1. In 1965 Potashnick Construction, a Missouri firm, was awarded a major public works contract for a project in Shizuoka that was part of the Tomei Expressway linking Tokyo and Nagoya, but Potashnick pulled out of the project, citing financial difficulties and problems with Japanese subcontractors. [BACK]

2. See, among others, Johnson et al. (1989), Magaziner and Hout (1981), Okimoto (1989), Patrick and Rosovsky (1976), Yamamura (1982), and Zysman (1983). For a preliminary version of the argument I present in this section, see Woodall (1992). My notion of dual economic policy markets was shaped by the insightful works of Lowi (1964, 1972). Ripley and Franklin 1987), and Huntington (1961). [BACK]

3. Whether Japan's economic miracle was realized because of or in spite of heavy, continuing state intervention is beyond the scope of the analysis here. The question is at the heart of the debate between the so-called revisionist and empirically oriented economist and political scientist; for example, compare Johnson (1982, 1990a), Johnson et al. (1989), and Tyson (1993), with Beason and Weinstein (1994) or Calder (1993). For a discussion of the nature and limitations of Japan's high-growth industrial policy, see Yoshikawa and Woodall (1985, esp. 693-701). Inoue (1993, 10-18) provides a succinct overview of the array of Japanese industrial policy tools. Vogel (1993) offers an insightful analysis of the defense-related spin-ons of Japanese commercial technology in contrast to the commercial spin-offs of U.S. defense technologies. [BACK]

4. Calder (1993, 183-95) presents an instance of private-sector defiance in the case of Kawasaki Steel. Samuels and Whipple (1989, esp. 276-80) assess MITI's abortive attempts to develop a commercial aircraft industry. [BACK]

5. On this point I concur with Katzenstein's (1985, 19-20) view concerning the ''smart-state'' thesis. While the developmental state has not always been sufficiently farsighted or swift to anticipate which industries to target and how to develop them, its wide-ranging and activist role presents an iron-clad case against the mythical notion of unfettered competition as the engine of Japanese economic growth. [BACK]

6. Describing the politics of commercial R&D programs in the United States, Banks et al. point out, "With rare exceptions, programs are conceived and designed in executive branch agencies by professional civil servants who are dedicated to the mission of their organization" (1991, 54). "A member of Congress," these authors reason, "viewing the uncertainties of the distributive consequences of [a commercial R&D program], should prefer to take his or her share of the pig in a more prosaic and safer form, such as federal construction projects" (75). [BACK]

7. According to data collected by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (reprinted in Keizai koho sentaa 1994, 71), the 1992 index for producer subsidy equivalents (in which higher values denote higher levels of government assistance) for agricultural products in Japan was 71, compared to 47 for the European Community and 28 for the United States. The 1992 index for consumer subsidy equivalents (in which larger negative figures denote greater consumer burdens) for agricultural products in Japan was -52, compared with -40 for the European Community and -19 for the United States. Between 1960 and 1990, however, the contribution of agriculture to Japan's GDP fell from 9 percent to less than 2 percent, and whereas 26 percent of Japan's workforce had been employed in agriculture in 1960, by 1990 that figure had dropped to 6 percent (MAFF data reprinted in Japan Almanac 1992, 110). [BACK]

8. Other advocates of the bureaucratic-dominance thesis include Pempel (1974); Baerwald (1974); Johnson (1975); Campbell (1977); Inoguchi (1983); van Wolferen (1989, 1993). Arguing the legislative-dominance thesis are Muramatsu and Krauss (1984); Pempel (1987); Inoguchi and Iwai (1987); McCubbins and Noble (1993). In the middle ground are Sato and Matsuzaki (1986). Samuels (1987) and Calder (1993) both emphasize the central role of the private sector in policymaking, depicting the private-sector elites as formidable bargaining opponents and, on occasion, as domineering actors in the politics of policymaking. [BACK]

