1. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge , in Science and Knowledge , ed. and trans. P. Heath and J. Lachs (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970), 123. German: «Das Ich setzt sich, als bestimmt durch das Nicht-Ich» ( Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, Fichtes Werke , vol. 1, ed. I. H. Fichte [Berlin, 1845; reprint Berlin: De Gruyter, 1971], 127). [BACK]

2. Fichte, Foundations , 130 (« Thätigkeit,» Grundlage , 134). [BACK]

3. Grundlage , 134. [BACK]

4. «One could wish that the word suffering {Leiden} had fewer connotations. It scarcely needs saying that we are not to think of painful feelings here» ( Grundlage , 134f.). One might say that this sentence reads a little bit strangely, since «painful feeling» is not a connotation but one of the core meanings of «Leiden.» Obviously, Heath and Lachs had this sentence in mind when they chose to translate Fichte's «Leiden» with «passivity.» Thus, their translation reads: «One could wish that the word passivity had fewer associated meanings. It scarcely needs saying that we are not to think of painful feeling here» ( Foundations , 130). This sentence too, one might say, looks a little bit strange, but not for the same reason as Fichte's. «Passivity» (as the German abstract noun «Passivitäit») is much more general than «painful feeling.» Thus, «painful feeling» is not a meaning of «passivity» at all, but rather is related to «passivity» as species is to genus, or it would be a connotation of some species of «passivity.» [BACK]

5. If «to anticipate» is used in connection with physical motion, as for instance, in the phrase «the basketball player anticipated the pass,» it refers less to the run itself and more to the preceding mental activity in the sense of «he anticipated the pass and thus ran forward and intercepted the ball.» Moreover, the broader connotations of the verb «to run» are preserved at both the level of mental and that of physical motion. Thus, I can say that I «ran into a strange sentence in a book,» or just as easily that I «ran into a friend on the street» and thus had a conversation.

In German, in a description as short as the English «He anticipated the pass,» one uses neither «(vor)laufen» nor «antizipieren» (or «vorwegnehmen, vorhersehen») but rather «abfangen» («He ting the pass ab»). In a longer narrative, one says, as in English, «He antizipierte the pass (or: sah the pass voraus), lief vor (or dazwischen), and ting the pass ab.» At a conference on Lacan at the Collège International de Philosophie in Paris in June 1990, Derrida talked about the different occasions when he had met Lacan. One time, they were sitting on a plane to Baltimore. As Derrida told it, what came to their minds was la mort, death. If Heidegger had been sitting next to them or between them and had counted this as an instance of authentic «Vorlaufen,» he would have been the only one to apply «vorlaufen» to a mental activity. [BACK]

6. On Heidegger's notions of «Bestand» and «Ge-stell» (enframing) and their relation to Auschwitz see my paper "On Brinks and Bridges in Heidegger," 130-142. [BACK]

7. After World War I, the «Helden von Verdun» and their «Vorlaufen in den Tod» definitely were—to use the vocabulary of the late seventies when conservative philosophy professors and other intellectuals in Germany began what they called a «semantischen Kampf» (semantic battle) against Habermas and other leftists— «besetzt» (occupied, claimed, or possessed) by the political Right. Certainly, whatever Heidegger meant by «Vorlaufen zum Tod,» it would have indicated slightly more than «anticipate,» as employed in the phrase «I anticipate that it will rain tonight, therefore, I will bring my umbrella.» Furthermore, Heidegger's «anticipation of death» would have required him to minimalize the time interval between the anticipation and the situation anticipated, so as to make the ultimate possibility of death and its attendant threat strikingly present. For it is only inauthentic Dasein that, as it were, remains inside the walls and treats death as some remote future possibility that it needs not be concerned about for the present. Was it necessary to express the dramatic surplus value of «anticipation of death» over «anticipation of a rainfall» by means of «vorlaufen»? As mentioned, in contrast to the English «anticipate», the German «antizipieren» is used only for mental activities, each of which entails a time interval. Precisely for this reason, one might say, Heidegger was forced to use «vorlaufen.» To be sure, even without its association with the Helden von Langemarck, «vorlaufen» provides the required dramatic flavor.

However, a lot of other words would have done just as well. Heidegger could have used phrases such as «sich konfrontieren mit» (to confront oneself with), «konfrontiert werden mit» (to be confronted with), «sich einer Gefahr oder dem Tode aussetzen» (to expose oneself to a danger or to death), «einer Gefahr ausgesetzt werden» (to be exposed to a danger), or something like «dem Tode ins Angesicht schauen» (to look into the face of death). (In section 74, he in fact says «go right under the eyes of Death,» BT 434; «dem Tod unter die Augen geht,» SZ 382.) The corresponding nouns «Konfrontation mit dem Tode,» «das Sich dem Tode Aussetzen,» or «das dem Tode ins Angesicht Schauen» would have looked like most other Heideggerian nouns, neither better nor worse. All these expressions would have been fully sufficient for academic discourse. In fact, they would have been preferable since academic discourse usually requires both a degree of abstraction and emotional neutrality. Quite clearly, anyone who wanted to avoid any possible associations between his theory of death and World War I and its attendant politics would not have used the phrase «vorlaufen in den Tod.» Furthermore, as shown above, there would have been no difficulty finding other terms. Consequently, Heidegger's use of «vorlaufen» is itself an «Überset-zung,» a transgression—indeed, a transgression of the very limits of academic discourse itself.

Of course, this transgression is in line with Heidegger's criticism of the universities of his time from the beginning of his career on, namely, that they did not address the concerns of factical existence. Because of the several peculiarities concerning the «vorlaufen in den Tod» I have pointed out, from the beginning of Division Two on one should be aware of the possibility that Heidegger did not mean his theory of his-toricality and politics to be (a) a-political (that is, about the exclusively personal decisions of an individual), (b) politically neutral, or (c) a theory of antitotalitarian, that is, anti-National Socialist politics. [BACK]

8. Parmenides, Fragments , trans. David Gallop (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), 60 (fr. 6, 1. 5). [BACK]

9. See «Die Zueignung des Verstandenen, aber noch Eingehüllten vollzieht die Enthüllung» (SZ 150); «When something is understood but is still veiled, it becomes unveiled by» (BT 191). See the translators' remark (BT 15). [BACK]

10. In German, the adjective «entschlossen» is used far more often than the abstract noun «Entschlossenheit.» (One might say, «I admire his Entschlossenheit,» or one might say «Im Zustand der, i.e. in the state of, Entschlossenheit.») However, one never says «in der Entschlossenheit sein» (to be in the Entschlossenheit). In section 74, Heidegger writes «Schicksalhaft in der sich überiefernden Entschlossenheit existierend» (SZ 384; «Existing fatefully in the resoluteness which hands itself down,» BT 436). Especially in the thirties, the preposition «in» in Heidegger has often, so to speak, enthusiastic connotations (see chapter 6, section A). In the state of Entschlossenheit Dasein no longer vacillates and is no longer in the dark, so to speak. Rather, in the state of Entschlossenheit Dasein itself, other Daseine, and matters in general have become entschlossen, i.e., unlocked in the sense of «offenbar» (SZ 386; «manifest,» BT 438), or they have become ent-hüllt in the sense of «durchsichtig» (SZ 122; «transparent,» BT 159). Therefore, in the state of resoluteness, Dasein is «hellsichtig» (SZ 384; «to have a clear vision,» BT 436). Thus, the «enthusiasm» of the state of resoluteness reminded Heidegger of the potential of «enthusiasm» in the preposition «in,» and he formulated the unusual phrase «in der . . . Entschlossenheit existierend.» For a further aspect of the prefix «ent-» and its function in Heidegger see chapter 2, section A.

