1. On this point, see Richard Wolin, The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. xi. [BACK]

2. For the locus classicus of Marx's view of ideology, see Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, Part One , ed. C. J. Arthur (New York: International Publishers, 1970). For a form of Marxism that maintains Marx's claim that ideology tends to conceal the state of society which would otherwise be transformed as a result of becoming aware of it, see Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics , trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1971). [BACK]

3. See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time , trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York and Evanston: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 60ff.

4. See ibid., p. 60.

5. Ibid., p. 51. [BACK]

3. See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time , trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York and Evanston: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 60ff.

4. See ibid., p. 60.

5. Ibid., p. 51. [BACK]

3. See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time , trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York and Evanston: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 60ff.

4. See ibid., p. 60.

5. Ibid., p. 51. [BACK]

6. For Heidegger's theory, which is crucial to his entire view of Being, see Being and Time , § 44, "Dasein, Disclosedness, and Truth," pp. 256-273. For criticism of Heidegger's supposed confusion of disclosure with truth, see Ernst Tugendhat, "Heideggers Idee von Wahrheit," in Heidegger: Perspektiven zur Deutung seines Werkes , ed. Otto Pöggeler (Köln and Berlin: Kiepenhauer and Witsch, 1969), pp. 286-297. See also Ernst Tugendhat, Der Wahrheitsbegriffbei Husserl und Heidegger (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1967). [BACK]

7. See Heidegger, Being and Time , p. 260.

8. See ibid., p. 264. [BACK]

7. See Heidegger, Being and Time , p. 260.

8. See ibid., p. 264. [BACK]

9. For discussion of the conception of concealment in Heidegger's theory, see Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics , trans. and ed. David E. Linge (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1977), p. 234. [BACK]

10. See Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings , ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 132. [BACK]

11. Martin Heidegger, On Time and Being , trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 69; Heidegger's emphases. [BACK]

12. Kant held that an original thinker is likely not to be aware of the nature of his or her own thought, which is only later established by epigones who bring out ideas applied but not completely understood by the original thinker. See

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Immanuel Kant, Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason , trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan and New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961), B 862, pp. 654-655. [BACK]

13. Heidegger's main work concerns, as its title suggests, the relation of Being and time. Although there is an immense literature concerning his thought, Dastur says that with the exception of a single dissertation, apparently none of it, besides her own recent work, directly addresses the topics of the temporality and of time. See Françoise Dastur, Heidegger et la question du temps (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1990), p. 126. [BACK]

14. See Heidegger, Being and Time , pp. 138-139.

15. See ibid., p. 62.

16. See ibid., § 32, pp. 188-194. [BACK]

14. See Heidegger, Being and Time , pp. 138-139.

15. See ibid., p. 62.

16. See ibid., § 32, pp. 188-194. [BACK]

14. See Heidegger, Being and Time , pp. 138-139.

15. See ibid., p. 62.

16. See ibid., § 32, pp. 188-194. [BACK]

17. This problem is ingredient in much of the later hermeneutic discussion, for instance in the work of Gadamer. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method , trans. Garrett Barden and John Cumming (New York: Crossroad, 1988). [BACK]

18. See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason , B 864, p. 655. [BACK]

19. See Heinrich W. Petzet, Auf einen Stern zugehen: Begegnungen mit Martin Heidegger 1929-1976 (Frankfurt a.M., 1983). [BACK]

20. For Heidegger's view of "destruction," see Martin Heidegger, Being and Time , § 6, "The Task of Destroying the History of Ontology." [BACK]

21. See John D. Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987), pp. 82-83. According to Dreyfus, Heidegger incompletely acknowledges his debt to Kierkegaard. See Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-WorM: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I (Cambridge, Mass., and London: MIT Press, 1991), p. 298. Dreyfus provides an extensive discussion of the relation of Heidegger to Kierkegaard. See Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World , pp. 283-340. [BACK]

22. See Jacques Taminiaux, "La présence de Nietzsche dans 'Etre et Temps.' "in " Etre et Temps" de Martin Heidegger. Questions de méthode et voies de recherche , ed. Jean-Pierre Cometti and Dominique Janicaud (Marseilles: Sud, 1989). pp. 59-76. [BACK]

