1. Ralph Beals, Politics of Social Research: An Inquiry Into the Ethics and Responsibilities of Social Scientists (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), 18. [BACK]

2. Horowitz, ed., The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot, 47. [BACK]

3. Excerpt from Theodore Vallance's congressional testimony, reprinted in "Testimony Before House Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, July 8, 1965," American Psychologist 21 (May 1966):469. [BACK]

4. BSNS, testimony of Lt. Gen. W. W. Dick, Jr., Chief of Research and Development, Department of the Army, 28. [BACK]

5. Bray, Psychology and Military Proficiency, 171. [BACK]

6. Charles Windle and T. R. Vallance, "The Future of Military Psychology: Paramilitary Psychology," American Psychologist 19 (February 1964):128. See also Theodore R. Vallance and Charles D. Windle, "Cultural Engineering," Military Review 42 (December 1962):60-64. [BACK]

7. Theodore Vallance, "Project Camelot: An Interim Postlude," American Psychologist 21 (May 1966):441, emphasis in original. [BACK]

8. For a detailed chronology of Camelot's projected research, see BSNS, testimony of Lt. Gen. W. W. Dick, Jr., Chief of Research and Development, Department of the Army, 30-32. [BACK]

8. For a detailed chronology of Camelot's projected research, see BSNS, testimony of Lt. Gen. W. W. Dick, Jr., Chief of Research and Development, Department of the Army, 30-32.

9. Ibid., 32. [BACK]

10. Irving Louis Horowitz, "The Life and Death of Project Camelot," American Psychologist 21 (May 1966):452; Horowitz, ed., The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot, 27. [BACK]

11. Aniceto Rodriguez, "A Socialist Commentary on Camelot," in The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot, 229. [BACK]

12. See the review of federally sponsored research in the year immediately after Camelot's exposure in FSISSBR. In these hearings, Thomas L. Hughes, Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, noted that many projects similar to Camelot had in fact been classified and these, obviously, never came to public attention. For a list of classified projects in military psychology during this period, see Watson, War on the Mind, 30. Later, Hughes declared that the futility of structural reform, such as that mandated by Johnson's memo, was an inevitable product of the confusing relationship between objective expertise and policy-making, unequal experts and policy-makers, and the unpredictability of human personality in general. "It is the human variables that defy the jurisdictional reforms, mock the machinery of government and frustrate the organizational tinkering. These are the phenomena that help assure that no rejuggling of administrative charts can finally surmount the uneven qualities of the men who inhabit the institutions. The human material, much as the institutional framework, will in the end determine whether intelligence and policy, either or both, have feet of clay." Thomas L. Hughes, "The Fate of Facts in a World of Men: Foreign Policy and Intelligence-Making," Headline Series no. 233 (New York: Foreign Policy Association, December 1976), 60. [BACK]

13. Howard Margolis, "McNamara Ax Dooms Camelot," Washington Post, 9 July 1965, B6. [BACK]

14. December 4, 1964, description sent by the Special Operations Research Office to scholars in Camelot, quoted in The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot, 48. [BACK]

15. The term "feasibility" was used in Camelot's own documents and the project was described as a "feasibility study" by Special Operations Research Office Director Theodore Vallance in his "Project Camelot," 442. [BACK]

16. The total Department of Defense budget for behavioral and social science research was $27.3 million in 1965, when Camelot was exposed. In 1966 the figure had reached $34 million and it was almost $50 million in 1970. See BSNS, 97, and Klare, War Without End, 373, app. C. [BACK]

17. BSNS, 5R. [BACK]

17. BSNS, 5R.

18. Ibid., 6R, and testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, 108. [BACK]

19. The most useful single source on the response to Camelot among social and behavioral scientists is Horowitz, ed., The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot. See also his "The Life and Death of Project Camelot," 445-454, reprinted from Trans-action (1965):3-7, 44-47. [BACK]