In a note, the translators give the German text of the entire sentence with «to have a clear vision» and comment on it: «It should perhaps be pointed out that 'Ohnmacht' can also mean a 'faint' or a 'swoon', and that 'Hellsichtigkeit' is the regular term for 'clairvoyance'. Thus the German reader might easily read into this passage a suggestion of the seer's mystical trance» (BT 436, n. 2). This explanation is somewhat misleading. I have never met anyone who thought of a faint when reading the sentence with « Übermacht » (« superior power ») and « Ohnmacht » (« powerlessness ») (SZ 384; BT 436). It might be the case that when going «right under the eyes of Death» (BT 434; SZ 382), some inauthentic Dasein faints. However, authentic Dasein most certainly does not do so, and in the sentence on Übermacht and Ohnmacht Heidegger is definitely talking about authentic Dasein. Furthermore, the adjective «hellsichtig» is used in the sense of «clear-sighted» or «keen-minded,» and less often in the sense of «clairvoyant.» The regular German adjective equivalent to the English «clairvoyant» is «hellseherisch.» The related abstract noun, «Hellsichtigkeit,» is used in the sense of «clear-sightedness» or «keen-mindedness,» and only secondarily in the sense of «clairvoyance.» Even the German noun and verb for «(to be) clairvoyant,» that is, «Hellseher» and «hellsehen,» mean not only «clairvoyant» and «to be clairvoyant,» but often «someone who sees clearly» or «to have a keen mind.» The abstract noun related to those two words when they refer to clairvoyance is «Hellsehen» (clairvoyance) or «Hellseherei» («During periods of what one calls Enlightenment it is not that easy to make one's living by Hellseherei»). I have never encountered any native speakers of German who read into this passage «a suggestion of the seer's mystical trance,» nor do I recall having come across such an interpretation in the German literature on Sein und Zeit . [BACK]

11. «Running into» sentences such as «Only by the anticipation of death is every accidental and 'provisional' possibility driven out» (BT 435; SZ 384), or «What if it is only in the anticipation of death that all the factical ' anticipatoriness ' of resolving would be authentically understood—in other words, that it would be caught up with in an existentiell way» (BT 350; SZ 302), one should keep in mind that, as the translators note (BT 350, n. 1), with «'provisional' possibility» they have translated Heidegger's «''vofläufige'' MÖglichkeit» (SZ 384), and with « 'anticipatoriness '» Heidegger's «" Voràlufigkeit "» (SZ 302). «Läufig» is the adjective of «laufen» (to run). It is applied almost exclusively to animals: «die läufige Hündin» is «a bitch in heat.» When it is applied to human beings, it sounds as vulgar as the adjective to «heat» in similar phrases in English. (Heidegger's «vulgär» is translated by Macquarrie and Robinson not as «vulgar» but as «ordinary» [see, for instance, "of the Ordinary { vulgären} Conception of Time," BT 456; SZ 404].) «Vorläufig» (and its abstract noun «Vorläufigkeit»), however, is used only in the sense of «preliminary,» «provisional,» «temporary,» or «interim» and does not sound vulgar at all. The English word «street-walker» is obviously tailored as a non-discriminatory word for people of that profession of which the above mentioned English translation of «Hündin» is a discriminatory expression. Perhaps, it was coined because «to walk» is precisely what streetwalkers do not do. Either they «hang around,» or, in a case of danger, they run, rush, or hurry. «Streetwalker» has no direct German equivalent. One does not say «Straßengeherin» or «Straßengeher.» However, not the noun but rather the verb «gehen» (to walk, to go) is used that way in phrases like «Ich gehe zur Universität» (I go to a university = I am a student at a graduate school), or «Ich gehe täglich ins Museum» (I go to the museum every day). Thus, as others go to a university, street-walkers «gehen auf den Strich» (walk on[to] the line). As is evident from this, in sentences like these, «gehen» can be used with various prepositions followed by the dative or the accusative. As for the streetwalkers, it is used with «auf» in the accusative («auf den,» not «auf dem»). This might be surprising since «Strich» (line) probably refers to the edge of the sidewalk along which streetwalkers walk. Thus, one might expect the German language to say «sie gehen am Strich (entlang)» or «sie gehen auf dem Strich (hin und her or entlang).» However, one might think, they «gehen auf den Strich (zu)» is meant in the sense of «Sie gehen zum Strich» (they go to[ward] the line) as a shorthand for «Sie gehen auf den Strich zu und dann an ihm entlang» (they go toward the line, turn onto it, and walk along the line). Thus, most probably the expression «auf den Strich gehen» is syntactically similar to sentences such as «Ich gehe auf die Wiese» or «Ich gehe auf's Eis (des Flusses),» that is, I approach a certain area, a meadow or a frozen river, and then I move around in that area (see Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob und Wilhelm Grimm , vol. 19 [Stob-Strollen] [Leipzig: Hirzel Verlag, 1957; reprint Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuchverlag, 1984], 1529f., 1561). From the viewpoint of ordinary Dasein, the streetwalkers have «zimmer schon» (always already) transgressed the edge. Thus, «gefallene Mädchen» (fallen girls) is another name for streetwalkers. Most of the time, «gefallene Mädchen» is somewhat derogatory though it can connote some sympathy or mercy. However, there is hardly any sympathy implied when «fallen» is combined with the prefix «ver-» (Heidegger's «verfallen,» «Verfallenheit» is translated with «fallen,» or «deteriorate,» «fallenness»; see «verfallen» in the glossary of BT, 519). One says, some person is « einer Droge, einem Menschen, einer sexuellen Perversion, einer Ideologie, etc. verfallen» (addicted to a drug, a person, a sexual perversion, an ideology, etc.) if one highly disapproves of this behavior, if one thinks the person will ruin his or her life, and if one sees no chance for that person to liberate himself or herself from the addiction. Probably for ordinary Dasein in the twenties in Germany, Prof. Unrat in Heinrich Mann's novel Professor Unrat (adapted for the screen as Der Blaue Engel [ The Blue Angel ] starring Marlene Dietrich and Emil Jannings) was the paradigm of a person who is «jemandem verfallen.» («Unrat» means «rubbish,» or «filth»; in his novel Heinrich Mann often has the word sound as though the character's name were «Professor Un-Rat,» that is, «Professor without-Counseb» or «without Way out» or «Professor With-the-Wrong-Advice.») As in these examples, the verb «verfallen» is used in the perfect participle form in the passive voice. Thus, an ordinary Dasein might have said or thought, «Die gefallenen Mädchéen sind dem Strich verfallen» (the fallen girls are addicted to the edge of the sidewalk) in the sense of «the fallen girls have fallen down the edge of the sidewalk,» that is, «sie liegen in der Gosse» (they are lying in the gutter) with no hope of reversing their fallenness. At that point another meaning of «ver-fallen» comes to mind. Their lives are verfallen (have expired). Thus, during fascism they were, along with others, put into concentration camps.

On a walk toward a brink and along the brink to the point, or area, of fall in Heidegger with further remarks on the use of prepositions such as «am,» «an den,» «zum,» «auf den» in connection with verbs like «gehen» see my paper "On Brinks and Bridges in Heidegger," 116-124. [BACK]

12. Heidegger uses the notion of call in both the chapters on conscience (sections 54 through 60, BT 312-348; SZ 267-301) and on anticipatory resoluteness (sections 61 through 66, BT 349-382; SZ 301-333) but not in the section on historicality. However, in section 72 he says that in the chapter on historicality «we come back in our investigation to the problem which we touched upon immediately before exposing temporality to view—the question of the constancy of the Self, which we defined as the "who" of Dasein,» and in the accompanying note he refers to section 64 (BT 427; SZ 375; see also the reference to section 63, BT 428; SZ 375). As was already mentioned, at the beginning of section 74 Heidegger returns to the notion of anticipatory resoluteness and refers to sections 60 and 62 and a passage in section 58 (BT 434; SZ 382f.). In addition, in the same section he says that «only if death, guilt, conscience, freedom, and finitude reside together equiprimordially in the Being of an entity as they do in care, can that entity exist in the mode of fate» (BT 437; SZ 385). In the chapters on conscience and on anticipatory resoluteness, Heidegger shows how the call calls Dasein forth into anticipatory resoluteness, and he already characterizes the call as «one which calls us back in calling us forth» (BT 326; «vorrufenden Rück-ruf,» SZ 280). However, it is only in the chapter on historicality that Heidegger elaborates the «horizon» (BT 434; SZ 383) of possibilities from which Dasein, having run forward into death, can choose. In other words, in the chapters on conscience and anticipatory resoluteness Heidegger elaborates the notion of death. In the chapter on historicality, however, he complements this analysis with that of birth, heritage, destiny, and fate. The analysis of conscience and anticipatory resoluteness would, so to speak, stand only on one leg without the chapter on historicality, and the former finds its completion only in the latter.

