C. Heidegger in the USA

Moving from the 1930s in Germany more than half a century ahead and halfway around the world, it has to be noted that—at least, as far as I know— in the German literature concerning politics in Being and Time no interpretation with a claim as strong as mine can be found. However, one also does not find there an interpretation such as Birmingham' s. Perhaps that is because, prior to any detailed analysis, German readers generally sense intuitively that Heidegger's language is so thoroughly impregnated with conservative figures of speech as to make the idea that he could have proposed Birmingham's anarchistic notion of politics unlikely. American readers perhaps do not share this background understanding to the same extent and so enjoy greater freedom in their interpretations. However, interpretations such as Birmingham's are also based on the fundamental self-understanding of the individual in the USA; a self-understanding that was either completely absent among many Germans of Heidegger' s time or was precisely the kind that conservatives argued and fought against. It is, Scheler would say, «English cant» (PPS 218) and its sociological

and cultural ramifications that make possible interpretations such as Birmingham' s. The «German» Held and the «German» notion of fate are indeed foreign to the average person, to the «they,» so to speak, in the United States.

At the beginning of chapter 4, I presented Guignon's reasoning that Being and Time is by no means «inherently fascist or proto-Nazi» (HC 131). His interpretation is directed in particular against Wolin's claim that

Heidegger's involvement with National Socialism—which was of the order of deep-seated, existential commitment—was far from being an adventitious, merely biographical episode. Instead, it was rooted in the innermost tendencies of his thought . This claim in no way entails the assumption that Nazism is somehow a necessary and inevitable outgrowth of the philosophy of Being and Time . It does suggest, however, that the politics of the Nazi movement emphatically satisfied the desiderata of authentic historical commitment adumbrated in that work. (PB 66)

As mentioned at the beginning of chapter I, section B, Guignon begins his essay by quoting Wolin's statement that «Existenzphilosophie in its Heideggerian variant tends to be inherently destructive of tradition» (PB 32) (HC 130), a statement that might lead us to expect that Wolin interprets the sentences on erwidert and Widerruf as acts of simple negations—like Birmingham. But Wolin does not comment on these sentences;^[55] however, amazingly, Guignon would probably accept all of Wolin's statements about destiny and fate, but give them a slight twist, and add his own interpretation of Heidegger's sentence on erwidert so as to present Being and Time as politically neutral. This is an interesting hermeneutical situation. Wolin's statements on Heideggerian philosophy's inherent tendency to destroy all tradition occur in the general introduction to his interpretation of Being and Time ("The 'Historicity' of Being and Time, " PB 22-35); he also adds there, however, a note that a «full exposition and justification of this claim will have to wait until our analysis of Heidegger's concept of "resolve" (Entschlossenheit ) below» (PB 32, n. 45). Accordingly, his interpretative statements refer not so much to Heidegger's concept of historicality as to that of resoluteness; in fact, they function as interpretation of historicality only with a stipulation that Guignon does not mention. After his interpretation of "Authenticity and Decision" (PB 35-40) and of "The Call of Conscience" (PB 40-46), Wolin interprets Entschlossenheit under the heading "A Self-Canceling Social Ontology; The Aporias of 'Decisiveness'" (PB 46-53). He focuses on the problem of «cri-terionlessness» (PB 52), and summarizes his analysis as follows:

For when {Heidegger's concept of decisiveness, or decisionism in general} is devoid of any and every normative orientation, "decision" can only be blind and uninformed —ultimately , it becomes a leap into the void. Without any material criteria for decision, it becomes impossible to distinguish an authentic from an inauthentic decision, responsible from irresponsible action—let alone on

what grounds an individual would even prefer one course of action to another. Indeed, at times, Heidegger seems to openly glorify the irrationalist basis of decision. (PB 52)

