Symbols, Computation, and Intentionality
  PREFACE

 collapse sectionINTRODUCTION
 •A Brief Guide to This Book

 collapse sectionPART I—  COMPUTATIONALISM AND ITS CRITICS
 collapse sectionChapter One—  The Computational Theory of Mind
 •1.1—  Intentional States
 •1.2—  Mental State Ascriptions in Intentional Psychology and Folk Psychology
 •1.3—  CTM's Representational Account of Intentional States
 •1.4—  Semantic Compositionality
 •1.5—  Cognitive Processes
 collapse section1.6—  Formalization and Computation
 •1.6.1—  Formalization
 •1.6.2—  A Mathematical Notion of Computation
 •1.6.3—  The Scope of Formal Symbol-Manipulation Techniques
 •1.6.4—  Computing Machines
 •1.7—  The Computational Account of Cognitive Processes
 •1.8—  Summary: The Computational Theory of Mind
 collapse sectionChapter Two—  Computation, Intentionality, and the Vindication of Intentional Psychology
 •2.1—  CTM's Account of Intentionality
 •2.2—  Intentionality
 •2.3—  CTM, Intentionality, and Semantics
 •2.4—  The Virtues of the Account
 •2.5—  CTM as the Basis for an Intentional Psychology
 •2.6—  The Disrepute of Mentalism—a Brief History
 •2.7—  Vindicating Intentional Psychology (1): Machine Functionalism
 •2.8—  Vindicating Intentional Psychology (2): Symbols and Computation
 •2.9—  Summary
 collapse sectionChapter Three—  "Derived Intentionality"
 •3.1—  Searle's and Sayre's Criticisms
 •3.2—  Three Implicit Criticisms
 •3.3—  The Formal Symbols Objection
 •3.4—  Derived Intentionality
 •3.5—  The Ambiguity of "Derived Intentionality"
 •3.6—  Causally Derived Intentionality
 collapse section3.7—  Assessing the Causal Derivation Objection
 •3.7.1—  The "Fodor Move"
 •3.7.2—  The "Dennett Move"
 •3.7.3—  Prospects of the Causal Derivation Objection
 collapse section3.8—  The Conceptual Dependence Objection
 •3.8.1—  The Homonymy of 'Healthy': An Aristotelian Paradigm
 •3.8.2—  "Derived Intentionality" as the Homonymy of 'Intentional'
 •3.8.3—  The Potential of a "Conceptual Dependence Objection"
 •3.9—  The Need for Semiotics

 collapse sectionPART II—  SYMBOLS, COMPUTERS, AND THOUGHTS
 collapse sectionChapter Four—  Symbols—An Analysis
 •4.1—  Symbols: Semantics, Syntax, and Tokening a Type
 •4.2—  Markers, Signifiers, Counters
 collapse section4.3—  Markers
 •4.3.1—  The "Text from Tanganyika" Experiment
 •4.3.2—  What Is Essential to the Notion of a Marker?
 •4.4—  Signifiers
 •4.5—  Counters
 •4.6—  The Relationship of the Marker, Signifier, and Counter Levels
 collapse section4.7—  Four Modalities of Conventional Being
 •4.7.1—  Case 1—The Optometrist
 •4.7.2—  Case 2—The Bilingual Optometrist
 •4.7.3—  Interpretability
 •4.7.4—  Intentional Tokening and Authoring Intentions
 •4.7.5—  Actual Interpretation
 •4.7.6—  Interpretability-in-Principle
 •4.7.7—  The Four Modalities
 •4.8—  Four Ways of Being a Signifier
 •4.9—  Four Modalities for Counters
 •4.10—  The Nature and Scope of This Semiotic Analysis
 •4.11—  The Form of Ascriptions of Intentional and Semantic Properties
 •4.12—  Summary
 collapse sectionChapter Five—  The Semantics of Thoughts and of Symbols in Computers
 collapse section5.1—  Semiotics and Mental Semantics
 •5.1.1—  The Homonymy of the Semantic Vocabulary
 •5.1.2—  Conceptual Dependence
 collapse section5.2—  Symbols in Computers
 collapse section5.2.1—  Computers Store Objects That Are Symbols
 •Example 1: The Adder Circuit
 •Example 2: Text in Computers
 •5.2.2—  A Rival View Refuted
 •5.3—  A New Interpretation of 'Symbol' and 'Syntax'
 •5.4—  Implications of a Separate Usage of 'Symbol'
 collapse sectionChapter Six—  Rejecting Nonconventional Syntax and Semantics for Symbols
 •6.1—  A Criticism of the Semiotic Analysis
 •6.2—  Initial Response
 collapse section6.3—  The Choice of Paradigm Examples
 •6.3.1—  Some Existing Uses of 'Symbol' and 'Meaning'
 •6.3.2—  Mental Representations as a Paradigm
 •6.3.3—  Symbols in Computers
 •6.4—  Further Objections
 •6.5—  The Essential Conventionality of Markers
 •6.6—  Syntax, Functional Role, and Compositionality
 collapse section6.7—  What Functional Description Can't Do
 •6.7.1—  Functionalist Theories of the Mind
 •6.7.2—  Functionalist Theories of Language
 •6.7.3—  The "Fallacy of Reduction"
 •6.8—  The Possibility of Pure Semantics
 collapse section6.9—  Tarski's Semantics
 •6.9.1—  A Nonconventional Analysis?
 •6.9.2—  The Conventionality of the Markers
 •6.9.3—  Field's Argument
 •6.9.4—  Blackburn's Argument
 •6.10—  "Pure Semantics" and "Abstract Languages"
 •6.11—  Conclusion

