A Madisonian Budget System

All modern governments are constrained in their budgeting by similar problems of budget composition. Most, however, have far simpler political systems. The main story of this book, the battle for control between Congress and the president, would make no sense in other nations. In England or Germany or Japan or Sweden the executive grows out of and dominates the legislature; an executive cannot exist without a legislative majority. If no majority exists, the government loses a vote of confidence, and a new election is held. In the United States the executive and the legislature may remain locked in bitter combat for years, each unable to remove the other.

This separation of the executive and the legislature is one of two distinguishing and, for budgeting, crucial aspects of the political system created by the Constitution. It is not just a structure but a value: we are taught in school James Madison's arguments that "separation of powers"

and "checks and balances" prevent tyrannical government and protect minorities. What is less obvious may be even more important: a system of checks and balances means that the legislature is as strong as the executive.

In other countries the executive assembles a budget proposal, which is difficult enough, and presents it to the legislature, expecting it to pass, as designed, in one bill. There may be some small changes at the margins, but the legislature is in no position to extensively revise the executive's plan. After all, the prime minister leads the majority party or coalition. Even in American state governments, however, the legislature is much more active than elsewhere; and Congress is, beyond doubt, the most powerful legislature of all.^[3]

Congress's unique role in budgeting is established by the Constitution, which states: "No Money may be drawn from the Treasury but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law" (Article 1, Section 9). The president can only spend money if Congress lets him. This power of the purse was described by Madison, extrapolating from Parliament's battles with the king, as "the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure."^[4] Congress may not feel its power of the purse is quite so effective, but if members of Congress as a group can ever be said to agree on anything it is that their power of the purse must be retained if they are to maintain their independence.

That means power over little as well as big things. Editorialists—and presidents—continually criticize Congress for attention to details that are beneath the dignity of a national legislature. In his 1988 State of the Union message, President Reagan cited "such items as cranberry research, blueberry research, the study of crawfish and the commercialization of wild flowers." From Congress's perspective, however, the issue is not whether there will be programs with local "pork-barrel" benefits. The Department of Agriculture is going to do research on something, somewhere .^[5] The issue is who will decide which localities benefit. If the president decides, he has a substantial weapon to reward and punish legislators; if he can control the members, he can control Congress.^[6]

We have, then, a Madisonian budget system, based on ambition opposing ambition, as part of our Madisonian government. After two hundred years we still have a powerful legislature, divided internally and checked externally. If anything, the system of checks and balances has grown more elaborate, both internally through the committee system and externally as Congress has given the president powers to do things Congress feels necessary but difficult for itself.