| Symbols, Computation, and Intentionality |
| PREFACE |
 | INTRODUCTION |
 | PART I— COMPUTATIONALISM AND ITS CRITICS |
| Chapter One— The Computational Theory of Mind |
| Chapter Two— Computation, Intentionality, and the Vindication of Intentional Psychology |
| Chapter Three— "Derived Intentionality" |
| PART II— SYMBOLS, COMPUTERS, AND THOUGHTS |
| Chapter Four— Symbols—An Analysis |
| Chapter Five— The Semantics of Thoughts and of Symbols in Computers |
| Chapter Six— Rejecting Nonconventional Syntax and Semantics for Symbols |
| PART III— THE CRITIQUE OF CTM |
| Chapter Seven— Semiotic-Semantic Properties, Intentionality, Vindication |
| Chapter Eight— Causal and Stipulative Definitions of Semantic Terms |
| • | 8.1— The Vocabulary of Computation in CTM |
| • | 8.2— A Bowdlerized Version of CTM |
| • | 8.3— The Problem of Semantics |
| 8.4— A Stipulative Reconstruction of the Semantic Vocabulary |
| • | 8.4.1— What Is Gained and Lost in Causal Definition |
| 8.4.2— Covariation and Mental-Semantics |
| 8.4.3— CCTI As a Demarcation Criterion for Meaning Assignments |
| 8.4.4— What CCTI Does Not Do |
| • | 8.4.5— Some Telling Comparisons |
| • | 8.4.6— The Tension between Generality and Explanatory Force |
| • | 8.4.7— Compositionality Revisited |
| 8.5— A Second Strategy: Theoretical Definition |
| 8.6— Mr-Semantics and the Vindication of Intentional Psychology |
| • | 8.7— Summary |
| Chapter Nine— Prospects for a Naturalistic Theory of Content |
| PART IV— AN ALTERNATIVE VISION |
| Chapter Ten— An Alternative Approach to Computational Psychology |
| Chapter Eleven— Intentionality Without Vindication, Psychology Without Naturalization |
| APPENDIX |
| Notes |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY |
| INDEX |