1. Jorge Luis Borges, "The Lottery in Babylon," in his Labyrinths , ed. Donald A. Yates and James E. Irby (New York: New Directions, 1964), 30, 34. [BACK]

2. Barbara Goodwin, Justice by Lottery (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). [BACK]

3. James Wycliffe Headlam-Morley, Election by Lot at Athens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933), 2. [BACK]

4. E. S. Staveley, Greek and Roman Voting and Elections (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), 61-72. [BACK]

5. Calabresi and Bobbitt took this phrase from William Arrowsmith, who speaks of "a nightmare of justice in which the assertion of any right involves a further wrong, in which fate is set against fate in an intolerable necessary sequence of violence." See his Tragedy: Vision and Form , ed. William Corrigan (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing, 1965), 332. [BACK]

6. Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt, Tragic Choices (New York: Norton, 1978), 18, 41, 44. [BACK]

7. Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 18. [BACK]

8. Robert Nozick (a philosopher I never expect to agree with!) has recently argued that "many of philosophy's traditional problems have turned out to be intractable and resistant to rational resolution [because] these problems may result from attempts to extend rationality beyond its delimited evolutionary function." Among those problems he includes the problem of "justifying goals." See his The Nature of Rationality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), esp. 133-139. [BACK]

9. Bernard Williams, Moral Luck , and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985). See also the important essay by Thomas Nagel, "Moral Luck" (in which he discusses our "fractional" contribution to the effects of our action), in Mortal Questions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979). For a collection of essays on this subject, see Moral Luck , ed. Daniel Statman (Albany: SUNY Press, 1993). Relatedly, also see Judith Shklar's brilliant analysis of the unstable distinction between "misfortune" and ''injustice" in The Faces of Injustice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990). [BACK]

10. Williams's example (after Charles Fried's) is the absurdity of justification when a man saves his wife rather than a stranger when those two are in equal peril. [BACK]

11. This is, I think, a fairly standard summary of Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and Critique of Practical Reason (1788). [BACK]

12. See Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), and Solomonic Judge -

ments: Studies in the Limitations of Rationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Quotation from Solomonic Judgements , 121. [BACK]

13. It might seem odd to speak of Christian theology in terms of luck, but here I claim the precedent of Bernard Williams, who writes, "the idea that one's whole life can in some such way be rendered immune to luck has perhaps rarely prevailed (it did not prevail, for instance, in mainstream Christianity)." See Moral Luck , 20. Also, we might want to consider the intimate ties between Christianity and magic, analyzed by Keith Thomas and David Hall, among others. See Keith Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic (New York: Scribners, 1971); David D. Hall, Worlds of Wonder, Days of Judgment: Popular Religious Belief in Early New England (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989). [BACK]

14. Jonathan Edwards, "God Glorified in Man's Dependence," in The Works of President Edwards , vol. 4, Containing Forty Sermons on Various Subjects (New York: Leavitt and Allen, 1858), 172. This sermon, delivered before an expectant Boston audience in 1731, was the first sermon published by Edwards. [BACK]

15. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals , trans. H. J. Paton (New York: Harper, 1964), 57. [BACK]

16. For a classic statement, see David Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930). For a vigorous defense of desert and a response to Rawls, see George Sher, Desert (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987). Robert Nozick, in the face of Rawls's argument against desert, has retreated however to the weaker claim of "entitlement" as the ground of distributive justice. See Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 185-231. [BACK]

17. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 310-315, quotation from 314. [BACK]

18. Ibid., 75. [BACK]

19. Ibid., 74. [BACK]

20. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia , 219. [BACK]

21. Rawls, A Theory of Justice , 3. [BACK]

22. Ibid., 12. [BACK]

23. In his most recent work, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), Rawls has put considerable distance between himself and Kant. He insists, for example, that justice as fairness is "political constructivism," as opposed to Kant's "moral constructivism." However, the difference here is a difference in scope, not a difference in their commitment to the categorical. [BACK]

24. In Political Liberalism , Rawls argues that much of the criticism directed at his abstract conception of the person comes from not seeing the veil of ignorance as a hypothetical construct. To my mind, however, this abstractness governs not only the specific device of the veil of ignorance but also his general conception of political personhood. [BACK]