In the course of this book, I will to some degree discuss the relation between Division One of Being and Time , the chapters on conscience and anticipatory resoluteness, and the chapter on historicality. For more on this issue, however, see my book Society, Community, Fate, and Decision: From Kant to Benjamin (in progress). In addition, it will become clear that the key terms in section 74 take up and echo the ones in the chapters on conscience and anticipatory resoluteness. [BACK]

13. Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures , trans. F. Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), 141. [BACK]

14. As the beginning of her comment shows, she interprets Macquarrie and Robinson already according to the model of counterattack and regards Heidegger's «erwidert» to be an even stronger distancing than a counterattack would be. Since my main point is that any interpretation of «erwidert» as some sort of distancing is false, I can leave open what precisely she means by «resistance and displacement» (TP 31) and whether the translators would regard Birmingham's or my «Guignonian» account of them as more faithful to their intentions. Birmingham obviously doesn't distinguish between «erwidert» and «Widerruf» («disavowal»). As her quote from Being and Time and her comments show, Birmingham always adds «( Erwidert )» to « reciprocative rejoinder » and its equivalents, but she never adds Heidegger's German word «Widerruf» to the English «disavowal.» Since for Birmingham both sentences, the one with «erwidert» as well as the one with «Widerruf,» refer to the same gesture of displacement, she seems to assume that one can therefore regard the verb «erwidert» as, so to speak, the verbalization of the preposition and prefix «wider» in «Widerruf.» Grammatically, only the «wider» in «Widermf» is a preposition, or rather a prefix, whereas the «wider» in «erwidert» is the root of a verb that can be connected with several different prefixes, for instance, «er-» in «erwidern,» or «an-» in «anwidern.» [BACK]

15. See Aristotle's summary: «For it is by proportionate requital ( ) that the city holds together. Men seek to return either evil for evil—and if they cannot do so, think their position mere slavery—or good for good—and if they cannot do so there is no exchange ( ), but it is by exchange that they hold together. This is why they give a prominent place to the temple of the Graces ( )—to promote the requital of services ( ); for this is characteristic of grace ( )—we should serve in return ( ) one who has shown grace to us ( ), and should another time take the initiative in showing it» ( Nicomachean Ethics , V, 8, 1132b: 33-1133a: 5)

In the classical book on the issue of gifts, Marcel Mauss writes, for instance: "Les dons échangés et l'obligation de les rendre" (M. Mauss, Essai sur le don: Forme et raison de l'échange dans les socédtés archaïques , in Sociologie et anthropologie [Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1973], 154), and « L'obligation de rendre est tout le potlatch , dans la mesure où il ne consiste pas en pure destruction. . . . L'obligation de rendre dignement est impérative. On perd la "face" à jamais si on ne rend pas, ou si on ne détruit pas les valeurs équivalentes» (ibid., 212). Moldenhauer in her translation uses «Erwiderung,» «Erwidern,» and «erwidem» in the accusative: "Die Gaben und die Pflicht, sie zu erwidern" ( Die Gabe: Form und Funktion des Austauschs in archaischen Gesellschaften , trans. Eva Moldenhauer [Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1968], 27) and « Die Pflicht des Erwiderns . Soweit er nicht in reiner Zerstörung besteht, macht die Pflicht des Erwiderns das Wesen des Potlatsch aus. . . . Außerdem muß die Erwiderung in würdevoller Form geschehen. Man verliert für immer sein "Gesicht", wenn man ihn nicht erwidert oder die entsprechenden Werte nicht zerstört» (ibid., 100f.). Her translation comes to the mind of every translator immediately and without any thinking. Any other translation—even one with «(be)antworten» or «zurück-erstatten» —would require some time to come up with and would sound more or less awkward, if only in comparison to her translation. An English translation reads: "Gifts and the Obligation to return Gifts'' ( The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies , trans. Jan Cunnison [New York: Norton, 1967], 6) and « The Obligation to Repay . Outside of pure destruction the obligation to repay is the essence of potlatch. . . . The obligation of worthy return is imperative. Face is lost for ever if it is not made or if equivalent value is not destroyed» (ibid., 40f.). I might note in advance that, in my interpretation, Heidegger's use of « erwidert » does not coincide with an Erwiderung in the sense of the potlatch since it lacks the symmetrical reciprocity, the to and fro, of expectations and obligations of the potlatch. However, in contrast to the other forms of Erwiderung, Heidegger's concept of it has in common with the pot-latch that one meets an expectation, or fulfills a request, whereas in an Erwiderung in the dative («No, I won't leave the room!») as well as in an Erwiderung in the accusative in the sense of a successful defense or counterattack one does just the opposite of what one's opponent commands, hopes, or expects one to do. For in the latter cases one does not, so to speak, give in or obey, but rather resists. [BACK]

16. See the «telephone receiver» (BT 141; SZ 107). For the «appeal» of a phone call that called upon one in one of these huge and quiet Berlin apartments of the haute bourgeoisie, see Walter Benjamin's "Das Telephon" in his Berliner Kindheit um Neunzehnhundert ( Gesammelte Schriften , vol. IV. 1 [Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1972], 242-243). [BACK]

17. In Heidegger's text Volk is accompanied by the definite article and not, as in the English translation, by the indefinite one («das Geschehen der Gemeinschaft, des Volkes,» SZ 384). It might be hard to imagine for English readers, but the definite article makes a big difference. If Heidegger had used the indefinite one, he would have written—at that point, at least—in the attitude of Weberian Wertfreiheit, value neutrality; or he would have talked about different people the way Herder talked about them, namely, as so many different flowers in the huge garden of mankind. In other words, he would have used «Volk» as a descriptive category that doesn't exclude any empirical member of the respective Volk. However, at Heidegger's time «Volk» with the definite article was most of the time used as a polemical notion in Carl Schmitt's sense, that is, as an excluding category. By using «Volk» with the definite article in texts on history and politics an author most of the time polemicized against liberals and leftists and thus excluded some empirical members of the Volk from the Volk (see chapters 3 and 4), especially since, at Heidegger's time even the phrase with the indefinite article could serve polemical purposes. In the last years of his life, Hermann Cohen spent all his energy on a book on religion, Judaism, and reason without being able to complete it fully. In 1919, one year after his death, it was published under the title Die Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums (The religion of reason from the sources of Judaism). It had to be edited in great haste. In its second, revised edition in 1929 the definite article before «religion» was left out since in two letters to the Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaft des Judentums from July and December 1917 Cohen had said that he wanted the title without the definite article (see the afterword of the editor, Bruno Straulß, to the second edition, Hermann Cohen, Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen der Judentums [Frankfurt: J. Kauffmann; photomechanical reprint Darmstadt: Joseph Melzer, 1966], 625). In his 1930 review of the second edition, Franz Rosenzweig describes the circumstances surrounding the first edition and comments on the change of the title as follows: «In the first nine years of its existence, the book even came along under a wrong title. It was entitled: "Die Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums." It's true title is: "Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums"—without the aggressive and intolerant definite—in this case really all too definite—article. Of course, the opposite is not meant either, namely, the indefinite article, which in this case would certainly be too indefinite. Rather, as far from haughty exclusiveness as from lazy "anything goes,'' Cohen focuses on that share in the one and universal religion of reason that is passed on to him by the sources of Judaism he has inherited» (Franz Rosenzweig, "Vertauschte Fronten," Der Morgen , 6. Jahrgang, April 1930, 1. Heft, 85f.). While Rosenzweig's comment in regard to the article is certainly always possible, and while from a narrow logical point of view one might even say that it is not necessarily cogent, it was certainly appropriate in, and facilitated by, the polemical usage in the twenties of the definite article on the Right («das Volk») and, for that matter, on the Left as well («das Proletariat,» «die Kapitalistenklasse»). In all my subsequent quotations of Heidegger's sentence with «der Gemeinschaft, des Volkes» I will quote the English translation in the following way: «the community, of {the} people» (BT 436; SZ 384).

