Symbols, Computation, and Intentionality |
PREFACE |
INTRODUCTION |
PART I— COMPUTATIONALISM AND ITS CRITICS |
Chapter One— The Computational Theory of Mind |
Chapter Two— Computation, Intentionality, and the Vindication of Intentional Psychology |
• | 2.1— CTM's Account of Intentionality |
• | 2.2— Intentionality |
• | 2.3— CTM, Intentionality, and Semantics |
• | 2.4— The Virtues of the Account |
• | 2.5— CTM as the Basis for an Intentional Psychology |
• | 2.6— The Disrepute of Mentalism—a Brief History |
• | 2.7— Vindicating Intentional Psychology (1): Machine Functionalism |
• | 2.8— Vindicating Intentional Psychology (2): Symbols and Computation |
• | 2.9— Summary |
Chapter Three— "Derived Intentionality" |
PART II— SYMBOLS, COMPUTERS, AND THOUGHTS |
Chapter Four— Symbols—An Analysis |
Chapter Five— The Semantics of Thoughts and of Symbols in Computers |
Chapter Six— Rejecting Nonconventional Syntax and Semantics for Symbols |
PART III— THE CRITIQUE OF CTM |
Chapter Seven— Semiotic-Semantic Properties, Intentionality, Vindication |
Chapter Eight— Causal and Stipulative Definitions of Semantic Terms |
Chapter Nine— Prospects for a Naturalistic Theory of Content |
PART IV— AN ALTERNATIVE VISION |
Chapter Ten— An Alternative Approach to Computational Psychology |
Chapter Eleven— Intentionality Without Vindication, Psychology Without Naturalization |
APPENDIX |
Notes |
BIBLIOGRAPHY |
INDEX |