 collapse sectionPART III—  THE CRITIQUE OF CTM
 collapse sectionChapter Seven—  Semiotic-Semantic Properties, Intentionality, Vindication
 •7.1—  A Brief Discussion of the Three Versions
 •7.2—  Semiotic-Semantic Properties and CTM'S Account of Intentionality
 •7.3—  Intentions, Conventions, and the Representational Account
 •7.4—  The Empirical Implausibility of the Account
 •7.5—  The Irrelevance of Conventions and Intentions
 •7.6—  Conflicts in the Notion of Representation
 •7.7—  Circularity and Regress
 collapse section7.8—  The Interpretability-in-principle Version
 •7.8.1—  Spurious Properties
 •7.8.2—  Strange Cognizers
 •7.8.3—  Lack of Explanatory Force
 •7.8.4—  The Reappearance of Conventionality at the Marker Level
 •7.9—  Applicability of These Criticisms
 •7.10—  Two Possible Responses
 •7.11—  Systematic Symbol Manipulation
 collapse section7.12—  Causality and Computers
 •7.12.1—  Representation Plus Causation
 •7.12.2—  Causality Explains Semantics
 •7.12.3—  Causal and Other Definitions of Semantic Terms
 •7.13—  Compositionality and the Conventionality of Syntax
 •7.14—  Semiotic-Semantics and the Vindication of Intentional Psychology
 •7.15—  Summary
 collapse sectionChapter Eight—  Causal and Stipulative Definitions of Semantic Terms
 •8.1—  The Vocabulary of Computation in CTM
 •8.2—  A Bowdlerized Version of CTM
 •8.3—  The Problem of Semantics
 collapse section8.4—  A Stipulative Reconstruction of the Semantic Vocabulary
 •8.4.1—  What Is Gained and Lost in Causal Definition
 collapse section8.4.2—  Covariation and Mental-Semantics
 •8.4.2.1—  Explanation and Demarcation
 •8.4.2.2—  Meaning Assignment and Meaningfulness
 •8.4.2.3—  Why We Need an Explanation of Meaningfulness
 collapse section8.4.3—  CCTI As a Demarcation Criterion for Meaning Assignments
 •8.4.3.1—  Demarcation, Interpretation, and Meaning Fixation
 •8.4.3.2—  The Suitability of CCTI for Demarcation
 •8.4.3.3—  The Problem of Misrepresentation
 collapse section8.4.4—  What CCTI Does Not Do
 •8.4.4.1—  Failure to Demarcate the Meaningful
 •8.4.4.2—  Why CCTI Does Not Explain Meaningfulness
 •8.4.4.3—  Instantiation and Realization
 •8.4.4.4—  Instantiation and the Explanation of Meaningfulness
 •8.4.5—  Some Telling Comparisons
 •8.4.6—  The Tension between Generality and Explanatory Force
 •8.4.7—  Compositionality Revisited
 collapse section8.5—  A Second Strategy: Theoretical Definition
 •8.5.1—  Does Theoretical Definition Explain Intentionality?
 collapse section8.6—  Mr-Semantics and the Vindication of Intentional Psychology
 •8.6.1—  The Special case of Semiotic-Semantic Properties
 •8.6.2—  Instantiation, Realization, Vindication
 •8.7—  Summary
 collapse sectionChapter Nine—  Prospects for a Naturalistic Theory of Content
 •9.1—  Strong and Weak Naturalization
 collapse section9.2—  What Is "The Mental"?
 •9.2.1—  Four Kinds of "Mental State"
 •9.2.2—  Intentionality and Directedness
 •9.2.3—  Broad Content, Narrow Content, Phenomenological Content
 •9.2.4—  The Plan of Attack
 collapse section9.3—  Phenomenology and the Mental
 •9.3.1—  The Legitimacy of the Phenomenological Approach
 •9.3.2—  The Reality of Phenomenological Features
 •9.3.3—  Is Phenomenology Essential to Some Mental States?
 •9.3.4—  Does Phenomenology Yield a Classification of the Mental?
 •9.4—  Phenomenology and Scientific Psychology
 collapse section9.5—  Why Phenomenology Cannot Be Naturalized
 •9.5.1—  The Argument from Epistemic Possibility (Cartesian Demons Revisited)
 •9.5.2—  An Objection: Metaphysical and "Nomological" Sufficiency
 •9.5.3—  The Phenomenological "What-It's-Like"
 •9.5.4—  Perspective, Subjectivity, and the Logical Resources of Natural Science
 •9.5.5—  The Objective Self and the Transcendental Ego
 •9.5.6—  The Argument from the Character—Veridicality Distinction
 •9.5.7—  Summary of Problems for Naturalizing Phenomenology
 collapse section9.6—  Naturalizing Broad Content
 •9.6.1—  Meaning Assignments
 •9.6.2—  Meaningfulness
 •9.7—  Naturalizing Narrow Content
 •9.8—  Conclusion

