1. The role of union organizations will be considered in some detail, especially in relation to efforts to control access to employment. However, this is not a study of farm worker unions per se (the United Farm Workers Union, AFL-CIO). While a thorough study of the UFW remains to be done, there are recent works that address the history and the dynamics of farm worker movements; see, for example, Thomas and Friedland, 1982; Friedland and Thomas, 1974; Majka and Majka, 1982; Jenkins and Perrow, 1977; and Thomas, 1981. The UFW and other unions will be drawn into this analysis where their inclusion is crucial for historical or analytic purposes. [BACK]

2. The impetus for this research design came from both the nature of the problems being studied and from the inspiration provided by three other works that attempted to combine structural and interactional analysis, i.e., Becker, Geer, Hughes, and Strauss ( Boys in White , 1961); Lipset, Trow, and Coleman ( Union Democracy , 1956); and Burawoy ( Manufacturing Consent , 1979). [BACK]

3. This name and the name given to the other major companies studied (Miracle Vegetable, Verde Lettuce, and Salad Giant) are fictitious. The real names are masked in order to protect the identities of individuals who are employed by these companies and who feared reprisal should their remarks be exposed. I have given the companies names that differ considerably from their real ones and have substituted pseudonyms for all respondents. The choice of Miracle Vegetable Company for fieldwork was somewhat arbitrary. During the course of the year's study, a strike among unionized lettuce workers began. To avoid the hazards associated with strikebreaking and the likely bias resulting from the influx of less experienced workers, I chose to work at a company still under contract with a union not participating in the strike. However, being in the

fields and in the labor camps during that time enabled me to monitor the strike and to interview workers who had walked out. [BACK]

1. The bottom tier firms are not really competitive of course with the top tier firms in the case of contract production. Rather the significance of the relationship resides in the fact that it stands in contrast to the traditional alternative of marketing cooperatives for smaller firms. In this sense, a larger firm, not a cooperative, has centralized control over capital and thus determines the allocation of market returns. While the contract relationship does not allow the smaller firm to compete with the larger, in order for the relationship to be maintained the smaller firm must also be maintained. The smaller firms can, and most often do, use the rent to sustain themselves and to finance continued production of other commodities. Thus "yeoman" farmers are drawn into the structure of industrial production rather than being expelled from it. Granted, their subordinate position in the relationship seriously limits opportunities for further expansion, as was argued in chapter 2, but it also raises an important issue for further research. That is, if this kind of relationship is a durable one (as I suggest elsewhere [Thomas, 1977]), then one might rephrase the commonly asked question, "Why are small farms vanishing?" to ask instead, "Why are there so many small farms still around?" [BACK]

2. For a more detailed organizational analysis of one of these firms, see Fredrick's study, "Agribusiness in the Lettuce Fields" (1979), and Friedland, Barton, and Thomas (1981). [BACK]

3. Commuters, in contrast, are workers who have temporary passes to allow them daily entry into the United States. In the lettuce industry, these workers are of particular importance to production areas near the Mexican border, e.g., the Imperial Valley in California and the San Luis Valley in Arizona. Since these workers have limited access to work in the U.S., they are least likely to show up in production areas farther than 50-75 miles from the border. [BACK]

4. These figures are based on data presented in chapter 6 in tables 24 and 25. [BACK]

5. This is calculated on the basis of information supplied by the president of Miracle Vegetable Company. The company operates a total of 16 wrap machines valued at $125,000 each for a total investment of $2 million. [BACK]

1. As continues to be the practice today, firms harvest and market lettuce under different labels. The label names correspond to the quality of lettuce packed. For example, Miracle Vegetable markets lettuce under three labels: Imperial, Prince, and Viceroy, in order of descending quality. [BACK]

2. In company literature distributed to employees at this and other companies, the use of drugs and alcohol on the job are specifically prohibited. However, even at companies that prepare these employee booklets, most workers reported never having received the literature. In any case, only a small percentage of the workers I interviewed could read English or Spanish. [BACK]

