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Conclusion: On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy

For obvious reasons, the present discussion is, in fact must be, provisional. As part of our inability to understand the relation between thought and action, we do not comprehend the link between Heidegger the man and Heidegger the thinker. Any effort to elucidate this connection is forced to develop its own way of going about things, since there is no well-established procedure or even a firm idea of what that would look like. This discussion is further limited by the unfortunate fact that, even now, portions of Heidegger's corpus are still unavailable for scholarly study. We cannot exclude the possibility that writings or documents may later emerge which will alter our present picture of what we now know about Heidegger's Nazism. Since the documents are held by Heidegger's closest admirers, presumably everything is already released which tends to exculpate the master. It is more likely that future publication will chip away little by little at the surrounding wall his unconditional defenders have erected to shield him from critical discussion. A likely source of incriminating evidence is Heidegger's correspondence from his period as rector. It is no accident that perhaps alone of all the major thinkers, the publication of Heidegger's complete works will not include his correspondence.

The basic claims of this essay are that Heidegger's Nazism is influenced by a series of contemporary factors, particularly German Volk ideology, but is finally based on his philosophy; and that the later evolution of his philosophy in the period after his service as rector of the University of Freiburg cannot be understood without, in fact must be understood through, his continued interest in an ideal form of Nazism. Heidegger stressed the concept of the turning to describe the evolution of his thought. The relation between his philosophical thought and his Nazism can be understood as a series of three turnings: an initial turning on the basis of his philosophy to National Socialism as it existed, a turning in which social, political, and historical factors, including German Volk ideology, and Heidegger's own philosophy of Being come together; a second turning away from really existent National Socialism when Heidegger became aware that the rectorate had failed; and a third turning—still based on his personal and philosophical acceptance of the manifest destiny of the German Volk —toward an ideal form of Nazism, from which he never later averted his gaze, and whose acceptance influenced the later evolution of his theory of Being.

The framework proposed here provides a coherent, plausible reading of the relation between Heidegger's philosophical thought and his own philosophy. Yet in the present, overheated atmosphere, in which the


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political stakes are high, in which scholarly careers are tied to the defense of Heidegger the man and above all Heidegger the thinker, no reading can be judged squarely on its merits. It would be illusory to anticipate that even best possible study could produce widespread assent, least of all among those Heidegger scholars who, following the master's lead, have already worked out various strategies for damage control. Just as Heidegger repeatedly hinted at a confrontation with Nazism but in fact finally never addressed it otherwise than as a rival theory of Being, there is no reason to forecast that Heidegger's closest supporters will confront the issues raised by the link between Heidegger's thought and his Nazism. In short, like the master himself, whenever possible they will continue business as usual.[37] Yet to do so, to fail to confront this problem, clearly reflects badly not only on Heidegger's philosophy but on philosophy in general.

As the materials about Heidegger's Nazism continue to accumulate, as the discussion expands, as more and more philosophers become aware of the complex issues, as we become ever more cognizant that the Holocaust is a central event of our time from which we cannot simply turn away, it becomes increasingly difficult, even for Heidegger's closest admirers, simply to pretend that his fateful decision for National Socialism was, is, or even could be essentially meaningless, or that it might be sufficient merely to deplore it. The point is emphatically not to discard Heidegger's philosophy, to consign it to the dustheap of history, as he so candidly consigned the history of ontology he intended to "destroy." It is rather to understand what remains of value in his thought through a thorough evaluation comprising all the relevant factors, including his attachment to Nazism.

As the master conception of his later thought is the event, it is appropriate to utilize the event of his lengthy adherence to Nazism as the turning point for a detailed examination of his entire corpus, to sift his ideas, to measure their worth, cognizant of the intrinsic link in his philosophical thought between ontology and politics. The effort to analyze and evaluate the basic concepts is a necessary part of the arduous process of coming to grips with the theory of an important thinker, someone who introduces new ideas. In that sense, what is necessary for Heidegger is what is required for any novel thinker. The difference, however, is that unlike any other philosopher in this century, Heidegger clearly and unambiguously, on the basis of his philosophical thought, identified with Nazism.

It is too late to expunge Heidegger's Nazism from the historical record or from the interpretation of his thought. Examination of Hei-


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degger's corpus shows that Heidegger's Nazism, real and ideal, is a permanent feature of his thought beginning in 1933. To fail to take his Nazism into account in the interpretation of his philosophical and "postphilosophical" thought, to endeavor to be more friendly to Hei-degger than to the truth, is finally to distance oneself from the concern with truth.


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