Groupings

Every bill will tap partisan and regional interests. Both a bill's debate and its provisions shape attitudes. We know, for example, that members of Congress are more willing to cut programs if they can focus attention on the money saved, not the programs cut. That was one point of reconciliation; it is also seen in the popularity of across-the-board cuts, rather than targeted ones, like those at the end of 1981.^[14] Because each bill poses issues differently, we need to look at many bills in order to understand the cleavages within Congress about budget policy. When we look at such a variety of bills, we see less stable coalitions than our previous story suggested. Yet amidst the cacophony of roll calls is a modicum of order, enough to suggest why Congress would have trouble solving the budgetary dilemma.

House members in the 97th Congress may be divided into six groups, more or less from right to left: domestic opposers, responsible conservatives, Sunbelt conservatives, Frostbelt moderates, Democratic loyalists, and diehard liberals.

Approximately forty opposers were fervent supporters of Ronald Reagan, and almost all were Republicans. They were distinguished from other Reaganites by their unwillingness to compromise even as much as their leader. They opposed the domestic government at every opportunity. They voted against individual appropriations that almost all other members supported. They voted against continuing resolutions. They voted against a tax hike even when endorsed by the president. They voted for spending cuts everywhere but in defense; for example, they supported cuts in farm programs and water projects.

About fifty responsible conservatives included most of the Republican

leadership and a few Democrats. They were stronger for budget balance, as opposed to simply opposing spending. Thus, they would support the 1982 tax increase, casting far fewer symbolic votes against routine appropriations, while supporting Reagan's basic priorities.

Unlike the first two groups, the ninety or so Sunbelt conservatives were united more by region than by party. About two-thirds were from the South, and Republicans constituted a slight majority. These members were quite conservative, but regional interest came first. They backed Reagan in hiking defense and cutting urban programs but, unlike the previous two groups, strongly supported rural "pork": water projects and farm subsidies. They also voted against the 1982 tax hike.

The sixty Frostbelt moderates were the regional mirror of the Sunbelt conservatives. Almost all from the North, they were willing to cut farm subsidies and water projects. While they supported Reagan on most big votes, they were uncomfortable with the military buildup, particularly when forced to choose between it and medicare. This largely Republican group was the broadest definition of the gypsy moths,

Around seventy members were Democratic loyalists, mostly southern and western Democrats who shared regional concerns with Sunbelt conservatives but who were much more comfortable with the Democratic party. Some were liberal; some were senior; all were pretty loyal. Their regional interests showed up in strong support for agriculture and water projects. They were more prodefense than were Frostbelt moderates. They opposed Reagan on major votes and strongly supported the appropriations bills, compromises no one loved, which kept the government running.

The last and largest, though outnumbered, group was around 110 diehard liberals who were northern Democrats. They opposed Reagan at almost every turn. They particularly opposed the defense buildup. They agreed with Stockman and Reagan, however, in one area: they didn't like rural subsidies, crop supports, and water projects. Some of this opposition was regional interest; some was the attitude toward business subsidies represented in support for reconciliation by Representatives Seiberling and Miller, the liberal side of Stockman's argument about justice and corruption.

The administration's maximum coalition consisted of the first four groups, between 240 and 250 members. But it would not be so easy to get because the Frostbelt moderates and Sunbelt conservatives did not agree on much of substance. Furthermore, a moderate-conservative budgeting compromise, if it lost the opposers, would need backing from members of one of the two Democratic groups. House Democrats, meanwhile, would have their own problems assembling a majority. They could rely on only two groups, about 180 to 190 members. If they allied with

the Frostbelt moderates, the loyalist Democrats would worry about defense and rural programs; alliance with Sunbelt conservatives was even less likely because they and the diehard liberals disagreed on virtually everything.

These groupings only reflected tendencies; on any particular issue, local concerns and the merits of the individual case would affect many members. If a vote was on one issue, rather than on a package, members could be targeted and lobbied, as on civil service retirement in the 1980 reconciliation. The clearest case of pressure occurred in May 1981, on the Export-Import Bank.

Congress had to pass a very large supplemental appropriation, H.R. 3512, before the FY81 CR expired on June 5. Reagan used the opportunity (so kindly granted by the Democrats' maneuvers) to request $15 billion in rescissions and an extra $12 billion in military spending. He had the whip hand because spending was expiring; the rescissions were mainly in slow-spending programs like housing; and, after reducing the rescission slightly, Congress passed the package easily. In the course of House consideration, however, Appropriations split the difference between the Export-Import Bank's $5.9 billion existing FY81 loan authority and Stockman's request of $5.1 billion. Diehard liberal David Obey submitted an amendment to cut to Stockman's level.

Export-Import's biggest beneficiaries are very large corporations (like Boeing) and big, very liberal unions (for example, the machinists, who work for Boeing). Good Republicans and good Democrats. Obey won, 234 to 169, on a ballot that split the parties (Republican 113 to 70, Democrat 121 to 99) and our six groups. Only the opposers, who disliked all subsidies (by 36 to 4) and the Sunbelt conservatives, who represented little industry that benefited from the Bank (by 62 to 21) came down strongly on one side of the issue. That night the affected groups got to work, and the next day the House reversed itself. The biggest switches were among the subsidy-oriented Sunbelt conservatives and the Democratic loyalists. The former went from 62 to 21 in favor of cutting to 42 to 40 opposed. The moderate loyalists went from 35 to 30 in favor of cutting to 52 to 14 opposed. Only the opposers and the responsible conservatives hardly moved at all after the lobbying blitz. Obey lost, 162 to 237. A program supported by business and labor groups was still hard to reduce. Lobbying pressure was most effective on an isolated issue, especially when applied to those members with least ideological or partisan commitment to reductions per se.^[15] They, however, were a majority.

Diverse preferences were highlighted most clearly in a series of votes on the reauthorization of the Legal Services Corporation (LSC). Reagan had wanted to kill Legal Services ever since, when he was governor of

California, California Rural Legal Assistance, funded by Legal Services, had blocked some of his policy initiatives in the courts. Local legal services agencies had a disconcerting and well-publicized habit of suing local and state authorities who, the poverty lawyers believed, were administering programs in ways contrary to the law. The LSC lawyers also won frequently. Many conservatives did not approve of the federal government paying liberal attorneys to sue the locals; even some moderates were uneasy with the idea. Liberals admired it: because everybody else had access to the courts for such purposes, so should the poor or, at least, their self-appointed legal advocates.

An amendment to ban political action by legal services agencies passed 275 to 146, with diehard liberals heavily opposed and moderate loyalists split evenly. It should be noted that, because few Republicans worked at the typical legal services agency, political action generated massive Republican opposition. A ban on lawsuits against governments also passed. The most revealing vote came on a motion to recommit (that is, kill) the legislation. It was phrased as allowing a hearing on the president's proposals (i.e., to eliminate the LSC), thereby making the vote more a matter of loyalty to the president than it would otherwise have been. Yet recommittal lost 176 to 233, as forty-two Republicans voted against it. Opposers and Sunbelt conservatives strongly supported the motion. Diehard liberals and moderate loyalists strongly opposed it. Responsible conservatives mainly supported their president, but the Frostbelt moderates voted almost two to one against recommittal. Even in June 1981 they would go only so far in support of the president.