Symbols, Computation, and Intentionality |
PREFACE |
INTRODUCTION |
PART I— COMPUTATIONALISM AND ITS CRITICS |
Chapter One— The Computational Theory of Mind |
Chapter Two— Computation, Intentionality, and the Vindication of Intentional Psychology |
Chapter Three— "Derived Intentionality" |
PART II— SYMBOLS, COMPUTERS, AND THOUGHTS |
Chapter Four— Symbols—An Analysis |
Chapter Five— The Semantics of Thoughts and of Symbols in Computers |
Chapter Six— Rejecting Nonconventional Syntax and Semantics for Symbols |
PART III— THE CRITIQUE OF CTM |
Chapter Seven— Semiotic-Semantic Properties, Intentionality, Vindication |
Chapter Eight— Causal and Stipulative Definitions of Semantic Terms |
Chapter Nine— Prospects for a Naturalistic Theory of Content |
PART IV— AN ALTERNATIVE VISION |
Chapter Ten— An Alternative Approach to Computational Psychology |
Chapter Eleven— Intentionality Without Vindication, Psychology Without Naturalization |
• | 11.1— The Central Problem of Modern Philosophy |
• | 11.2— The "Received View" |
• | 11.3— Dialectical Possibilities |
11.4— Psychology, the Mental, and Causal-Nomological Explanation |
11.5— Intentionality, Materialism, and the Generality of Physics |
• | 11.6— The Commitments of the Special Sciences |
• | 11.7— Final Words |
APPENDIX |
Notes |
BIBLIOGRAPHY |
INDEX |