 collapse sectionPART IV—  AN ALTERNATIVE VISION
 collapse sectionChapter Ten—  An Alternative Approach to Computational Psychology
 collapse section10.1—  A Story about the Maturation of Sciences
 •10.1.1—  Copernicus, Galileo, Newton
 •10.1.2—  Chemistry
 •10.2—  The Appeal of a Mature Psychology
 •10.3—  Computation, Mathematization, and Connectivity
 •10.4—  The Implicit Form of Cognitive Psychology
 collapse section10.5—  Intentionality
 •10.5.1—  The Pure Logical Analysis of Intentionality
 •10.5.2—  The Formal Description of Intentionality
 •10.5.3—  Intentionality and the Realm of Nature
 •10.5.4—  BCTM and Accounting for Intentionality
 collapse section10.6—  A Reorientation in the Philosophy of Cognitive Science
 •10.6.1—  A Better Description of Scientific Practice
 •10.6.2—  Ideology and Theory—Bad Precedents
 •10.6.3—  Scientific Progress without Naturalization
 •10.6.4—  Comparisons with other Research Programmes
 •10.7—  Computation and Its Competition
 collapse sectionChapter Eleven—  Intentionality Without Vindication, Psychology Without Naturalization
 •11.1—  The Central Problem of Modern Philosophy
 •11.2—  The "Received View"
 •11.3—  Dialectical Possibilities
 collapse section11.4—  Psychology, the Mental, and Causal-Nomological Explanation
 •11.4.1—  The Verstehen Argument
 •11.4.2—  Intentional Categories and Causal Relevance
 •11.4.3—  Need Mentalistic Discourse Be Scientific to Be Legitimate?
 collapse section11.5—  Intentionality, Materialism, and the Generality of Physics
 •11.5.1—  Why Ontology Extends Beyond Science
 •11.5.2—  Intentional Psychology, Ontology, Generality
 •11.6—  The Commitments of the Special Sciences
 •11.7—  Final Words

 collapse sectionAPPENDIX
 collapse sectionSymbols and Machine Computation
 •A.1—  The Design Process and Semiotics
 •A.2—  The Functional Level
 •A.3—  Functional Architecture and Semiotics
 •A.4—  Markers in Computers
 •A.5—  Computer Signifiers
 collapse sectionA.6—  The Counter Question
 •A.6.1—  Coding and Inherited Syntax
 •A.6.2—  Structured Representations
 •A.6.3—  Rule-Governed Syntactic Structures
 •A.6.4—  The Nature of the Computer's Syntactic "Sensitivity"
 collapse sectionA.7—  Formal Rules and the System Question
 •A.7.1—  Causality, Functional Architecture, and Formal Rules
 •A.7.2—  The Machine Table and Formal Rules
 •A.8—  Computers and Intentions
 collapse sectionNotes
 •INTRODUCTION
 •Chapter One— The Computational Theory of Mind
 •Chapter Two— Computation, Intentionality, and the Vindication of Intentional Psychology
 •Chapter Three— "Derived Intentionality"
 •Chapter Four— Symbols—An Analysis
 •Chapter Five— The Semantics of Thoughts and of Symbols in Computers
 •Chapter Six— Rejecting Nonconventional Syntax and Semantics for Symbols
 •Chapter Seven— Semiotic-Semantic Properties, Intentionality, Vindication
 •Chapter Eight— Causal and Stipulative Definitions of Semantic Terms
 •Chapter Nine— Prospects for a Naturalistic Theory of Content
 •Chapter Ten— An Alternative Approach to Computational Psychology
 •Chapter Eleven— Intentionality Without Vindication, Psychology Without Naturalization
 •APPENDIX
  BIBLIOGRAPHY
 collapse sectionINDEX
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 •L
 •M
 •N
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