However, Guignon's reference to Wolin does not lead us to expect that in "'Destiny' or The Incorporation of Dasein Within A Historical Community" (PB 53-66), Wolin, in a sense, interprets «historicality» from pretty much the same point of view as Guignon himself, namely, arguing that, according to Heidegger, the past is meant to provide decision with those meanings that decision in itself lacks: «Historicity is a mode of authentic, past-directed temporalization : Dasein situates itself in relation to a meaningful historical continuum, and this act endows its projection toward the future with content and direction» (PB 60). However, in contrast to Guignon, Wolin discusses the past, as I did in chapters 1 and 2, using the singular, and he characterizes Dasein's relation to it, as I did, in terms of subjugation:

The discussion of "authentic temporality," in which the concept of "destiny" figures so prominently, is specifically intended to solve the problem of the self-referentiality of resolve in its preliminary version. In effect, the indeterminacy of resolve is answered by the demand that the individual subordinate him or herself to a common destiny. (PB 57)

Wolin finds this sense of subjugation, subordination, or, as he puts it, «fatalism» (PB 62), in section 74 in the passages preceding the sentence on «repetition» (BT 434-437; SZ 382-385), and this leads Wolin to posit an opposition between voluntarism and fatalism:

The opposition between voluntarism and fatalism in Being and Time is never reconciled. Heidegger tries to have it both ways and fails: "destiny" is meant to provide the existentiell basis for the empty self-referentiality of authentic decision, thereby furnishing a measure of content for an otherwise ungrounded, free-floating will. However, the "fatalistic" implications of this category subsequently undermine the autonomy of authentic resolve, an autonomy that was so painstakingly wrested (via the Angst of Being-towards-death) from the inauthentic Existenzialien of everydayness. Since this manner of reconciling the opposition is unpalatable, Heidegger at times lurches to the opposite extreme, suggesting that destiny itself can be "chosen" or "willed." But with this move, we have essentially relapsed into the same decisionistic arbitrariness that the concept of destiny was intended to counteract in the first place. (PB 62f.)

According to Wolin, the concept of destiny is grounded in that of repetition. He quotes the sentence on repetition («But when one has, . . .» BT 437; SZ 385) (PB 63) to address the problem of mere reproduction of the past, but he focuses not on the passage about Erwiderung and Widerruf (BT 438; SZ 386) but rather

on the sentence about the choice of the hero (BT 437; SZ 385). Based on this, he launches the same criticism as above and reiterates the same aporia:

To repeat an authentic possibility derived from the past means that "Dasein may choose its hero ," . . . But the question remains: on what basis is the hero to be chosen? How is one to recognize an authentic hero from an icon with feet of clay? Unless some criteria of selection are provided, we run the risk once more of relapsing into the vertiginous arbitrariness of pure decisionism. The only answer Heidegger provides to this question is characteristically unsatisfying. When we inquire as to the basis on which authentic repetition is to proceed and in terms of which true heroes might be distinguished from charlatans . . . we are told that repetition itself is "grounded existentially in anticipatory resolve." { BT 437; SZ 385} Thus, resolve is grounded in repetition (e.g., the choice of a proper hero), and repetition itself is grounded in resolve. Once again, circular reasoning replaces cogent insight and sheer assertion substitutes for compelling argumentation. (PB 63f.)

Note that in this passage Wolin switches from the singular «destiny» to the plural of several possibilities, the «true heroes» and «charlatans.» Already here Guignon can step in and reevaluate Wolin's entire argument. However, Wolin goes a step further. Since Heidegger's concept of decision lacks any content, Dasein is not only not capable of any reasonable decision but also has no way to resist any preexisting decision. Thus,

not only is decisionism thoroughly "unprincipled"; it is also on this account nakedly opportunistic . And all voluntaristic bluster about "will," "choice," etc., notwithstanding, opportunism in the end reveals itself often enough as a base and simple conformism. Thus, because it lacks any and every inherent basis for choice, decisionism is forced to grasp at random existing opportunities for self-actualization. And as we saw earlier, an authentic resolve that shunned self-actualization would be a contradiction in terms. As innately destitute of inner substance, resolve has no choice but to conform to whatever options are historically available. (PB 64f.)

