Sharif Husayn’s Struggle to Maintain His Authority

The separation of Medina from the province of the Hijaz and the imminent danger of railway construction to Mecca forced Sharif Husayn to engage in acts that would show the central government that he was an indispensable representative of the government in the region. He systematically challenged, and at times harassed, other high officials, particularly the governor of the Hijaz and the muhafız of Medina.

Conflict between governor and grand sharif was endemic in the administration of the Hijaz. Provincial notables challenged the governors’ authority elsewhere in the empire (as did, for example, Sayyid Talib in Basra), but in the Hijaz the grand sharif’s authority, based on his pedigree and services in the holy places, had acquired historical legitimacy. Although the Young Turk governments recognized the sharif’s authority in any explicit way in affairs pertaining to the Beduin and the pilgrimage only (after searching for royal decrees that may have defined the grand sharif’s prerogatives more precisely), there was little else to be regulated in the Hijaz.

Much has been said about the inimical relationship between the sharif and the governors in the Hijaz. Against the immediate background of the second half of the Hamidian period, when there was a durable and corrupt alliance between Governor Ahmed Ratib Pasha and grand sharifs Muttalib and ‘Ali, the tensions between Husayn and the governors and the high turnover of governors during the Young Turk period appear striking. Whether these feuds were in fact politically significant enough to frustrate the government’s policies in the Hijaz is doubtful.

Some of the difficulties of making appointments in remote provinces (such as the shortage of qualified candidates, the vicissitudes of the new political order, the reluctance of appointees to serve in harsh geographical and climatic conditions in remote regions) were pointed out in chapter 2. These factors resulted in frequent replacements of governors and other high officials. It is true that in the Hijaz the governor felt overshadowed by the grand sharif, which made the governorship of the province an even less desirable and more difficult post. Sharif Husayn repeatedly sent reports to İstanbul about the lack of experience of the governors.^[138] He sometimes complained that, even though a governor’s good intentions and integrity were incontestable, the incumbent was ignorant of local conditions and customs. He went so far as to hold the governors’ inexperience responsible for the delay of measures he in fact had an interest in obstructing. Whenever the sharif heard that İstanbul was contemplating a change of governors he applied pressure to have his personal candidates appointed. It would not be correct, however, to ascribe the constant resignations of the governors chiefly to Sharif Husayn’s efforts to oust them or to view the turnover simply as an indication of his inimical relationship with İstanbul or of the independent power he attained in the Hijaz.

The most noted confrontation between a governor and the grand sharif occurred in the fall of 1911. Earlier that year İstanbul sent Hazım Bey, a Unionist and an able administrator, as governor to the Hijaz.^[139] A strong governor was needed during the troubles in Asir and the sha rif’s absence on his campaign against Idrisi. Upon his return from Asir, Husayn claimed to have been insulted to see Hazım in the reception party together with sharifs from the rival Zayd clan.^[140] Prominent among the latter was Sharif Muhammad Nasir, a descendant of the brother of Grand Sharif ‘Abd al-Muttalib of the Zayd, who had maintained good relations with the CUP.^[141] Husayn’s insistence that Nasir should be dismissed from the party angered the governor, who refused afterwards to pay a courtesy visit to Sharif Husayn. Husayn turned to the grand vizier, who applied pressure on Hazım to pay the requested visit. Hazım complied, and soon after left Taif for his new post as governor in Beirut. Sharif Husayn’s ability to prevail upon the government to have a governor of Hazım Bey’s stature removed suggests that he was able to establish a degree of independence in the Hijaz. However, a more intricate combination of factors was generally responsible for the transfer of a governor. Hazım’s transfer, for instance, may have had more to do with the need for his services to deal with the growing agitation in Beirut than with the appeasement of Sharif Husayn.

The sharif had little positive influence on the appointment of governors. His attempts to secure permanent appointments for military commander and acting governor ‘Abdullah Pasha in 1910^[142] and Münir Pasha in 1913 were not successful.^[143] Nor was the sharif able to influence the decisions for minor provincial posts. His appeals in this regard were frequently declined.^[144] In December 1912, in a telegram to Grand Vizier Kamil Pasha, he protested the retention of an official in Jidda by the Ministry of Finance contrary to his advice. He claimed that four officials, including the controversial one, who were all Unionists, added to the Jiddans’ existing resentment of the Committee, which derived from the unfavorable results of the Balkan War. Even though the Unionists were neither in power nor influential at this time, the effect of Husayn’s pleas was the replacement of a single official only.^[145]