25. Rawls, A Theory of Justice , 15. [BACK]

26. Ibid., 47. See also 491, where Rawls once again compares ethical understanding to grammatical knowledge. [BACK]

27. Noam Chomsky, Syntactic Structures (The Hague: Mouton, 1957), 5. [BACK]

28. A cursory list of semantic theorists would include Rudolf Carnap, Donald Davidson, Michael Dummett, Hilary Putnam, W. V. Quine, Alfred Tarski, the later Wittgenstein, and Paul Ziff. Some of these, needless to say, themselves have complicated arguments about the analyzability of semantics. (Quine, for example, argues against the factuality of semantics in favor of its indeterminacy.) [BACK]

29. Chomsky, Syntactic Structures , 100, 101, 106. [BACK]

30. Chomsky's own impatience with semantics, of course, has not prevented other Chomskian linguists from trying to work out a generative semantic theory. See, for example, Jerrold J. Katz and Jerry A. Fodor, "The Structure of a Semantic Theory," in The Structure of Language: Readings in the Philosophy of Language , ed. Jerry A. Fodor and Jerrold J. Katz (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), 479-518. [BACK]

31. For that reason, poetry, a linguistic performance if ever there is one, would also make no analytic sense to Chomsky. John Hollander seems to have this in mind when he incorporates a sentence Chomsky finds nonsensical ("Colorless green ideas sleep furiously") into his poem "Coiled Alizarine," his playful tribute and gentle rebuke to Chomsky. [BACK]

32. This point emerges most clearly in Chomsky's critique of Paul Grice, Peter Strawson, and especially John Searle. See Chomsky, "The Object of Inquiry," in his Reflections on Language (New York: Pantheon, 1975), esp. 53-77. For a useful (and complexly qualifying) account of this debate, see Michael Dummett, "Language and Communication," in Reflections on Chomsky , ed. Alexander George (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 192-212. [BACK]

33. Noam Chomsky, Cartesian Linguistics: A Chapter in the History of Rationalist Thought (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), and Language and Mind , enlarged ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972), 1-23. [BACK]

34. Chomsky, Language and Mind , 12. [BACK]

35. Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965), 58. [BACK]

36. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations , trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 3rd ed. (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1958), §373. [BACK]

37. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar , ed. Rush Rhees, trans. Anthony Kenny (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974), part 1, §§104, 23. [BACK]

38. Ibid., part 1, §133. [BACK]

39. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations , §19. [BACK]

40. J. S. Thompson, "The Reactionary Idealist Foundation of Noam Chomsky's Linguistics," Literature and Ideology 4 (1969): 1-20. [BACK]

41. "Linguistics and Politics: Interview with Noam Chomsky," New Left Review 57 (September-October 1969): 21-34, quotation from 31-32. [BACK]

42. Chomsky, "On Cognitive Capacity," in Reflections on Language , 4. [BACK]

43. On the whole, Chomsky is much more impressed by Descartes than he is by Kant, whom he tends to assimilate into the Cartesian tradition, noting that Kant's ideas are "rather similar" to the "rich and varied work of seventeenth-century rationalists." See Reflections on Language , 7, also 131. [BACK]

44. Chomsky's commitment to civil disobedience is well known. For Rawls's detailed discussion of this subject, see A Theory of Justice , 363-391. [BACK]

45. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus , trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), 6.341. [BACK]

46. Rawls himself has now come to concede this point. In Political Liberalism , acknowledging that his theory of justice is not and cannot be a comprehensive doctrine, he forthrightly says, "The idea of political justice does not cover everything, nor should we expect it to." And he goes on, "Political justice needs always to be complemented by other virtues" (21). [BACK]

47. Rawls, A Theory of Justice , 494-495. [BACK]

48. Gregory Vlastos, "The Individual as Object of Love in Plato's Dialogues," in his Platonic Studies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 1-34, quotation from 32. [BACK]

49. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 181. [BACK]

50. Rawls, A Theory of Justice , 191. Susan Moller Okin has critiqued this neglect of feeling in Rawls as part of his Kantian heritage. See Okin, "Reason and Feeling in Thinking about Justice," Ethics 99 (1989): 229-249. See also her Justice, Gender, and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989). Okin's critique, however, does not extend to the ideal of justice, which remains for her a foundational ideal. [BACK]

51. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals , passim, quotation from 66. [BACK]

52. Ibid., 66. [BACK]

53. Walt Whitman, "Song of Myself," in Leaves of Grass: The First (1855) Edition , ed. Malcolm Cowley (New York: Viking, 1959), 28, ellipses in original. All subsequent citations to this edition will appear in the text. [BACK]