20. Robert A. Nisbet, "Project Camelot and the Science of Man," in The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot, 316, 323. See also Nisbet's "Project Camelot: An Autopsy," in On Intellectuals: Theoretical Studies/Case Studies, ed. Philip Rieff (New York: Anchor Books, 1970), 307-339. [BACK]

21. Horowitz, "The Life and Death of Project Camelot," 448. See also Robert Boguslaw, "Ethics and the Social Scientist," in The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot , 107-127. Of all the experts involved in Camelot, Boguslaw defended most strongly the noble motive—"to find nonmilitary and nonviolent solutions to international problems." [BACK]

22. "Feedback from Our Readers," Trans-action 3 (January-February 1966):2. For another statement of the view that the U.S. military's patronage of behavioral science demonstrated more enlightenment than was evident in civilian government agencies, see George E. Lowe, "The Camelot Affair," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 22 (May 1966):48. [BACK]

23. FSISSBR, testimony of Gabriel Almond, 27 June 1966, 114. [BACK]

24. Walt Rostow, quoted in Allan A. Needell, "'Truth Is Our Weapon': Project TROY, Political Warfare, and Government-Academic Relations in the National Security State," Diplomatic History 17 (Summer 1993):417. According to Needell, the center was a direct outgrowth of a top-secret State Department program, Project TROY, which mobilized an impressive group of social and physical scientists (including a number of psychologists with experience in World War II) in the area of anti-Communist political and psychological warfare. For more on the center's CIA ties, and for the role of the new intelligence community in supporting research on mass communication, see Simpson, "U.S. Mass Communications Research and Counterinsurgency after 1945," 21-29. [BACK]

25. Ithiel de Sola Pool, "The Necessity for Social Scientists Doing Research for Governments," in The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot, 267-268. [BACK]

25. Ithiel de Sola Pool, "The Necessity for Social Scientists Doing Research for Governments," in The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot, 267-268.

26. Ibid., 277. [BACK]

27. Horowitz, ed., The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot, 7. [BACK]

28. Horowitz, "Social Science and Public Policy," 341. [BACK]

29. Kurt Lewin, "Action Research and Minority Group Problems," in Resolving Social Conflicts, 213. [BACK]

30. Alpert, "Congressmen, Social Scientists, and Attitudes Toward Federal Support of Social Science Research," 685. [BACK]

31. Daniel Lerner, "Social Science: Whence and Whither?" in The Human Meaning of the Social Sciences, 30. [BACK]

32. Horowitz, "The Life and Death of Project Camelot," 454; Irving Louis

Horowitz, "The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot," in The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot, 40-41. [BACK]

33. Herbert C. Kelman, "Manipulation of Human Behavior: An Ethical Dilemma," in A Time To Speak: On Human Values and Social Research (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1968), 16. [BACK]

34. Herbert C. Kelman, "The Social Consequences of Social Research," in A Time To Speak, 32-33. [BACK]

35. Franz Boas, "Scientists as Spies" (1919 letter to The Nation ), in The Shaping of American Anthropology, 1883-1911: A Franz Boas Reader, ed. George W. Stocking, Jr. (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 336. See also the reference to this episode in Beals, Politics of Social Research, 51. [BACK]

36. "Statement on Problems of Anthropological Research and Ethics," in Beals, Politics of Social Research, 193, 195-196. Beals's Politics of Social Research was based in large part on the report he did under American Anthropological Association auspices in the aftermath of Camelot. For the original text of the report, see "Background Information on Problems of Anthropological Research and Ethics," American Anthropological Association Newsletter 8 (January 1967). See also Stephen T. Boggs's and Ralph L. Beals's testimony in FSISSBR, 72-93; and Bryce Nelson, "Anthropologists' Debate: Concern Over Future of Foreign Research," Science 154 (December 23, 1966):1525-1527. [BACK]

