Symbols, Computation, and Intentionality |
PREFACE |
![]() | INTRODUCTION |
![]() | PART I— COMPUTATIONALISM AND ITS CRITICS |
![]() | Chapter One— The Computational Theory of Mind |
![]() | Chapter Two— Computation, Intentionality, and the Vindication of Intentional Psychology |
![]() | Chapter Three— "Derived Intentionality" |
![]() | PART II— SYMBOLS, COMPUTERS, AND THOUGHTS |
![]() | Chapter Four— Symbols—An Analysis |
![]() | Chapter Five— The Semantics of Thoughts and of Symbols in Computers |
![]() | Chapter Six— Rejecting Nonconventional Syntax and Semantics for Symbols |
![]() | PART III— THE CRITIQUE OF CTM |
![]() | Chapter Seven— Semiotic-Semantic Properties, Intentionality, Vindication |
![]() | Chapter Eight— Causal and Stipulative Definitions of Semantic Terms |
![]() | Chapter Nine— Prospects for a Naturalistic Theory of Content |
• | 9.1— Strong and Weak Naturalization |
![]() | 9.2— What Is "The Mental"? |
![]() | 9.3— Phenomenology and the Mental |
• | 9.4— Phenomenology and Scientific Psychology |
![]() | 9.5— Why Phenomenology Cannot Be Naturalized |
• | 9.5.1— The Argument from Epistemic Possibility (Cartesian Demons Revisited) |
• | 9.5.2— An Objection: Metaphysical and "Nomological" Sufficiency |
• | 9.5.3— The Phenomenological "What-It's-Like" |
• | 9.5.4— Perspective, Subjectivity, and the Logical Resources of Natural Science |
• | 9.5.5— The Objective Self and the Transcendental Ego |
• | 9.5.6— The Argument from the Character—Veridicality Distinction |
• | 9.5.7— Summary of Problems for Naturalizing Phenomenology |
![]() | 9.6— Naturalizing Broad Content |
• | 9.7— Naturalizing Narrow Content |
• | 9.8— Conclusion |
![]() | PART IV— AN ALTERNATIVE VISION |
![]() | Chapter Ten— An Alternative Approach to Computational Psychology |
![]() | Chapter Eleven— Intentionality Without Vindication, Psychology Without Naturalization |
![]() | APPENDIX |
![]() | Notes |
BIBLIOGRAPHY |
![]() | INDEX |