54. My argument here parallels Philip Fisher's, in his discussion of Whitman's democratic poetics as an "aesthetics of the social space." See Fisher, "Democratic Social Space: Whitman, Melville, and the Promise of American Transparency," Representations , no. 24 (1988): 60-101. [BACK]

55. Allen Grossman has written that Whitman's is "a world composed of a limitless series of brilliant finite events each of which imposed closure at the grammatical end of its account." See his "The Poetics of Union in Whitman and Lincoln," in The American Renaissance Reconsidered: Selected Papers from the English Institute, 1982-83 , ed. Walter Benn Michaels and Donald E. Pease (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 183-208, quotation from 189. [BACK]

56. Allen Grossman is exactly right, I think, when he writes that "the fullness of articulation of Whitman's poem" depends "on the failed predecessor system of which all that survives is love without an object" (ibid., 199). [BACK]

57. For a fine reading of this detail, see Karen Sanchez-Eppler, Touching Liberty: Abolition, Feminism, and the Politics of the Body (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 77. [BACK]

58. Michael Sandel, "The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self," Political Theory 12 (1984): 81-96. [BACK]

59. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals , 105. [BACK]

60. The literature on this subject is formidable. See, for example, Paul Ziff, Semantic Analysis (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960); Jerry A. Fodor and Jerrold J. Katz, "The Structure of a Semantic Theory," Language 39 (1963): 170-210; reprinted in The Structure of Language , ed. Fodor and Katz, 479-518. For more recent discussions, see Norbert Hornstein, "Meaning and the Mental: The Problem of Semantics after Chomsky," in Reflections on Chomsky , ed. George, 23-40, and Dummett, ''Language and Communication." [BACK]

61. John Searle, "Chomsky's Revolution in Linguistics," The New York Review of Books June 29, 1972, 16-24, reprinted in On Noam Chomsky , ed. Gilbert Harman (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press, 1974), 2-33. [BACK]

62. J. L. Austin, "A Plea for Excuses," Philosophical Papers , 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 201. [BACK]

63. Mikhail Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination , ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 293. [BACK]

64. Quoted by Horace Traubel in his foreword to The American Primer (1904; rpt. Stevens Point, Wis.: Holy Cow! Press, 1987), viii-ix. [BACK]

65. Martha C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986). [BACK]

66. The charge of sentimentalism, influentially leveled by Ann Douglas in her The Feminization of American Culture (New York: Knopf, 1977), has actually not been disputed by Jane Tompkins in her equally influential defense of the women writers in Sensational Designs: The Cultural Work of American Fiction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). [BACK]

67. Susan Warner, The Wide, Wide World (1850; rpt. New York: Feminist Press, 1987), 208. All subsequent citations to this edition will appear in the text. [BACK]

68. Warner's father was ruined in the panic of 1837, and the family had to move from New York to Constitution Island, where Warner began writing novels to support her family and where she and her sister Anna remained for the rest of their lives. [BACK]

69. The Catholic Church refers to Augustine as Doctor Gratiae . As Albert C. Outler notes in his introduction to Augustine, "The central theme in all of Augustine's writings is the sovereign God of grace and the sovereign grace of God." See Confessions and Enchiridion , ed. and trans. Albert C. Outler (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1955), 14. See also Jaroslav Pelikan's excellent discussion of Augustine's "paradox of grace" in The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100-600) , vol. 1 of The Christian Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 292-307. [BACK]

70. Augustine, Enchiridion , in Confessions and Enchiridion , §107 (404). [BACK]

71. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine , trans. D. W. Robertson (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958), 23. [BACK]

72. Augustine, Enchiridion , §§99, 107 (pp. 398, 404). The quotation "God maketh one vessel for honorable, another for ignoble use" is from Proverbs 8:35. [BACK]

73. Jaroslav Pelikan, The Growth of Medieval Theology (600-1300), vol. 2 of The Christian Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 81. My discussion of Augustine and of Luther (to follow) is heavily indebted to this magisterial study. [BACK]

74. Martin Luther, Lectures on the First Epistle of St. John (1527), trans. Walter A. Hansen, Luther's Works (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1956), 30:300. [BACK]

75. The phrase, "I, Martin Luther, Augustinian," appeared in the letter to Mayor Muhlphordt, appended to The Freedom of a Christian (1520), trans. W. A. Lambert, rev. Harold J. Grimm, Luther's Works , 31:333. [BACK]