One can witness the increase of the polemical politics of de-cision and exclusion by comparing the prefaces Hermann Cohen's widow, Martha Cohen, wrote for the two editions of the book. Especially the preface to the second edition is a very moving document. In addition, she points out a geographical fact that illuminates Cohen's effort. Having quoted a non-Jewish theologian's praise of the first edition, she continues: «How much consolation, how much hope is given by such a sincere and heartfelt understanding { of the Jew Cohen's book by a Christian theologian } in these times of great conflicts! How strongly does {the sincere and heartfelt understanding of the Jew Cohen's book by a Christian theologian } confirm the unifying influence of the great personality of Hermann Cohen! Indeed, it might seem not without deeper significance that his town of birth, Coswig, is situated between the town of Luther, Wittenberg, and the home of Moses Mendelssohn» ( Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen der Judentums , n.p.). It is the same politics of Ausgleich pursued by the late Scheler after his Kehre (see chapter 3, section F) and taken up by Tillich (see chapter 4, section B) in order to overcome the polemical politics of decision. [BACK]

18. Walter Benjamin, "The Storyteller: Reflections on the Works of Nikolai Leskov," in Illuminations: Essays and Reflections , ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), 83f. Benjamin says «Stellungskrieg.» Thus, one might replace «tactical warfare» with «trench warfare.» [BACK]

19. Walter Benjamin, "Erfahrung und Armut," Gesammelte Schriften , vol. II.l (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1977), 214. [BACK]

20. Ibid., 218. Mickey Mouse shows up also, not in the second, but in the first version of Benjamin's The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, Gesammelte Schriften , vol. 1.2 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1974), 462. [BACK]

21. See on this my book Society, Community, Fate, and Decision: From Kant to Benjamin (in progress). [BACK]

>22. In Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob und Wilhelm Grimm , vol. 23 (Stuttgart: Hirzel Verlag, 1936; reprint Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuchverlag, 1984), cc. 396f., one finds for «überliefern» a first group of meanings with examples like «to deliver a letter» or «he handed over the flock of sheep to his master» and a second group summarized by the formula «to ausliefern/preisgeben (hand over/surrender) someone to the enemy, the court, the devil, etc.» with both German words belonging to the strongest ones available for such events. «Ausliefern/Auslieferung» is still today the official term for «to extradite, extradition.» It is also used with regard to private relationships. Person A is treated extremely badly by A's lover, B. However, for some reason A is not able to leave B, as much as A would like to, and A doesn't know why A cannot leave B. Thus, if asked why he or she doesn't leave B, A can give only that type of answer that, in a way, is no answer, and this answer is formulated with the perfect passive participle of «ausliefern» («I am ihr/ihm ausgeliefert») or of «ver-fallen» («I am ihm/ihr verfallen») (see above, n. 11). «To be completely (or, auf Gedeih und Verderben) ausgeliefert to someone» is used to convey that one is completely at someone else's mercy. [BACK]

24. One might think that the expression «hands itself down» in the subordinate clause, «The resoluteness which comes back to itself and hands itself down» (BT 437; SZ 385), means an act in which resoluteness establishes a tradition for future generations. However, this is excluded by the main clause of the sentence, by the preceding passage on heritage, destiny, and fate (see chapter 2) as well as by the sentences, immediately following, on repetition and on the choice of the hero and Treue. Thus, one cannot read the expression as «hands itself down [to/for the future generations» but only as «hands itself down [to the possibility it has inherited].» [BACK]

25. In German this passage reads as follows: «Das wiederholende Sichüberliefern einer gewesenen Möglichkeit erschließt jedoch das dagewesene Dasein nicht, um es abermals zu verwirklichen. Die Wiederholung des Möglichen ist weder ein Wiederbringen des "Vergangenen", noch ein Zurückbinden der "Gegenwart" an das ''Überholte". Die Wiederholung läßt sich, einem entschlossenen Sichentwerfen entspringend, nicht vom "Vergangenen" überreden, um es als das vormals Wirkliche nur wiederkehren zu lassen» (SZ 385f.). None of the thirteen sentences of the entire paragraph has as its grammatical subject a «Dasein,» but rather each of them has «resoluteness» « repetition » and the like. See the translators' remark (BT 15). To be sure, nouns ending in «-ung,» «-keit,» or «-heit» can shorten the text significantly. However, at the same time, in this case it is part of the strategy to reveal basic passivities as the purpose of Dasein's activities. [BACK]

26. «If you are not willing, I use violence» (Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, "Erlkönig"). [BACK]

27. Birmingham sets off the passage beginning with «The repeating of that which. . . » (BT 437; SZ 385) and ending with the sentence with «Widerruf» (BT 438; SZ 386), and she quotes the sentence with «Widerruf» as follows: «But when such a rejoinder is made to this possibility in a resolution, it is made in a moment of vision; and as such it is at the same time a disavowal of that which in the 'today' is working itself out as the "past" (SZ, 385-386/437-438)» (TP 31). Thus, readers familiar with Macquarrie and Robinson's usage of quotation marks will expect the same German text as above. For they will assume that the single quotation marks with «today» represent Heidegger's quotation marks, and that the double quotation marks with «past» are one of those added by the translators. Readers not familiar with the translators' usage of quotation marks will wonder about the single quotation marks with «today,» will consult Macquarrie and Robinson's translation, and will finally realize that Birmingham treated the quotation marks in Being and Time as though she had run in the quote and not set it off as a block quotation. [BACK]

28. See above, n. 14. [BACK]

29. As the title of a short text by Freud already indicates ("Erinnern, Wiederholen und Durcharbeiten," "Recollecting, Repeating, and Working Through"), the psychoanalytic notion of repetition refers to a person retrieving and repeating his or her past. However, the purpose of this repetition is to liberate oneself from this past by «dis-empowering» it. This notion of origins and one's relation to them is in line with the modem notion of Enlightenment and of reflection. Birmingham interprets «fate» as the moment in which tradition is displaced and disempowered, that is, destroyed (see above pp. 46ff.). She could have made her interpretation more dramatic if she had interpreted «Schicksal» as I do. Fate, destiny, or Volk raises its voice and demands our subjugation. However, in the sentences on Erwiderung and Widerruf, authentic Dasein disrupts continuity and refuses to subjugate itself. Alternately, one might say that in the sentence on Erwiderung authentic Dasein tentatively subjugates itself in order thereupon, however,—that is, in the sentence on Widerruf—to fight back and to distance itself from the past (see on this possibility section C of chapter 5). However, the fact that the objects of the Erwiderung and the Widerruf differ excludes both variants of this interpretation. [BACK]

30. This is already shown by a passage in which Heidegger uses «Heute» with regard to inauthentic Dasein and thus puts it in quotation marks since inauthentic Dasein is not capable of seeing the Gegenwart (present) as «Heute» («today»): «In inauthentic historicality, on the other hand, the way in which fate has been primordially stretched along has been hidden. With the inconstancy of the they-self Dasein makes present its 'today' { sein "Heute" } » (BT; SZ 391). It is also supported by the sentence in question itself. For the Erwiderung «is made in a moment of vision » (BT 438; in the German text, the words in italics modify «Erwiderung» : «Die Erwiderung. . . als augenblickliche der Widerruf ,» SZ 386), and Heidegger explains « Augenblick » ( «moment of vision ») as the present that is present for authentic Dasein, i.e., as « eigentliche Gegenwart » (« Present. . . authentic ») in contradistinction to « Gegenw ä rtigen » (« making present ») as the present as it exists for inauthentic Daseine (SZ 338, BT 387f.). In the context of this passage as well as in section 74, Heidegger uses the concept of «Situation» («situation»). The best commentary on his usage seems to be his own comment in the so-called Natorp-Bericht: «In contrast to location [Lage], the situation [ Situation ] of factical life denotes life's taking-a-stance which is made transparent as falling and which is apprehended in the given concrete worry as in the possible counter-movement to falling care { verfallenden Sorge } » ("Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle: Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation," trans. Michael Baur, Man and World 25 [ 1992], 364; "Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation," Dilthey-Jahrbuch 6 [1989], 243). [BACK]

31. As in English, quotation marks in German indicate that one is quoting, talking about a term and its meaning or that one is distancing oneself from what one refers to. Derrida wrote an entire book on the use of quotation marks with «Geist» in Being and Time and their absence with the same word in the Rectorate Address ( Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question ). So as not to have to comment on all quotation marks or the lack of them, I note here that, of course, not all quotation marks in Sein und Zeit are meant to indicate distance. The fact that many quotation marks are not distancing or disparaging makes those that are all the more disparaging. [BACK]