9. Berger and Piore (1980) present an insightful analysis of the nature, casues and function of industrial dualism. Clark (1979) and Dore (1973) assess the contours of the Japanese case. [BACK]

10. In contrast, McCubbins and Noble (1993) expend so much effort disproving the "abdication" thesis—the notion that the legislature abdicates control over policy choices to the bureaucracy—that they ignore the contributions of the bureaucracy. [BACK]

11. Lowi (1964, 677-715: 1972, 298-310). Clausen (1973) and Ripley and Franklin (1987) also contribute important insights to this school of thought. [BACK]

12. Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993) and McCubbins and Noble (1993) adopt this approach, and it leads the latter to argue that Japanese bureaucrats "act from a script written and directed by politicians and parties" (12). However, there is nothing in principal-agent theory, that dictates that the legislators, rather than government bureaucrats, play the role of principal in the policy-making process. [BACK]

1. An official of the U.S. Embassy, in Tokyo described this episode to me. Krauss (1989) also mentions the incident. [BACK]

2. The defining phrases quoted in this paragraph are from T. Maeda (1988, 16); Cutts (1988, 48); "Dango" (1983, 67); Kensetsugyo  wa ima (1980, 91); Taoka (1982, 338) Uchiyama (1982, 32-39); Watanabe (1982, 272); Los Angeles Times (26 Apr. 1991) K. Maeda (1990, 85). See Woodall (1993a) for a preliminary version of the argument presented in this section. [BACK]

3. This incident is described in Kosei torihiki iinkai (1990, 33-36), "Gojugo-oku-en" (1989), and Yomiuri shinbun (Osaka ed., 21 June 1989). On the heels of the cease-and-desist order, an editorial in Asahi Shinbun (6 Oct. 1989) commented, "The [American] demand has come as a great shock to the Japanese construction industry, which has continued to do business in a climate where fixing bids is considered commonplace." [BACK]

4. For examples of such lists, see Erickson (1969, 84); Haar (1983, 14); Hay and Morris (1991, 75-80); Kuhlman (1969, 69). [BACK]

5. Data in this section are drawn from Kensetsu gyokai gurafu (1989, 1994); Ministry of Construction; Economic Planning Agency; Kensetsu Keizai Kenkyujo (Research Institute on Construction and Economy). [BACK]

6. According to the official government scheme, construction firms are grouped into three categories: general contractors ( zenekon ), specialized contractors, and equipment installers. The cornerstone of the industry are the general contractors—grouped into twenty-eight subcategories—some of which are backed by, retinues of up to four layers of subcontractors. In the mid-1980s, over one-third of licensed construction contractors were classified as general contractors, while the remainder were firms specializing in wood building (21.6 percent), specialized work (25.7 percent—e.g., asphalt, dredging and reclamation, and electrical projects), and equipment installation (17.8 percent); Kensetsu sangyo handobukku (1987, 17). [BACK]

7. For profiles of the Big Six, see T. Maeda(1988,55-66, 144-152, 156-167). Data on the size of these firms are from Japan Company Handbook (1994). T. Maeda (149-52 and 168-81) also profiles the "quasi-large-scale" contractors in the second tier of zenekon . [BACK]

8. Such contacts among competitors were the basis of a price-fixing ring in the U.S. electrical equipment industry in the early 1960s: "Getting together with competitors was looked on as a way of life, a convention, 'just as a manager's office always has a desk with a swivel chair.' It was considered easier to negotiate market percentages than to fight for one's share, less wearing to take turns on rigged bids than to play, the rugged individualist" (Smith 1963, 175). [BACK]

9. On the issue of self-enforcement, see, for example, Stigler (1964, 44-61); Asch (1969, 64); Hay and Kelley (1974, 77); Scherer and Ross (1990, 245). [BACK]

10. Wolff and Howell (1992, 57) argue that lax antitrust enforcement can be viewed as a facet of Japan's trade policy: "Weak antitrust enforcement has made possible the 'privatization of protection'—the de facto protection of the domestic market on a sector-by-sector basis by private groups through restrictive distribution arrangements, import-regulating cartels, pressures on customers and distributors, and similar measures." [BACK]