76. Martin Luther, Lectures on Galatians, Chapters 1-4 (1535), trans. Jaroslav Pelikan, Luther's Works , 26:377. [BACK]

77. The verse is "And because you are sons, God has sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts" (Galatians 4:6). [BACK]

78. Luther, Lectures on Galatians, Chapters 1-4 , 386-387, 380, 386, 387. [BACK]

79. Ibid., 375. [BACK]

80. The Bondage of the Will , a polemic against Erasmus, was considered by Luther himself to be one of his two or three best works. [BACK]

81. Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will (1525), trans. Philip S. Watson, Luther's Works , 33:37, 38, 43, 291. [BACK]

82. John Calvin, The Institutes of the Christian Religion , ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), 205-212. [BACK]

83. As Philip S. Watson points out in his notes to The Bondage of the Will , Luther is actually using the word "contingent" rather imprecisely, since he interprets "contingency" as virtually equivalent to "chance,'' as the Schoolmen did not. In Scholastic theology a distinction is made between necessitas consequentiae ("necessity of consequence") and necessitas consequentis ("necessity of the thing consequent"). The latter is absolute, but the former is conditional and includes contingency as part of its workings. Luther's imprecision has been noted by Erasmus as well, who, in his reply, said that most Christian theologians "define 'contingent' rather more accurately than you do." [BACK]

84. Luther, Lectures on Galatians, Chapters 1-4 , 226-227. [BACK]

85. Luther, Lectures on the First Epistle of St. John , 311. [BACK]

86. Ibid. [BACK]

87. Luther, Lectures on Galatians, Chapters 1-4 , 231, 226. [BACK]

88. Against Max Weber's emphasis on the connection between Reformation theology and economic discipline (in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism ), Michael Walzer emphasizes the connection between Reformation theology and political discipline. See Walzer, The Revolution of the Saints (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), quotation from 25-26. [BACK]

89. Since much of my discussion will appear as a critique of Luther, I want to take this opportunity to acknowledge an aspect of Luther not emphasized in this chapter. In the same commentary on Galatians 4:6 in which Luther so frequently used the word "certainty," he also wrote movingly about the "sigh" uttered by the Holy Spirit when Moses, pursued by the

Egyptians, "saw the very presence of death in the water and wherever he turned his gaze," and became "thoroughly terrified." Then the Holy Spirit

emits what seems to us to be some sort of sob and sigh of the heart; but in the sight of God this is a loud cry and a sigh too deep for words. . . . Then the Father says: "I do not hear anything in the whole world except this single sigh, which is such a loud cry in My ears that it fills heaven and earth and drowns out all the cries of everything else." You will notice that Paul does not say that the Spirit intercedes for us in temptation with a long prayer, but that He intercedes with a sigh.

See Lectures on Galatians, Chapters 1-4 , 384-385. [BACK]

90. Sacvan Bercovitch, The American Jeremiad (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978). [BACK]

91. Luther, Lectures on Galatians, Chapters 1-4 , 124, 127, 128. [BACK]

92. Augustine, Confessions , in Confessions and Enchiridion , Book 10, §6 (pp. 205-206). [BACK]

93. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine , 9, 18, 10. Augustine here also distinguishes between two kinds of love, the love that uses and the love that enjoys, our relation to God being inimitably a case of the latter but also supremely a case of the latter. [BACK]

94. Interestingly, Luther did critique Augustine for giving too little attention to faith: "In Augustine one finds too little faith, in Jerome none at all. No one among the ancient teachers is sincere to the extent that he teaches the pure faith" ( Lectures on the First Epistle of St. John , 313). [BACK]

95. Luther, Lectures on Galatians, Chapters 1-4 , 127, 129. [BACK]

96. Ibid., 129. [BACK]

97. Luther, The Freedom of a Christian , 367. [BACK]

98. Edward Taylor, Preparatory Meditations , First Series, no. 12, in The Poems of Edward Taylor , ed. Donald E. Stanford (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), 25. [BACK]

99. Of course, Taylor also wrote (and perhaps is better known for) many other poems, not about the delights of loving God but about a debilitating sense of personal unworthiness. [BACK]

100. Stanley Fish argues for the importance of Augustine to Donne and Herbert; Louis Martz argues for the importance of the medieval heritage to metaphysical poetry in general; Barbara Kiefer Lewalski argues against both Fish and Martz in presenting the metaphysical poets not as the tag-ends of medieval or Counter Reformation spirituality, but as pioneers of a Protestant poetics. However, since this Protestant poetics owes its vitality to the continuing presence of Augustine and to the poetic genres of the Bible, Lewalski's work actually supports my point here about the "historical memory" of Protestantism. See Fish, Self-Consuming Artifacts (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); Martz, The Poetry of Meditation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954); Lewalski, Protestant Poetics and the Seventeenth-Century Religious Lyric (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). [BACK]

