Ideology and Reaganism

An election is more plausibly viewed as a referendum on such generalities as "less government" or "more fairness" than as a vote on complicated policies. The claim of a mandate by Reagan's supporters was really a claim to general endorsement; the Heritage Foundation report was a statement of policies that could be deduced (or so they claimed) from the ideology that (they assumed) the public had embraced in the person of Ronald Reagan.

"Reaganism" and "Reaganomics," Laurence Barrett observed, are terms that suggest particular biases and ways of thinking, if not specific policies.^[12] Unlike Carter or Ford or Nixon, Reagan's ideas were clear enough that his name could be used as shorthand for them. Proud (maybe bellicose) patriotism, enthusiastic capitalism, exaltation of the individual, and condemnation of big government—these themes gave Reaganism its appeal. From the other side, that same combination animated a passionate resistance to his leadership.

Reaganism's potential appeal is best understood if we call it by the name his supporters might prefer: "Americanism." Americanism in this sense had always combined individualistic capitalism and distrust of government with fervent nationalism. Americans were defined not by their origins but by adherence to a life-style; moreover, life's superiority was confirmed by the hordes of immigrants who flocked to U.S. shores from all over the world for a chance to live it. Reagan thus had a very powerful imagery at his command; when invoked, it sounded familiar and inspiring and true to many Americans. Those who opposed him might have trouble explaining why, being reduced perhaps to a lot of "yes, buts." Yet, for all its power, Americanism was a contested creed.

Even after fifty years, the greatest obstacle to Reagan's vision of the nation was the Great Depression. The crash and its aftermath of unemployment had dampened Americans' enthusiasm for unfettered capitalism. "Leave it to business," the motto of Republicans throughout their history, was rejected during the New Deal by a very American experimentalism: people were suffering, and the government helped them. New Deal policies followed no coherent economic theory, but there was a coherent political theory: government is the agent of the people.

The New Deal liberals and their heirs did not reject capitalism and individualism. Instead they argued that the actions of government in a democracy were needed to keep the promise of American individualism: anyone, of no matter what birth, could rise and prosper according to one's merits. To liberals the great tension of American politics was between

democracy and capitalism because capitalism too often meant entrenched private power. When Reagan invoked the "American way," liberals saw a history of efforts to preserve injustices and protect established power within society by impugning the patriotism of reformers; they remembered the "Red Scare" of 1919–1920, McCarthyism in the 1950s, the constant attack on labor unions as "socialistic," and resistance to the civil rights movement of the 1960s. Reagan invoked the federal system and states rights, citing Jefferson and other founders of the nation; his opponents heard "states rights" and saw racist consequences. As far as liberals were concerned, Americanism had been invoked on the wrong side far too often.

Reagan would continually stumble on one issue, symbolizing the public attachment to government action: social security. The free market was still the ideal of most Americans, but they wanted some protection.

Surveys revealed the public's attitude toward the two main strains of American ideology. In 1980, as in previous years, Americans preferred to call themselves "conservative" rather than "liberal" by margins ranging from four to three to about two to one. Yet as many Americans rated themselves as "moderate" as would admit to conservatism and liberalism combined. Ordinary Americans, suspicious of both sides, were more centrist than politicians.

Voters normally support the more moderate candidate who is safer and closer to their preferences. In 1980 that was clearly Jimmy Carter. Ronald Reagan was viewed as substantially more conservative than the norm, while Carter moved during the campaign from almost exactly normal to somewhat more liberal. In September a Gallup poll reported that 82 percent of respondents agreed that Carter took "moderate, middle-of-the-road positions." A Los Angeles Times poll reported that 41 percent described Reagan as "too extreme," but only 13 percent said the same of Carter.^[13] In short, Reagan's world view worried a lot of people.

They did not, however, see Reagan as so extreme that they should reelect a president who had failed.^[14] Ultimately, dismay with Carter overwhelmed fear of Reagan. The most common reasons for a Reagan vote were "it is time for a change" and "he is a strong leader." Reagan's victory was not ideological.

The general public did have broad preferences on public policy that fit both Reagan's appeal and the course of events in 1980. Considerable majorities believed that defense needed more dollars and that social welfare needed less, but the desired changes were modest.^[15] Reagan's election thus showed a public willing to risk a dash of conservatism, considering the available alternatives.

Even if the public had not become more conservative, the 1980 election guaranteed a conservative Congress. A massive purge of the liberal

establishment took place: four House committee chairs (the first losses by Democratic leaders since 1966), House Majority Whip John Brademas, and a raft of famous liberal senators were ousted. The Republicans' twelve-seat gain in the Senate contained elements of luck; a number of Democrats lost by paper-thin margins. Yet the losers' liberalism clearly had not helped them, and the victorious challengers were a rather conservative group.^[16]

In the House, the Republican thirty-three-seat gain was no fluke. If anything, the Democrats were protected by the well-known advantages of incumbency. The freshmen Republicans looked like a solidly conservative group, just as freshmen Democrats seemed fairly liberal, but there were many more Republicans. "On important issues freighted with ideological implications," political scientist Charles Jacob reported, "the possibility of a working conservative majority in the House is at hand."^[17] If holdover members voted as they had in the recent past—by no means a certainty—and if the new members were loyal to their parties—another big "if"—Republicans could win budget battles by about twenty votes. The potential margin was slim but extant.

Democrats in House and Senate had to hope that Reagan, given enough rope, would tie himself in knots. Gary Hart expressed the sentiment: "I give the Reagan administration about eighteen to twenty-four months to prove it doesn't have any answers either."^[18]