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The Construction Tribe

The policy tribalists (zoku giin ) are those LDP legislators who have "a considerable amount of influence in a particular area of government policy and enough seniority in the party to have influence on a continuing basis within the ministry responsible for that policy area" (Curtis 1988, 114).[7]

The LDP's first policy tribe, the public works tribe, was formed in 1956 when Tanaka Kakuei led a walkout of parliamentarians from a policy deliberation meeting (Campbell 1977, 119). Over time, the number of tribes grew to about a dozen: construction, commerce and industry, agriculture, fisheries, transport, welfare, labor, education, posts and telecommunications, finance, national defense, and foreign affairs. Each tribe also has a number of branches. Within the construction tribe, for example, there are tribal branches corresponding


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to the various MOC bureaus; hence, a road tribe, river tribe, housing tribe, and so forth. Moreover, officials at the sub-bureau level at MOC recognize the dam tribe, the parks tribe, and the sewage tribe. In the late 1980s, for instance, Watanabe Eiichi was esteemed as a "big boss" in the dam tribe, while Tamura Hajime had the singular distinction of being recognized as the kingpin among sewage tribalists. From the perspective of public works bureaucrats, these distinctions are important when it comes time to lobby for budget allocations and policy proposals.

Policy tribalists are the most influential legislators in any given subgovernment. Some observers believe that the expertise and influence acquired as a result of long years of service in a specific policy area enable the LDP's policy tribalists to "match and even dominate" their peers in the government bureaucracy (Schoppa 1991, 79). In addition, tribalists act as brokers in transactions involving the LDP and specific government agencies. This role often extends to the mediation of sectionalist turf wars between government ministries as well as fighting alongside bureaucratic allies in such disputes (Johnson 1989). Furthermore, tribalists play a leading part in shaping and securing passage of policy and budget proposals. In late August, the most hectic stage of compiling ministerial budget proposals, tribalists become the focal point of the "root binding" efforts of government bureaucrats eager to secure larger allocations for their ministry or bureau. In the compilation of the 1987 budget, for example, each bureau chief, deputy chief, and section director in the MOC was assigned to contact about twenty LDP parliamentarians during a period spanning several days in late August. Special care was taken to secure the acquiescence of key members of the construction tribe, particularly its "big bosses" (pers. interview).

Construction tribalists make their presence felt in decisions concerning public works projects. "In return for their donations from the industry," one observer notes, "members of the LDP's construction tribe are expected to use their contacts with the ministries handling public works to help decide which companies win major projects or, more usually, how business will be shared . . . between the major players" (Far Eastern Economic Review , 16 June 1988, 58). Members of the LDP's construction tribe are seen as the most authoritative articu-


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lators of the "voice of heaven" in the dango system of allocating public works contracts, and tribalists play a key role in prioritizing the major projects competing for appropriations. In this respect, the tribalists serve as gatekeepers—individuals who determine the allocation of scarce resources—and, thus, are responsible for the perpetuation of patterns of privilege and deprivation.

Naturally, construction tribalists win handsome political contributions from construction firms in exchange for this preferential policy influence. Former Construction Minister Kono Ichiro and his "favored contractor policy" (gyosha yusen seisaku ) elevated influence-peddling to a shadowy art form. Contractors were expected to make monetary gifts in exchange for priority designation to bid on public works projects. To get an audience at Kono's personal residence, a one-time supplicant recalled having first to pay a "shoe removal fee" (kutsunugidai ) to Kono's assistant. Once inside the door, a contractor paid a "floor cushion fee" (zabutondai ) and a "something-or-other fee" (nantokadai ) before Kono himself deigned to make an appearance (Asano et al. 1977, 28; Kasumi 1993, 149).