11. A former member of a government advisory committee claims that eliminating bid-rigging and payoffs would reduce the cost of public works by half (Jin et al. 1981, 194). Former Transport Minister Ishihara Shintaro believes that price-fixing inflates the cost of public construction in Japan by 40 percent (Ishihara and Morita 1989). Maeda Kunio, a scholar who has written widely on the construction industry, calculates that dango results in projects costing 30 to 40 percent more than necessary (in Kasumi 1993, 146-47). The situation is comparable to the state of affairs in Italy, as described by a senior Treasury Minister there: "In effect, much of Italian enterprise has functioned with a system of hidden taxation, in the form of bribes and kickbacks they [contractors] had to pay for any public contract" ( New York Times , 25 Mar. 1993). [BACK]

12. The cost of certain construction tools and materials, such as metal tools and lumber, are higher in Japan than in the United States, but these differences account for only a fraction of the overall disparity. T. Sato (1992) analyzes cross-national differences in private-sector construction costs: If one sets per-square-foot costs in the U.S. at 100, then costs in Canada are 126, costs in typical European countries are in the 101 to 135 range (except for Finland, 161, and the U.K., 226), while costs in Japan are 274. [BACK]

1. On the motives of bureaucrats, see, for example, Niskanen (1971, 36, 38-39); Simon (1976, 110-11); Downs (1967, 81-88); Johnson (1989, 8). In Japan, the allure of elite social status and a sense of national service also drive the actions of state officials. As Johnson observes, "The ancestors of the modern Japanese bureaucrats are the samurai of the feudal era." A career in the central bureaucracy—particularly. the economic ministries, such as finance or MITI—continues to "attract the most talented graduates of the best universities in Japan, and the positions of higher-level officials in these ministries are . . . considered the most prestigious in the country" (1982, 20 and 36). Moreover, in interviews I conducted, a wide range of current and former bureaucrats expressed patriotism and a commitment to the general welfare that exceeded mere lip service. During these interviews, MOC officials emphasized the desire to achieve nationwide "balance" in decisions concerning the allocation of public resources. Given their lower salaries relative to former university classmates employed in the private sector, myopic material self-interest could not be the only goal of Japanese government bureaucrats. [BACK]

2. On the politicization and reputation of MOC, see Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993, 124); Okimoto (1989, 202); Calder (1988, 153-54, 190-91, and 292); Marshall with Toyama (1992, 37); Kanryo kiko kenkyukai (1978, 46-47); Kusayanagi(1975, 154); Saito (1978, 89). [BACK]

3. Ohashi went on to serve ten terms in the Lower House of the Diet, representing his native Shimane. As for the "Gang of Four"—Miyashige Mamoru, Kono Tsutomu, Kato Yutaka, and Wada Tsutomu—each proceeded to enjoy a successful career at MOC. S. Matsumoto (1974, 139), Johnson (1982, 59-60), and Kanryo kiko kenkyukai (1978, 27) discuss this matter. [BACK]

4. Kato (1992) shows how Finance Ministry officials shaped agendas and persuaded politicians of the merits of a consumption tax. For examples from MITI, see Johnson (1982). One of the MITI episodes involved a protracted tug-of-war between Tanaka Kakuei and Fukuda Takeo in seeking to promote the careers of officials within the ministry sympathetic to their respective interests. Another case concerned pressure that led to the resignation in 1993 of a bureau chief Naito Masayuki, who had approved the "gilded promotion" of a junior official. It so happened that the junior official was the son of the administrative vice-minister, and the promotion took place immediately prior to the junior official's resignation from MITl in order to run in the 1993 Lower House elections. [BACK]

