The State as a State of Mind

We began looking at the public sphere as part of the search for the state as it is commonly discussed—institutionalized in some form that allows one to talk of the state as having its own interests and tasks, under pressure from society's problems, struggling to maintain its independence. In American politics no one entity fits that role. Senators and representatives come closest, but have no monopoly of authority; in some areas, especially foreign and defense policy, they see themselves as outsiders vis-à-vis the president and his minions. Instead of a group of people or formal institutions, the state, in a sense, is a state of mind.

In the budget battles, participants who emphasize balance above other values feel particularly like the Marxists' embattled state managers. When the media raise a clamor against deficits, they are thinking like state managers but, unlike the politicians, they do not have to do anything. They fulfill their obligations to the system by criticizing the politicians, which, neatly enough, allows the press to believe itself both critical and loyal at the same time. Meanwhile, some holders of formal authority (in Congress and the presidency) resist the balancers, though, under the terms of the political debate, they cannot say they are doing so. No one is for the deficit, at least not publicly.

We have an extremely vigorous and important public sphere; it shapes the actions of holders of formal authority, at the same time criticizing them and committing itself to system maintenance. The state itself is a category of interest, distinguishable by the way it is discussed and, for a moment in time, defined. The "party of responsibility"^[32] consists of politicians who more likely represent that interest than the two other major aggregations: the established coalition of social hierarchy and competitive individualism, which cares more about moral control and freeing capital, and the liberal, egalitarian coalition, which cares more about changing institutions to provide benefits to the less powerful.^[33] Thus, we recreate the basic cleavages sensed by both Marxists and conservatives—versions of capitalism and mass politics, both pressuring the state in the middle—into a more appropriate form. This produces a shifting battle of interests; the state has distinct advantages through its validation in the public sphere, but, because it is just one construction of interest, the state need not win the battle.

"Interest,"just like "state," is a social construction. When there is widespread agreement on the answer to the stirring question of the old labor song—"Which Side Are You On?"—we have temporarily accepted the latest definition of who are "the interests" and who is "the state." Usually, things are not that clear. That is why the state is often a state of mind. To those who grew up with power in America as a fissiparous construct,

so hard to get hold of it slips through your fingers, namely, the pluralists who until recently dominated debate on American politics, the state is not problematic because they do not expect any group or interest or institution to rule.

This understanding of the special nature of the American state and the public interest can be used to make sense of the major cleavage in American political science, between pluralism, best represented by David Truman, and its critics, best represented by Theodore J. Lowi.