Symbols, Computation, and Intentionality |
PREFACE |
INTRODUCTION |
PART I— COMPUTATIONALISM AND ITS CRITICS |
Chapter One— The Computational Theory of Mind |
Chapter Two— Computation, Intentionality, and the Vindication of Intentional Psychology |
Chapter Three— "Derived Intentionality" |
PART II— SYMBOLS, COMPUTERS, AND THOUGHTS |
Chapter Four— Symbols—An Analysis |
Chapter Five— The Semantics of Thoughts and of Symbols in Computers |
Chapter Six— Rejecting Nonconventional Syntax and Semantics for Symbols |
PART III— THE CRITIQUE OF CTM |
Chapter Seven— Semiotic-Semantic Properties, Intentionality, Vindication |
• | 7.1— A Brief Discussion of the Three Versions |
• | 7.2— Semiotic-Semantic Properties and CTM'S Account of Intentionality |
• | 7.3— Intentions, Conventions, and the Representational Account |
• | 7.4— The Empirical Implausibility of the Account |
• | 7.5— The Irrelevance of Conventions and Intentions |
• | 7.6— Conflicts in the Notion of Representation |
• | 7.7— Circularity and Regress |
7.8— The Interpretability-in-principle Version |
• | 7.9— Applicability of These Criticisms |
• | 7.10— Two Possible Responses |
• | 7.11— Systematic Symbol Manipulation |
7.12— Causality and Computers |
• | 7.13— Compositionality and the Conventionality of Syntax |
• | 7.14— Semiotic-Semantics and the Vindication of Intentional Psychology |
• | 7.15— Summary |
Chapter Eight— Causal and Stipulative Definitions of Semantic Terms |
Chapter Nine— Prospects for a Naturalistic Theory of Content |
PART IV— AN ALTERNATIVE VISION |
Chapter Ten— An Alternative Approach to Computational Psychology |
Chapter Eleven— Intentionality Without Vindication, Psychology Without Naturalization |
APPENDIX |
Notes |
BIBLIOGRAPHY |
INDEX |