23. See Michael Zimmerman, Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity. Technology, Politics, Art (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990). [BACK]

24. See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason , trans. Smith, B xiii, p. 20. [BACK]

25. For Ryle's view of a category mistake, which may well be derived from Heidegger, whose thought he admired, see Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949). [BACK]

26. For instance, in a recent letter to me Prof. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann specifically denied permission to see the manuscript of a lecture on technology, "Die Gefahr," delivered by Heidegger in Bremen in 1949, and already cited in the literature, on the grounds that none of Heidegger's Nachlass could be seen prior to publication. Heidegger's Beiträge zur Philosophie , his longest work, has recently been published. See Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe , vol.

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65, Beitr ä ge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis ), ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989). According to Thomä, there are at least two other unpublished manuscripts of comparable size in the Heidegger Archives. See Thomä, Die Zeit des Selbst (see introd., n. 6), pp. 761-762. [BACK]

27. Nazism is a form of totalitarianism. Heidegger is certainly not the only major thinker to adhere to totalitarianism. An example that comes readily to mind is the adherence of the Hungarian philosopher, Georg Lukács, to Stalinism. His justification of his adherence to Stalinism on the grounds that it was necessary to defeat Nazism is the obverse of hints in Heidegger's writings that Heidegger's Nazism was partially motivated by anticommunism. Heidegger's anticommunism was typical among conservative intellectuals and also part of National Socialist ideology. [BACK]

28. For instance, Derrida's limitation of his recent study of Heidegger's Nazism to Heidegger's relation to official, Hitlerian Nazism, simply excludes from consideration Heidegger's later interest in an ideal form of Nazism. See Jacques Derrida, De l'esprit: Heidegger et la question (Paris: Éditions Galilée, 1988). If for no other reason, Derrida's explanation that in 1933 Heidegger was himself prey to the metaphysics which he had not yet overcome in his Fundamen-talontologie is unconvincing in its failure to explain Heidegger's continued concern with Nazism in later years. [BACK]

29. For the concept of the turning, which Heidegger applies to his own thought, see ''The Letter on Humanism,'' in Heidegger, Basic Writings , p. 208. Derrida's interpretation of Heidegger's Fundamentalontologie as still not having overcome metaphysics represents the application to Heidegger's position of the critique that in this text Heidegger applies to humanism, particularly to Sartre. [BACK]

30. See "Only a God Can Save Us: Der Spiegel's Interview with Martin Heidegger," Philosophy Today 20 (Winter 1976): 275: "I gave a lecture course with the title, Poetizing and Thinking . This was in a certain sense a continuation of my Nietzsche lectures, that is to say, a confrontation with National Socialism." [BACK]

31. For the most recent, full-scale defense, see Silvio Vietta, Heideggers Kritik am Nationalsozialismus und an der Technik (Tübingen: Niemeyer Verlag, 1989). Wolin identifies an example of the politically evasive ways in which some Heideggerians describe their own actions in a review of Hans-Georg Gadamer's Philosophical Apprenticeships . See Sheldon Wolin, "Under Siege in the 'German Ivory Tower,' " New York Times Book Review , 28 July 1985. p. 12. [BACK]

32. For the passage in question, see Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics , trans. Ralph Mannheim (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 199. [BACK]

33. See Wolfgang Schirmacher, Technik und Gelassenheit (Freiburg: Alber, 1983), p. 25: "Ackerbau ist jetzt motorisierte Ernährungsindustrie, im Wesen das Selbe wie die Fabrikation von Leichen in Gaskammern und Vernichtungslagern, das Selbe wie die Blockade und Aushungerung von Läindern, das Selbe wie die Fabrikation von Wasserstoffbomben." [BACK]

34. For instance, Schneeberger's book, which is the first documentary study, was published by the author himself in order to protect against legal action from

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the Heidegger family. See Guido Schneeberger, Nachlese zu Heidegger: Dokumente zu seinem Leben und Denken (Bern, 1962). [BACK]