| • | • | • |
The Arab Parliamentary Contingent in the First Legislative Year
Parliament opened on 17 December 1908. The event aroused empire-wide interest, and, according to one account, so many people came to İstanbul from the provinces to witness the event that some newly arriving deputies had to be placed in dormitories of boarding schools for lack of vacancies in the capital’s hotels.[75] This festive opening in İstanbul was also marked by celebrations in provincial centers that featured speeches and prayers, but only modest public interest. In Jidda the celebration took place in the town hall while the postmaster, “an advanced constitutionalist,” had a “wooden triumphal arch” erected near the post office.[76] In Mecca all the dignitaries, including the grand sharif, observed the occasion in the military headquarters.[77] In Medina large numbers of Beduin and their shaykhs also participated. Together with the local Ottoman officials and officers, they listened to a speech by the tahrirat müdürü (director of correspondence) on the formulaic theme of the legitimacy of constitutionalism before religious law (meşrutiyetin meşruiyeti).[78]
On 23 December the Chamber elected a speaker (president). Ahmed Rıza was chosen with an overwhelming majority (205 votes). The two Arab deputies, Nafi‘ of Aleppo (who had the distinction of having served also in the Parliament of 1877–78) and ‘Abd al-Qadir of Medina, finished in distant seventh (nine votes) and ninth place (seven votes), respectively. One of the first items on the newly convened Chamber’s agenda was the examination of the records submitted by local electoral committees and the endorsement of the credentials of the successful candidates.
The list of those whose qualifications were in heated contention included several from the Arab provinces: Yusuf Shitwan (Tripoli-Libya), ‘Umar Mansur (Benghazi), Sayyid Talib al-Naqib (Basra), and Shafiq al-Mu’ayyad (al-‘Azm) (Syria). The objections to these deputies were in essence political, but often legal impediments or electoral irregularities were put forward.
Shitwan, a judicial inspector in the previous regime,[79] and al-Mu’ayyad, a high-level imperial delegate at the Tobacco Régie in İstanbul,[80] were accused of having spied for Abdülhamid.[81] Al-Mu’ayyad was in addition charged with perjury in a personal inheritance case. ‘Umar Mansur was alleged to have falsified his election papers.[82] As for Talib, the naqib al-ashraf [ 83] of Basra, he was one of those prominent Arab notables whose local standing assured him a spot in the Chamber, although his commitment to the new constitutional regime was suspect.[84] Despite the objections, Mansur, al-Mu’ayyad, and Talib were endorsed after deliberation. In Shitwan’s case new elections were ordered on grounds that he secured the deputyship by intimidating certain officials. However, Shitwan was successful also in the reelection. When objections were raised again on the floor in the summer of 1909, Mansur interpreted them as an insult to Shitwan’s constituency. Other Arab deputies, including ‘Abd al-Hamid al-Zahrawi (Hama), spoke on his behalf.[85] Unlike al-Mu’ayyad and Talib, Shitwan became a CUP loyalist in the years to come, especially after the CUP subscribed to an Islamic political orientation in 1913. Yet another election was repeated in Libya, when the deputy-elect for Fezzan (Tripoli-Libya) decided to return to his business. The Turkish kaymakam of the district of Ghat, Cami Bey, won the re election. On the occasion of his endorsement in the summer of 1909, objections were unsuccessfully raised against him on grounds of administrative malpractice and tax corruption.[86]
No sooner had Parliament opened than many of the Arab deputies joined a society called the Arab-Ottoman Brotherhood (Al-ikha’ al-‘arabi al-‘uthmani, or Uhuvvet-i Arabiyye-i Osmaniye), which had been formed in İstanbul in September[87] and had welcomed the Arab deputies to the capital with a big reception.[88]Al-ikha’ served a dual purpose. On the one hand, it constituted an extension of the societies that Arabs, mainly students, had formed in the capital before the revolution in order to promote contacts among the Arabs living there. On the other hand, its founders, who had been officials in the Hamidian regime, hoped to preserve their status “by presenting themselves as the protectors of Arab interests in the empire”[89] and to develop an Arab coalition that would collectively work toward the achievement of Ottoman unity. Shafiq al-Mu’ayyad was one of the founders and served as president; Shitwan was also a member.[90] The close involvement of these two men, both of whom had been incriminated in Parliament, gave to the brotherhood the appearance of an oppositional group. In reality it was a short-lived society in which voices of future rival Arab opinions coexisted. Al-ikha’ also had branches in the Arab provinces, where its propaganda had a distinctly anti-CUP tone.[91] Just as future supporters of the CUP joined Al-ikha’, future opponents such as Rafiq al-‘Azm and Rashid Rida denounced the society for its leaders’ connections with the old regime. The society was closed after the counterrevolutionary upheaval of April 1909, accused of having had connections in Damascus with the local branch of the İttihad-ı Muhammedi Cemiyeti (Muhammadan Union Society), the instigator of the counterrevolution.
