Symbols, Computation, and Intentionality
  PREFACE

 expand sectionINTRODUCTION

 collapse sectionPART I—  COMPUTATIONALISM AND ITS CRITICS
 expand sectionChapter One—  The Computational Theory of Mind
 expand sectionChapter Two—  Computation, Intentionality, and the Vindication of Intentional Psychology
 expand sectionChapter Three—  "Derived Intentionality"

 collapse sectionPART II—  SYMBOLS, COMPUTERS, AND THOUGHTS
 expand sectionChapter Four—  Symbols—An Analysis
 expand sectionChapter Five—  The Semantics of Thoughts and of Symbols in Computers
 collapse sectionChapter Six—  Rejecting Nonconventional Syntax and Semantics for Symbols
 •6.1—  A Criticism of the Semiotic Analysis
 •6.2—  Initial Response
 expand section6.3—  The Choice of Paradigm Examples
 •6.4—  Further Objections
 •6.5—  The Essential Conventionality of Markers
 •6.6—  Syntax, Functional Role, and Compositionality
 expand section6.7—  What Functional Description Can't Do
 •6.8—  The Possibility of Pure Semantics
 expand section6.9—  Tarski's Semantics
 •6.10—  "Pure Semantics" and "Abstract Languages"
 •6.11—  Conclusion

 collapse sectionPART III—  THE CRITIQUE OF CTM
 expand sectionChapter Seven—  Semiotic-Semantic Properties, Intentionality, Vindication
 expand sectionChapter Eight—  Causal and Stipulative Definitions of Semantic Terms
 expand sectionChapter Nine—  Prospects for a Naturalistic Theory of Content

 collapse sectionPART IV—  AN ALTERNATIVE VISION
 expand sectionChapter Ten—  An Alternative Approach to Computational Psychology
 expand sectionChapter Eleven—  Intentionality Without Vindication, Psychology Without Naturalization

 expand sectionAPPENDIX
 expand sectionNotes
  BIBLIOGRAPHY
 expand sectionINDEX
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