5. Nishioka (1988) provides a detailed description of the events summarized here. Contemporary newspaper accounts include Asahi shinbun (5 Dec. 1951; Tokyo ed., 3 Apr. 1952; Tokyo ed., 4 June 1953); Nihon keizei shinbun (19 June 1951, 27 Aug. 1951); Mainichi shinbun (13 Mar. 1959); Yumiuri shinbun (3 Dec. 1948, 27 Dec. 1952); Shakai taimusu shinbun (14 Mar. 1953). [BACK]

6. Chalmers Johnson (1974) was among the first scholars to recognize the political importance of amakudari ; my analysis drew inspiration from his work. The findings presented here are based on data concerning the post-retirement fates of 114 former upper-level officials (bureau chief and above) who served between 1948 and 1988. The post-retirement fates of noncareer civil servants is far more harried: "Having no real authority or law-making power, these retired officials are obliged to grow old in a 'second life' making the rounds with résumé in hand" (S. Matsumoto 1974, 151). See also Kanryo kiko kenkyukai (1978, 151) and Yamamoto (1975, 140-41). [BACK]

7. Amakudari hakushio (1985, 138) provides information about the post-retirement reemployment pathways for officials of selected ministries:

8. Despite the striking parallels and differences between pantouflage and amakudari , I am unaware of any in-depth comparative analysis of their origins and functions. For example, in contrast to the one-way street taken by Japanese bureaucrats, French government officials need merely take a leave of absence from the civil service in order to run for elective office. Criticism surrounds the practice in both countries. The statement of a French observer (cited in Cohen 1969, 198) applies equally well to Japan: they "decide everything among themselves behind a curtain of opaque 'technicity," in clandestine meetings where agreements are too easily reached among civil servants who have already pantouflés (moved into private firms) and civil servants who would like to pantoufler ." The term pantouflé (literally "bedroom slippers") refers to how high civil servants slip back and forth from lifetime appointments in the grand corps to high-placed private-sector jobs. I am grateful to David Wilsford for insights. [BACK]

9. For example, an official posted to MOC's Road Bureau discovered that the de facto strongman in the area of road administration was not the incumbent bureau chief but, rather, a retired director of the bureau and (and former vice-minister of construction) who exercised "cloistered rule" from the post of president of the Japan Highway Corporation. [BACK]

10. Jin et al. (1981, 198-99); Asahi shinbun (13 Sept. 1993). Between 1974 and 1984, among the "descending angels" who landed at the five public corporations under MOC jurisdiction, over 40 percent were former MOC officials ( Amakudari hakusho 1985, 161):

11. Thirty-eight MOC officials descended into national elective politics between 1950 and 1994:

12. The 1980 Upper House election, in which two MOC former vice-ministers won seats, clearly illustrates the Construction Machine's success in directing the vote in each administrative jurisdiction (Jin et al. 1981, 188):

1. The zenith of Christian Democratic dominance came in 1948, when the party won nearly 49 percent of the popular vote and 53 percent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies. However, that was the only time the party came close to reaping half of the popular vote and commanding an absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies. In contrast, during the height of LDP dominance in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the party secured almost 60 percent of the popular vote and over 63 percent of Lower House seats. For comparative electoral data, see Gorvin (1989). [BACK]

2. On the rise of career politicians worldwide, see King (1981, 249-85); Sartori (1967, 156-73); Hancock (1972); Jackson (1988); Polsby (1968). [BACK]

3. This point is argued in Masumi (1985, 3-26; 1988, 288); Yamaguchi (1985); Curtis (1988, 229-32 and passim); Hirose (1983, 54); Kyogoku (1987, esp. 245-89). [BACK]

4. I use "hereditary parliamentarian" to denote a parliamentarian whose parent, parent-in-law, grandfather, uncle, or sibling has served in the national Diet. Aoki (1980, 64-93) uses a broader definition of the term. [BACK]

5. The occupational routes that bring LDP legislators to the Diet vary from election to election, but the preponderance of hereditary politicians among LDP backbenchers (including independents and New Liberal Club candidates who later joined the LDP) has tended to increase since the late 1950s. Throughout the 1980s, roughly 40 percent of LDP backbenchers were hereditary politicians. (Below, the total number of LDP backbenchers is shown in brackets after the election year; data from various years of Kokkai benran , Jinji koshinroku , Asahi senkyo taikan , Seikan yoran ).