101. David Hall, Worlds of Wonder, Days of Judgment , 11, and "The World

of Print and Collective Mentality in Seventeenth-Century New England," in New Directions in American Intellectual History , ed. John Higham and Paul Conkin (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), 169. [BACK]

102. Sydney E. Ahlstrom, introduction to Theology in America (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), 24. [BACK]

103. Perry Miller, The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century (New York: Macmillan, 1939), 3-34. [BACK]

104. For an account of the "multivocal" religious culture in Massachusetts, see Janice Knight, Orthodoxies in Massachusetts (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994). For an account of the heterogeneity of popular religion, see Jon Butler, Awash in a Sea of Faith: Christianizing the American People (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990). [BACK]

105. Ahlstrom, introduction to Theology in America , 23. [BACK]

106. Douglas, The Feminization of American Culture , 74-75. [BACK]

107. For a suggestive reading of Edwards along these lines, see Sandra Gustafson, "Jonathan Edwards and the Reconstruction of 'Feminine' Speech," American Literary History 6 (1994): 185-212. [BACK]

108. Jonathan Edwards, A Treatise Concerning Religious Affections , ed. John E. Smith, vol. 2 of Works of Jonathan Edwards (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), 107, 108. [BACK]

109. Ibid., 100. [BACK]

110. Ibid., 96. [BACK]

111. To a modern reader, Locke uses the word "preference" in a rather peculiar way. A typical construction is: a man "prefers his not falling to falling," or "a Man would preferr flying to walking." In other words, the phenomenon of preference is related to the question of free agency. But Locke is also careful to distinguish between preference and volition ("Preference, which seems perhaps best to express the Act of Volition, does it not precisely"). See An Essay Concerning Human Understanding , ed. Peter H. Nidditch (1690; rpt. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), II.xxi.5-15 (236-241). Edwards, on the other hand, uses the word "preference'' in a way much closer to our modern usage, relating it, that is, to our likes and dislikes. Perry Miller has presented Locke as the "central and decisive event" in Edwards's intellectual life. This view has now been challenged, especially by Norman Fiering. See Miller, Jonathan Edwards (New York: William Sloane, 1949), 52; Fiering, Jonathan Edwards's Moral Thought and Its British Context (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 35-40. [BACK]

113. In this sense, Edwards's position is actually surprising close to Hobbes's. Hobbes writes, "Every man, for his own part, calleth that which pleaseth, and is delightful to himself, good; and that evil which displeaseth him. . . . And as we call good and evil the things that please and displease; so call we goodness and badness, the qualities or powers whereby they do it." See Hobbes, The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury , ed. Sir William Molesworth (Aalen, Germany: Scientia, 1962), 4:32. [BACK]

114. Jonathan Edwards, Concerning the End for Which God Created the World , in Ethical Writings , ed. Paul Ramsey, vol 8. of Works of Jonathan Edwards (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 422. [BACK]

115. Ibid., 446. [BACK]

116. Jonathan Edwards, "Love More Excellent than Extraordinary Gifts of the Spirit" (sermon), in Ethical Writings , 160. [BACK]

117. Edwards, Concerning the End , 419. [BACK]

118. Alan Heimert, Religion and the American Mind: From the Great Awakening to the Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), 108-112; Fiering, Jonathan Edwards's Moral Thought , 126. [BACK]

119. Edwards, The Nature of True Virtue , in Ethical Writings , 568. [BACK]

120. Ibid., 569, italics in original. [BACK]

121. Edwards defines "a sense of desert " as "that sense of justice , before spoken of, consisting in an apprehension of that secondary beauty that lies in uniformity and proportion. . . . Which is indeed a kind of moral sense, or sense of a beauty in moral things. But, as was before shown, it is a moral sense of a secondary kind, and is entirely different from a sense or relish of the original essential beauty of true virtue" (ibid., 582, italics in original). [BACK]

122. Ibid., 573. I should point out, of course, that Edwards is not unguilty of aestheticism himself, since he defines "true virtue" as that which "is beautiful by a general beauty" (540). [BACK]

123. Ibid., 540. [BACK]