Thus, if one combines the inherent opportunism with the «sufficiently formal and abstract» (PB 76) character of the existential analysis of Being and Time , «one could virtually imagine the philosopher opting for a Bolshevist instead of a Nationalist revolutionary course» (PB 76). Since from the beginning Wolin has made it clear beyond any doubt that, for him, Heidegger belonged to the conservatives who opposed the Weimar Republic as well as bolshevism, this second step of his interpretation introduces some ambiguity into his summary, either intentionally or by accident. Wolin continues:

The consequences of this decisionistic "ethical vacuum," coupled with the prejudicial nature of Heidegger's conservative revolutionary degradation of the modem life-world, suggest an undeniable theoretical cogency behind Heideg-

ger's ignominious life-choice of 1933. In its rejection of "moral convention" which qua convention, proves inimical to acts of heroic bravado— decisionism shows itself to be distinctly nihilistic vis-à-vis the totality of inherited ethical paradigms. For this reason, the implicit political theory of Being and Time — and in this respect, it proves a classical instance of the German conservative-authoritarian mentality of the period—remains devoid of fundamental "liberal convictions" that might have served as an ethicopolitical bulwark against the enticement of fascism. Freed of such bourgeois qualms, the National Socialist movement presented itself as a plausible material "filling" for the empty vessel of authentic decision and its categorical demand for existentiell-historical content. The summons toward an "authentic historical destiny" enunciated in Being and Time was thus provided with an ominously appropriate response by Germany's National Revolution. The latter, in effect, was viewed by Heidegger as the ontic fulfillment of the categorical demands of "historicity": it was Heidegger's own choice of a "hero," a "destiny," and a "community." (PB 65)

Thus, one might ask, Was the Heidegger of Being and Time a Nazi? Or was he just a conservative who unfortunately wrote a book that took any weapons against National Socialism out of his hands? Did he write a book against the alleged conformism of the «they» without realizing that he himself did nothing but reestablish this conformism on the noble level of authentic Dasein? Would Heidegger have become a communist if the communists, in some way or another, had seized power? These are embarrassing conclusions. To be sure, Georges Sorel changed from a Leninist into an admirer of Mussolini; in the latter years of the Weimar Republic, some Social Democrats or communists changed over to National Socialism; in 1933, many people who had formerly been neutral—or lukewarm—became National Socialists. And perhaps even in politics, the French proverb that the extremes touch each other contains some truth. However, German professors at that time insisted on the difference between the Right and the Left, and according to Wolin, so did Heidegger. Should we assume that all this notwithstanding, Heidegger wrote a book in which he blurred these differences? Not in his prephilosophical opinions but rather in his masterpiece, the great philosopher maneuvers himself into the position of the double-headed mortals who vacillate between the Right and the Left and consequently conform to whatever decisions are forced upon them. At this point, Guignon can see not only the possibility but, so to speak, the necessity to intervene. And he can do so very smoothly.

Wolin already anticipated the result of his interpretation early on in his argument concerning historicality, namely, in the note accompanying his quotation of the sentences «The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself, . . . but not necessarily as having thus come down» (BT 435; SZ 383):

The concluding phrase to this citation is of great interest insofar as it indicates a profound decisionistic residue in the entire discussion of historicity. It implies

that the taking up of historically extant possibilities is never something unalterable and merely given, but in the last analysis something codetermined by the autonomous decision of Dasein itself. (PB 60, n. 107)