37. Beals, Politics of Social Research, 78. [BACK]

38. See for example, the testimony of Stephen T. Boggs, Executive Secretary, American Anthropological Association, in FSISSBR, 72-77. He discusses, among other things, anthropologists' deep concerns over the revelations of a CIA-funded project on Vietnam at Michigan State University. For more on the CIA-MSU connection, see Max Frankl, "University Project Cloaked C.I.A. Role in Saigon, 1955-59," New York Times, 14 April 1966, 1-2; and Warren Hinkle, "The University on the Make," Ramparts 4 (April 1966):11-22. [BACK]

39. Martin Diskin, personal communication, 26 October 1990. [BACK]

40. Eric R. Wolf and Joseph G. Jorgensen, "Anthropology on the Warpath in Thailand," The New York Review of Books 15 (19 November 1970):26-35. For additional insight into the debate within anthropology, see "Social Responsibilities Forum," Current Anthropology 9 (December 1968). [BACK]

41. There were, predictably, far more restrictions erected in Latin America than in Asia or Africa, but repercussions were felt by researchers working in Burma, Nepal, Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Egypt, and South Africa, among other countries. See Beals, Politics of Social Research, 20-25. Accounts of research directly and negatively effected by Project Camelot can be found in American Anthropological Association Fellow Newsletter 6 (December 1965):2-3; Elinor Langer, "Foreign Research: CIA Plus Camelot Equals Troubles for U.S. Scholars," Science 156 (23 June 1967):1583-1584; letter to the editor by Dale L. Johnson, American Anthropologist 68 (August 1966):1016-1017; Kalman H. Silvert, "American Academic Ethics and Social Research Abroad: The Lesson of Project Camelot," in The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot, 81-82. [BACK]

42. Gabriel Almond, at an American Political Science Association forum on

Project Camelot in September 1965, quoted in Lowe, ''The Camelot Affair," 47. [BACK]

43. Horowitz, ed., The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot, 20; FSISSBR, 20; Dose, "A Social and Political Explanation of Social Science Trends," 197. For a senior Special Operations Research Office researcher's defense of Project Task as "a most uncynical and unsinister project," and his complaint that the debate surrounding Camelot's demise had been dishonest and shrill, see Milton Jacobs, "L'Affaire Camelot," letter to the editor, American Anthropologist 69 (June-August 1967):364-366. [BACK]

44. On Project Agile, see Lyons, The Uneasy Partnership, 197; Watson, War on the Mind, 319. On post-Camelot research aimed at preventing revolution in Latin America, see DDSFAR, 64-65. [BACK]

45. Memo from Director of Defense Research and Engineering to Assistant Secretaries for Research and Development of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Director, Advanced Research Projects Agency, 18 August 1965, 1-2, "NAS Archives Central Policy Files: DNRC: Behavioral Sciences: Com on Govt Programs in Behavioral Sc: Adv: General: 1965," National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C. I am indebted to Mark Solovey for sharing this document with me. [BACK]

46. DDSFAR, testimony of John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense Research and Engineering, 93. [BACK]

47. FSISSBR, testimony of Arthur Brayfield, Executive Officer, American Psychological Association, 66. [BACK]

48. Mark Solovey, "Social Science and the State during the 1960s: Senator Fred Harris's Effort to Create a National Social Science Foundation" (paper presented at "Toward a History of the 1960s," Madison, Wisconsin, 30 April 1993). [BACK]

49. Subcommittee on Government Research of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, Hearings on "National Foundation for Social Sciences," February, June, July 1967, 90th Cong., 1st sess., pts. 1-3. For excerpts of the hearing testimony, see "The Case for a National Social Science Foundation," 219-252. For a general discussion oft he effort to establish a separate social science foundation, and changes within the NSF during the 1960s, see Larsen, Milestones and Millstones, chap. 4. [BACK]