6. According to Masumi (1985, 385), koenkai became prevalent among conservative parliamentary candidates at the time of the general election of 1958. In the 1960 election. Masumi believes, candidates running under the banner of the Socialist party followed suit, and by 1963, candidates for local political office had organized koenkai as well. See also Allinson (1980, 114-16 and passim); Yonemoto (1987, 234); Iyasu (1984, 152); Thayer (1969, 88). The pioneering work of Curtis (1971) supplies much of our understanding of koenkai . [BACK]

7. On Kanemaru's koenkai, see Yonemoto (1987, 223, 227, 234); "Kai no kuni" (1991); Yomiuri shinbun (18 and 28 Mar. 1993); Asahi shinbun (28 Mar. 1993); Nihon keizai shinbun (24 Mar. 1993). [BACK]

8. On the functions of koenkai , see Thayer (1969, 102); Curtis (1988, 157); Iyasu (1984, 152, 177); Matoba (1986, 165); Tomita et al. (1986, 260). [BACK]

9. On constituency service, see Masumi (1988, 292); Okuno (1978, 72); Thayer (1969, 94); Hirose (1981, 257); Matoba (1986, 163). [BACK]

10. Norota Hosei, Futada Koji, Sato Takao, and Muraoka Kanezo benefited from this support. These koenkai were disbanded in the midst of the zenekon scandal, which intensified in the wake of the July 1993 general elections. [BACK]

11. Ishikawa and Hirose (1989, 141-42); and Iwai (1990, 127). By way of comparison, the nonelection-year expenses for an aspirant to the Lower House are roughly four times the amount spent by a typical candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives in 1988. During those U.S. elections, candidates spent $274,000, on average, although the average winning candidate spent $388,000 (Magelby and Nelson 1990). [BACK]

12. Two surveys, one by the Utopia Research Group (reported in Iwai 1990, 126) and one by Tokyo shinbun (30 May 1992; reprinted in Fukuoka 1993, 103), on the sources of political financing present roughly similar results:

13. The demographic factors are discussed in Curtis (1971, 127-29) and Masumi (1985, 385). Mackie and Rose (1982, 406-12) provide a succinct discussion of the basic features of electoral systems worldwide. [BACK]

14. Under the 1889 Election Law, votes were cast for a plurality of candidates and 257 districts elected a total of 300 representatives. The system was based on an ''open ballot'' (not a secret ballot), in which the only eligible voters were males 25 years of age or older who paid at least ¥15 in direct taxes. For an overview of the evolution of Japan's electoral institutions up to the mid-1980s, see Soma (1986, esp. 21-41 and 206-44). [BACK]

15. In 1947 the disparity between the most overrepresented and the most underrepresented districts was 1.51-to-1; by the mid-1980s, the disparity had grown to 5.12-to-1. Relevant data are presented in Tonedachi (1994, 73) and Kawamura and Matsui (1993, 10). [BACK]

1. See, for example, Scalapino and Masumi (1962, 18); Benjamin and Ori (1981, 65); Baerwald (1986, 46-47); Ike (1972, 81-83); Iyasu (1984, 115 and 118); Ward (1967, 65 and 68-69). [BACK]

2. Nakane (1970) and Stockwin (1982, 35-39) argue this point. Culturalist views also inform the pioneering work of Scalapino and Masumi (1962); for example: "In part, it [factionalism] is the product of deeply rooted cultural forces that contribute to a 'Japanese-type organizational model,' a structure built on the basis of loosely federated leader-follower familial-type units" (100). Other analyses in the cultural mode include Totten and Kawakami (1965); Farnsworth (1966); Ishida (1971); Curtis (1971, 1988); Thayer (1969); Baerwald (1986); and Johnson (1990b), though he had earlier made a case against "national character" explanations (1982, 7-9). [BACK]

