| Japan Under Construction |
| Acknowledgments |
| Note on Conventions |
 | Introduction |
| The Dual Political Economy |
| • | The Developmental State |
| The Clientelist State |
| • | Particularism |
| • | Political Corruption |
| • | Economic Inefficiency |
| • | Clientelism and Single-Party Dominance |
| • | Political Actors and Institutions |
| • | Rival Approaches |
| • | Summary |
| One Construction Contractors and the Calculus of Collusion |
| • | Profile of a Two-Tier Industry |
| • | Historical Development of the Industry |
| • | Dango as a Collusive System |
| • | The Logic of Collusive Action |
| Two Public Works Bureaucrats Under Siege |
| The Publics Works Bureaucrats |
| • | MOC's Structure and Mission |
| • | MOC's "Two Species" |
| • | Two Ladders to the Top |
| • | Politics and Personnel: The Kono Tempest |
| • | Personnel "Loans" |
| • | The Roots of Sectionalist Rivalry |
| Descent from Heaven |
| • | Amakudari to Construction Firms |
| • | "Side-Slipping" into Public Corporations |
| • | Descending into Elective Politics |
| • | "Construction Friction" |
| Three The Career Politician and the Phantom Party's Invisible Feet |
| • | The Phantom Party's Head |
| • | The Rise of the Career Politician |
| The Invisible Feet of the Phantom Party |
| • | Koenkai |
| • | The Pillars of Influence |
| • | A Costly Career |
| The Role of Electoral Institutions |
| • | Changing the Rules of the Electoral Game |
| • | Construction Friction and the Phantom Party |
| Four Factioneers, Tribalists, and the LDP's Construction Caucus |
| Factions and Political Clientelism |
| • | Candidate Endorsement and Campaign Support |
| • | Political Funds |
| • | Allocation of Posts |
| • | Constituency Service Networks |
| The Construction Tribe |
| • | The Shadow Cabinet |
| • | The Enigma of Japanese Pork |
| • | The Bounties of Credit-Claiming |
| • | Tiptoeing toward Resolution |
| Conclusion Change and Inertia in the Politics of Japanese Public Works |
| • | Foreign Pressure and Domestic Change |
| • | The Imperiled Domestic Interests |
| • | Growth with Clientelism |
| • | Another Japanese Export? |
| • | How Institutions Matter |
| • | Wrecking Ball or Face-Lift? |
| • | Implications for Reform |
| Appendix A Chronology of Trade Friction and Scandal in Japanese Construction, 1985–1994 |
| Appendix B Administrative Vice-Ministers of Construction, 1948–1994 |
| Appendix C Construction Ministers, 1955–1994 |
| Appendix D Positional Influence and the Pork Barrel: A Multivariate Regression Model |
| Notes |
| • | Introduction |
| • | One Construction Contractors and the Calculus of Collusion |
| • | Two Public Works Bureaucrats Under Siege |
| • | Three The Career Politician and the Phantom Party's Invisible Feet |
| • | Four Factioneers, Tribalists, and the LDP's Construction Caucus |
| • | Conclusion Change and Inertia in the Politics of Japanese Public Works |
| References |
| Index |
| • | A |
| • | B |
| • | C |
| • | D |
| • | E |
| • | F |
| • | G |
| • | H |
| • | I |
| • | J |
| • | K |
| • | L |
| • | M |
| • | N |
| • | O |
| • | P |
| • | R |
| • | S |
| • | T |
| • | U |
| • | V |
| • | W |
| • | Y |
| • | Z |
