Symbols, Computation, and Intentionality

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PREFACE

INTRODUCTION

PART I—  COMPUTATIONALISM AND ITS CRITICS

Chapter One—  The Computational Theory of Mind

Chapter Two—  Computation, Intentionality, and the Vindication of Intentional Psychology

Chapter Three—  "Derived Intentionality"

PART II—  SYMBOLS, COMPUTERS, AND THOUGHTS

Chapter Four—  Symbols—An Analysis

Chapter Five—  The Semantics of Thoughts and of Symbols in Computers

Chapter Six—  Rejecting Nonconventional Syntax and Semantics for Symbols

PART III—  THE CRITIQUE OF CTM

Chapter Seven—  Semiotic-Semantic Properties, Intentionality, Vindication

Chapter Eight—  Causal and Stipulative Definitions of Semantic Terms

Chapter Nine—  Prospects for a Naturalistic Theory of Content

PART IV—  AN ALTERNATIVE VISION

Chapter Ten—  An Alternative Approach to Computational Psychology

Chapter Eleven—  Intentionality Without Vindication, Psychology Without Naturalization

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11.1—  The Central Problem of Modern Philosophy

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11.2—  The "Received View"

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11.3—  Dialectical Possibilities

11.4—  Psychology, the Mental, and Causal-Nomological Explanation

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11.4.1—  The Verstehen Argument

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11.4.2—  Intentional Categories and Causal Relevance

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11.4.3—  Need Mentalistic Discourse Be Scientific to Be Legitimate?

11.5—  Intentionality, Materialism, and the Generality of Physics

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11.6—  The Commitments of the Special Sciences

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11.7—  Final Words

APPENDIX

Notes

BIBLIOGRAPHY

INDEX

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