Not a Mandate But an Opportunity

As in virtually any election, poor people, blue-collar workers, union members, the less educated, and racial minorities were more likely to vote Democratic than were white, middle- and upper-middle-class citizens. In a less typical result that caused much speculation, women were less pro-Reagan than were men. Almost all demographic groups preferred Reagan, voting Republican far more than in 1976.^[5] Although these results suggested that the new administration would be less supportive of affirmative action, antipoverty proposals, and job programs than had its predecessor, they did not suggest that voters expected Reagan to attack unions, the poor, and the variously disadvantaged. Otherwise, all these groups (always excepting blacks, who were to have rather serious problems with the new president) would not have moved toward the Reagan camp.

Because election returns themselves cannot convey their own meaning, we must look to polls to see what voters expected when they voted Republican. More than anything else, the election demanded some action about the economy. Everybody wants less inflation and less unemployment; in fact, Table 2 reveals those as the two most common reasons for the vote—followed by budget balance. Foreign policy issues trailed badly. The heralded "social issues" emphasized by the "Moral Majority"—at least as symbolized by the Equal Rights Amendment and abortion—were mentioned by only 7 percent of respondents. Perhaps more telling, the "Needs of Big Cities," items that would tap the concerns for poverty and distributional equity (and self-interest) fueling "Great Society" liberalism, were hardly mentioned at all. Those concerns were not even on the agenda.

Carter did well among voters most worried by unemployment. But that was more because unemployment's victims are traditionally Democratic than because they had faith in Carter. In fact, Gallup in September

and the Los Angeles Times in October found that the historic advantage of the Democrats as the party best able to prevent unemployment had dissipated. Both polls showed Reagan as better than Carter on unemployment by around four to three. Voters who cared most about inflation, budget balancing, or cutting taxes—traditional Republican themes—favored Reagan by large margins.

A more interesting question, in view of Reagan's endorsement of the Kemp-Roth tax cut, was the relative weight of tax, balance and inflation concerns, because most informed observers saw a tax cut as preventing budget balance and potentially allowing inflation. Carter had campaigned against the Kemp-Roth proposal (for three annual 10 percent tax cuts) on just those grounds. By a 53 percent to 30 percent margin (see Table 3) the public disagreed with the claim that "cutting taxes is more important than balancing the federal budget." We therefore might have expected the Kemp-Roth proposal to hurt Reagan. The voters

clearly did not favor cutting taxes if that would produce an unbalanced budget.

The story is in the "if." Reagan's supporters, unlike Carter's, tended to believe that the tax cut and budget balance could be combined.^[6] Much of Reagan's campaign attempted to show that they could be.

Some supply-siders argued that growth resulting from their tax cut would balance the budget, and perhaps Reagan believed it. That was not, however, the crucial argument. More important was Reagan's (and the public's) belief that domestic spending could be cut by eliminating "waste, fraud, and abuse." In the campaign's showdown debate, President Carter challenged Reagan about his plan to cut taxes, increase defense, and balance the budget. Reagan replied,

Well, most people when they think about cutting government spending, they think in terms of eliminating necessary programs or wiping out something, some service that government is supposed to perform. I believe that there is enough extravagance and fat in government. As a matter of fact, one of the secretaries of H.E.W. under Mr. Carter testified that he thought there was $7 billion worth of waste and fraud in welfare, and in the medical programs associated with it. We've had the General Accounting Office estimate that there are probably tens of billions of dollars lost in fraud alone, and they have added that waste adds even more to that.^[7]

The challenger's answer in the debate was what he had been saying on the campaign trail for months; it was a prominent part of his formal statement on economic policy given in Chicago on September 9, 1980; it was his own deep belief; and it was what his advisers told him.

When Reagan promised to cut 7 percent of the budget in this manner, "experienced Washington budget specialists" (as The Economist put it) were "divided as to whether that initial pledge was naive or disingenuous."^[8] As one put it, "it would be the budgetary coup of the century if cuts of such magnitude could be made by eliminating 'waste and fraud' without dropping programs of substance."^[9] We have seen, however, that the public thought waste was massive. The message that Reagan wanted to cut domestic spending got through: a September CBS News poll found that 49 percent believed Reagan wanted to cut domestic spending, and only 14 percent thought he favored raising it.^[10] Given the usual low level of public awareness—people care more about personal matters than politics^[11] —this seven to two ratio, even with the nonresponses, reveals an unambiguous image. But people, or at least Reagan's supporters, did not expect his cuts to hurt them.

In light of what we know about general public attitudes on spending, specific attitudes on the tax cut, and the appeals made during the campaign itself, clearly the election was no mandate to cut taxes at the expense

of a balanced budget. But when Reagan maintained that choice was unnecessary, he represented his supporters.

Ideology and Reaganism

An election is more plausibly viewed as a referendum on such generalities as "less government" or "more fairness" than as a vote on complicated policies. The claim of a mandate by Reagan's supporters was really a claim to general endorsement; the Heritage Foundation report was a statement of policies that could be deduced (or so they claimed) from the ideology that (they assumed) the public had embraced in the person of Ronald Reagan.

