Four Factioneers, Tribalists, and the LDP's Construction Caucus
1. See, for example, Scalapino and Masumi (1962, 18); Benjamin and Ori (1981, 65); Baerwald (1986, 46-47); Ike (1972, 81-83); Iyasu (1984, 115 and 118); Ward (1967, 65 and 68-69). [BACK]
2. Nakane (1970) and Stockwin (1982, 35-39) argue this point. Culturalist views also inform the pioneering work of Scalapino and Masumi (1962); for example: "In part, it [factionalism] is the product of deeply rooted cultural forces that contribute to a 'Japanese-type organizational model,' a structure built on the basis of loosely federated leader-follower familial-type units" (100). Other analyses in the cultural mode include Totten and Kawakami (1965); Farnsworth (1966); Ishida (1971); Curtis (1971, 1988); Thayer (1969); Baerwald (1986); and Johnson (1990b), though he had earlier made a case against "national character" explanations (1982, 7-9). [BACK]
3. Kohno (1992) raises a similar question. For example, in 1956 the LDP comprised eight "army divisions" and one "regiment." By the mid-1960s, five main factions had emerged. Reed and Bolland (forthcoming, 10-19) argue that the SNTV in middle-sized districts, which elect on average four representatives, holds the key to the recent stability of a five-factioned LDP, because the effective number of candidates in a district tends to be one greater than the number of open seats. [BACK]
4. The estimate for the 1960s is from Totten and Kawakami (1965). Estimates for the 1990s are from the Utopia Survey and a survey taken by the Tokyo shinbun , reprinted respectively in Iwai (1990, 126) and Fukuoka (1993, 103). The effects of decentralization and the revisions of the Political Fund Control Law were frequently mentioned in the interviews I conducted; see also Iwai (1990, 106-9) and Kohno (1992, 368-69). [BACK]
5. The allocation of posts took three fundamental forms. Sometimes a party president would reward "mainstream" factional allies by allocating posts on the basis of the numerical "power balance" that prevailed at the time. On other occasions, to promote intraparty goodwill, the president would distribute posts in roughly equal numbers to all factions. At yet other times, posts were allocated on the basis of simple seniority ranking (Sato and Matsuzaki 1986, 63-67). [BACK]
6. The dominance of one or two factions in various political posts between 1955 and 1992 is illustrated by the following data:
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7. Noteworthy among the numerous studies of the roles and functions of the LDP's policy tribes are Inoguchi and Iwai (1987); Itasaka (1987); Nihon keizai shinbunsha (1983); Park (1986); Sato and Matsuzaki (1986); Schoppa (1991); Yuasa (1986). But whereas Yuasa maintains that appointment to the chairmanship of a PARC division in itself entails tribalist status (11-12), Sato and Matsuzaki (264) as well as Inoguchi and Iwai (154-64 and 293-304) contend that appointment to particular party and cabinet posts in a policy area determines which legislators become tribalists. Schoppa (1991, 79) calls the LDP's tribalists "cliques of Diet members with special influence in specific policy areas." [BACK]
8. The change can be deduced from the increase in the membership of the bukai and the number of LDP parliamentarians affiliated with the corresponding standing committees in the Diet's Lower House (Inoguchi and Iwai 1987, 136-37). Between 1955 and 1975, the number of PARC divisions and committees roughly tripled (Sato and Matsuzaki 1986, 263; Seikan yoran 1991, 488-91):
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9. For example, consider the changes in the swing vote for PARC division heads from 1955 to 1991, where "swing vote" is defined as the candidate's percentage of the vote in the election following appointment to the specified post minus the percentage in the election before appointment. (These calculations include only legislators representing Lower House districts.)
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10. For example, the average annual rank among Japan's 47 prefectures from 1966 to 1989 for selected prefectures was: Hokkaido (3.2), Niigata (4.4), Shimane (10.6). Tokyo (28.7), Osaka (39.2), and Saitama (40.2). For 1975 to 1989 the average annual ranking was: Hokkaido (3.6), Niigata (4.9), Shimane (4.6), Tokyo (34.9), Osaka (46.5), and Saitama (41.5). [BACK]
11. Asahi shinbun (28 Mar. 1993); Yomiuri shinbun (28 Mar. 1993). Other alleged instances of Kanemaru's farflung influence include construction of the Tokyo Trans-Bay Tunnel and a parking structure in Yokkaichi City ( Asahi shinbun , 10 Apr., 29 Aug., 15 Nov. 1993). [BACK]
12. Sources for the following discussion of credit-claiming in Japan include Hirose (1981, 57); van Wolferen (1989, 193, 305); Wakata (1986, 69); Inoguchi and Iwai (1987, chap. 2). For discussions of credit-claiming by politicians in the United States, Italy, and elsewhere, see Mayhew (1974, 52-53); Johannes and McAdams (1987, 537); Walston (1988, 233). [BACK]