An especially acrimonious antagonism existed between the muhafız of Medina, ‘Ali Rida Pasha, and Sharif Husayn as a result of the new status of the muhafızlık and the implications for the grand sharifate. If Sharif Husayn had some degree of success in maintaining his political preponderance in Mecca, he was generally frustrated in his dealings with the muhafızs of Medina. Traditionally, the grand sharifs maintained deputies in the towns of the Hijaz to perform duties related to the pilgrimage and matters of the Beduin. In the spring of 1910 a crisis broke out between Muhafız ‘Ali Rida Pasha and the grand sharif’s deputy in Medina, Sharif Shahat. The muhafız claimed that Shahat had helped a convict—exiled to Medina for his involvement in the counterrevolutionary uprising of April 1909—escape to Egypt and that subsequently Shahat himself had fled to Mecca. ‘Ali Rida asked the minister of the interior to have Sharif Husayn dismiss Shahat and to entrust the Medina government with the conduct of the affairs traditionally pertaining to the sharifate’s representative in Medina.^[146]

Prior to the July 1910 decision of the government to separate Medina from the Hijaz, Muhafız ‘Ali Rida Pasha complained that both the emirate and the directorate of the Hijaz Railway were acting in Medina like governments within a government and indicated that their arbitrary acts caused excitement and confusion among the tribes. For example, the grand sharif deducted from the government subsidy earmarked for a tribe an amount that the pilgrimage caravan officials had traditionally given its shaykhs as a gift. He also asked for the arrest of some tribal chiefs. The shaykhs, in turn, wrote to the muhafız threatening to blow up the railway. The muhafız concluded that the government in Medina could not tolerate the implementation of heedless policies, much less take responsibility for them.^[147] In response, Husayn allied himself with Governor Kamil and asked for the replacement of ‘Ali Rida Pasha, but without success.^[148]

The grand sharif took liberties in his recognized domain of relations with the tribes to promote his local agendas. As the complaints of the muhafız reveal, one of Husayn’s tactics to maintain broad local authority and to prevent İstanbul from taking measures to increase direct central control in the Hijaz to the detriment of his own authority was to encourage dissension among the tribes in the Medina area.^[149] The campaign against Ibn Sa‘ud, which the sharif undertook without any military assistance from the government, was another maneuver designed to serve as a display of his power both to the tribes in the region and to İstanbul. Nevertheless, Husayn’s correspondence with the grand vizier during the Najd campaign included elaborate references to the resolute and long-standing obedience of the sharifs of his family to the Ottoman caliph since the days of Sultan Selim. He presented his latest campaign as an attempt to protect the rights and interests of the state and the caliphate not only in the Hijaz (which, Husayn added, boasted orderly and stable government compared with the other provinces) but also in the entire Arabian Peninsula.^[150]

Whatever his success in asserting his will vis-à-vis the governors in the Hijaz, the grand sharif failed to abort İstanbul’s decision regarding Medina. Tension between the muhafızlık and the emirate became chronic. Toward the end of 1911 Sharif Husayn displayed an independent attitude in Mecca. He was frustrated by his apparent loss of control over northern Hijaz but emboldened by the removal of Governor Hazım in the fall of 1911. At this juncture his dismissal in favor of Sharif Haydar seems to have been considered in İstanbul, but was opposed by Mahmud Shawkat Pasha, then minister of war.^[151] The British consul, also irritated by the recent attitude of the sharif, pointed to the influential support of the minister of war that the sharif enjoyed.^[152] In reality, Mahmud Shawkat Pasha had friendly relations with Sharif Haydar and disagreed with Husayn on the extension of the Hijaz Railway. His opposition to any plans for Husayn’s removal can be explained by his fear of altering the status quo in the Hijaz during hostilities with Italy in the Red Sea.

During the period of the CUP’s political troubles, from the spring of 1912 to the summer of 1913, the sharif enjoyed relative freedom of action. The 1912 elections were held in the Hijaz with little regard for established procedures, and the sharif was allowed to secure the election of his second son, Faysal, as deputy from Jidda, in addition to ‘Abdullah, who was reelected for Mecca.^[153] The successful completion of the sharif’s second Asir campaign, due not so much to military victories but to the cessation of Italian support to Idrisi, added to his prestige in the Hijaz.^[154] Yet the sharif’s attempts to increase his civil and military authority in this opportune period did not bring substantial results. Following Governor Hazım’s departure, Husayn reacted to the reports that İsmail Fazıl Pasha, former governor of Syria, was under consideration for the position. Citing the ineptitude of İsmail Fazıl, he proposed two local functionaries, over whom he probably enjoyed some influence, Münir Pasha (commander of forces in the Hijaz) and Ziver Bey (the şeyhülharam, or keeper of the Prophet’s tomb), as his candidates.^[155] The Ministry of the Interior appointed Halil Pasha, Governor of Kosova, instead. Then, advancing Halil’s unfamiliarity with the local language and customs, the ministry rescinded the appointment in favor of Mustafa Zihni Pasha (Babanzade), a Baghdadi Kurd and governor of Janina.^[156] Not surprisingly the relationship between the sharif and Mustafa Zihni Pasha was adversarial from the beginning. When Zihni Pasha was transferred later in 1912, Sharif Husayn not only renewed his request for the appointment of Münir but also asked that the positions of military commander and governor be united in his candidate. The Gazi Ahmed Muhtar government, which by this time had displaced the Unionists, reminded Husayn that it was established practice to appoint governors from the civil list (even though arrangements along the lines of the sharif’s request were not uncommon in certain provinces). He was also informed that the new appointee, Reşid Pasha, was due to arrive in Mecca shortly.^[157] It seems that Reşid Pasha never went to the Hijaz and that Münir served as acting governor for the next few months.

