The Counterrevolution

The 31 March Incident was an uprising of conservative forces in İstanbul: religious students and functionaries, military cadres with traditional education who faced displacement by younger officers, and loyalists to the old regime. Most likely, it received encouragement from the CUP’s decentralist opponents, the Ahrar party.^[113] In time-honored Ottoman tradition, resistance to change was expressed in a religious idiom. The uprising was led by İttihad-ı Muhammedi, which had come to the surface only days before the uprising. It posed a profound challenge to the new regime, and consequently to the CUP, less than nine months after the revolution. The Committee managed to bring the volatile situation in the capital under control only with help from the loyal Third Army units and immediately proceeded to take measures for a more decisive role in government.

According to the responses to a memorandum sent by the restored government to the provinces inquiring about the extent of local agitation, the Incident did not have significant repercussions in the Arab provinces, except in Damascus. The governors reported that there was little reason to fear local uprisings but took the opportunity to ask for troop reinforcements and improvement of the security apparatus.^[114] Except for Damascus, there was no link between local elements and the insurgents in İstanbul. However, once the reactionary uprising took place and revealed the vulnerability of the regime, local groups resorted to its slogans to promote specific objectives. In Medina troops took up arms, locked themselves in the Prophet’s Mosque, and demanded discharge.^[115] In Baghdad an organization called Mashwar (Consultation), which had been formed by a member of a local notable family, ‘Isa al-Jamili, with the participation of some officials, surfaced and apparently acquired the support of sections of the army stationed in the city. This group was reported to have been in contact with the tribes of Arabia in an attempt to establish an independent Arab kingdom.^[116] Even though Mashwar had been known to the government before the Incident, ten days after it the grand vizier urged a thorough investigation lest the reactionary outburst in İstanbul encourage this subversive scheme.

In Damascus a counterrevolutionary upsurge was engineered by conservative notables and the local branch of İttihad-ı Muhammedi.^[117] The leaders of the Damascus organization included ‘Abd al-Qadir al-‘Ajlani, ‘Abdullah al-Jaza’iri, Tawfiq al-Qudsi, and Rida ‘Attar. Governor Nazım mentioned that others who “were deceived with the religious propaganda” of this group showed repentance after they found out about the “malevolent intentions” of the leaders.^[118] The governor did not elaborate on the true motives of the “reactionaries,” which were no doubt the same as those of the parent group and its allies: to undermine the regime by suggesting that the new order threatened religion, an accusation to which the CUP’s opposition would resort time and again in the future. The governor feared that the trial of the accused might occasion unruly behavior on the part of segments of the population and that military reinforcements from outside the province would be needed, since the local reserve forces were suspected of harboring reactionary sympathies.^[119]

The events of April 1909 crystallized forces in the Ottoman body politic that had started to take shape in the aftermath of the 1908 Revolution. An important outcome of the revolt was the deposition of Abdülhamid on charges of complicity in favor of his brother Sultan Mehmed Reşad (r. 1909–18). The Incident pitted the CUP against the “Liberal” decentralists and compelled the Committee to reappraise its role in government by defining its political objectives. The successful suppression of the uprising by the Third Army units under the command of Mahmud Shawkat Pasha enhanced the CUP’s stature vis-à-vis its political opponents, but shook its self-confidence. The Committee now deemed it imperative to assert itself more directly in the conduct of state policy and proceeded to take steps that would weaken political opposition. Mahmud Shawkat Pasha, who commanded considerable moral authority after the suppression of the uprising, wanted to preserve the constitutional order, but he did not have faith that the Unionists could achieve this. The Committee maintained Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha at the helm of the government instead of appointing a grand vizier from its own ranks.

Mahmud Shawkat Pasha was the descendant of an Arabic-speaking family from Baghdad.^[120] Like his father, who had served as mutasarrıf in Iraq, he advanced in the service of the Ottoman state, was Ottomanized and dedicated to the survival and integrity of the empire. As the commander of the forces that had restored order in the capital, Mahmud Shawkat Pasha enjoyed great prestige. He was appointed inspector-general of the three European army corps and became a powerful figure under the martial law regime that was instituted after the counterrevolution was crushed.^[121]

Plagued as the CUP was by tensions between its military and civilian wings, Mahmud Shawkat embodied the enhanced position of the military in Ottoman politics while remaining above and beyond the CUP and overshadowing it. The best that the CUP could do in the months following the counterrevolution was to place two of its civilian members, Mehmed Talat and Mehmed Cavid, in the Hüseyin Hilmi cabinet as the interior and finance ministers, respectively.^[122] The suppression of the counterrevolution did not put the CUP at the helm of the government, but debilitated the opposition and allowed the Committee to pursue its political objectives more aggressively with two of its most capable and committed members in key ministerial positions.