1. Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, 86-87.

2. Ibid., 84-86.

3. Yousaf and Adkin, Bear Trap, 154.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Saikal and Miley, Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan, 16.

7. McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft, 32.

8. Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, 88.

9. Ibid., 89.

10. Kornienko, “Afghan Endeavor,” 10.

11. Ibid.

12. Najibullah, quoted in Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, 178.

13. “A.” Personal communication, Kabul, 1987.

14. Kornienko, “Afghan Endeavor,” 11.

15. Ibid., 12.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., 13.

18. Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, 89.

19. Yousaf and Adkin, Bear Trap, 166-73.

20. Ibid., 174-79.

21. Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, 89, 90.

22. Kakar, Geneva Compromise on Afghanistan, 138; Kakar, Afghans in the Spring of 1987, 13.

23. Kakar, “Afghanistan on the Eve of Soviet Withdrawal.”

24. To effect equality among Afghan ethnic groups, Kishtmand, a politburo member of PDPA, wrote that the state was to carve out “autonomous administrative units” on the basis of “national characteristics” within a “federal structure.” “The Constitution and the National Problem in the Republic of Afghanistan,” The Truth about the Saur Revolution (PDPA newspaper), 9 Qaus 1367 (30 November 1987), page unknown. Kishtmand’s view was a replica of the Soviet model, which is impracticable in Afghanistan because of its highly mixed population.

25. Resolution of the Second Congress of the Party, Aims of the Fatherland Party (Maramnama-e-hizb-e-watan), Kabul, 1990.

26. Sharq, Memoirs, 282.

27. Ibid., 256.

28. Yousaf and Adkin, Bear Trap, 42.

29. Sharq, Memoirs, 272.

30. Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, 255.

31. Ibid., 285, 294.

32. Rais, “Afghanistan and Regional Security,” 82.

33. The departing Soviet army handed over all of its heavy weapons and food supplies to the Kabul regime; in addition, it is believed that during the six months of 1989 the Soviets delivered $1.5 billion worth of weapons, including five hundred Scud surface-to-surface missiles. Every day from fifteen to eighty huge planes would bring weapons of all kinds to Kabul. Sharq, Memoirs, 292; Yousaf and Adkin, Bear Trap, 227; Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, 297. “Moreover in significant areas of military advice and intelligence support Moscow’s direct invlovement in Afghanistan’s internal affairs did not end with the formal withdrawal of Soviet troops”; Rais, “Afghanistan and Regional Security,” 82.

34. Kornienko, “Afghan Endeavor,” 11.

35. Sharq, Memoirs, 260, 257.

36. Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, 296.

37. Kornienko, “Afghan Endeavor,” 14; Yousaf and Adkin, Bear Trap, 234.

38. Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, 297.

39. According to the CIA, General Akhtar of the ISI promoted the idea of outright military victory for Afghan Islamists. Yousaf and Adkin, Bear Trap, 234.

40. Ibid., 1, 22, 234.

41. Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, 200.

42. Ibid., 201.

43. Ibid.

44. In 1987 the following broad percentages were allowed to the Islamic groups: to Hekmatyar, 18-20 percent; to Rabbani, 18-19 percent; to Sayyaf 17-18 percent; to Khalis, 13-15 percent; to Mohammadi, 13-15 percent; to Gailani, 10-11 percent; and to Mojaddidi, 3-5 percent. Yousaf and Adkin, Bear Trap, 105.

45. Kakar, “Afghanistan on the Eve of Soviet Withdrawal.” The information on the shura held in February 1989 are drawn from this source. I lived in Peshawar at the time. I am grateful to Mohammad Qasim Laghmani for giving me valuable information and some documents on the shura. Laghmani was a member of the commissions of the shura that laid down electoral procedures for it. See also Khalilzad, Prospects for Afghan Interim Government; Maley and Saikal, Political Order in Post-Communist Afghanistan.