3. Kohno (1992) raises a similar question. For example, in 1956 the LDP comprised eight "army divisions" and one "regiment." By the mid-1960s, five main factions had emerged. Reed and Bolland (forthcoming, 10-19) argue that the SNTV in middle-sized districts, which elect on average four representatives, holds the key to the recent stability of a five-factioned LDP, because the effective number of candidates in a district tends to be one greater than the number of open seats. [BACK]

4. The estimate for the 1960s is from Totten and Kawakami (1965). Estimates for the 1990s are from the Utopia Survey and a survey taken by the Tokyo shinbun , reprinted respectively in Iwai (1990, 126) and Fukuoka (1993, 103). The effects of decentralization and the revisions of the Political Fund Control Law were frequently mentioned in the interviews I conducted; see also Iwai (1990, 106-9) and Kohno (1992, 368-69). [BACK]

5. The allocation of posts took three fundamental forms. Sometimes a party president would reward "mainstream" factional allies by allocating posts on the basis of the numerical "power balance" that prevailed at the time. On other occasions, to promote intraparty goodwill, the president would distribute posts in roughly equal numbers to all factions. At yet other times, posts were allocated on the basis of simple seniority ranking (Sato and Matsuzaki 1986, 63-67). [BACK]

6. The dominance of one or two factions in various political posts between 1955 and 1992 is illustrated by the following data:

7. Noteworthy among the numerous studies of the roles and functions of the LDP's policy tribes are Inoguchi and Iwai (1987); Itasaka (1987); Nihon keizai shinbunsha (1983); Park (1986); Sato and Matsuzaki (1986); Schoppa (1991); Yuasa (1986). But whereas Yuasa maintains that appointment to the chairmanship of a PARC division in itself entails tribalist status (11-12), Sato and Matsuzaki (264) as well as Inoguchi and Iwai (154-64 and 293-304) contend that appointment to particular party and cabinet posts in a policy area determines which legislators become tribalists. Schoppa (1991, 79) calls the LDP's tribalists "cliques of Diet members with special influence in specific policy areas." [BACK]

8. The change can be deduced from the increase in the membership of the bukai and the number of LDP parliamentarians affiliated with the corresponding standing committees in the Diet's Lower House (Inoguchi and Iwai 1987, 136-37). Between 1955 and 1975, the number of PARC divisions and committees roughly tripled (Sato and Matsuzaki 1986, 263; Seikan yoran 1991, 488-91):

9. For example, consider the changes in the swing vote for PARC division heads from 1955 to 1991, where "swing vote" is defined as the candidate's percentage of the vote in the election following appointment to the specified post minus the percentage in the election before appointment. (These calculations include only legislators representing Lower House districts.)

10. For example, the average annual rank among Japan's 47 prefectures from 1966 to 1989 for selected prefectures was: Hokkaido (3.2), Niigata (4.4), Shimane (10.6). Tokyo (28.7), Osaka (39.2), and Saitama (40.2). For 1975 to 1989 the average annual ranking was: Hokkaido (3.6), Niigata (4.9), Shimane (4.6), Tokyo (34.9), Osaka (46.5), and Saitama (41.5). [BACK]

11. Asahi shinbun (28 Mar. 1993); Yomiuri shinbun (28 Mar. 1993). Other alleged instances of Kanemaru's farflung influence include construction of the Tokyo Trans-Bay Tunnel and a parking structure in Yokkaichi City ( Asahi shinbun , 10 Apr., 29 Aug., 15 Nov. 1993). [BACK]