3. Despite persistent requests made of a total of eleven firms, none would allow access to such data. Many of the firms expressed fear that they would lose competitive advantage should such data be revealed—even when assured that records would remain anonymous. Others flatly refused or suggested that the union might find the information useful. Also, even if companies were to divulge production figures, there would be no way legally to obtain verification of citizenship status from workers for the purpose of comparison. Attempts were also made to gain access to blind earnings records of United Farm Workers members through the union's accounting apparatus. Citing the urgency of preparations for contract negotiations, the UFW declined to participate in the study. It was later revealed to me during consultation with union staff that the UFW did not keep track of production, even for developing contract proposals. [BACK]

1. At the time of the interviews, Mondragon (whose name has been changed to protect his present position) worked for another lettuce producer in the Salinas Valley. His departure from Miracle came about as a result of the firm's having been raided by the Border Patrol in two consecutive months. The circumstances are recounted later in this section. However, Mondragon's testimony as to management practice was corroborated by former employees of the company. [BACK]

2. In addition, I had decided during the course of the strike not to openly engage in research or discussion with the strikebreaking workers. Given the turmoil and the emotions of the times, I felt it wise to pursue other avenues of data collection. [BACK]

3. Verde executives reported that the company had had some financial problems but refused to elaborate. Annual reports of the parent corporation describe in vague terms the position of the subsidiary but mask the extent of losses by aggregating sales and income figures for Verde with other associated subsidiaries. Therefore it is impossible to give an accurate picture of the actual profit/loss situation for the company. [BACK]

4. Promotion at Verde is no less restricted in its scope, however, than other companies. As in other companies, upward occupational mobility is limited to the fields. Though in theory a worker could rise in the ranks from fieldwork to maintenance or other technical employment, organizational obstacles block such movement. Most higher level jobs require that applicants speak and read English. The training needed for technical certification, e.g., a welder's license, is not provided by the company. Finally, jurisdictional boundaries between unions act to create exclusive occupational ladders, e.g., the distinction between field and nonfield work is simultaneously a boundary between the UFW and the Teamsters. [BACK]

5. Twenty-seven lettuce workers from Verde were interviewed at length during the course of the study. Fifteen had two or more years' seniority with the company while the remainder had less than two years. Because evidence of the two-tier system began to emerge only after a majority of the interviews had been conducted, I could not collect more specific data on earnings or work history for the entire group. Therefore, the material presented and the conclusions reached are based almost entirely on those interviews. [BACK]

1. See figure 2 in chapter 3. [BACK]

2. Salinas Californian , 9/20/79, and table 20. [BACK]

3. The use of technological change for the purpose of enhancing managerial control has been widely studied. For some recent examples, see Braverman (1975), Noble (1977), and Edwards (1979). [BACK]

4. See, among others, Blauner (1964), Chinoy (1955), Roy (1952), Burawoy (1979), and Braverman (1975). [BACK]

5. This sort of extended supervision through family members is by no means restricted to wrap machine crews. Examples can be found in small family businesses and other industries in which family labor is employed. In an earlier study of work organization on the

tomato harvesting machines, I found that some of the companies employed husbands as machine drivers and their wives as ''foreladies''; see Thomas (1977) and Friedland and Barton (1975). [BACK]

6. This is not to deny that some foremen flirt in order to pick up women in their crew. One foreman at Miracle, in particular, had a reputation for such behavior. As a result, women who worked on his crew were often suspected by others of sleeping with him. [BACK]

7. See the discussion of machine cost in chapter 3. [BACK]

8. For example, see Tepperman (1970); Balu and Jusenius (1976); U.S. Department of Labor (1975); Gubbels (1977); and Glazer and Waehrer (1977). [BACK]

9. I am grateful to Anne Fredricks for sharing this insight gained from her fieldwork in Wisconsin canneries. [BACK]

10. During the early morning hours when workers assembled in the company parking lot waiting for the buses to arrive, most conversation among the men was centered on the availability of work in other crews and companies and on the earnings of the ground crew workers. Not unlike the network-building described by Lipset et al. (1956:194-197) in Union Democracy , wrap crew workers attempted to strike up conversations and friendships with ground crew members in the hope of finding an "in" to those jobs. [BACK]