32. See on this my book Society, Community, Fate, and Decision: From Kant to Benjamin . [BACK]

33. The mountains cannot but repeat what is called out to them. The only other possibility left to them is not to answer at all, that is, not to listen to the call. In English, one can say that a performance or a speech had a «good echo» or that it had a «bad echo.» Thus, in contrast to the mountains, those who produce the echo are in a position to contradict. In German, «Echo» in this sense is used only seldom and only as «good echo,» as a confirmation. One doesn't say a speech received a «schlechtes Echo» (bad echo). That is, in German an echo is almost by definition something that cannot contradict the original sound. The English «bad echo» is usually translated as «schlechten Anklang,» Anklang being somewhat similar to but not the same as Echo. However, in contrast to English, in German «Echo» is not used as a verb. In an article about the new conservatism among many young people in Spain, Alan Riding writes that the new leader of the People's Party, Mr. José Maria Aznar, «is still just 40 and, while anything but a charismatic campaigner, he has found himself being acclaimed in universities by young people for whom attacks on the Government echo their own growing frustration with the Spain spawned by a decade of Socialist rule» ("Spanish Students Rebelling against the Left," The New York Times , Friday, June 4, 1993, 59). Hannah Arendt would surely have liked sentences such as this one. For in situations like these some people «echo» others who in turn, so to speak, «re-echo» the former and so on. This is how power is generated that is then turned against the status quo and its inherent violence. As to Heidegger's notorious sentence on the German and Greek languages as «the most powerful and most spiritual of all languages» (IM 57; EM 43), in this case he is right at least with regard to the similarities between both languages. For, the Greek verb , or , seems to have been used in the sense of «to sound,» «to ring,» or «to peal,» but not in the sense of the quote. Even if, however, it was also used that way, most of the Greek philosophers didn't like motions as formless as power in Hannah Arendt's sense.

Note that, at least for the person who receives it, an echo is most of the time a wonderful or miraculous event. An echo always entails more than, so to speak, echo simple, more than just the physical process of literally repeating what was said. The surplus over echo simple is what makes an echo an echo, and this surplus is present in the sentence «Die Berge erwidern meinen Ruf.» One must not mix that sentence up with the German saying «Wie man in den Wald hineinruft, so schallt es heraus» (As you call into the forest, so does the sound return to you). One uses the latter in the sense of «you get as much as you give» and in cases of echo simple, if one is annoyed with, or angry about, someone who agrees to anything, and who doesn't show any initiative. Thus, Heidegger might say that it is said by someone who finds forests pretty boring, and who thus isn't a «real German.» A «real German» would use this sentence only ironically (to hide his anger) since the person lacking any initiative, or enthusiasm, would display the caricature of the relationship between a «real German» and the «deutsche Wald» (the German Forest). For the «deutsche Wald» animates and inspires a «real German.» The «German forest,» as it were, «echoes» the «real German,» or rather, the «real German» «echoes» the «German forest» As to suggestions or commands, the person receiving a command must not just respond by means of echo simple. For such a response always gives rise to the suspicion that the person has mental and emotional reservations about the command. Rather, he must display the proper surplus over echo simple that shows that he obeys and realizes the command wholeheartedly and enthusiastically (see, for instance, the fourth and fifth of the National Socialist «laws of life» of the German student, chapter 3, n. 17; see also «to stand in the storm» in section A of chapter 6). Note that, if one applies this to authentic Dasein, one no longer talks exclusively in terms of mere subjugation. The enthusiasm accompanying subjugation enables one to realize the call, that is, to cancel the world of inauthentic Dasein. See also chapters 2 and 3.

I have gathered the «German experience» of the «German forest» by listening to the call or whisper of the «German soul» or by just echoing—like the echo simple or «idle talk» —an old stereotype. However, here are some pieces of a speech by Heidegger on Albert Leo Schlageter. Schlageter was one of the top «Helden» of the Nazis. He belonged to the «Freikorps,» illegal armed groups that performed acts of sabotage in Poland, East Prussia, and in the «occupied» Rheinland and that attacked the Polish people, Communists, Social Democrats and other «enemies of the people.» Sabotaging a railroad track in the Rheinland, Schlageter was captured, sentenced to death, and executed according to martial law on the twenty-sixth of May 1923 (see Farías, Heidegger and Nazism , 87ff.; Heidegger und der Nationalsozialismus , 142ff.; Jay W. Baird, To Die for Germany: Heroes in the Nazi Pantheon [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990], 26ff.). In Baden, each year a ceremony commemorating Schlageter was held on the anniversary of his execution. On this occasion in 1933, that is, shortly after the Machtergreifung, in his speech on the front steps of the main entrance to the university Heidegger said: «Whence this hardness of will { Härte des Willens }, which allowed him to endure the most severe ordeal {das Schwerste durchzustehen } ? Whence this clarity of heart , which allowed him to envision what was greatest and most remote { Klarheit des Herzens , das Größte und Fernste sich vor die Seele zu stellen}? Student of Freiburg! German student! When on your hikes and marches you set foot in the mountains, forests, and valleys of this Black Forest, the home of this hero {die Heimat dieses Helden}, experience this and know: the mountains among which the young farmer's son grew up are of primitive stone, of granite! They have long been at work hardening the will {Sie schaffen seit langem an der Härte des Willens}. The autumn sun of the Black Forest bathes the mountain ranges and forests in the most glorious clear light. It has long nourished clarity of the heart {Sie nährt seit langem die Klarheit des Herzens } » (Farías, Heidegger und der Nationalsozialismus , 146; this is my own translation; see Farías, Heidegger and Nazism , 91; Wolin, ed., The Heidegger Controversy , 41). Another passage reads: «With a hard will and a clear heart, Albert Leo Schlageter died his death, the most difficult and the greatest of all. Student of Freiburg, let the strength of this hero's native mountains flow into your will { in deinen Willen strömen } ! Student of Freiburg, let the strength of the autumn sun of this hero's native valley shine into your heart! Preserve both within you and carry them, hardness of will and clarity of heart, to your comrades at the German university» (Wolin, ed., The Heidegger Controversy , 41; see Farías, Heidegger and Nazism , 92; German edition, 147). I will also quote the next passage, for as I will discuss in chapters 2, 3, and 5, several scholars regard «fate» («Schicksal») in section 74 of Sein und Zeit to be a power with which authentic Dasein breaks. Or, alternatively, they maintain that fate is produced by the Dasein in the sense that once Dasein has become authentic, it can freely—no longer determined by the «they» or someone else—create its own fate. I will show that it is just the other way around, namely, that an individual's fate preexists and determines the individual, and that authenticity consists in complying with one's fate, whereas inauthentic Daseine try to avoid or to «shirk» it. At the same time, the passage shows also that Heidegger used «Held» in the sense prevalent at that time, namely, in line with the paradigmatic case of the «Helden von Langemarck»: «Schlageter walked these grounds as a student. But Freiburg could not hold him for long. He was compelled to go to the Baltic; he was compelled to go to Upper Silesia; he was compelled to go to the Ruhr. He was not permitted to escape his destiny so that he could die the most difficult and greatest of all deaths with a hard will and a clear heart { Er durfte seinem Schicksal nicht ausweichen, um den schwersten und größten Tod harten Willens und klaren Herzens zu sterben}. We honor the hero {den Helden} and raise our arms in silent greeting» (Wolin, ed., The Heidegger Controversy , 42; see Farías, Heidegger and Nazism , 93; German edition, 148). Since I began this part with the «Helden von Langemarck,» let me mention that—one feels tempted to say, of course—Heidegger began his speech on Leo Schlageter with a reference to the German soldiers in World War I (see Farías, Heidegger and Nazism , 89f.; German edition, 144f.; Wolin, ed., The Heidegger Controversy , 4o; instead of the sentence «He alone must convey to the soul of the people the image of their future awakening to honor and greatness, in order to die in faith» in Farías [ Heidegger and Nazism , 90] read with Wolin: «Alone, drawing on his own inner strength, he had to place before his soul an image of the future awakening of the Volk to honor and greatness so that he could die believing in this future» [The Heidegger Controversy , 40f.]; see Farías, Heidegger und der Nationalsozialismus , 145).