46. Quoted in Shahadat, Newspaper of the Islamic Party (Peshawar), 2 Sunbula 1367/1988, 1.

47. Yousaf and Adkin, Bear Trap, 226-32.

48. Ibid., 230.

49. Ibid., 129, 231.

50. Ibid., 129.

51. Sharq, Memoirs, 301.

52. Ibid. Kakar, “Failed Coup,”112.

53. Sharq, Memoirs, 301.

54. Kakar, “Failed Coup,” 113.

55. Bisharat, “Stormy Developments,” 12.

56. Sharq, Memoirs, 302.

57. Maley and Saikal, Political Order in Post-Communist Afghanistan, 27.

58. Ibid., 28.

59. Ibid., 24.

60. Kakar, “Central Asia.”

61. Maley and Saikal, Political Order in Post-Communist Afghanistan, 27.

62. Ibid., 26.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

67. Kakar, “The Policy of Intrigues,” 12.

68. Kakar, “The Policy of Intrigues,” 12; Yusufzai, “Dostum.”

69. Kakar, “The Policy of Intrigues,” 17.

70. Along with Nawaz Sharif, other foreign dignitaries who participated in the Peshawar meeting were the governor of the Northwest Frontier Province; Siddiq Kanju, minister of state without portfolio; General Asif Nawaz, Pakistan’s chief of staff; General Javid Nassir, chief of the ISI; Mehr Mosawi, Iran’s roving ambassador; the ambassdors of Iran and Saudi Arabia in Islamabad; Turkey al Faisal, chief of the intelligence service of Saudi Arabia; and Benon Sevan. After Helal, Hekmatyar’s representative, walked out of the meeting, the Afghan leaders present were Khalis, Sayyaf, Mohammadi, Rabbani, Gailani, and Mojaddidi.

71. Kakar, “The Success of the Failed Babrak Karmal,” Mujahid Wolas (newspaper), June 1992, 4.

72. Rais, “Afghanistan and Regional Security,” 82.

73. A. Shinwari, “Afghanistan—two years of mujahideen’s rule,” Afghanistan Forum, July 1994, 7. The article first appeared in The Frontier Posts, 10 May 1994. Marwat even holds that not only the Peshawar Accords but “all accords proved to be the license given by vested interests to the mujahideen leaders for killing and [destroying] their own people and country.” F. R. Marwat, “Waiting for the U.N.,” Writers’ Union of Free Afghanistan, July-August 1994, 48.

74. Kakar, “Success of Babrak Karmal,” 2.

75. Anonymous, “From Peshawar to Kabul,” Rastgoyan, Journal of the National Salvation Front 4, no. 4 (1992): 3.

76. Ibid.

77. S. M. Maiwand, The Maiwand Trust (New Delhi), 10 May 1992, 4. I have drawn throughout on this informative and trustworthy weekly newsletter for the Mojaddidi period.

78. Ibid.

79. Maiwand Trust, 17 May 1992, 6.

80. Supreme Court of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, “Fatwa on Veil,” Kabul, 1993, 36.

81. BEBT, “Note on Events in Kabul” (in Pashto), December 1993. A manuscript by an insider, 7, 8.

82. Maiwand Trust, 17 May 1992, 5.

83. BEBT, “Note on Events in Kabul,” 8.

84. H. Azizi, “Guardianship or Looting of a City?” Afghanistan [Journal] (Peshawar), April 1994, 66.

85. For details, see S. Kh. Hashemyan, “The End of Two Months of Blood, and the Start of Four Months of Troubles,” Afghanistan Mirror, special bulletin, 29 June 1992.

86. A. R. Dostum, statement in the Constituent Assembly of the National and Islamic Movement, Mazar, 31 May 1992, 2.

87. Bisharat, “Stormy Developments,” 10. For a list of senior Parchami officers in the army of the Islamic State, see Peace (monthly newspaper), December 1993, 4.

88. Interview with Mawlawi M. Zarif, Mujahid Wolas (newspaper), November-December 1993, 1.

89. Ermacora, “Human Rights in Afghanistan,” 32.

90. Rashid, “Green Revolutionary,” 19.

91. For comments on the Islamabad Accords, see Kakar, “Time for Choice,” 2-9.

92. For details, see Gh. Parwani, “The Jalalabad Accords,” Writers’ Union of Free Afghanistan, May 1993, 7; “New Peace Accords Concluded in Jalalabad,” Afghanistan Forum, July 1993, 6.

93. “Strange Calm in Kabul,” Afghanistan Forum, November 1993, 10.