The year 1912 was exceptional in terms of the sharif’s relations with the British. As early as January 1912 the French consul in Jidda reported a trip ‘Abdullah took to Cairo with the purpose of seeking the khedive’s support.^[158] The first contact between ‘Abdullah and the British authorities, the precursor of negotiations that opened the door to a British-sharifian alliance in 1916, may have occurred on this occasion.

But it is also at this juncture that the sharif’s endeavor to assert his authority resulted in a clash with the British authorities. The sharif reorganized the appointment procedure of pilgrim guides to maximize his profits and undermine the British Consulate’s control over Indian pilgrims.^[159] He also proceeded to take over the supervision of the water condenser that insured Jidda’s water supply from the official Hijaz Commission of Health. A transfer of control to the sharif, the consul claimed, would risk the lives of pilgrims, among them 30,000 British subjects.^[160] In the summer of 1912 Jidda’s telegraphic communication with the outside world was interrupted for an extended period and could not be restored because of the Italian presence in the Red Sea. During this period, the Beduin attacked military barracks in Jidda and shot at the British Consulate to protest the emancipation of certain slaves. The consul maintained that the sharif gave his implicit consent to these acts of aggression “to impress the local authorities with his power, [and to show them] how entirely at his mercy they are.” The consul recommended that British subjects be discouraged from performing the pilgrimage in order to deal the sharif a financial blow and to show him that “he is not entirely beyond the reach of the Powers.” He wrote, “[T]he fear of a repetition of the lesson would mitigate more than half of the evils and eliminate more than half the difficulties with which we have to contend, and this, moreover, without wounding the pride and damaging the financial interests of the central government which derives no profit from the Haj.”^[161] That the British authorities were contemplating in the summer of 1912 action intended to damage the grand sharif’s finances and religious prestige suggests that any contacts with the British in Egypt earlier in the year were inconsequential.

The return of the CUP to power in January 1913 heralded a tightening of central control. The sharif’s reaction was predictable. In two letters sent to İstanbul in April 1913, following the promulgation of the Provincial Law, he revisited some of the difficulties that arose because of the separation of Medina from Mecca, particularly the ambiguity that ensued in the responsibilities of the grand sharifate with respect to the pilgrims and Beduins.^[162] He accused the muhafız of injustice, ineptitude, and unlawful acts. In a detailed memorandum the muhafız denied all the accusations.^[163] A few weeks later Husayn requested once again the appointment of Münir Pasha as titular governor. The previous government had already designated Nedim Pasha, the Governor of Bitlis, for the post and the sharif was informed of the new appointment.^[164] However, the CUP government reversed that decision, apparently before Nedim Pasha went to the Hijaz, and commissioned Vehib Bey for the post.

Starting in 1914 the reorientation of İstanbul’s imperial policy toward an Ottomanism with greater emphasis on Islam and the crystallization of international factors that ultimately precipitated the world war were conducive to a more fundamental change in the established relationship of the grand sharifate to the capital. In the months preceding the war the sharif was irked by officially sponsored aggressive Islamic propaganda, which had the potential of robbing him of his moral force in Arabia, where he had posed as the protector of Islamic traditions and practices. Although his political fortunes were tied to that of the government, he opposed further centralization and deemed reform as contrary to religion. İstanbul’s espousal of an Islamic ideology not only threatened to overshadow his religious standing but also directed the government’s attention to the holy places as bases for propaganda.

In the meantime, the growing international tensions prompted Britain to renew contacts with the sharif regarding a prospective alliance against the Ottoman government. Sharif ‘Abdullah, apprehensive about the subjugation of the Hijaz to stricter central controls and the removal of his father over disagreements with the new governor Vehib, responded positively to British overtures in Cairo and sounded out British willingness to aid his father in the event of deteriorating relations with İstanbul. These contacts were resumed after the outbreak of the war. The story of British-Hashemite relations is too well-known to be related here.^[165] The next chapter will examine the Ottoman flank of the balancing act that the sharif was forced to play after the outbreak of war.