Early in the second constitutional period, calls for Arab autonomy and independence came from outside the empire but failed to find enthusiastic reception among the Arabs. In December 1908 a declaration demanding self-government for Syria, written in Paris by an organization calling itself the Syrian Central Committee and signed by Rashid Mutran, circulated within the empire. The author asserted that constitutional government in the Western sense was not possible in the Ottoman Empire and that minority aspirations would inevitably lead to its dissolution. He recommended that the Syrians adopt the principles of the new constitution but apply them in an autonomous Syria. Mutran also suggested to the Western powers that the establishment of an autonomous Syria in the strategic location it occupied would also serve their interests.[92]
Though couched as an appeal for autonomy, the thrust of the manifesto of the Syrian Central Committee represented a reiteration of Syrian separatism that had never found support in Syria, much less among the Arabs in general. Beirut’s Christian deputy Sulayman al-Bustani was one of the first to reprehend Mutran.[93] For many Syrians the Syrian Central Committee based in Paris was an unknown entity that represented little beyond the desires of its founders and, like Nagib Azoury’s Ligue de la Patrie Arabe, did not have a following anywhere.[94] The circular caused widespread anger and sadness in Syria, according to the governor in Damascus,[95] and the British consul in Damascus reported that the proposal to give Syria “partial independence of the Turkish Empire” was received “with disapproval and contempt throughout Syria.”[96] Similar denunciation came from a second Arab group in Paris, the Syrian Ottoman Society, led by Shukri Ghanem.[97]
The strong and broad reaction to the Syrian Committee’s declaration demonstrated the Ottomanist convictions of different segments of the Arab society. It also evinced the diverse avenues of political expression that had opened under the new regime and to which opponents and proponents of politicized issues would resort in the months and years to come. The matter was discussed in Parliament. The press gave wide coverage to it. Numerous letters and telegrams of protest arrived at the grand vizierate and the presidency of Parliament from the provinces and even from outside the empire.
In Parliament deputies insisted on going on the record with their declarations of support for the Ottoman state, in condemning the circular, and in concurring with the denunciatory letters from Syria.[98] The fear of French designs on Syria added to the consternation. Nafi‘ al-Jabiri characterized Mutran as a madman and confirmed that all Arab peoples in the entire empire placed their political sentiments under the same banner.[99] Particularly interesting were the comments of a Beiruti deputy;[100] he denounced the references to the Syrian Committee on the floor and in the press as the “Arab Committee.” In an effort to disassociate Beirut from the Mutran initiative, he maintained that Mutran’s committee pretended to speak for the Arabs in the province of Syria only, thus once again underscoring the localism and diversity in the Arab regions. While all Arab deputies concurred in their criticism of the circular, Muhammad Arslan, deputy from Latakia, pleaded that the condemnation should not be extended to the entire Mutran family; many members of Mutran’s own family, he indicated, had been among the first to condemn him.[101] Indeed, Nadra Mutran, one of the founders of Al-ikha’ in İstanbul,[102] openly expressed his criticism for brothers Rashid and Nakhla, who professed to be the leaders of the Syrian Committee.[103] Such differences of political outlook between members or branches of the same families were a feature of Arab political life shared by Muslims and Christians.