12. Sources for the following discussion of credit-claiming in Japan include Hirose (1981, 57); van Wolferen (1989, 193, 305); Wakata (1986, 69); Inoguchi and Iwai (1987, chap. 2). For discussions of credit-claiming by politicians in the United States, Italy, and elsewhere, see Mayhew (1974, 52-53); Johannes and McAdams (1987, 537); Walston (1988, 233). [BACK]

1. Overseas Bechtel and a group of nine Japanese firms were awarded a ¥90-billion contract to perform work on Haneda Airport. Schal Associates secured 6 percent of an ¥18-billion project—jointly undertaken with a group of Japanese contractors—to construct a hotel and conference hall as part of Yokohama's "Minato Mirai 21." Meanwhile, Tishman Realty and Construction broke into the private sector market by winning a contract to work on a hotel in Osaka. Other U.S. companies that established a presence in Japan included Fluor Daniel, the Ralph M. Parsons Company, Turner Construction, Morrison Knudsen, and Hellmuth, Obata, and Kassabaum. [BACK]

2. Details of the incident are provided in "Gojuniman" (1989); Mainichi shinbun (23 Apr. 1990): Peterzell (1990); Sandei mainichi (3 Dec. 1989); Shukan bunshun (3 Dec. 1989,28). [BACK]

3. For example, Asahi shinbun (25 Oct. 1993) reported the results of a study conducted by the Management and Coordination Agency: of the 139 government agencies and public corporations surveyed, one third employed a designated bidding system and did not publicly disclose bidding results, and about half employed qualifying standards that disadvantaged foreign firms. [BACK]

4. Woodall (1993b, 38-42) offers an overview of the nature and consequences of these international structural changes. Kennedy (1987, 525 and passim) and, especially, Nye (1990) discuss the nature and implications of the relative decline in U.S. hegemony. Bhagwati uses the term "diminished giant syndrome" to describe the psychological effects of this decline in the United States; see Bhagwati and Patrick (1993, 11). [BACK]

5. One U.S. Commerce Department official admitted that the construction industry had not applied as much pressure as desired to reinforce the government's stance in the construction talks. That official attributed this reticence to the fact that the larger U.S. firms feared losing token projects in the Japanese market and the smaller firms lacked political clout (Bradford et al. 1993; see also Setzer and Krizan 1993). [BACK]

6. The construction case thus affirms Putnam's thesis (1988) concerning the "synergistic strategies" by which a foreign negotiator can manipulate conditions in his counterpart's domestic polity. Building upon Putnam's work, Schoppa (1993, 372) argues that "by transforming a narrow domestic issue into one with implications for an important bilateral relationship . . . foreign pressure can expand elite-level participation as previously uninvolved bureaucratic agencies, senior party leadership, and interests groups come to have a stake in dealing with the problem." Moreover, the threat of U.S. retaliation under Section 301 produced an air of crisis and anxiety in Tokyo. Elevating the dispute to a crisis almost ensured the participation of Japanese officials at the highest level: ''crisis decisions in foreign policy are made by an elite of formal, official office-holders'' (Lowi 1967, 301). In the negotiations that produced the Major Projects Agreement in 1988, for example, the key decision-makers were Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru and Ozawa Ichiro, his specially selected chief negotiator. [BACK]

7. With the economic decline in 1991, private construction investment in Japan decreased, and government spending on public works helped cover the difference, rising from 26.4 percent of total construction investment in 1990 to 34 percent in 1992. Nevertheless, Japan's largest general contractors continued to suffer due to the decline in overseas construction activity. In particular, the collapse of real estate prices in many parts of the United States, reduced demand for office space (especially in places like California, where flows of military funds were drying up), and the effects of economic recession resulted in fewer orders for the Japanese construction firms. Many of these firms incurred losses on assets they had acquired at vastly inflated prices prior to the U.S. recession. [BACK]