Note that the second of the four quotes provides a good example of the double aspect of Entschlossenheit I mentioned in section A of this chapter. Heidegger calls upon the listeners to make an Entscheidung, that is, to no longer vacillate between several voices but rather to listen to the one voice, the voice of the people. In doing so, one ent-schließt sich, opens oneself and becomes a passive vessel so that «the power of the mountains of this hero's home» can «stream in your will.» Filled with «the power of the mountains of this hero's home,» one acquires « hardness of will » that enables one to be verschlossen für (closed against) the other voices and that empowers one to work for the realization of the task fate has ordained and to endure the consequences of this labor.

I will elaborate the «German» notion of fate in chapters 2 and 3. However, let me already here point out a passage in Hitler's Mein Kampf . The very first sentences of the book read as follows: «Als glückliche Bestimmung gilt es mir heute, daß das Schicksal mir zum Geburtsort gerade Braunau am Inn zuwies. Liegt doch dieses Städtchen an der Grenze jener zwei deutschen Staaten, deren Wiedervereinigung mindestens uns Jüngeren als eine mit allen Mitteln durchzuführende Lebensaufgabe erscheint» (MK 1). «Schicksal weist mir zu» means that fate allots something to me; that fate «gives,» «assigns,» something as its «gift» to me. Its gift is often a task I must perceive and carry out. «Aufgabe» is «task;» «Lebensaufgabe» is a task one has to pursue throughout one's entire life and which is one's main or only mission in life to which everything else has to be subordinated. Thus, the entire passage can be translated as follows: «Today it seems to me providential that Fate chose Braunau on the Inn as my birthplace. For this little town lies on the boundary between two German states the reunification of which seems at least to us of the younger generation as the mission of our life, which we have to pursue by every means at our disposal.» The expression «das scheint/erscheint mir gut (zu tun)» (this seems to me good [to do]) is often used in the sense of «I have decided to do this,» namely, as a shorthand of the longer sentence «this seems to me good to do and thus I have decided to do it.» However, one has to keep two things in mind. First, grammatically my «life work» or the thing to be done by me occurs as the subject of the sentence, and the verb «erscheinen» is sometimes used in a very emphatic sense. Christians speak of «Marienerscheinun-gen» (apparitions of Mary), «Wundererscheinungen» (apparitions of miracles = miracles). «Heute ist mir der Herr erschienen» (Today, the Lord appeared to me = I had a vision of the Lord)—this sentence might be used by someone who had such an experience. In fact, Heidegger uses «erscheinen» in his definition of the authentic experience of Being in the pre-Socratics: «But for the Greeks standing-in-itself {Insichstehen} was nothing other than standing-there, standing-in-the-light {Im-Licht-Stehen}. Being means appearing {Sein heißt Erscheinen}. Appearing is not something subsequent that sometimes happens to being. Appearing is the very essence of being { Sein west als Erscheinen } . . .. The essence of being is physis . Appearing is the power that emerges, unconcealment, aletheia» (IM 101-102; EM 77)- In a passage on historical man as the breach (see chapter 2, n. 32), Heidegger takes advantage of the possibility that a Erscheinung can be sudden and overpowering. In light of such uses of «erscheinen,» it is quite possible that the thing to be done, so to speak, appears to me, approaches me, and claims to be done by me, to be recognized as my «life work» I have to take over. (Note that grammatically in both cases the concerned subject—the one who has a vision of the Lord as well as the one who decides to do something— occurs as the dative object of the sentence.) This is important for the second point one has to keep in mind. For even if the expression «es/etwas erscheint mir» (it/something seems/appears to me) is used in the sense of «I decide/have decided to do,» it is most of the time not meant in the sense of «I have arbitrarily decided to do» but rather in the sense of «the issue itself—die Sache selbst, as Hegel would say—suggests that the best thing to do, or the only thing to do, is . . .. » Throughout his book, Hitler leaves no doubt that he hasn't come to his «life work» by his own arbitrary choice but rather that it was fate that assigned his «life work» to him, and he makes extensive use of the «German» notion of fate according to which fate exists prior to «us» and «gives» «us» our «life work» (see section A of chapter 3. With all this in mind, Heidegger might have even translated the relative clause, «the reunification of which seems . . . means at our disposal» with «the reunification of which has unconcealed itself at least to us of the younger generation as the task of our life, which we have to pursue by every means at our disposal.»

In light of these facts as well as in light of the politics and rhetorics of the National Socialists, German readers quite naturally and without hesitation would have connected «Lebensaufgabe» (life work) and «Schicksal» (fate). Listening to our fate, we realize that it gives us our «Lebensaufgabe.» Or our «Lebensaufgabe» as allotted to us by fate becomes clear, or reveals itself, to us if we are capable of listening to fate. That is, by no means do we come up with our «Lebensaufgabe» by ourselves. Instead, fate «gives» us our «Lebensaufgabe,» as Schlageter did not freely choose, or come up with, his «Lebensaufgabe»; rather, he «was compelled to go to the Baltic; he was compelled to go to Upper Silesia; he was compelled to go to the Ruhr. He was not permitted to escape his destiny so that he could die the most difficult and greatest of all deaths with a hard will and a clear heart» (Wolin, ed., The Heidegger Controversy , 42; see Farías, Heidegger and Nazism , 93; German edition, 148). Inauthentic Dasein wants to evade the task fate has in store for it. Authentic Dasein, however, obeys and tries to realize its «Lebensaufgabe.»

