise by Ruder & Finn is not supported by their suggested television and newspaper advertisements. What they have done is to say what in their opinion is wrong with "Project A"; they have not proved that their "Project B" is a suitable alternative [emphasis in original]. {2112.05, pp. 1–2}

Blalock attaches comments by Burgard, with which he wholeheartedly agrees:

We can always test the Project A commercials to see what the reaction is [emphasis in original]. {2112.05, p. 3}

Although Blalock and Burgard totally rejected "common sense" as a means of warding off attacks on the industry, eight years later that tactic was to become the centerpiece of the industry's efforts to defeat an initiative measure in California that would have restricted smoking in public places and workplaces. Indeed, the campaign committee established by the industry was called "Californians for Common Sense" (see chapter 10).