B. «Erwidert» («Reciprocative Rejoinder»)

In an interview with Andreas Isenschmidt for Swiss radio, broadcast on 9 October 1987, Hans Jonas remarked upon the characteristic of «authenticity» («Eigentlichkeit») as resoluteness: «You must resolve something for yourself. Resoluteness as such, not for what or against what one resolves oneself, but that one resolves oneself becomes the authentic signature of authentic Dasein. Opportunities to resolve oneself are, however, offered by historicity» (MH 201). Richard Wolin seems to give this a twist: «A philosophy of existence such as Heidegger's presupposes that all traditional contents and truths have lost their substance; and thus all that remains is naked facticity , that is, the sheer fact of existence. Thus, unlike traditional hermeneutics, which believes that the past contains a store of semantic potentials that are inherently worthy of redemption, Existenzphilosophie in its Heideggerian variant tends to be inherently destructive of tradition» (PB 32). At the beginning of his essay "History and Commitment in the Early Heidegger," Charles Guignon quotes this passage from Wolin as well as Habermas' s characterization of resoluteness as «the decisionism of empty resoluteness»^[13] and sets his interpretation of Heidegger's concept of action against that backdrop. According to Guignon, Wolin and Habermas assume «that Heidegger regards choice and action as resting on a kind of "leap," in a "moment of vision," cut off from all bonds to traditional social standards and moral ideals» (HC 130). Guignon, on the other hand, argues that «Being and Time is working toward a notion of what Charles Taylor calls "situated freedom," an understanding of action as nested in and guided by a range of meaningful, historically constituted possibilities, which are binding on us because they define who we are» (HC 131). He presents comments on several concepts in Heidegger and concludes with an interpretation of section 74 that consists of three passages. Two of these I quote here completely since I will refer to them several times later on. In the first passage, Guignon claims that

Heidegger's account of authentic historicity expands the conception of authentic agency by (1) showing how we draw guidance from the past, and (2) providing an account of action as the transmission and realization of a tradition.

First, the discussion of the individual's grounding in the past comes across in the description of authenticity as involving "repetition" or "retrieval." When Dasein "explicitly" grasps its indebtedness to "the way in which Dasein has been traditionally understood," according to Heidegger, it grasps its own actions as drawing on and making manifest the possibilities opened by a shared heritage. Authentic Dasein "chooses its hero" and is "free for the struggle of loyally following in the footsteps of that which can be repeated" (BT , 437). What is suggested here is that, when one understands oneself as relying on "the Dasein which has been there," one draws a role-model or exemplar from the heroes and heroines of the past and uses that model as a guide for orienting one's life. The paradigmatic stories of our predecessors provide plot-lines, so to speak, for articulating our own lives into coherent, focused happenings. This is most apparent, of course, in the way religious people draw on the lives of the saints or on Old Testament stories in defining their aims. But it is also true for people in professions (Socrates for philosophers, Florence Nightingale for nurses), for cultural groups (Sitting Bull for Native Americans, Martin Luther King for American blacks), and so on. Following the guidelines of the life of the Dasein who came before, the authentic individual finds a sense of direction and an awareness of his or her place in the wider drama of the historical culture. Only in this way, Heidegger claims, can one achieve genuine "self-constancy" and "connectedness" (BT , 439, 442).

Secondly, authentic historicity shows how our agency contributes to the transmission of a tradition. This aspect of historicity is worked out in the account of authentic historiography. Heidegger starts from the familiar observation that writing history always involves "selection," and that the ability to select what can count as historically relevant requires that we operate with some understanding of the overall outcome or impact of the unfolding course of events. For this reason, "Even the disclosure of historiography {sic } temporalizes itself in terms of the future " (BT , 447). Our ability to identify what genuinely matters in the events of the past depends on our ability to grasp history as a "context of effectiveness and development" which is seen as adding up to something as a totality—as going somewhere or making sense overall. (HC 136f.; n. 12 refers to Heidegger, Frühe Schriften [Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1972], 369)

In the second passage, Guignon comments on these two points in terms of Heidegger's reference to Nietzsche's The Use and Abuse of History for Life in section 76 (HC 137f.). In the third passage, he interprets authentic Dasein's attitude toward its present and future as follows:

Finally, authentic historiography is critical. But it is critical not in Nietzsche's sense of "judging and annihilating a past." Instead, for Heidegger, critique is aimed at the "today": authentic historiography "becomes a way in which the 'today' gets deprived of its character as present; in other words, it becomes a way of painfully detaching oneself from the fallen {sic } publicness of the 'today'" (BT , 449). As critical, authentic historiography requires a "disavowal

of that which in the 'today' is working itself out as the past," that is, a "destructuring" of the hardened interpretations circulating in the public world in order to recover "those primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of Being—the ways which have guided us ever since" (BT , 438, 44). The critical stance "deprives the 'today' of its character as present , and weans one from the conventionalities of the 'they' " (BT , 444). Heidegger's claim here is that it is only on the basis of utopian ideals together with a sense/of alternative ways of living discovered by antiquarian preservation that we can have a standpoint for criticizing calcified forms of life of the present. The present can be seen as deformed or defective only in contrast to an understanding of the potential built into our heritage and the truest aims definitive of our destiny. The account of authentic historiography in Being and Time is clearly not just a recipe for writing better history books. Rather, historiography becomes a model for authentic action. Authentic Dasein understands its fundamental task as the preservation and transmission of its historical culture for the purposes of realizing a shared destiny. As transmitters of a tradition, it is incumbent on us to seize on the defining possibilities of our common world, to creatively reinterpret them in the light of the demands of the present, and to take a stand on realizing the prospects for the future. As always, the future is primary. Just as the life of the individual is primarily defined by its "being-towards-the-end," so the community's being is defined by its directedness towards its "destiny," that is, the task of working out the basic experiences that define it. (HC 138)

Clearly, according to Guignon, Heidegger stresses the need for utopian ideals for a critique of the forms of life of the present, and, ontologically, the primacy of utopian ideals is grounded in the primacy of the future. It seems to be clear as well that there are several heroes, Socrates, Martin Luther King, Florence Nightingale, Sitting Bull, and others. However, how and from where we get the utopian ideals is not so clear. Also, Guignon's use of the singular and the plural seems to be confusing. In the second quote, he speaks first of «alternative ways of living discovered by antiquarian preservation,» then of «a tradition,» after this of «defining possibilities of our common world,» which we have to «creatively reinterpret . . . in the light of the demands of the present.» However, given the necessity of utopian ideals, Guignon's use of the singular and the plural is fully justified. Only the utopian ideals enable us to discover several alternative ways the past offers and then to choose among them that one way or that one tradition we establish as binding for ourselves. Both the utopian ideals and this single tradition we choose enable us to criticize the forms of life of the present. But Guignon's interpretation may have a second aspect, namely, that there is no single binding way, or tradition, at all. Rather, the utopian ideals enable us to «creatively reinterpret» not only the forms of life of the present but also the different ways of life of the past that still exist, albeit in calcified forms. Thus, according to one's utopian ideal one might choose not Sitting Bull, but rather Socrates as his hero. Socrates

himself, however, does not determine what use his adherent makes of him or how he interprets and, maybe, at a later time reinterprets Socrates. In this second aspect, it is clear that the utopian ideals enable us to distance ourselves not only from the present but also from the past. However, even without the second aspect the utopian ideals make our distancing from the past possible insofar as it is only on the basis of those ideals that we can see the multiplicity of possible heroes offered by the past. And only because of that can we then choose among them and select that one tradition we regard as binding for ourselves. Even if one leaves aside the process of singling out a tradition from several alternative ways of life by means of an utopian ideal and looks only at the last paragraph of the second quotation, our relationship to the tradition we transmit entails the ability to distance ourselves from its specific forms in the present and thus from the past itself. For the utopian ideals also enable us to «creatively reinterpret» the specific forms in which the tradition we transmit is alive. Thus, Guignon seems to focus on a distancing from the past as the bottom line of Heidegger's concept of historicality. In the light of our utopian ideals we distance ourselves from the present and the past as from some monolithic bloc. In so doing, we see that the past contains several different possibilities and heroes. The choice of one single hero requires that we can distance ourselves from all the other possible heroes, and we can do this only thanks to our utopian ideal. The utopian ideal, in turn, is not derived from the past but enables us to choose among all possible heroes the one who fits our ideal. Without this utopian ideal we would remain immersed in an unchallenged present or in a multifariousness of heroes without being able to distance ourselves from them and to single out the tradition we regard as binding for ourselves.