50. DDSFAR, pt. 1, 52-55. [BACK]

51. A clear statement of this equation was offered by Milton Jacobs, a senior researcher at the Special Operations Research Office during the Camelot era, who noted several years later from a perch in academia that "working for the United States Government should not suddenly become sinful . . .. I am sure that most university professors and intellectuals, in and out of government, feel responsibility to their society as well as to their chosen field of endeavor. I doubt that these responsibilities need be contradictory. If they are, our nation is in deep trouble." Jacobs, "L'Affaire Camelot," 366. [BACK]

52. Quoted in DDSFAR, 16, and in Klare, War Without End, 98. For a critical analysis of the Defense Science Board's Report of the Panel on Defense Social and Behavioral Sciences, which treats it as evidence of "the ominous conversion of social science into a service industry of the Pentagon," see Irving

Louis Horowitz, "Social Science Yogis & Military Commissars," Trans-action 5 (May 1968):29-38. [BACK]

53. Watson, War on the Mind, 307. [BACK]

54. DDSFAR, pt. 1, testimony of John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense Research and Engineering, 10, 18. See also BSNS, testimony of Maj. Gen. John W. Vogt, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 81-82. [BACK]

55. For a general discussion of the evolution of these morale studies, and their relationship to the conduct of the Vietnam War, see Watson, War on the Mind, 27-28, 265-267, 299-300, 326; and "The RAND Papers," Ramparts 11 (November 1972):25-42, 52-62. [BACK]

56. The source of this oft-repeated phrase appears to be Alexander Leighton, who wrote that "the administrator uses social science the way a drunk uses a lamppost, for support rather than illumination." See Leighton, Human Relations in a Changing World, 128. That this phrase had become conventional wisdom among experts and bureaucrats is illustrated by the fact that Thomas L. Hughes, Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from 1963 to 1969, used it, without attribution, almost thirty years later in his "The Fate of Facts in a World of Men," 24. Leighton was a psychiatrist who worked in the Postan, Arizona, Japanese-American relocation center and then headed the Office of War Information's Foreign Morale Analysis Division, set up by the Military Intelligence Service of the War Department in 1944. Leighton and his group of behavioral scientists studied Japanese-Americans, and then Japanese citizens, by taking a ''psychiatric approach in problems of community management." [BACK]

57. Project head Leon Goure, for example, regularly briefed most of the war's top policy-makers—Bundy, McNamara, Rostow, and Westmoreland— and the Viet-Cong Motivation and Morale Project office in Saigon was a central gathering place for high-level bureaucrats passing through South Vietnam. Carl Rowar, former head of the U.S. Information Service, also wrote in 1966 that the VC M&M "lies at the heart of President Johnson's strategy." "The RAND Papers," 60-61. [BACK]

58. Anthony Russo, "Looking Backward: RAND and Vietnam in Retrospect," Ramparts 11 (November 1972):56. [BACK]

59. D. M. Condit, Bert H. Cooper, Jr., et al., Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict, 3 vols. (Washington, D.C.: American University, Center for Research in Social Systems, 1968), xxi-xxii. [BACK]

60. See Annotated Bibliography of SORO Publications (Washington, D.C.: American University, Special Operations Research Office, February 1966); Annotated Bibliography of CRESS Publications (Washington, D.C.: American University, Special Operations Research Office, August 1966); Annotated Bibliography of CRESS Publications (Washington, D.C.: American University, Special Operations Research Office, April 1969). [BACK]

61. The study refers repeatedly to World War II attitude investigations like Samuel Stouffer's The American Soldier. For an example, see Andrew R. Molnar with Jerry M. Tinker and John D. LeNoir, Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies (Washington, D.C.: American University, Center for Research in Social Systems, 1966), 80. [BACK]

62. Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process," 270-279. [BACK]

63. Molnar with Tinker and LeNoir, Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies, 270, 274-275. [BACK]

64. Ted Gurr with Charles Ruttenberg, Cross-National Studies in Civil Violence (Washington, D.C.: American University, Center for Research in Social Systems, May 1969), 11-12. [BACK]

