Symbols, Computation, and Intentionality

  PREFACE

 expand sectionINTRODUCTION

 collapse sectionPART I—  COMPUTATIONALISM AND ITS CRITICS
 expand sectionChapter One—  The Computational Theory of Mind
 expand sectionChapter Two—  Computation, Intentionality, and the Vindication of Intentional Psychology
 expand sectionChapter Three—  "Derived Intentionality"

 collapse sectionPART II—  SYMBOLS, COMPUTERS, AND THOUGHTS
 collapse sectionChapter Four—  Symbols—An Analysis
 4.1—  Symbols: Semantics, Syntax, and Tokening a Type
 4.2—  Markers, Signifiers, Counters
 collapse section4.3—  Markers
 4.3.1—  The "Text from Tanganyika" Experiment
 4.3.2—  What Is Essential to the Notion of a Marker?
 4.4—  Signifiers
 4.5—  Counters
 4.6—  The Relationship of the Marker, Signifier, and Counter Levels
 expand section4.7—  Four Modalities of Conventional Being
 4.8—  Four Ways of Being a Signifier
 4.9—  Four Modalities for Counters
 4.10—  The Nature and Scope of This Semiotic Analysis
 4.11—  The Form of Ascriptions of Intentional and Semantic Properties
 4.12—  Summary
 expand sectionChapter Five—  The Semantics of Thoughts and of Symbols in Computers
 expand sectionChapter Six—  Rejecting Nonconventional Syntax and Semantics for Symbols

 collapse sectionPART III—  THE CRITIQUE OF CTM
 expand sectionChapter Seven—  Semiotic-Semantic Properties, Intentionality, Vindication
 expand sectionChapter Eight—  Causal and Stipulative Definitions of Semantic Terms
 expand sectionChapter Nine—  Prospects for a Naturalistic Theory of Content

 collapse sectionPART IV—  AN ALTERNATIVE VISION
 expand sectionChapter Ten—  An Alternative Approach to Computational Psychology
 expand sectionChapter Eleven—  Intentionality Without Vindication, Psychology Without Naturalization

 expand sectionAPPENDIX
 expand sectionNotes
  BIBLIOGRAPHY
 expand sectionINDEX

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