Symbols, Computation, and Intentionality
  PREFACE

 expand sectionINTRODUCTION

 collapse sectionPART I—  COMPUTATIONALISM AND ITS CRITICS
 collapse sectionChapter One—  The Computational Theory of Mind
 •1.1—  Intentional States
 •1.2—  Mental State Ascriptions in Intentional Psychology and Folk Psychology
 •1.3—  CTM's Representational Account of Intentional States
 •1.4—  Semantic Compositionality
 •1.5—  Cognitive Processes
 collapse section1.6—  Formalization and Computation
 •1.6.1—  Formalization
 •1.6.2—  A Mathematical Notion of Computation
 •1.6.3—  The Scope of Formal Symbol-Manipulation Techniques
 •1.6.4—  Computing Machines
 •1.7—  The Computational Account of Cognitive Processes
 •1.8—  Summary: The Computational Theory of Mind
 expand sectionChapter Two—  Computation, Intentionality, and the Vindication of Intentional Psychology
 expand sectionChapter Three—  "Derived Intentionality"

 collapse sectionPART II—  SYMBOLS, COMPUTERS, AND THOUGHTS
 expand sectionChapter Four—  Symbols—An Analysis
 expand sectionChapter Five—  The Semantics of Thoughts and of Symbols in Computers
 expand sectionChapter Six—  Rejecting Nonconventional Syntax and Semantics for Symbols

 collapse sectionPART III—  THE CRITIQUE OF CTM
 expand sectionChapter Seven—  Semiotic-Semantic Properties, Intentionality, Vindication
 expand sectionChapter Eight—  Causal and Stipulative Definitions of Semantic Terms
 expand sectionChapter Nine—  Prospects for a Naturalistic Theory of Content

 collapse sectionPART IV—  AN ALTERNATIVE VISION
 expand sectionChapter Ten—  An Alternative Approach to Computational Psychology
 expand sectionChapter Eleven—  Intentionality Without Vindication, Psychology Without Naturalization

 expand sectionAPPENDIX
 expand sectionNotes
  BIBLIOGRAPHY
 expand sectionINDEX
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