Manheim in his English translation has replaced the structure, «it seems to us» with one in which «we» is the active subject («Today it seems to me providential that Fate have chosen Braunau on the Inn as my birth place. For this little town lies on the boundary between two German states which we of the younger generation at least have made it our life work to reunite by every means at our disposal,» [MKe 3]). For readers not familiar with the «German» notion of fate Manheim's alteration might change the meaning of the passage. Fate has given us something, for instance, our place of birth. Our «life work,» however, we create by ourselves without fate giving it to us. Or each authentic Dasein has created its «life work» by itself without being subject to any command. Some authentic Daseine have «good luck» («good fate»), others have «bad luck» («bad fate») because for some, fate—that is, life in all the aspects that authentic Dasein cannot change—is such that authentic Dasein can carry through its life work. For others, however, life is not such that Dasein can succeed in its life work. In this sense, Manheim's translation is even prone to completely reverse the meaning of the sentence: «We» have made up our «life work» by ourselves; it is only at this point (i.e., after the decision) that fate—as being favorable to our life work—steps in to provide us with a place advantageous for the pursuit of our life work or, if it is unfavorable to our life work, prevents us from carrying it out successfully. In German, however, the sentence reads the other way around: Fate has assigned our «Lebensaufgabe» to us, and it has put us in a place where «we» can easily and early on recognize the «Lebensaufgabe» we have been given. The «glückliche Bestimmung» («Today, it seems to me providential») is not that fate provides us with useful means or a favorable environment to realize our life work created by ourselves independent of fate, but rather that fate has its «Lebensaufgabe» for us and that at the same time it has placed us in such a position that we do not need long and painful journeys to perceive our «Lebensaufgabe.» The «glückliche Bestimmung» —or «Gunst des Schicksals» (favor of fate)—consists in that, as Hitler acknowledges in 1925, he was put by fate in a position where he could recognize his «Lebensaufgabe» assigned to him by fate very early on in his life. This is in contrast to a bourgeois Bildungsroman, where the readers learn, or are confirmed in their belief, that it takes some time, and often diverse—as the title of one of Fontane's novels says— Irrungen und Wirrungen (or dialectical movements as in the Bildung of spirit in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit ), to recognize or accomplish one's life work or to realize that one has failed to do so. By the way, Heidegger might say that already the word «Lebensaufgabe» itself tells us all this. For, as was said above, «Lebensaufgabe» consists of «Leben» and «Aufgabe.» «Aufgabe» in turn consists of the noun «Gabe» and the prefix «auf-.» «Gabe» is «gift.» The prefix «auf» marks the gift as a task, and the addition of «Lebens-» emphasizes that the task is a very special task, namely, one that demands that one puts all of one's energies into its service. One doesn't produce a gift to oneself. Instead, one accepts a gift from someone else. This is certainly true of the relationship of Being and Daseine in the writings of the later Heidegger. For a given way of unconcealment is not produced by the Daseine or, as he often says, by «man» («der Mensch»). Rather, it is Being that gives it to the Daseine. As I will show, the same relation holds for destiny/fate and authentic Dasein in Being and Time . Of course, Hitler's listening to the call and his task—to reunite Germany and Austria as the precondition of conquests of other countries (MKe 3; MK 1(—entailed a lot of «disavowal[s]» (BT 438; SZ 386). In his book, he adduces as the first disavowal the «Vernichtung» (MK 14; «destruction,» MK 16) of the Austrian state. In Mein Kampf , the second proper name of a human being to occur is «Leo Schlageter.» The first name is «Johannes Palm.» During the Napoleonic War, as Hitler tells his readers, Palm practiced resistance against the French troops. However, he was betrayed by an Austrian official, but he didn't disclose anything or anyone to the French. After this, Hitler just says: «In this he resembled Leo Schlageter» (MKe 4; in German the sentence is shorter: «Also wie Leo Schlageter,» MK 2) in order, thereupon, to make a new point. He could take for granted that to all his readers Schlageter was very well known. It is only after Palm and Schlageter that Hitler's parents are mentioned; they are not referred to by their names but only as «der Vater» («the father») and «die Mutter» («the mother»). On page 6 of the German edition, Hitler refers to himself via the voice of his political enemies: «dieser 'Hitler'» (MK 6; «this 'Hitler',» MKe 8). Only after he has narrated the life of his father up to the latter's death does the fourth proper name occur: «Professor Dr. Leopold Pötsch,» his teacher of history in elementary school who taught him the understanding of history that would remain with him for life (MK 12; MKe 14). Only the «Helden» of National Socialism deserve a name. By saying just «der Vater» and «die Mutter,» he can kill two birds with one stone. (Such speaks the English language; the German language isn't better, or is even worse, on this issue; translated word-by-word, it says that you «beat {in the sense of «kill» } two flies with one stroke.») By saying «die Mutter,» he can present his beloved mother as the proper incarnation of and representative of the Sitte (custom) of the Heimat (homeland); by saying «der Vater,» he can maintain the same with regard to the powers represented by the male and at the same time hide his dislike for his father. In fact, Hitler really killed three birds with one stone. For by simply saying «der Vater» he need not tell the story of his father's name, that is, that his father was the illegitimate child of a Miss Schickelgruber and thus was named Alois Schickelgruber. Later on, Alois's mother married a Mr. Hitler. It was only several years after his mother's death and with the help of the testimony of three illiterate witnesses that Alois Schickelgruber claimed to be the legitimate child of Mr. Hitler and was registered in the parish register as Mr. Alois Hitler. For various reasons, as the last name of someone who propagates the purity and superiority of the Aryan race the name «Schickelgruber» sounded pretty ridiculous. (His political enemies would have referred to him as «der Schickelgruber.»)

For all that was said about the «German forest» in this note, «echo» is of course too nice and delicate an expression. For what is required from the listeners is just plain subjugation to the call of the Black Forest, Heidegger, Hitler, and Schlageter. At the same time, the experience of the «German Forest,» at least in it's Heideggerian version, excludes the experience of otherness that several interpreters consider to be Heidegger's central theme in section 74; the experience of otherness as in a passage in Henry David Thoreau's Walden : «There came to me in this case a melody which the air had strained, and which had conversed with every leaf and needle of the wood, that portion of the sound which the elements had taken up and modulated and echoed from vale to vale. The echo is, to some extent, an original sound, and therein is the magic and charm of it. It is not merely a repetition of what was worth repeating in the bell, but partly the voice of the wood; the same trivial words and notes sung by a wood-nymph.» This passage is quoted in a book on Heidegger, the title of which refers to what this note is about, namely, in John Sallis' Echoes: After Heidegger (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), 4. Sallis has not echoed the different echoes on the story of Echo he tells in the first chapter, ''' " (ibid., 1-14) with an account of the possible echoes of Heidegger's sentences on erwidert and Widerruf in Heidegger's interpreters, and he doesn't refer to these sentences at a later point either. [BACK]

34. In German, one would say, «in the following beiläufigen situation.» «Beiläufig» is another instance of a composite of a prefix («bei-») and »läufig,» «läufig» being the adjective to the verb «daufen» (to run, to walk) (see above, n. 11). In the case of «beiläufig,» «bei» is an abbreviation of «vorbei,» which means «past» primarily in the spatial sense. Thus, «can einem Kino vorbeilaufen» is «to walk past a movie theater» in the sense of «to pass by a movie theater.» «Beiläufig erwähnen» is «to mention in passing.» [BACK]

35. The third stanza of Baudelaire's poem "A une passante" reads: « éclair. . . puis la nuit!—Fugitive beautß/Dont le regard m'a fait soudainement renaître,/Ne te verrai-je plus que dans l'ßternitß?» What is the «éclair» ? Is it the look of the «femme» who «passa,» as introduced in the first stanza and whose eyes are mentioned in the second stanza? Is it the shock of the I (the «Moi, je» of the second stanza) when he sees the femme? Is it the shock of the I when he sees that the femme returns his gaze? Is it the passing of the femme? Or is it the passing femme ? Or all together? In any case, the «Dont» refers to the «Fugitive beauté.» However, the «Dont» might be either the genitivus subjectivus or the genitivus objectivus of «regard.» In the first case, the «regard» is that of the femme who looks at the I. In the second case, the «dont» would be the object of the look of the I who looks at the femme. In this case, it would be left open whether the femme looks back or not. In "On some Motifs in Baudelaire," Benjamin is certain that, as in contrast to the I in a poem by Stefan George, «Baudelaire leaves no doubt that he looked deep into the eyes of the passer-by» ( Illuminations: Essays and Reflections , 196, n. 3). However, he translates the third stanza and the entire poem in such a way that one is inclined to assume that the femme did not return the gaze of the I, and he uses a word, «leihen,» that can be used as an equivalent to «erwidern» in the accusative in the sense of «to return»; «Ein Blitz, dann Nacht! Die Flüchtige, nicht leiht / Sie sich dem Werdenden an ihrem Schimmer./Seh ich dich nur noch in der Ewigkeit?» ( Gesammelte Schrifien , IV. 1, 41). I mention this in order to point out that Benjamin comments on «Aura» in terms of, or even defines «Aura» as, the return of a gaze and that, in this context, he uses «erwidern» in the accusative: «Since the camera records our likeness without returning our gaze {ohne ihm dessen Blick zurüickzugeben }. But looking at someone carries the implicit expectation that our look will be returned {Dem Blick wohnt aber die Erwartung inne, von dem erwidert zu werden, dem er sich schenkt; the relative clause is left out in the English translation; it reads something like: «the look will be returned by the one to whom the look gives itself» }. Where this expectation is met {Wo diese Erwartung erwidert wird} . . .. there is an experience of the aura to the fullest extent . . .. The person we look at, or who feels he is being looked at, looks at us in turn. To perceive the aura of an object we look at means to invest it with the ability to look at us in return» ("On Some Motifs in Baudelaire," 188; Gesammelte Schrifien , 1.2, 646f.; italics mine, J. F.). As in the case of the echo (see above n. 33), not every physical look in return is an Erwiderung in this sense. For this, see also Benjamin's remarks on eyes in Baudelaire's poems ( Illuminations , 189) and his comment on a sentence in Baudelaire on eyes «sad and translucent like blackish swamps,» or having «the oily inertness of tropical seas» : «When such eyes come alive, it is with the self-protective wariness of a wild animal hunting for prey. (Thus the eye of the prostitute scrutinizing the passers-by is at the same time on its guard against the police. . ..) That the eye of the city dweller is overburdened with protective functions is obvious» (ibid., 190f.). See also the subsequent quote from Georg Simmel on another aspect of hearing and seeing in the modem cities and in public conveyances (ibid., 191). Anyway, as one might gather from this note and from my examples of «erwidern,» in a theoretical text every instance of «erwidern» requires a careful, contextual, or explicit comment or calls for an «Erwiderung» in the accusative in which it is determined or explained or in which it can, so to speak, develop into this or that narrative. One might regret that Heidegger did not comment at all on his short sentence with «erwidert» aside from the sentence on «Widerruf» about which I will say more in chapters 2 and 3—in fact, one might even rebuke him for it. However, one must not forget that the grammatical structure and the semantics unambiguously allow only for my interpretation and not for Guignon's or Birmingham's.