65. M. Gordon et al., "COCON—Counterinsurgency (POLITICA): The Development of a Simulation Model of Internal Conflict under Revolutionary Conflict Conditions," quoted in Cina, "Social Science for Whom?" 326. [BACK]

66. Cina, "Social Science for Whom?" 331. [BACK]

67. This comment was made by Iowa congressional representative H. R. Gross during the Camelot hearings. See BSNS, 94. [BACK]

68. For an example of an ambitious, apolitical vision for psycho-technological aid to defense organizations and policy-making, see Bray, "Toward a Technology of Human Behavior for Defense Use," 527-541. For a spirited critique of this postwar trend in the social sciences, see C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959). For an even earlier critique that anticipated these trends, see Lynd, Knowledge for What? [BACK]

69. George A. Lundberg, Can Science Save Us? (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1947), 38. [BACK]

70. Horowitz, ed., The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot, 48. For some interesting comments on the language of Camelot documents, see Marshall Sahlins, "The Established Order: Do Not Fold, Spindle, or Mutilate," in The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot, 77-78. [BACK]

71. For a portrait of these and other individuals, whose commitments to a military policy informed by behavioral expertise decisively shaped the Vietnam War, see David Halberstam, The Best and the Brighten (New York: Penguin Books, 1969). [BACK]

72. Rensis Likert, "Behavioural Research: A Guide for Effective Action," in Some Applications of Behavioural Research, ed. Rensis Likert and Samuel P. Hayes (Paris: UNESCO, 1957), 11. [BACK]

73. B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), 67. Beyond Freedom and Dignity analyzed the political function of psychology and made explicit recommendations for the public roles of psychological experts. See also B. F. Skinner, "Freedom and the Control of Men," American Scholar 25 (Winter 1955-56):47-65. [BACK]

74. For the argument that, in spite of such challenges, "the military uses of psychology have been pursued with ever more energy and increasing imagination" since the early 1960s, see Watson, War on the Mind. [BACK]

75. Harold D. Lasswell, "Must Science Serve Political Power?" American Psychologist 25 (February 1970):119. [BACK]

76. For comparative data on levels of funding by the DOD and HEW (and other domestically oriented agencies), see National Science Foundation, Federal Funds for Science, 1950-62, followed by Federal Funds for Research, Development, and Other Scientific Activities, 1962-70. [BACK]

77. National Science Foundation, Federal Funds for Science, 1960, 1961, 1962, p. 100, table 15; Federal Funds for Research, Development, and Other Scientific Activities: Fiscal Years 1965, 1966, and 1967 15:102, table C-13. [BACK]

78. Noam Chomsky, "Intellectuals and the State," in Towards a New Cold War: Essays on the Current Crisis and How We Got There (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982), 65. [BACK]

79. For more of Chomsky's work on the political consequences of social scientific scholarship and the responsibilities of intellectuals, see American Power and the New Mandarins (New York: Vintage Books, 1967); Deterring Democracy (New York: Hill and Wang, 1991); For Reasons of State (New York: Vintage Books, 1970); Towards a New Cold War: Essays on the Current Crisis and How We Got There (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982); Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies (Boston: South End Press, 1989). For Chomsky's well-known critique of B. F. Skinner's behaviorism and its political implications, see his review of Verbal Behavior by B. F. Skinner, Language 35 (January-March 1959):26-58, and "The Case Against B. F. Skinner," New York Review of Books 17 (30 December 1971):18-24. [BACK]

80. 1972 draft of Blackberry Winter, quoted in Yans-McLaughlin, "Science, Democracy, and Ethics, 214. [BACK]

81. For a description of the conference action, see "Psychology and Campus Issues," in Korten, Cook, and Lacey, eds., Psychology and the Problems of Society, 366-376. In this instance, protest was leveled not against the foreign area research activities of psychologists, but against a research project being conducted on the student New Left itself by Alexander W. Astin and the American Council on Education. [BACK]