If this is a fair summary of Guignon's interpretation, he seems to interpret the very important sentence on «erwidert» («reciprocative rejoinder») preceding the one with the phrase he quotes («a disavowal of that which in the "today", is working itself out as the 'past' ») as Macquarrie and Robinson do in their translation of Sein und Zeit . Their translation reads:

Arising, as it does, from a resolute projection of oneself, repetition does not let itself be persuaded of something by what is 'past', just in order that this, as something which was formerly actual, may recur. Rather, the repetition makes a reciprocative rejoinder to the possibility of that existence which has-been-there. But when such a rejoinder is made to this possibility in a resolution, it is made in a moment of vision; and as such it is at the same time a disavowal of that which in the "today", is working itself out as the 'past'. (BT 437f.)

In the note accompanying this passage, the translators give Heidegger's German text and add their comment on the entire passage:

'Die Wiederholung lässt sich, einem entschlossenen Sichentwerfen entspringend, nicht vom "Vergangenen"überreden, um es als das vormals Wirkliche nur

wiederkehren zu lassen. Die Wiederholung erwidert vielmehr die Möglichkeit der dagewesenen Existenz. Die Erwiderung der Möglichkeit im Entschluss ist aber zugleich als augenblickliche der Widerruf dessen, was in {sic } Heute sich als "Vergangenheit" auswirkt.' The idea seems to be that in resolute repetition one is having, as it were, a conversation with the past, in which the past proposes certain possibilities for adoption, but in which one makes a rejoinder to this proposal by 'reciprocating' with the proposal of other possibilities as a sort of rebuke to the past, which one now disavows. (The punning treatment of 'wieder' and 'wider' is presumably intentional.) (BT 438, n. 1)

To be in a position of having a conversation with the past with its several possibilities that we can adopt, reject, or reinterpret presupposes that we are in a free relationship to the past, whether or not we are so only through utopian ideals. Only this position of free distance from the past, that is, one in which the past does not determine us—at least not completely—enables us to have this conversation, that is, to consider all the possibilities offered by the past, to reject several, to adopt some, and to reinterpret them.

To be sure, the first sentence on the denial of a simple recurrence of the past awakens the expectation that in the following sentence, this distance between the present and the past that cannot simply recur is further explained, stressed, and deepened. Furthermore, the German word «erwidern» seems to fit this purpose exactly. For if we are in a position to be able to make an Erwiderung (response, reciprocation, reciprocative rejoinder), we are free to reject, that is, we can choose freely between several possibilities in the sense of Macquarrie and Robinson's «conversation with the past.» However, in German, in cases like these, one uses «erwidern» not in the accusative but rather in the dative; that is, one would have expected Heidegger to write «erwidert vielmehr der Möglichkeit der dagewesenen Existenz.» For, grammatically, the recipient of an Erwiderung in this sense is the dative object of the sentence. For example, someone has told me to leave the room, but I «erwidere ihm "Nein!"» (I respond to him "No!"), «Ich erwidere ihm , daß ich den Raum nicht vedassen werde» (I respond to him that I will not leave the room). The other person, in turn, might erwidern something to my Erwiderung and so on until we reach an agreement. Thus, we would have, as it were, conversations with all the heroes and would then erwidern to all but one of them that we have considered them but have decided not to adopt them and instead will adopt another one with whom we also had a conversation and who has convinced us. However, in Heidegger's sentence the addressee of the Erwiderung is the accusative object of the sentence («erwidert vielmehr die Möglichkeit der dagewesenen Existenz»).