94. M. K. Momand, “My Observations,” Sabawoon [Journal] (California), July 1994, 21. In a letter sent in January 1994 from Kabul the writer states: “To the people of Kabul there no longer exists either a lion [Mas’ud] or an amiror a hero. They are all thieves and violators of people’s honor and property. Mas’ud’s men are illiterate Panjsheri youth who do not even know how to pray and observe the commands of Islam. They know nothing else but to engage in homosexuality and make the boys and girls dance for them. They steal people’s property and kidnap their children. Hekmatyar’s men, who are older than Mas’ud’s men, respect people’s honor, but their rockets have destroyed much of Kabul. In fact, their rockets and the aircraft and bombs of Mas’ud have ravaged Kabul. Dostum’s men are all addicted to hashish (chars); they are all homosexuals, burglars, and criminals. Even their officers cannot control them. Just like Mas’ud’s men, they also do as they please.” Qari Abdullah in Peace (monthly newspaper), 15 March 1994, 4.

95. A. Safi, former member of parliament from Tagab, personal comunication, December 1993. In the Tagab round of fighting Mas’ud paid 100,000 afghanis, and Hekmatyar paid from 1,200 to 2,000 Pakistani rupees a month to each of their recruits. One rupee equalled 95 afghanis. Mas’ud had advantages over his rivals in money matters. According to a commander of Mas’ud, “I would spend 20 million afghanis on each of the military posts per week.” Also, according to him, “once, shortly after 20 billion afghanis had arrived from Moscow, these were all taken out of the bank for military purposes.” Anonymous, [tb“Why and How the War in Kabul Started,” Afghanistan Journal, April 1994, 10.

96. D. Sahari, “Afghanistan and the Islamic World,” Mujahid Wolas (newspaper), January-February 1994, 2.

97. Afghanistan Forum, January 1994, 7.

98. “Why and How the War Started,” 72.

99. Ibid.

100. Afghanistan Forum, March 1994, 13.

101. “Why and How the War Started,” 72.

102. Interview with Hekmatyar, Shafaq (newspaper), May 1994, 3. For details see A. H. Ahady, “An Evaluation of the Four Main Peace Plans for Afghanistan,” Afghan Millat (newspaper), Peshawar (21 July 1994).

103. Statement by Rabbani, Jam’iyyat (newspaper), May 1994, 3.

104. S. Coll, “The Agony of Victory,” Afghanistan Forum, March 1994, 16.

105. Z. Abbas, “The Battle for Kabul”, Afghanistan Forum, May 1994, 9. According to S. Mojaddidi, “Mas’ud has gathered around him a number of companions who hold that the Pashtuns have ruled over us for years, and now it was time we ruled over them”; Shafaq (newspaper), May 1994, 3.

106. Abbas, “Battle for Kabul,” Afghanistan Forum, 9.

107. Ibid. In particular, the loss in November 1993 to Dostum of the Sher Khan Post on the Oxus at the instigation of Mas’ud by a commander of the Islamic Union became the last straw in the coalition between Dostum and Mas’ud. See “Why and How the War Started,” 9.

108. B. Rumer and E. Rumer, “Who Will Stop the Next Yugoslavia?” World Monitor, November 1992, 38; Malik, “Contemporary South and Central Asian Politics,” Asian Survey, October 1992, 901. Masu’d, who “dreams of a pan-Tajik constituency for himself,” is backing Tajik rebels against the Moscow-installed government in Doshanbay, the capital of Tajikistan. A. Rashid, “Battle for the North,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 31 March 1994, 23.

109. Anonymous, “Central Asia: The Silk Road Catches Fire,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 December 1992, 45, 46.

110. D. Sahari, “Afghanistan and the Islamic World,” Mujahid Wolas (newspaper), no. 11-12 (January-February 1994), 2.

111. Interview with Rabbani, Afghanistan Forum, March 1994, 26.

112. In Kabul an official spokesman claimed, “We have clear-cut evidence about direct interference by Uzbekistan in the Kabul fighting”; ibid., 20.

113. A. R. Safi, former member of parliament from Shiberghan, personal communication, February 1994.

114. Ibid.

115. “Message to the Kunduz Commanders,” Writers’ Union of Free Afghanistan, 4 May 1994, 1.

