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Thirteen Guerrilla Warfare: Spending Politics, 1982
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Getting Through the Election

After reconciliation and the September veto override, Congress had to finish up FY83 appropriations so it could recess for the election. Both Speaker O'Neill and Senate Majority Leader Baker were tempted to wrap up everything for the year in the continuing resolution, but the administration refused. On the day House Appropriations reported out its CR, the president called for a lame-duck session. Reagan explained his demand in procedural terms, deploring the attempt "to run the Federal Government without a proper budget." Tip O'Neill scoffed, "You know what happened, the defense figures are so much lower, and they don't want them."[21]

No one likes lame-duck sessions. Howard Baker apparently figured that whatever deal could be cut with the House could be done as easily before the election as after. Barring Republican gains in November—which, with unemployment headed over 10 percent, seemed unlikely—there was no reason to wait. But the president's procedural argument, supported by such unlikely allies as the New York Times, was hard to counter. Baker and O'Neill grudgingly agreed to the postelection session.

The House, therefore, with support from some GOP leaders, passed a short-term continuing resolution 242 to 161. In the Senate, Appropriations Committee members set defense spending at their own desired level, tacked a few authorizations on to the bill, and reported it out. In a thirteen-hour session on September 23, senators rejected all major Democratic spending amendments but added a miscellany of authorizing


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measures. Proponents were grabbing seats on the CR train. Disgusted, Jamie Whitten asserted that the result "attacked the whole idea of being a continuing resolution—it's a catchall legislative bill."[22] Not for the last time.

House conferees realized they could not get away with keeping defense at FY82 levels. The prodefense mood had been eroded but not ended. They settled for allowing DOD to spend at a rate of about $229 billion for the year, albeit with restrictions on some new procurement. The Pentagon was thus assured a 14 percent nominal spending increase, quite substantial because inflation would be under 5 percent. Nevertheless, DOD was unhappy because the spending level and restrictions on procurement represented substantial changes from its request. In our opinion the giant FY83 request had made the final increase seem less huge. For domestic spending, in contrast, the status quo, hemmed in by recession and deficit, was the implicit standard.

Legislators' attention turned to—though it had never really left—the campaign.


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Thirteen Guerrilla Warfare: Spending Politics, 1982
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