Symbols, Computation, and Intentionality |
PREFACE |
![]() | INTRODUCTION |
![]() | PART I— COMPUTATIONALISM AND ITS CRITICS |
![]() | Chapter One— The Computational Theory of Mind |
![]() | Chapter Two— Computation, Intentionality, and the Vindication of Intentional Psychology |
![]() | Chapter Three— "Derived Intentionality" |
![]() | PART II— SYMBOLS, COMPUTERS, AND THOUGHTS |
![]() | Chapter Four— Symbols—An Analysis |
![]() | Chapter Five— The Semantics of Thoughts and of Symbols in Computers |
![]() | Chapter Six— Rejecting Nonconventional Syntax and Semantics for Symbols |
![]() | PART III— THE CRITIQUE OF CTM |
![]() | Chapter Seven— Semiotic-Semantic Properties, Intentionality, Vindication |
• | 7.1— A Brief Discussion of the Three Versions |
• | 7.2— Semiotic-Semantic Properties and CTM'S Account of Intentionality |
• | 7.3— Intentions, Conventions, and the Representational Account |
• | 7.4— The Empirical Implausibility of the Account |
• | 7.5— The Irrelevance of Conventions and Intentions |
• | 7.6— Conflicts in the Notion of Representation |
• | 7.7— Circularity and Regress |
![]() | 7.8— The Interpretability-in-principle Version |
• | 7.9— Applicability of These Criticisms |
• | 7.10— Two Possible Responses |
• | 7.11— Systematic Symbol Manipulation |
![]() | 7.12— Causality and Computers |
• | 7.13— Compositionality and the Conventionality of Syntax |
• | 7.14— Semiotic-Semantics and the Vindication of Intentional Psychology |
• | 7.15— Summary |
![]() | Chapter Eight— Causal and Stipulative Definitions of Semantic Terms |
![]() | Chapter Nine— Prospects for a Naturalistic Theory of Content |
![]() | PART IV— AN ALTERNATIVE VISION |
![]() | Chapter Ten— An Alternative Approach to Computational Psychology |
![]() | Chapter Eleven— Intentionality Without Vindication, Psychology Without Naturalization |
![]() | APPENDIX |
![]() | Notes |
BIBLIOGRAPHY |
![]() | INDEX |