116. Yousaf and Adkin, Bear Trap, 142.

117. N. Majruh, personal communication, June 1994.

118. Interview with Q. M. A. Wiqad, Writers’ Union of Free Afghanistan, 30 March 1994, 8.

119. BEBT, “Note on Events in Kabul,” 9.

120. R. Yusufzai, International News (Peshawar), 3 November 1993, 21.

121. T. Weiner, “Blowback from the Afghan Battlefield,” New York Times Magazine, 13 March 1994, 53.

122. Interview with Q. M. A. Wiqad, Writers’ Union of Free Afghanistan, 30 March 94, 8.

123. Sahari, “Afghanistan and the Islamic World,” 2.

124. S. Yarzay, “Problems and Fighting in Kabul,” Writers’ Union of Free Afghanistan, 20 July 1994, 6; Z. Durani, “What is Going on in Kabul?” Writers’ Union of Free Afghanistan, 2 August 1994, 7.

125. Momand, “My Observations,” 21.

126. M. Shindanday, “The Tyrannized and Powerless Afghans,” Writers’ Union of Free Afghanistan, 20 July 1994, 6.

127. Sahari, “Afghanistan and the Islamic World,” 2. “From the city of Mazar to the frontier post in Torkham the Islamic groups have set up customs posts (pataks). In each of these posts each group levies tolls on a loaded truck, ranging from twenty thousand to over a million afghanis. Because of insecurity trucks now go in caravans as the caravans of men, camels, and horses went in the Middle Ages. It now takes about twenty days for a caravan to reach Torkham from Mazar, whereas before the communist coup in 1978 it took only a day for a truck to make the journey. From Mahipar, east of Kabul, to Torkham twenty-eight such posts are in place. This part, which is the worst, is called the Looting Highway (Shahrah-e-Choor). A man who had made the journey from Mazar to Torkham with a caravan has been quoted as saying ‘The situation of the highway from the hydroelectric dam of Mahipar to Sarobi is totally disappointing. In each bend of the road one and even two customs posts operate. In these posts rusty, ruthless, and tyrannical men, seen often with wild and long hair and beards, have come together. To them it is useless to plead and implore. Instead of God, the Prophet, the Quran, and the love of parents they recognize money. For them it is ordinary to curse, insult, and beat a passenger and bring down his belongings and food. An ordinary man of them can stop a truck and even a caravan with impunity for days and beat a passenger whom he dislikes to the limit of death. Most of these posts belong to major groups.’ Some among them are, of course, pious, but the majority are such as described. It is because of the heavy tolls that in Kabul a sack of wheat flour [70 kilograms] is sold for one hundred thousand afghanis, a staggering amount. The pious muslims now say that Doomsday is near.” Shahbaz, “Mazar-e-Sharif—Torkham,” Writers Union of Free Afghanistan, 7 September 1994, 6.

128. “Interview with the Mawlawi of Tarakhel,” Afghanistan (Journal), April 1994, 41. The bickering among the Islamic groups is harming Afghanistan. Internally, it acts as a divisive force, subverting the process of reunification and reconstruction. Abroad, it is looked on as a symbol of Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism, intolerance, and radicalism. This is why Afghanistan has plummeted from a global flash point to a local affair. From a major catalyst that initiated the disintegration of the Soviet Union, it has developed into a “self-destructive inter-Afghan affair, threatening to split Afghanistan.” Marwat, “Waiting for the U.N.,” 48.

129. Momand, “My Observations,” 24.

130. Quoted in Sahari, “Afghanistan and the Islamic World,” 2.

131. Statement by M. A. Nae’em, Writers’ Union of Free Afghanistan, 24 April 1994, 2.

132. R. Yusufzai, “Zahir Shah Option Resurfaces in Search for Afghan Peace,” The Breeze of Freedom (journal), no. 4 (Mar.-Apr. 1994): 38.

133. H. Naweed, interview with R. Oakley, Writers’ Union of Free Afghanistan, nos. 22-23 (8 June 1994), 7.

134. N. M. Kamrany, personal communication, June 1994. Kamrany is a professor of economics at the University of California, Los Angeles.

135. Weiner, “Blowback,” 53.

136. Ibid. According to a U.S. satellite survey, 19,470 hectares were cultivated in poppies during the 1991-92 season in Afghanistan. The Breeze of Freedom (journal), no. 4 (Mar.-Apr. 1994): 63.

137. Quoted in the San Diego Union-Tribune, 5 July 1994, A12.

138. Quoted in Weiner, “Blowback,” 53.