"Reaganism" and "Reaganomics," Laurence Barrett observed, are terms that suggest particular biases and ways of thinking, if not specific policies.^[12] Unlike Carter or Ford or Nixon, Reagan's ideas were clear enough that his name could be used as shorthand for them. Proud (maybe bellicose) patriotism, enthusiastic capitalism, exaltation of the individual, and condemnation of big government—these themes gave Reaganism its appeal. From the other side, that same combination animated a passionate resistance to his leadership.

Reaganism's potential appeal is best understood if we call it by the name his supporters might prefer: "Americanism." Americanism in this sense had always combined individualistic capitalism and distrust of government with fervent nationalism. Americans were defined not by their origins but by adherence to a life-style; moreover, life's superiority was confirmed by the hordes of immigrants who flocked to U.S. shores from all over the world for a chance to live it. Reagan thus had a very powerful imagery at his command; when invoked, it sounded familiar and inspiring and true to many Americans. Those who opposed him might have trouble explaining why, being reduced perhaps to a lot of "yes, buts." Yet, for all its power, Americanism was a contested creed.

Even after fifty years, the greatest obstacle to Reagan's vision of the nation was the Great Depression. The crash and its aftermath of unemployment had dampened Americans' enthusiasm for unfettered capitalism. "Leave it to business," the motto of Republicans throughout their history, was rejected during the New Deal by a very American experimentalism: people were suffering, and the government helped them. New Deal policies followed no coherent economic theory, but there was a coherent political theory: government is the agent of the people.

The New Deal liberals and their heirs did not reject capitalism and individualism. Instead they argued that the actions of government in a democracy were needed to keep the promise of American individualism: anyone, of no matter what birth, could rise and prosper according to one's merits. To liberals the great tension of American politics was between

democracy and capitalism because capitalism too often meant entrenched private power. When Reagan invoked the "American way," liberals saw a history of efforts to preserve injustices and protect established power within society by impugning the patriotism of reformers; they remembered the "Red Scare" of 1919–1920, McCarthyism in the 1950s, the constant attack on labor unions as "socialistic," and resistance to the civil rights movement of the 1960s. Reagan invoked the federal system and states rights, citing Jefferson and other founders of the nation; his opponents heard "states rights" and saw racist consequences. As far as liberals were concerned, Americanism had been invoked on the wrong side far too often.

Reagan would continually stumble on one issue, symbolizing the public attachment to government action: social security. The free market was still the ideal of most Americans, but they wanted some protection.

Surveys revealed the public's attitude toward the two main strains of American ideology. In 1980, as in previous years, Americans preferred to call themselves "conservative" rather than "liberal" by margins ranging from four to three to about two to one. Yet as many Americans rated themselves as "moderate" as would admit to conservatism and liberalism combined. Ordinary Americans, suspicious of both sides, were more centrist than politicians.

Voters normally support the more moderate candidate who is safer and closer to their preferences. In 1980 that was clearly Jimmy Carter. Ronald Reagan was viewed as substantially more conservative than the norm, while Carter moved during the campaign from almost exactly normal to somewhat more liberal. In September a Gallup poll reported that 82 percent of respondents agreed that Carter took "moderate, middle-of-the-road positions." A Los Angeles Times poll reported that 41 percent described Reagan as "too extreme," but only 13 percent said the same of Carter.^[13] In short, Reagan's world view worried a lot of people.

They did not, however, see Reagan as so extreme that they should reelect a president who had failed.^[14] Ultimately, dismay with Carter overwhelmed fear of Reagan. The most common reasons for a Reagan vote were "it is time for a change" and "he is a strong leader." Reagan's victory was not ideological.

The general public did have broad preferences on public policy that fit both Reagan's appeal and the course of events in 1980. Considerable majorities believed that defense needed more dollars and that social welfare needed less, but the desired changes were modest.^[15] Reagan's election thus showed a public willing to risk a dash of conservatism, considering the available alternatives.

Even if the public had not become more conservative, the 1980 election guaranteed a conservative Congress. A massive purge of the liberal

establishment took place: four House committee chairs (the first losses by Democratic leaders since 1966), House Majority Whip John Brademas, and a raft of famous liberal senators were ousted. The Republicans' twelve-seat gain in the Senate contained elements of luck; a number of Democrats lost by paper-thin margins. Yet the losers' liberalism clearly had not helped them, and the victorious challengers were a rather conservative group.^[16]

In the House, the Republican thirty-three-seat gain was no fluke. If anything, the Democrats were protected by the well-known advantages of incumbency. The freshmen Republicans looked like a solidly conservative group, just as freshmen Democrats seemed fairly liberal, but there were many more Republicans. "On important issues freighted with ideological implications," political scientist Charles Jacob reported, "the possibility of a working conservative majority in the House is at hand."^[17] If holdover members voted as they had in the recent past—by no means a certainty—and if the new members were loyal to their parties—another big "if"—Republicans could win budget battles by about twenty votes. The potential margin was slim but extant.

Democrats in House and Senate had to hope that Reagan, given enough rope, would tie himself in knots. Gary Hart expressed the sentiment: "I give the Reagan administration about eighteen to twenty-four months to prove it doesn't have any answers either."^[18]