Symbols, Computation, and Intentionality |
PREFACE |
INTRODUCTION |
PART I— COMPUTATIONALISM AND ITS CRITICS |
Chapter One— The Computational Theory of Mind |
Chapter Two— Computation, Intentionality, and the Vindication of Intentional Psychology |
Chapter Three— "Derived Intentionality" |
PART II— SYMBOLS, COMPUTERS, AND THOUGHTS |
Chapter Four— Symbols—An Analysis |
• | 4.1— Symbols: Semantics, Syntax, and Tokening a Type |
• | 4.2— Markers, Signifiers, Counters |
4.3— Markers |
• | 4.3.1— The "Text from Tanganyika" Experiment |
• | 4.3.2— What Is Essential to the Notion of a Marker? |
• | 4.4— Signifiers |
• | 4.5— Counters |
• | 4.6— The Relationship of the Marker, Signifier, and Counter Levels |
4.7— Four Modalities of Conventional Being |
• | 4.8— Four Ways of Being a Signifier |
• | 4.9— Four Modalities for Counters |
• | 4.10— The Nature and Scope of This Semiotic Analysis |
• | 4.11— The Form of Ascriptions of Intentional and Semantic Properties |
• | 4.12— Summary |
Chapter Five— The Semantics of Thoughts and of Symbols in Computers |
Chapter Six— Rejecting Nonconventional Syntax and Semantics for Symbols |
PART III— THE CRITIQUE OF CTM |
Chapter Seven— Semiotic-Semantic Properties, Intentionality, Vindication |
Chapter Eight— Causal and Stipulative Definitions of Semantic Terms |
Chapter Nine— Prospects for a Naturalistic Theory of Content |
PART IV— AN ALTERNATIVE VISION |
Chapter Ten— An Alternative Approach to Computational Psychology |
Chapter Eleven— Intentionality Without Vindication, Psychology Without Naturalization |
APPENDIX |
Notes |
BIBLIOGRAPHY |
INDEX |