As mentioned above, in the quote from "On Some Motifs in Baudelaire," the relative clause «dem er sich schenkt» has been left untranslated. «Schenken» is «to give a gift»; «sich jemandem schenken» is «to give oneself (as a gift) to someone.» Quite literally, the entire sentence reads: «But inherent to the gaze is the expectation to be returned by the one to whom the gaze has given itself (as a gift).» One might say, the I in Baudelaire's poem «schenkt sich» to the femme, and hopes that the gaze of the femme «leiht sich ihm» in return. On the level of historicality in Being and Time , the gaze that schenkt sich to the femme (or the eye of the prostitute scrutinizing the passersby) is the command delivered by destiny, fate, and the community of the people (see chapters 2 and 3), and the gaze of the femme who, if she erwidert the gaze of the I, sich leiht to the I (or the passerby who erwidert the gaze of the prostitute) is Heidegger's «sich {einer überkommenen Existenzmöglichkeit} überliefernde Entschlossenheit» (SZ 385; «The resoluteness which . . . hands itself down {to the possibility of existence that has come down to us},» BT 437). [BACK]

36. As one sees with regard to the last sentence, «erwidern» in the dative and «erwidern» in the accusative in the sense of «to fight back» amount to a Wider-rede, or Wider-spruch, both being expressions for «to contradict.» In contrast to «erwidern» and «Erwiderung,» both «Widerrede» and «Widerspruch» are used only as negations and cannot be used the way «erwidern» is used in the sense of «to comply with a request.» Thus, if Heidegger had wanted to say what Guignon and Birmingham assume he does, he could have written, for instance, «Die Wiederholung widerspricht vielmehr der (or, spricht/redet vielmehr gegen die) Möglichkeit der dagewesenen Existenz. Die Widerrede/Der Widerspruch gegen die Möglichkeit im Entschluß ist aber/sogar zu-gleich. . .. »

The words «Widerrede» and «Widerspruch/widersprechen» show that there might be something about Birmingham's suggestion that the verb «erwidern» is, so to speak, the verbalization of the prefix «wider» in «Widerruf » (see above, n. 14). However, the reasons presented in this chapter and in the following ones show that Heidegger uses «erwidern» in the sense of «to comply with,» and not in the sense of a «Widerrede» or in the sense of «to fight back.» In addition, contrary to Birmingham (TP 31) the prefix «wider-» is by no means used exclusively in the sense of «contrary to or against» (see chapter 5, n. 70). On my interpretation, the prefix «wider-» in Widerruf in fact means «contrary to» or «against,» for a Widerruf is a disavowal or revocation. However, if one wants to regard Heidegger's use of «erwidern» as a verbalization of a prefix, it would not be the prefix «wider-» but rather the prefix «wieder-» (re-, back, again), or the prefix «wider» in the sense of «wieder» (see chapter 5, n. 70). This is appropriate, and perhaps even consciously intended by Heidegger, since his erwidern/Erwiderung is meant as a peculiar Wiederholung (repetition) whose features I will spell out in more detail in the following chapters.

Erwidern as Widerrede or Widerspruch shows that «erwidern» in the dative and «erwidern» in the sense of «to fight back» have, so to speak, one foot in the vocabulary of speaking and calling. However, the same holds true for «erwidern» in the sense of «to comply with a demand,» as my examples and «erwidern» in the sense of «to echo» show. In addition, the noun «Widerruf» (disavowal, revocation) contains the noun «Ruf,» call. Thus, erwidern, Erwiderung, and Widerruf all, so to speak, echo the language of the sections on the call of conscience. In section 58 Heidegger says of authentic Dasein: «When Dasein understandingly lets itself be called forth to this possibility, this includes its becoming free for the call—its readiness for the potentiality of getting appealed to. In understanding the call, Dasein is in thrall to [hörig] its own-most possibility of existence» (BT 334; SZ 287). The German adjective «hörig» contains the root «hören» (to hear, to listen). Readers should keep in mind that, at Heidegger's time as well as today, «hörig» is only used in one of two ways: either as a sociological term in the sense of «thrall» with regard to slaves or peasants in feudal societies (and in this sense in Germany at Heidegger's time no one was any longer hörig to anyone else), or as a synonym for «verfallen» (see above, n. 11). Instead of saying, «A ist verfallen (addicted to) B, a drug, or a sexual habit,» one might as well say that A «ist hörig B, etc.» The sentence with erwidern in section 74 echoes precisely the sentence with hörig in section 58. Quite certainly, Heidegger used the adjective «hörig» in order to have the strongest expression for «obligation» and «submission.» The sentence with hörig and the entire chapter on conscience show that neither the chapter on conscience nor, by inclusion, section 74 talks about a conversation with the past or the peculiar act of disavowal Birmingham finds in it.

The sentence with hörig at the same time testifies to the two aspects of Entschlossenheit mentioned in section A above, namely, an activity of Dasein that results in an act of submission to the call. (Though Dasein is passive from the beginning and becomes active only in order to comply with the call. The call, however, demands obedience. It is one's duty to comply with the call, and a duty is what cannot not be done.) In doing so, authentic Dasein opens itself for the voice of the Volk and locks up, or seals off, itself from the many other voices. Those Daseine that become inauthentic, however, are not capable of doing so since they are verfallen to the many voices of idle talk and curiosity.

In his 1935 lecture, An Introduction to Metaphysics , Heidegger finds his notion of Hörigkeit in Heraclitus's fragment 34: «Correspondingly, the hearing that is a following [Hörig-sein] is contrasted with mere hearing. Mere hearing scatters and diffuses itself in what is commonly believed and said, in hearsay, in doxa , appearance. True hearing has nothing to do with ear and mouth, but means: to follow the logos and what it is, namely the collectedness of the essent itself. We can hear truly { das echte Hörigsein} only if we are followers {Hörige}. But this {Hörigkeit aber} has nothing to do with the lobes of our ears. The man who is no follower {Wer kein H6riger ist} is removed and excluded from the logos from the start, regardless of whether he has heard with his ears or not yet heard» (IM 129; EM 99; see also the continuation of the quote). On the formula «the collectedness of the essent itself» see section B of chapter 5. The people who merely hear or who, so to speak, hear only with their ear lobes are the people engaged in idle talk, etc., or those who listen to the call such a way that «causes get pleaded» and the call «becomes perverted in its tendency to disclose» (BT 319; SZ 274); that is, people who don't listen to the call or who—what amounts to the same thing—answer to the call with an Erwiderung in the dative or an Erwiderung in the sense of «to fight back.» The distinction between one who «has heard with his ears» and one who has «not yet heard» corresponds to the distinction between inauthentic Daseine and ordinary Daseine. The distinction between authentic, or h6riges, Dasein and those who are «removed and excluded from the logos» corresponds to the distinction in section 74 of Being and Time between those Daseine that have fate—the authentic Daseine—and those that don't have fate—the inauthentic Daseine (see section C of chapter 2). After World War II and after his engagement with National Socialism, Heidegger felt that his language was somewhat rough. For, in ''The Question Concerning Technology," published in 1954, he writes: «Always the unconcealment of that which is goes upon a way of revealing. Always the destining of revealing holds complete sway over men. But that destining is never a fate that compels { das Verhängnis eines Zwanges }. For man becomes truly free only insofar as he belongs to the realm of destining {des Geschickes} and so becomes one who listens, though not one who simply obeys {nicht aber ein Höriger}» (BW 306; VA 28). One might infer from this passage that his notion of hörig sein in Being and Time and, by inclusion, his notion of erwidern in section 74 indeed mean «to simply obey,» in contradistinction to inauthentic Dasein, which does not obey. On Geschick, Gemtit, Gebirg, Gestell, and Gewährendes in "The Question Concerning Technology" see my paper "On Brinks and Bridges in Heidegger," esp. 130-135. [BACK]