For Wolin, this autonomy of the Dasein vis-à-vis the past is the unwanted outcome of Heidegger's analysis. Heidegger wanted a past, or destiny, that subjugated the Daseine. Because of his concept of resoluteness, however, these Daseine rum out to be those «Helden» who care only about their glorious self-affirmation and thus negate the past and its offers. However, Heidegger did not explicitly state that he wanted to develop a concept of a subjugating past that left no room for Dasein's objection against the past's exaction. Therefore, one can regard Dasein's autonomy, if properly understood—that is, in terms of, as Guignon says with reference to Taylor, «situated freedom» (HC 131)—to be not the unwanted outcome but rather exactly the aim Heidegger was reaching for. On this basis, one can see Being and Time in its political import as a book of fundamental, and in themselves neutral, politics rather than as a proto-fascist or at least very confused book. Guignon might even concede that in the passage preceding the sentences on repetition and the choice of one's hero, Heidegger allows some demanding aspect in heritage, destiny, and past. However, beginning with the sentence «But when one has, by repetition, handed down to oneself a possibility that has been. . . . » (BT 437; SZ 385), Heidegger might introduce Dasein's relative independence vis-à-vis the past and the present; this independence is not the same as Wolin's glorious acts of self-affirmation or nihilism in regard to the past; rather, it is made possible by Dasein's utopian ideal, and it enables Dasein to consider the various possibilities offered by the past, to choose what fits its utopian ideal, and to distance itself from the others as well as from the present, as, according to Guignon, Heidegger states in the sentences on erwidert and Widerruf (BT 438; SZ 386).^[56]

Wolin sees an unresolved tension in Heidegger's theory. On the one hand, there is fate as a tradition demanding obedience. On the other, Dasein is only concerned with its self-affirmation and is intrinsically nihilistic vis-à-vis the past^[57] Regarding the nihilistic Dasein, it seems to me that—when reading Heidegger, at least—Wolin has not sufficiently distanced himself from a specifically North American notion of authenticity. As an advertisement for the aftershave lotion «eXcesS» puts it, «an overstepping of bounds»—this is what Americans have to do to be noticed socially. The attitude of overstepping bounds, of being creative, of making a difference, of breaking with the tradition and initiating something new, and of distancing oneself from all others as the norm of life is probably related to the admirable figures of cowboys, dishwashers, and self-made men. Each of them had left behind the suffocating traditions of the «Old World»; each of them was concerned with making his own life and fate.^[58] The self-made man, however, is actually the

opposite of a German «Held» and of the «Helden» (SZ 385; «hero,» BT 437) in Being and Time . A German Held is not someone who distances himself from tradition so as to realize himself in his individuality; rather, he is someone capable of forgetting himself, of putting his entire being into the service of the common good, and of «sacrificing» himself for it. Or—more precisely and in terms of the logic of transfiguration^[59] —a Held even finds his self-fulfillment in self-sacrifice for the common good.^[60] Still, especially under the sway of deconstructive theory, which fits nicely into, as Heidegger would say, the American «they,» a large majority of American commentators project the self-made man onto Heidegger's Held and authentic Dasein, and even project the aspect of distancing onto the notion of fate. Fate becomes something created by the authentic Dasein itself, or it becomes the site of resistance to and breaking with any tradition.

Guignon probably intends his emphasis on utopian ideals as a means to avoid Wolin's criticism of circularity.^[61] In his book Heidegger: Thought and Historicity , Fynsk finds nothing wrong in circularities like these, once we come to think of the circular movement not «in a linear fashion,» but «on the contrary, as a simultaneous, open-ended movement in two opposing directions—not in terms of a circle but in terms of a paradoxical structure of simultaneous approach and withdrawal, of a casting forth that casts back.»^[62] In some sense, this anticipates his interpretation of section 74. Fynsk warns against an interpretation in which we lose sight of «the possibility of thinking the political import of Heidegger's thought.»^[63] Thus, by his «largely immanent readings of Heidegger's texts,»^[64] Fynsk wants to illuminate «those points where the text marks its relation to something that exceeds it and that provokes its movement.»^[65] Yet, in his interpretation of Being and Time , in the chapter "The Self and its Witness,"^[66] he doesn't talk about politics, at least not in the sense of Wolin and Guignon. It is «the other» and «the more primordial experience that is an originary encounter with alterity»^[67] that ignites the paradoxical structure of simultaneous approach and withdrawal. Choosing one's hero is this act of approaching and following. However, as the sentences on erwidert and Widerruf show, «choosing as affirming and following is not a form of passive reception; insofar as it involves interpretation, it is also a struggle»;^[68] a struggle whose purpose is to distance Dasein from its hero. The way from Being and Time does not lead to the Nazis but to Heidegger's lectures on Nietzsche:

Therefore, if the "following" that is made possible by such an existentiell choice is a fateful necessity, then it might be said that, by writing Being and Time , Heidegger had to write Nietzsche —at least, insofar as a fate must be written. Nietzsche , we might say, represents Heidegger's effort to lose Nietzsche. The engagement with that possibility of existence (or of thought) that is Nietzsche's—a repetition of the engagement marked in Being and Time —is

undertaken for the purposes of disengagement and the demarcation of a new historical position.^[69]

I leave open whether Fynsk's interpretation is closer to Birmingham or to Guignon, or whether it marks a genuine stand within the field demarcated by «erwidert» as conversation with, and negation of, the past. In my view it is a further example of the devastating effects of Heidegger's «playful» punning with «wieder» and «wider,» and with the dative and accusative.

Guignon developed an interpretation according to which authentic Dasein distances itself from the present and the past and yet identifies itself with some past. However, as I pointed out in section B of chapter 1, this would have required the dative with «erwidert.» Yet, there is even a sense of «erwidern» in the accusative according to which it might mean an act of distancing even stronger than in Guignon. As Guignon and also Fynsk, Birmingham too might have admitted a strong demand in the passages on heritage, destiny, and repetition in order then to make the act of negation that, according to her, authentic Dasein performs in the sentences on erwidern and Widerruf even more dramatic. In section B of chapter 1 I presented Birmingham' s interpretation of the passage on erwidert and Widerruf, and in section C of chapter 2 I summarized her interpretation of the passage on «destiny.» Birmingham wants to show that «Heidegger does not articulate a philosophy of history at all, but instead opens the way for rethinking political judgment» (TP 25), and that Lacoue-Labarthe is wrong in his claim that Heidegger's engagement in National Socialism was «permitted» by «an unexamined theory of mimetic identification» (TP 44).^[70] Following her interpretation of «erwidert» and «Widermf» she states in a bluntly metaphysical way that there are entities with a clear definition, that Heidegger knew of this, and that, in the passage in question, he wrote about these entities:

Events, by definition, are occurrences that interrupt routine processes, and Heidegger clearly understands this when he writes of the event of destiny as that which allows for the disavowal of the past and possibility of something unexpected and unpredictable. . . . In still other words, Dasein's critical response dissolves any authorization of repeatable historical possibilities based on a myth of beginnings. (TP 31)

By this, she smuggles into the text a term of the later Heidegger, «Ereignis,» which Heidegger does not use at all as a technical term in Being and Time . (Note that she translates «Geschehen» with «historizing,» or «historicity»; thus, «event» must be the translation of the term «Ereignis» in Heidegger's later writings.) She regards her projection of her specific interpretation of the later Heidegger's concept of event onto the two passages in Being and Time in section 74 as sufficient to refute Lacoue-Labarthe's analysis of the Rectorate Address and of Being and Time . After these two points, she tries to

show that this project of Being and Time , namely, to develop a philosophy of Rig, of antitotalitarian politics, is central in Heidegger's lectures on Nietzsche between 1936 and 194o (TP 33ff.).^[71] Thus, if Lacoue-Labarthe is wrong, what else was it that «permitted» Heidegger's engagement in National Socialism? Her answer is brief: «in certain crucial texts in the 1930s, namely, the Rectorial Address and in some passages of Introduction to Metaphysics , Heidegger forgot the sublime moment which calls for Dasein's resolute judgment» (TP 44). He forgot. Thus, according to Birmingham, having been engaged since at least the early 1920s until, at least, the end of the 1930s in a philosophy of antitotalitarian politics, the greatest philosopher simply forgot his entire philosophy though it was tailored precisely as a theoretical and practical critique of situations like his and Hitler's Machtübernahme in 1933.^[72]