1. A. Morozov, “Between Amin and Karmal,” 37. Morozov was the KGB deputy chief in Afghanistan from 1975 to 1979. I am grateful to Mr. Alam Katawazay for providing me copies of the three articles by Morozov. Quoting from Morozov, Arnold states that “[President] Da’ud delegated to him [Amin] the military-recruitment program and introduced him to the K.G.B.” (“Communism in Afghanistan,” 114). If not a printing mistake, this wild statement should be rejected outright.

2. Morozov, “Night Visit,” 32.

3. Morozov, “Between Amin and Karmal,” 39.

4. Morozov, “Night Visit,” 30.

5. Roy, “Origin,” 53.

6. Arnold, “Communism in Afghanistan,” 53.

7. Safi, Just Uprising; Anonymous, Uprising of the Twenty-fourth; Yusufi, Uprising; Khairkhwah, Commemorating the Martyrs.

8. Deac, “Sky Train Invasion,” 23.

9. Dobbs, “Secret Memos.” This article is based on the newly disclosed Soviet archives containing the minutes of the decision the Soviet leaders had made about invading Afghanistan. I am pleased to note that the article confirmed my findings. I am grateful to Dr. Zamin Mohmand for providing me the clipping of the article.

10. Wakman, Afghanistan, 119.

11. Anwar, Tragedy, 162.

12. Ibid., 162, 165.

13. Ibid., 168.

14. A photographer of the Afghan delegation quoted by Daoud Malikyar, personal communication, San Diego, June 1991.

15. Morozov, “Shots Fired,” 32.

16. Anwar, Tragedy, 168.

17. Ibid., 170, 171.

18. Morozov, “Shots Fired,” 34.

19. G. Povlovsky, the Soviet chief adviser in Afghanistan in 1979, quoted in Sharq, Memoirs, 159. Dr. Mohammad Hassan Sharq held high state positions when Mohammad Daoud was prime minister and president of Afghanistan. A medical physician by profession, Dr. Sharq was Mohammad Daoud’s associate. From 1988 to 1989 he himself was prime minister of Afghanistan. His book, which describes mainly the events in high circles, is very informative. Sharq is the first prime minister of Afghanistan to publish his memoirs.

20. A former government official, personal communication, Los Angeles, February 1991. The official said that he was present at the occasion.

21. Quoted in Morozov, “Shots Fired,” 34.

22. Bradsher, Afghanistan, 117.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Shroder and Assifi, “Afghan Mineral Resources,”112. According to the authors, the Soviet exploitation of Afghan resources can be understood from the further facts that Afghan-Soviet agreements called for the average annual export of 2.5 billion cubic meters of gas to the Soviet Union up to 1985. The revenues from the sale of gas were not, however, to be paid to the Afghan government: they were to be applied as repayment for Soviet loans and the interest on those loans, including funds spent by the Soviets for Soviet-assisted projects. In addition, in 1980 the Soviets took the step of crediting its imports of Afghan natural gas against the cost of maintaining the “friendly fraternal assistance” of its “limited military contingent” in Afghanistan. In other words, after 1980 the Afghans were forced to pay with their natural resources for the invasion and occupation of their own country and the destruction of their own people. Also, in early 1980 Soviet experts began to increase gas production by 65 percent. Afghan gas fields at a place near Shiberghan were (as of 1977) estimated to have reserves in excess of 500 trillion cubic feet. In 1979 Soviet experts discovered another gas-bearing zone in northern Afghanistan capable of producing one-quarter million cubic meters per day. See also Assifi, “Russian Rope.”

26. A former official of the Afghan Ministry of Finance, personal communication, Pul-e-Charkhi concentration camp, 1983.

27. A former senior official, personal communication, Kabul, 1987.

28. Mansur Hashemi, the former Khalqi minister of water and power, personal communication, Sadarat prison, 1982.

29. A former junior professor of Kabul University, personal communication, Peshawar, 1988.

30. A senior official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Khalqi Government, personal communication, Kabul, 1987.

31. Bradsher, Afghanistan, 118.

32. S. Harrison, quoted in Wakman, Afghanistan, 121.

33. For details of how the United States and other noncommunist governments stopped financial aid to the Khalqi government, see Bradsher, Afghanistan, 99.

34. Ibid., 118.

35. Ibid., 117.

36. Ibid., 122. In July 1979 Amin took an unusual step to establish a personal relationship with the U.S. administration. According to a former government official, he carried a personal message from Hafizullah Amin to Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter’s national security adviser. The official said that he personally handed over the letter to Mr. Brzezinski but received no reply.

37. Bradsher, Afghanistan, 179.

38. Nasrat, “Bitter Facts,” 97. According to Nasrat,“If the country’s situation had not taken a different turn, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, on his own request, would have been appointed minister of tribal affairs.” According to rumors in circulation in Kabul at the time, Hekmatyar was assigned the post of prime minister in the envisaged Khalqi-dominated coalition government.

39. Kornienko, “Afghan Endeavor,” 54-55. I am grateful to Ralph Magnus for giving me a copy of the article along with the official Soviet memoranda attached to it.

40. Ibid., 30.

41. G. M. Noorzoy, personal communication, Kabul, February 1980.

42. Ivanov, “Revelations,” 20.

43. Bradsher, Afghanistan, 176. According to Abdul Hakeem Hakeemi, commander of the Bagram airbase at the time, the number was much smaller, and they arrived only weeks before the invasion. Personal communication, San Diego, March 1995.

44. A former Afghan official, personal communication, Los Angeles, 1991.

45. Roy, Islam and Resistance, 121, 76.

46. Bradsher, Afghanistan, 173-75; see also Arnold, Afghanistan’s Two-Party Communism, 96.

47. Bradsher, Afghanistan, 185.

48. In 1989 the Soviet Supreme Council denounced the invasion by a vote of 1,678-18, with 19 abstentions (Honolulu Advertiser, 25 December 1989, C1).

49. Bradsher, Afghanistan, 155.

50. Dobbs, “Secret Memos.”

51. Ibid.