The Mutran affair suggests that Arab leaders had faith in the Ottomanist vision that the 1908 Revolution promised. Although separatist schemes continued to originate from outside the borders of the Ottoman state, for most Arabs the new constitution and Parliament dispelled any need for a separate existence. Furthermore, even the Syrians did not think in terms of a broader community sharing an alternative political vision. From the vehemence with which Mutran was criticized, it seemed clear that there was faith in Ottoman unity both within and outside Parliament.
The Arab leaders saw no inconsistency between the sentiments expressed on the occasion of the Mutran letter and, within days of that parliamentary debate, undertaking an initiative to form an Arab parliamentary group. This initiative under the leadership of Nafi‘ was reported in the press.[104] The group counted among its objectives the attainment of proportional representation in Parliament and in state service.[105] Hüseyin Cahid, who had published an article only days earlier in which he contended, on the basis of the Mutran debate, that there was no inclination toward a “politics of nationality” (milliyet politikası)[106] in Parliament, came out vehemently against the formation of an “Arab party,” interpreting its demands as a desire for independence. The group’s formation also coincided with the crisis that led to the vote of no confidence for Kamil Pasha and made the CUP even more sensitive to any potential initiative from an organized opposition. Nafi‘ had to assuage such reaction by publicly renouncing the pursuit of special Arab interests and declaring the group open to all.
The thrust of Arab opinion in Parliament remained in the direction of unity and uniformity within the imperial framework, not toward particularism. In the first annual session of Parliament, Arab deputies raised concerns pertaining to variant practices in the different provinces, in particular the regional, and seemingly arbitrary, divergence in the kinds of taxes as well as their methods of collection. One of the earliest statements in this regard came from Rajab Efendi, a deputy from Yemen (Hodeida), who argued against the practice of levying an onerous market tax in Yemen instead of the regular Ottoman taxes based on crops, animals, and profits. The deputy stressed that Yemen had no legal distinction from the other provinces and that the market tax hurt Yemen’s agriculture and trade.[107] Similarly, ‘Abd al-Mahdi Efendi complained about a tax in Karbala that he claimed was not levied anywhere else, as other deputies complained that certain taxes were collected in different proportions, even in neighboring provinces.[108] At the root of the problem lay the government’s failure to put tax registers in order. The deputies envisaged a greater role for the government to regularize tax collection.
Demands for special prerogatives deriving from specific concerns of the provinces were also placed on the agenda. A motion to provide for minting coins specific to Yemen was quickly tabled, leaving the rationale for the demand in obscurity.[109] The Aleppine contingent favored a ban on wheat exports from the district of Elbistan, ostensibly on grounds of shortages due to locusts. The minister of the interior, Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha (later grand vizier) addressed the matter during an interpellation. He stressed that provincial governors had no authority to impose such restrictions. Nafi‘ asked for further empowerment of local authorities and more funding to cope with the problem.[110] Particularly interesting was the discussion of taxes collected in Anatolian provinces earmarked for a medical school in Damascus and an industrial school in Ankara. Some deputies objected to the use of funds collected in their provinces for schools in other provinces. Others countered, arguing that the Damascus and Ankara schools would be open to all and would not be for the benefit of the two provinces only.[111]
There was nothing that distinguished Arab deputies from Turkish deputies in the kinds of issues they raised and the frequency and tone with which they did so. Arab deputies evinced particular interest in issues pertaining to other Arab provinces. This was in part due to the similarity of social, administrative, and economic problems in the broader region, but also to a sense of commonality among these deputies. On the whole, the Arab political orientation reinforced the Unionist conception of a unitary state. The many demands from the Arab provinces pertaining to regional deprivations, administrative irregularities, and security issues presumed the responsibility of the central government and indeed reinforced the role of the center.[112]
The CUP’s political program stressed equal rights and obligations for all Ottomans. The new government aimed at systematizing fiscal and administrative practices. Yet the implementation of a reform program embodying these ideals encountered problems in the political turmoil—international complications, financial constraints, and the Committee’s ambiguous role in the political process—that marked the initial stage of constitutional rule. During the first of the four months when Parliament held regular sessions its work was devoted mostly to its internal organization. In the second month it was distracted by a showdown between the CUP and Grand Vizier Kamil Pasha, which resulted in the replacement of Kamil by Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha. In April, less than four months after Parliament convened, its work was interrupted by a counterrevolutionary uprising.