Former Prime Minister Tanaka fashioned a nationwide system of illegal kickbacks in exchange for political meddling in the allocation of public works projects (Johnson 1986). As the investigation in the zenekon scandal revealed, the country's largest general contractors gave letter grades to construction tribalists and gauged their political contributions accordingly. For example, one large general contractor reportedly presented biannual "gratitude gifts" to some eighty influential politicians (Asahi shinbun , 23 Sept. 1993). Kanemaru Shin was singled out for special distinction: his A-plus grade (actually "SA," presumably to denote "Special A") brought him gifts of ¥10 million at midsummer and at year's end. Seven other construction tribalists were awarded A grades (entitling them to biannual gratuities of ¥5 million). Even those squeaking by with Ds received two installments of ¥1 million each year.

It appears that the LDP policy tribalists' increased store of policy expertise afforded them a more significant role in the policymaking process than their predecessors had enjoyed. Virtually all outside observers agree that the policy tribalists used their know-how "in the service of ever-more-effective policy plunder—gathering more re-


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sources for their constituents and favored industries" (McCubbins and Noble 1993, 8). Certainly, the construction tribalists' influence seemed substantial enough to construction contractors to warrant enormous, and often illegal, political contributions.

The Shadow Cabinet

The LDP's Policy Affairs Research Council (Seimuchosakai, or PARC) was a training ground for aspiring policy tribalists. During the heyday of single-party hegemony, PARC was the "stage," the "shadow cabinet" or "second government," for policy drama (Inoguchi and Iwai 1987, 20 and 27–28). In most policy domains, PARC played a greater policymaking role than did the Diet's committees and subcommittees. Beginning in fiscal year 1960, government ministries submitted their budget proposals to PARC before reporting to the Ministry of Finance (McCubbins and Noble 1993, 15). From their strategic vantage point on the council, the LDP's policy tribalists could affect policy and budget proposals at the earliest stages. Before a bill was submitted for deliberation in the Diet, a complex bargaining process from within PARC had shaped its content (see Figure 3).

As with other components of the LDP's organization, PARC evolved from predecessor entities (Fukui 1970, 30). PARC's prototype emerged around 1918 as a sort of "shadow cabinet" within the Constitutional Government Party (Kenseito). Originally, it granted the party influence over the bureaucratically dominated policy process. Although PARC performed essential functions for the LDP as a whole, it served primarily to help members pursue their goals. Legislators pursuing ideological goals could find like-minded colleagues in, for instance, PARC's deliberative councils for education and defense policy. Yet, for the majority of "foot soldiers" in the LDP's parliamentary contingent, PARC was a convenient vehicle for achieving reelection.

Certain PARC divisions (bukai ), investigation committees (chosakai ), and special committees (tokubetsu iinkai ) attracted more members than others. Generally, an LDP legislator can belong to a maximum of three divisions (and an unlimited number of investigation and special committees). Divisions with consistently sparse membership


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Figure 3.
The LDP's Organization and the Legislative Process


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include cabinet, labor, local administration, foreign affairs, justice, science and technology, and environment; the larger divisions include transport, communications, and social affairs. However, the "three noble houses" (go-sanke )—commerce, agriculture, and, the largest of all, construction—always draw the largest membership (Itasaka 1987, 1). The magnetic appeal of these divisions, however, did not appear until around 1967, amid a decline in the LDP's popularity at the polls.[8]

The disparity in the size of PARC's divisions derives from the perception that tangible electoral rewards accompany membership in certain divisions. Given the small and relatively unorganized domestic interest groups concerned, the cabinet, foreign affairs, and justice divisions attract few members. Although ideologically attractive to some, defense and education also draw relatively few members. In contrast, members of the commerce division claim numerous small retailers as their constituents, while those in the agricultural division appeal to the powerful farm lobby. Legislators in the construction division accomplish two goals simultaneously: garnering votes from six million construction workers and campaign contributions from a generous industry.

The legislators chairing PARC's commerce, agriculture, and construction divisions have, on average, fared better among swing voters in the election following their appointment as chair. No such benefit has accrued to the chairs of the education, local administration, or cabinet divisions.[9] For good reason, then, the chairships of the three noble houses became highly coveted, and the occupants of these posts were referred to as "cabinet ministers within the party."


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