8. A similar point is made by Schoppa (1993, 373 and passim). Based on an analysis of Japanese financial politics, Rosenbluth (1989, 53 and 94), argues that "foreign diplomatic pressure is effective only when market forces have already altered domestic costs and benefits or when there is a perceived threat of retaliation." Similarly, Bayard and Elliott (1995) found that U.S. market-opening initiatives were particularly effective when they meshed with the interests of domestic Japanese groups that shared American interests. [BACK]

9. Apter and Sawa (1984); Ishikawa and Hirose (1989, 65-120); Pempel (1979); Steinhoff (1988); Taylor (1983); van Wolferen (1989, 65-81, 159-80 and passim). [BACK]

10. See, for example, Curtis (1988, 229-32); Kyogoku (1987, 245-89); Masumi (1985, 1:3-26). [BACK]

11. On the situation in agriculture, see Hayami (1990); Hillman and Rothenberg (1988); Van der Meer and Yamada (1990). [BACK]

12. The fact that the bureaucratic elite erected barricades does not mean that the prewar developmental regime was completely insulated from partisan meddling. Elected politicians did influence the making of structural policy, such as budgetary and locational decisions concerning public works; see Akita (1967); Duus (1968); Mikuriya (1980); Najita (1967); Scalapino (1953); Woodall (1990). The essential point is that elected politicians played a decidedly minor role in the forging of policies for strategic industries and sectors, particularly in the prewar era and during the first three decades after World War II. [BACK]

13. Various writers cite the end of the cold war as a contributing factor in the fall of ruling parties in Japan, Italy, Canada, Germany, and Venezuela; see, for example, Inoguchi (1993); Martin (1993); Schorr (1993). [BACK]

14. At the outset of the 1990s, major political corruption scandals rocked Japan, Italy, India, Brazil, Venezuela, and the United States; less sensational scandals appeared in Germany, Spain, France, and Britain. Now that the West is no longer fixated on containing the communist menace, Daniel Bell (1993, 18) theorizes, "democratic political corruption has become one of the surpassing political issues. The bipolar world dominated by the Communist-capitalist dichotomy has been replaced by a politically unitary one, divided by corrupt and clean." [BACK]

15. Remnants of the cold war survive in the tensions on the Korean peninsula, the dispute between Japan and Russia concerning sovereignty over the Southern Kuriles, and the persistence of Marxist-Leninist regimes in China. North Korea, and Vietnam. [BACK]

16. I concur with Odawara's assessment (1993, 32): "What destroyed Kanemaru was the Sagawa Express scandal's exposure of his skillful wielding of backroom power as lubricated by, illicit funds and unscrupulous connections. More disturbing, however, is that nothing was accidental about this affair; corruption is deeply imbedded in factional politics." [BACK]

17. The policy of "opening to the left" was approved at the Christian Democratic congress held in Naples in 1962, and became a necessity in the wake of the party's poor showing (and the Communist Party's stellar performance) in elections the following year. Under this policy, the Christian Democrats repeatedly relied upon the Socialist Party as a coalition partner or as the supplier of external support in numerous Christian Democrat-dominated cabinets from 1963 through 1992. [BACK]

18. For example, 80 percent of the eight hundred industrialists surveyed by Pino Arlacchi stated that the bustarelle continued to change hands even after the Mani Pulite probe. Although the investigation apparently resulted in slight improvement (85 percent of those polled admitted that bribes were necessary to win public contracts prior to the crackdown), 13 percent said that nothing had changed. Arlacchi's findings are discussed in "Still Crooked" (1994). [BACK]

19. For instance, bid-rigging allegedly occurred in March 1994 under open bidding procedures in the allocation of the contract to construct a pavilion to honor those who died in World War II. The low bid of ¥5 billion was submitted by a joint venture headed by Takenaka Corporation, the only member of the Big Six not implicated in the zenekon scandal. Tenders were accepted only from A-rank firms as determined by MOC's Kanto Regional Construction Bureau. Although there were thirty such firms, the need to exchange information among firms in order to form joint ventures allegedly facilitated the successful bid-rigging; Asahi shinbun (19 Mar. 1994). [BACK]