There is a usage of the German verb «erwidern,» not in the dative, but in the accusative that meets the expectation that in the sentence in question Heidegger heightens the distance between the present and the past and according to which this distance would be even more pronounced than is suggested in the

interpretation of Guignon and the translators who allow Dasein finally to adopt or to identify itself with some hero offered by the past. For «erwidern» in the accusative can be used in the sense of «defending oneself against» or «fighting back.» For instance, in a sports competition, party A, a soccer team or a fencer, launches an attack against party B, and if B can defend itself or even launch a counterattack against A, one might summarize this by saying, «B has erwidert A's attack.» Wolin does not comment on the sentence with «erwidert,» but he might have thought of this sentence in connection with his argument that Heidegger's philosophy of existence «tends to be inherently destructive of tradition» (PB 32). Birmingham, however, has explicitly adopted this interpretation, or rather an even stronger one, in her essay "The Time of the Political." Inserting «(Erwidert)» after «reciprocative rejoinder,» she quotes Macquarrie and Robinson's translation from «The repeating of that which is possible does not bring again . . .» to «a disavowal of that which in the "today", is working itself out as the 'past'» (BT 437-438; SZ 385-386), and comments on it as follows:

Macquarrie and Robinson's translation of Erwidert as "reciprocative rejoinder" conveys too great a sense of a return understood as identity: I reply to you in the same way that you did to me. In more militaristic terms, I return the strike in the same way that I received it. But clearly the passage above suggests. something different. The response to repeatable historical possibilities is one which disavows any notion of continuity or identity with the past. Here a reference to the preposition "wider " meaning "contrary to or against" is helpful in grasping Heidegger's sense of reply as Erwidert . The reply or response to historical possibilities is precisely that which disrupts identity and continuity. Dasein's authentic reply in the Augenblick to historical possibilities (Erwidert ), is the site of resistance and displacement. In still other words, Dasein's critical reply in the Augenblick marks the hiatus between the no-longer and not-yet, refuting the notion of history as a continuum.

Therefore, Dasein's critical reply (Erwidert ) to repeatable historical possibilities calls into question the repetitive, narrative mode of legitimation. (TP 31)^[14]

However, these are not the only ways to use erwidern in the accusative. Most of the time, erwidern in the accusative is used in the sense of the Greek . Someone has done me a favor, and now I'm obliged to return that favor, as the second act within the old institution of , grace, charity, as the binding glue of each society and between different societies.^[15] Someone has given me a present, has sent me a letter, or has visited me. According to the rules of charity, I am obliged to give a gift, write a letter, or pay a visit in return, that is, «I will erwidern the present, letter, or visit.» Since Heidegger elsewhere talks about «Ruf» (call) and «Anruf» (appeal, phone call) and since «Anruf» is used mainly for making a phone call, one might have had one's answering machine switched on: «Ich erwidere Ihren

Anruf so bald es mir möglich ist» (I'll return your call as soon as possible) if there had been answering machines in the 1920s. Anyway, «einen Anruf erwidern» was a common phrase at that time.^[16] 16 Or, suppose Mr. Jones has fallen in love with Ms. Smith and, hoping she would love him too, declares his love to her. However, Ms. Smith doesn't love him at all, but rather feels somewhat annoyed by his declaration and tells him so. Thus, in a narrative to her friend, Ms. Smith might use erwidern in the dative and tell her «And I erwiderte ihm "No! I'm sorry, I don't love you at all".» However, if she did love him and let him know her love, one would use erwidern in the accusative in a narrative about this: «And she erwiderte his love.» Or take the German sentence «Die Berge erwidern meinen Ruf» (the mountains erwidern my call). It is a common, somewhat poetical, German expression for «echo.» Finally, «Sie erwiderte meinen Hilferuf» (She erwiderte my call for help). One might use this sentence to summarize that when person A called for help, person B (that is, B is the one who «erwidert A's call for help») actually helped A deal with his or her predicament. This is the opposite of erwidern as counterattack and of erwidern in the dative as well. For in a counterattack one erwidert if one resists some attack or demand, defends oneself against it, or even launches an attack of one's own. In cases like the call for help, however, one erwidert this call precisely by complying with it. Heidegger's sentence does not give any indication of which sense of «erwidern» in the accusative he meant. However, as I will show in what follows, the context of this sentence rules out not only Guignon's but also Birmingham's interpretation.